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Inflation was a common problem for developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
From the beginning of the 21st century on, inflation is no longer as widespread as it used 
to be, but some few countries, like Turkey, continued to suffer from high inflation. Why 
have some developing countries become laggards in tackling the inflation problem, while 
most other countries stabilized their prices by 1990s? I argue that the answer can be 
found in socio-political factors as much as in economic factors.  
This dissertation strives to explain the persistence of inflation in developing 
countries with a socio-political approach. I suggest that persistent inflation cannot be 
explained solely by economic approaches. We also need to analyze the socio-political 
context of a country in order to understand why policymakers maintain inflationary 
policies and delay stabilization. This dissertation suggests that policymakers in some 
countries may experience greater difficulties in tackling inflation and face persistent 
inflation because of certain limitations, such as threats to national security, democracy, 
political instability, and proportional electoral system. 
 iv
This study compares the Turkish case with four other countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Israel, and Mexico) to examine in detail whether and how social and political factors 
affect persistence of inflation. In addition to case studies, a statistical analysis of cross-
national analysis is employed in order to get plausible explanations of persistent inflation. 
Many statistical analysis results support what is found in the case analyses. Findings 
suggest that international security concerns affect persistent inflation. High military 
expenses, which are necessary because of high threats to security, decrease the ability to 
eliminate inflation. Moreover, regime instability makes states less able to tackle the 
inflation problem and a consolidated democracy is the best political setting for price 
stabilization. Also, strong and stable governments are associated with less inflationary 
years. Electoral system and party system are relevant as well because they affect the 
strength and stability of the government. On the other hand, inequality and poverty do not 
seem to affect price stabilization. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century, the problem of inflation has plagued many countries. After World War I, 
Europe faced runaway prices; and while some industrialized countries faced bouts of inflation in 
1970s, inflation has been most dislocating for the developing countries, particularly in Latin 
America. By the early 1990s, many developing countries succeeded in stabilizing their prices, 
but now inflation plagued ex-communist or newly independent countries for a short while. By 
the arrival of the 21st century, only a few countries still faced high inflation. One of these 
exceptional cases was Turkey: as late as 2002, its inflation rate was about 45 percent per year 
(see Table 1). 
Inflation was a common problem for developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Why 
have some developing countries become laggards in tackling the inflation problem, while most 
other countries stabilized their prices by 1990s? This dissertation strives to explain the 
persistence of inflation in developing countries beyond 1990s. Traditional economic theorists 
have attributed persistent inflation to faulty monetary and fiscal policies. This study intends to 
complement this approach by taking into account some political and social influences, such as 
strategic position, security threats, political regime, political system, electoral and party system, 
poverty, and inequality, to explain success and failure in price stabilization. 
This study compares the Turkish case with four other countries (Israel, Mexico, Brazil, 
and Argentina) to examine whether and how social and political factors affect persistence of 
inflation. As can be seen in Table 1, all five case countries examined here not only suffered from 
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high inflation, but also experienced persistent inflation. All these countries were able to eliminate 
persistent inflation eventually and some did it earlier than the others.  
Table 1: Percent change in annual inflation rates 
  Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1970 14 22 6 5 7 
1971 35 20 12 5 16 
1972 58 17 13 5 12 
1973 61 13 20 12 15 
1974 24 28 40 24 16 
1975 183 29 39 15 19 
1976 444 42 31 16 17 
1977 176 44 35 29 23 
1978 176 39 51 18 53 
1979 160 54 78 18 62 
1980 101 133 131 27 110 
1981 105 102 117 28 37 
1982 165 101 120 59 31 
1983 344 135 146 102 31 
1984 627 192 370 66 48 
1985 672 226 309 58 45 
1986 90 147 48 86 35 
1987 131 228 20 132 39 
1988 343 629 17 114 74 
1989 3,080 1,431 20 20 63 
1990 2,314 2,948 17 27 60 
1991 172 477 19 23 66 
1992 25 1,023 12 16 70 
1993 11 1,927 11 10 66 
1994 4 2,076 12 7 106 
1995 3 66 10 35 94 
1996 0 16 11 34 82 
1997 1 7 9 21 86 
1998 1 3 5 16 85 
1999 -1 5 5 17 65 
2000 -1 7 1 10 55 
2001 -1 7 1 6 54 
2002 26 8 6 5 45 
2003 22 14 3 4 25 
2004 13 6 1 3 15 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 2004 
 2
While inflation can be traced to various economic factors, ranging from international 
price increases to budget deficits, persistence of inflation is a related but separate phenomenon to 
explain. Persistent inflation is when inflation becomes a chronic problem and continues more 
than ten consecutive years. This study focuses on the persistence of inflation and argues that 
some countries may experience greater difficulties in tackling inflation and face persistent 
inflation because of certain limitations, such as threats to national security, democracy, political 
instability, and proportional electoral system. The greater such limitations are, the harder it 
becomes for states to adopt disinflationary policies and resolve the problem of persistent 
inflation.  
More specifically, this study finds that international security concerns affect persistent 
inflation. High military expenses, which are necessary because of high threats to security, 
decrease the ability to eliminate inflation. Moreover, regime instability makes states less able to 
tackle the inflation problem. Also, both consolidated democracy and political stability are 
associated with less inflationary years. On the other hand, inequality and poverty do not seem to 
affect price stabilization.  
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The inflation problem has affected various countries throughout history. The modern inflation 
phenomenon began to appear in the 1960s and then increased and peaked in the 1970s (Frisch 
1983). Since the 1970s, international financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), have prescribed specific economic measures to help countries deal with inflation, such as 
liberalization of the economy and cutting down budget deficits.  
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With the rise of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, international financial institutions have 
identified inflation as the number one economic disease. Although inflation was seen as the most 
important economic illness to cure even in advanced countries, the IMF by and large focused on 
developing countries, as mostly they were the ones which suffered from runaway inflation. From 
the late 1980s on, many developing countries started stabilizing their prices, either by 
implementing the orthodox policies advocated by the IMF or by heterodox policies.1 Some 
countries succeeded in eradicating inflation easily. However, for a few others it has taken 
decades to achieve disinflation.  
Table 2 lists countries which have had high inflation at least once in respective decades. 
Table 3 demonstrates the countries which have had high inflation on average during last three 
decades. As can be seen from Table 2, in the 1970s even some advanced countries faced high 
inflation (e.g. Italy, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Iceland, and Spain). Yet, in the 1980s and 
1990s inflation largely became a problem of developing countries (see Table 3). It was 
commonly prevalent in Latin America and Africa, and in the 1990s it also emerged in ex-
communist countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Orthodox programs aim a sharp decrease in inflation by restricting demand in the economy through tight fiscal and 
monetary policies. Heterodox policies also utilize tight monetary policies, but they seek to freeze incomes and key 
prices as well. 
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Table 2: Countries that have had high inflation at least one year in given periods 
 
 High Inflation 
(20%-100%) 
Hyper-inflation 
(≥ 100%) 
 
1970-1979 
 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Dem. Rep. of Congo, 
Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica,  Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, 
Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay 
 
Argentina, Chile 
 
 
1980-1989 
 
Angola, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, 
Colombia, Dem. Rep. Of Congo, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gambia, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, New Zealand, Niger, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, Sao Tome 
& Principe, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, 
Tanzania, Tonga, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ghana, 
Israel, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Sierra 
Leone, Turkey, Uganda, 
Vietnam, Zambia 
 
 
1990-1999 
 
Albania, Algeria, Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Rep., Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Rep. of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovak Rep., 
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Rep. of Yemen, Zimbabwe 
 
Angola, Argentina,  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan,  Belarus, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Dem. Rep. 
of Congo, Croatia, Estonia, 
Georgia, Guyana, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia,  Moldova, 
Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovenia, Sudan, Suriname, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Zambia 
 
2000-2004 
 
Argentina, Burundi, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ghana, Laos, Malawi, 
Moldova, Myanmar, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, 
Suriname, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia 
 
Angola, Belarus, Dem. Rep. of 
Congo, Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Compiled from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 2004 
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Table 3: Countries that have had high inflation on average in given periods 
 High Inflation 
(20%-100%) 
Hyper-inflation 
(≥ 100%) 
 
1970-1979 
 
Angola, Bangladesh, Brazil, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Ghana, Iceland, 
Israel, Laos, Nicaragua, Peru, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab 
Emirates, Uruguay 
 
 
Argentina, Chile 
 
 
1980-1989 
 
Chile, Colombia, Dem. Rep. Of Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Iceland, Laos, Lebanon,  Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Paraguay, Poland, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zambia  
 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Israel, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Sierra Leone, Uganda, 
Vietnam 
 
 
1990-1999 
 
Albania, Cambodia, Colombia, Ghana,  
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, 
Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Poland, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sudan, 
Suriname, Tanzania, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Rep. 
of Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
 
Angola, Argentina,  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan,  Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Dem. Rep. of Congo, Croatia, Estonia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,  Moldova, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
2000-2004 
 
Belarus, Laos, Myanmar, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, 
Suriname, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Venezuela 
 
 
Angola, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Compiled from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 2004 
From the beginning of the 21st century on, we see that inflation is no longer as 
widespread as it used to be. Among upper middle-income developing countries,2 only Turkey 
and Venezuela have been unable to decrease average levels of inflation below 20 percent by the 
first years of the 21st century (see Table 3). Looking at Table 4, we also see that the number of 
countries that experienced high inflation (especially hyper inflation) decreased sharply by the 
early 2000s. Moreover, Table 5 shows that even the average level of inflation decreased in many 
countries: only eight countries had average inflation rates between 20 percent and 100 percent 
                                                 
2 The World Bank divides economies according to their gross national income (GNI) per capita. According to the 
2004 data, the groups are: low income, $825 GNI or less; lower middle income, $826-$3,255 GNI; upper middle 
income, $3,256-$10,065 GNI; and high income, $10,066 GNI or more. 
(http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/income.htm) 
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and only three countries had average inflation rates over 100 percent. Therefore, having high 
inflation has become uncommon in the 2000s, even for the developing countries.  
Table 4: Number of countries categorized according to whether they had high or hyper 
inflation at least one year in given periods 
 
  
High Inflation 
(20-100%) 
 
Hyper-inflation 
(≥ 100%) 
 
Total number of 
countries 
 
1970-1979 
 
77 
 
5 
 
150 
 
1980-1989 
 
69 
 
19 
 
152 
 
1990-1999 
 
92 
 
38 
 
177 
 
2000-2004 
 
24 
 
4 
 
177 
Source: Compiled from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 2004 
Table 5: Number of countries categorized according to their average inflation level in given 
periods 
 
  
High Inflation 
(20-100%) 
 
Hyper-inflation 
(≥ 100%) 
 
Total number of 
countries 
 
1970-1979 
 
14 
 
2 
 
150 
 
1980-1989 
 
26 
 
8 
 
152 
 
1990-1999 
 
32 
 
25 
 
177 
 
2000-2004 
 
8 
 
3 
 
177 
Source: Compiled from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 2004 
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 What makes recent high inflation cases puzzling is that over the last decade inflation has 
significantly decreased on a global scale mainly through neoliberal policies. Global inflation was 
14.1 percent in 1980-1984. It has dropped from 30.4 percent in 1990-94 to 3.9 percent in 2000-
2004. Developing countries had a 31.4 percent average inflation rate in 1980-84 and 53.2 percent 
in 1990-94, but only a 5.6 percent average inflation rate in 2000-2004.3 Kenneth Rogoff (2003), 
the chief economist of the IMF, calls this phenomenon “global disinflation.” He attributes this 
global drop in inflation largely to improved independence of central banks and greater 
awareness, especially among politicians and policymakers.  
Does this mean that the policymakers and politicians in the countries that still have high 
inflation are unaware of the dangers of inflation and/or the policies to deal with it? This is 
unlikely, because dangers of inflation and the policies to end inflation are common knowledge. 
There should be other explanations that can account for the inability to end persistent inflation. 
Although most scholars focus on the economic sources of chronic inflation, this research focuses 
on socio-political variables to explain why some countries were unable to end their chronic 
inflation problem, despite the emphasis of international monetary authorities on anti-inflationary 
policies and increased awareness about inflation in the last two decades.  
                                                 
3 Data taken from IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2004. 
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1.2 COSTS OF INFLATION AND DISINFLATION 
Inflation is considered an economic ill because of the alleged costs it imposes on the economy, 
such as uncertainty, distortion of prices, and worsening of income distribution. However, it is 
difficult to generalize about the effects of inflation. Most of these effects depend on the type of 
inflation, whether it is moderate, high, hyper, anticipated, or unanticipated. For example, 
redistributive effects on inflation depend on whether the social groups anticipate inflation and 
can adjust to it (Bronfenbrenner and Holzman 1963).  
The effects of hyperinflation and persistent inflation are also different. While the costs of 
hyperinflation are pretty obvious to public (fall in economic growth, extreme economic certainty, 
decrease in investment, and so on), costs of persistently high inflation are ambiguous at best. 
Moreover, hyperinflation can usually be eliminated at once and the result is not very costly. 
Therefore, it is much easier for policymakers to decide eliminating hyperinflation compared to 
persistent inflation. Moreover, persistent inflation countries have already got used to living with 
high inflation, so there are fewer incentives to get rid of inflation. There is also less credibility on 
the part of policymakers, as probably they have tried to eliminate inflation several times with no 
success (Vegh 1992).  
There is no real agreement between scholars on whether inflation really affects economic 
growth (Temple 2000). However, there is a common belief, due to Philips curve theory, that a 
decrease in inflation may bring a rise in unemployment at least in short term (Siklos 2003). As 
suggested by Samuelson and Nordhaus (1989), costs of inflation are obscure and unclear, while 
the costs of unemployment are obvious and clear. Therefore, there is a natural tendency among 
the public to favor employment over elimination of inflation.  
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Another problem is that inflation stabilization programs are usually recessionary (Calvo 
and Vegh 1994; Calvo and Vegh 1999). Therefore, the real costs of inflation appear once states 
decide to eliminate high inflation, as policies that decrease inflation generally repress economic 
growth, increase unemployment, decrease profits, and slow down business activity. These 
usually result in an economic stagnation (Weintraub and Jutabha 1981; Samuelson and Nordhaus 
1989). Such conditions created by disinflationary policies are socially and politically 
undesirable, as citizens expect a prosperous and growing economy from their policymakers 
(Keehn 1980). Therefore, governments that  create stagnation while trying to decrease inflation 
suffer from severe loss of popularity (Paldam 1994).  
Despite the above mentioned costs, most governments have chosen to implement 
disinflationary policies to eliminate high inflation. The question is why some have done it early, 
while others, like in Turkey, have delayed it until 2000s.  
1.3 EXPERIENCES WITH PERSISTENT INFLATION  
All case countries of this study experienced high and persistent inflation. Although some of their 
experiences were similar, they also had diverse economic conditions and used diverse methods to 
deal with them. Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico followed a similar development pattern 
by starting to follow Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) development strategy in the 
1930s and by implementing it more profoundly in the 1950s and 1960s. This development model 
began to collapse in 1970s, and coupled with the oil crisis and general economic slowdown in 
the world, all of these countries began to suffer from high inflation. Israel’s inflation was more 
due to its costly international wars and high defense expenses.   
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When the 1982 debt crisis started, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were not able to find 
foreign debt. Inflation became rampant and they intensified their economic liberalization efforts 
in an attempt to recover from the crisis. Argentina and Brazil tried a series of heterodox and 
orthodox stabilization programs, but the success with disinflation came in 1990s with orthodox 
plans. On the other hand, without experiencing too many failed attempts, both Israel and Mexico 
eliminated persistent inflation with heterodox plans earlier than Argentina and Brazil did. 
Turkey, on the other hand, had no success in stabilization up until 2001. Below are the details 
about the experiences of these countries. 
1.3.1 Turkey’s Experience with Inflation   
Turkey is a perfect example of a country experiencing persistent inflation. Starting from the 
1930s Turkey implemented inward-oriented, state-led economic policies, as part of ISI. During 
those times, inflation was a problem only during the World War II. After the War until late 
1970s, Turkey had one-digit inflation, except some sporadic surges in inflation. In 1978, 1979, 
and 1980, IMF supported austerity measures were implemented to put rising inflation under 
control, but they proved unsuccessful (Hershlag 1988). 
In January 1980, Turkey initiated a neo-liberal stabilization program as a response to the 
serious balance of payments crisis and recession, which hit the economy in the second half of the 
1970s. This period also coincided with an increase in inflation. The stabilization program, which 
received wide support from the IMF, World Bank, and the OECD, changed the direction of the 
Turkish economy from inward oriented import substitution industrialization to a free-market 
based system. The primary goals of the program were balancing the payments and decreasing 
inflation (Öniş and Özmucur 1990). The program achieved its balance of payments objective and 
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brought economic growth, but it failed to decrease inflation to single digit levels, despite the 
measures taken, such as devaluation of the exchange rate, liberalization of interest rates, and 
tight monetary policies. Inflation declined after the January 1980 stabilization program for three 
consecutive years, but still it remained over 20 percent. 
Despite rising inflation, developments in the Turkish economy in the 1980s were 
impressive. After 1983, inflation began to rise again while the economy started to grow 
vigorously (Nas and Perry 2000). Turkish economy grew 4.6 percent on average between 1981 
and 1985 and the growth rate reached 8.1 percent in 1986. The exports also grew from 5.2 
percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 1985 (Öniş and Özmucur 1990). However, this economic 
growth was volatile and there were major macroeconomic instabilities. For example, the 
February 1988 disinflationary program soon proved unsuccessful due to political instability and 
the inflation increased further (Alper and Üçer 1998). In fact, both Turkish scholars and 
businessmen were complaining that tight monetary policies deteriorated income distribution and 
decreased economic growth and investment (Hershlag 1988). 
In the 1980s, the Turkish government took various measures in order to decrease 
inflation. As part of the new neo-liberal economic agenda, foreign exchange regime was 
liberalized in 1984 and Turkish Lira became convertible in 1989. Some measures were also 
taken to increase Central Bank independence after 1986. Moreover, in the second half of the 
1980s, the government changed the deficit financing method from monetization, which is the 
most inflationary way, to bond financing and tried to stabilize the exchange rate to control 
inflation (Dibooglu and Kibritcioglu 2001). However, despite these reforms, inflation continued 
through the 1990s.  
 12
In 1994 a foreign exchange crisis occurred and this resulted in another IMF supported 
stabilization program in April 1994. With short-term monetary and fiscal policies, inflation fell 
from 106 percent in 1994 to 82 percent in 1996, but started to rise again immediately due to 
political instability (Alper and Üçer 1998; Nas and Perry 2000). In 1995, 1998, and 2000, the 
government introduced a series of disinflationary policies, but again failed to eliminate high 
inflation (Dibooglu and Kibritcioglu 2001). In February 2001, Turkey had another major 
financial crisis that resulted in another major stabilization program and vast IMF assistance, 
which finally started to decrease inflation permanently.  
Why was Turkey unable to eliminate high inflation up until the 2000s? Not because the 
policymakers did not know about the negative effects of inflation. One answer is that in Turkey 
disinflation was never the most important policy goal of the policymakers (Alper and Üçer 
1998). Although disinflationary policies were implemented, they were always short-lived. This 
situation lasted until the beginning of the 21st century. But why was this the case? Because 
knowing about the economic policies that can eliminate inflation is not enough. What is needed 
is the “willingness” of policymakers and thus the “political ability” to implement these 
disinflationary policies consistently. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine this aspect of 
the inflation problem.  
1.3.2 Inflation Experiences in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Israel 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had somewhat similar economic experiences. They were all ex-
colonial countries which inherited unequal wealth distribution and dependent development 
patterns (Baran 1957). Thanks to the Great Depression in 1929-31, not only Turkey but also 
these three Latin American countries tried to break their dependency by implementing ISI from 
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the 1930s on. The ISI development strategy increased industrialization rapidly in these countries 
but it began to run its course in the 1970s. Increased state expenditures, unmet by the increases in 
the state revenues, eventually caused high inflation. 
Argentina’s economy had recurring cycles of hyperinflation followed by attempts of 
stabilization. When the military took power in 1976, the ISI was seen as the cause of economic 
crisis, so the authoritarian government began to implement sweeping neoliberal economic 
reforms in 1977. Trade was liberalized, currency was devalued, prices were liberalized, and 
wages were frozen. It was also hoped that liberalization would discipline organized groups, 
erode social basis of populism in Argentina, and create a stable political order (Schamis 1999). 
In 1978 economy was in recession but inflation was still above 150 percent. Therefore, 
the government decided to deepen the liberalization of the economy and initiated a price 
stabilization plan, known as Tablita Plan. In order to decrease inflation, this program 
preannounced exchange rate which was set at levels below the inflation rate. However, it soon 
caused the Argentine currency to overvalue, and thus, increased trade deficit. Also, total debt 
rose from $4 billion in 1978 to $9 billion in 1979 (Schamis 1999). In the 1980s, the real per 
capita decreased 0.4 percent annually while the foreign debt grew (Beckerman 1992).  
When Alfonsín administration (1983-89) took power after democratic elections, the 
economy was a mess. There was huge public debt, deep recession, and high inflation 
(Beckerman 1992). The new government initiated a heterodox stabilization plan in 1985, known 
as the Austral Plan. However, although this plan reduced the inflation rate to less than 100 
percent in 1986, inflation started to rise again in 1987. Another stabilization program, Plan 
Primavera, was initiated in August 1988 and the currency was devalued. This was also a 
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heterodox program which included wage and price controls. Yet, by 1989 public debt was 
unsustainable and inflation rate skyrocketed to over 3,000 percent (Beckerman 1992).  
Elected in May 1989 elections, President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) opened a new 
phase in the Argentine economy. The next day after taking office in July 1989, Argentina’s next 
heterodox stabilization program, the Bunge y Born Plan (BB Plan), was announced. This plan 
also collapsed like the Plan Primavera. Next, Menem launched a deep-seated liberalization of 
the economy, which included sweeping privatization and subsidy reduction. He also initiated a 
new price stabilization plan in 1991, the Convertibility Plan. The Convertibility Plan was a quite 
orthodox economic plan which pegged peso one-to-one to dollar and made peso fully 
convertible. This plan immediately achieved price and exchange-rate stability. It also created 
economic growth for several consecutive years.4  
In the late 1990s Argentina failed to maintain balance of payments surpluses. With 
economic crises in East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), and then in Brazil (1999), the Argentine 
economy increasingly became prone to economic instability and finally had a severe crash in 
2001. As the Argentina went through its worst economic crisis, the Convertibility Plan was 
abandoned in 2001 and the crisis pushed inflation to 25.9 percent in 2002.5 However, Argentina 
returned to stability in the following years.  
Like Argentina, inflation was an enduring problem in Brazil. The average annual 
inflation rate was 18 percent in 1950-60, rose to 60 percent in 1960-65, and then it went down to 
28 percent in 1966-70. In the first years of the 1970s, inflation remained below 20 percent,  but 
from 1975 on the annual inflation rate remained above 20 percent (Graham 1982). By the late 
                                                 
4 There was economic growth between 1991 and 1998, except the economic decline in 1995. 
5 Data taken from the International Financial Statistics (2006) of International Monetary Fund. 
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1970s Brazil already had chronic high inflation and a balance of payments problem. This 
situation worsened with the 1982 debt crisis (Baer 2001).  
As Brazil was suffering from chronic budget deficits and high public debt, inflation 
continued to rise in late 1980s. Before the Cruzado Plan was announced by the Jose Sarney 
government (1985-90) in February 1986, monthly inflation rates were almost 25 percent 
(Beckerman 1992). Cruzado Plan was a heterodox plan that included wage and price freezes. It 
was based on the idea that Brazil’s inflation problem was largely caused by inertia. This plan 
worked well at first, but soon proved to be a failure due to public deficit, monetization, and 
decline in agricultural output (Baer 2001).  
After the collapse of the Cruzado Plan, inflation began to rise with a rapid pace. Monthly 
inflation rate soared to over 20 percent. In 1987 a new heterodox plan, Bresser Plan, was 
introduced. This was not a major stabilization program, and unlike Cruzado Plan, its goal was 
just decreasing high inflation not eliminating it. It included a three month wage freeze, some 
public spending cuts, and devaluation of the currency. Also, unlike the Cruzado Plan which 
caused overheating in the economy, Breser Plan tried to decrease consumption by tight monetary 
policies (Baer 2001).  
After Bresser Plan failed, Brazil had another heterodox stabilization program, the 
Summer Plan (1989), which also collapsed in few months because of rising public debt and 
hyperinflation (Beckerman 1992). With the support of the IMF, a new economic program, the 
Collor Plan, was announced in 1990 by the Collor administration (1990-92). The government 
also liberalized trade, privatized important state enterprises, and deregulated the markets. The 
Collor Plan sharply tightened monetary policies, but as the economy got into recession 
government yielded the political pressures and brought the end of the plan (Bruno 1993).  
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The next government was led by Itamar Franco (1992-95), who had no choice but initiate 
another stabilization plan as hyperinflation became rampant. His finance minister Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso came up with a new plan, called Real Plan (1994). Unlike the previous plans, 
Real Plan brought fiscal adjustment. It also included a new indexation system and tight monetary 
policies (Baer 2001). Cardoso also continued with the deregulation of the economy and 
privatization.  
Real Plan succeeded in decreasing inflation and the economic recovered. However, the 
crises in East Asia and Russia caused significant capital flight and sparked another economic 
crisis in 1999. Unlike Argentina, the government chose to devalue the currency. The devaluation 
helped to moderate the crisis and by 2000 economy began to recover.  
The Mexican economic system has been different from Argentine and Brazilian systems 
because it was based on the corporatist structure that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
established during its six decades long dominancy (Stevens 1977). This system involved state 
ownership of key industries; subsidization and protection of private industry; some redistributive 
policies; and co-optation of intelligentsia, labor and peasant leaders (McCaughan 1993).  
In Mexico 1950s and 1960s were known as the era of “stabilizing development,” because 
it was period of low inflation, stable exchange rate, and rapid growth (Schamis 1999). However, 
1970s were characterized with budget deficit and the economic instabilities because of increased 
government expenditures. In fact, the Luis Echeverría government (1970-76) followed overly 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that caused a cycle of inflation similar to Argentina 
and Brazil. As a result, the government had to introduce a stabilization program that included a 
59 percent devaluation of the currency in 1976 (Schamis 1999). This was the first devaluation in 
Mexico since 1954 (Heath 1999). 
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Thanks to the oil revenues and availability of foreign debt, the government continued to 
spend extensively during the presidency of López Portillo (1976-82). Yet, the oil prices fell, and 
the government failed to tighten fiscal and monetary policies. With the fear of a new devaluation 
the private capital began to flee Mexico. As a response, Mexico nationalized all its banking 
system in August 1982 and announced an involuntary debt moratorium, marking the beginning 
of the world wide “debt crisis” (Lustig 1998).  
With rampant inflation and increased capital flight, De la Madrid administration (1982-
88) took a series of economic liberalization measures, but could not prevent inflation to rise 
above 100 percent in 1987. As a result the government initiated a comprehensive stability plan 
known as the Economic Solidarity Pact (or Solidarity Plan) in December 1987. This plan 
involved deep structural reforms that liberalized the economy further, but at the same time it was 
a “heterodox” plan which included wage and price controls. It decreased inflation slowly but 
effectively. By 1989 inflation dropped to 20 percent levels and by 1992 inflation rate was already 
under 20 percent.6    
From the presidency of Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) on, Mexican economic policies were 
deeply neoliberal. The successive governments of Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-200), and 
Vincente Fox (2000-06) liberalized trade, liberalized foreign investment, and privatized most 
state enterprises. Mexico even entered into a free trade agreement (NAFTA) with the US and 
Canada in 1994. After experiencing another economic crisis right after this agreement, inflation 
increased to 35 percent in 1995, but by 1998 it was again below 20 percent and never increased 
again to over 20 percent.  
                                                 
6 Data taken from the International Financial Statistics (2006) of International Monetary Fund. 
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Similar to Mexico, Israel’s inflation also persisted but not the extent of Argentina and 
Brazil. However, the economic history of Israel is quite different from the Latin American 
countries and Turkey. First of all, as it came into existence only in 1948, Israel has a shorter 
economic history. In the first years of its existence, the Israeli economy was highly politicized as 
political parties controlled allocation of resources. However, by time, the Israeli economy 
gradually switched to the free market model and internationalized its economy. 
In the beginning the Israeli economy was highly centralized, significant state aid was 
provided to agrarian labor, and collectivism was the operating principle more than efficiency and 
profitability (Aharoni 1998). Despite that, Israel had a balanced budget until the 1960s. 
However, the 1967 Six Days War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War increased military 
expenditures and created significant budget deficits. Nonetheless, unlike the Latin American 
cases, Israel continued to have the ability to borrow because of the foreign support it had, 
especially from the US (Beckerman 1992). Yet, this did not prevent inflation from rising in the 
1970s. From 1974 to 1984, there was high inflation in Israel. Because of long-standing 
indexation and dollarization of the economy, inflation problem was exacerbated (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2002).  
After following expansionary policies in the early 1980s, a financial crisis hit the Israeli 
economy in 1983. With the crisis inflation rose even further and public debt increased. When the 
National Union government (coalition between Likud and Labor parties) came to power in 
September 1984, domestic debt was more than the GDP and foreign debt was half of it 
(Beckerman 1992). In 1984 and 1985, annual inflation rose above 300 percent. The government 
tried to cut expenditures, but inflation remained high. Finally in July 1985, the government 
announced a major heterodox stabilization plan. The 1985 economic plan relied on a wide 
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national consensus to initiate a decrease in consumption in order to stop inflation. The main labor 
organization and main business association agreed to limit wage and price increases. At the same 
the US provided a $1.5 billion grant to support international reserves (Aharoni 1998).  
Despite the failure of heterodox stabilization plans in Argentina and Brazil, the Israeli 
heterodox plan proved to be a success. The budget deficit dropped sharply and so did inflation. 
By 1987, the inflation rate was already under 20 percent. The consumption increased and wages 
rose (Leiderman 1993). At the same time government reformed the economy by liberalizing the 
financial markets and cutting public expenditures. Inflation remained at low double digit levels 
until 1997, but then it even decreased further and the economy stayed in good shape since 
stabilization (Nitzan and Bichler 2002).  
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The puzzle that this study tries to explain is persistent inflation, which has affected some 
countries continuously for decades. As mentioned above, this study argues that persistent 
inflation cannot be explained solely by economic approaches. Inflation persists because 
policymakers are not willing to introduce the disinflationary policies on time. Politically they 
may not be capable of bearing the possible costs of disinflation in the short-term, so they keep 
delaying it. We need to analyze the socio-political context of a country in order to understand 
why policymakers keep on implementing inflationary policies.  
In order to explain persistent inflation I will supplement economic views of inflation with 
a socio-political approach. Here I challenge the mainstream view of inflation, which states that 
inflation is by and large a monetary problem, by evoking socio-political arguments. I argue that 
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international political factors, such as the strategic position of a country and the security threats it 
faces; political factors such as political regime type, political system, system of elections and 
political parties; and social factors such as poverty and inequality determine the resilience of the 
inflation problem by determining the capacity of the state to tackle it through consistent 
stabilization policies. Therefore, the economic, political, and social context of a country must be 
analyzed together to understand the persistence of inflation.   
This study does not seek to explain why inflation problem appears initially. Rather it 
seeks to explain why it persists. It does not reject economic explanations of persistent inflation. 
However, it tries to complement those views by offering socio-political reasons of why inflation 
is not reduced with the same promptness in all countries.  
This study is motivated by the puzzle of persistent inflation in Turkey, but it also focuses 
on four other countries with persistent inflation, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and Mexico. These 
countries stabilized prices at different times. It is a good demonstration of how diverse have been 
the experiences of even very typical cases of persistent high inflation. This diversity of 
experience urges us to investigate what determines policymaker’s willingness or ability to 
achieve sustained price stability. A larger sample cross-national analysis is also employed to 
obtain statistically significant findings.  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Inflation is one of the most important concerns of policymakers and it has been subject to large 
amounts of scholarly research. Inflation not only has been a widespread economic problem with 
important repercussions, but also different approaches to this problem through history reflects 
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shifts in economic ideas. Although today most economists believe that the ultimate goal of 
monetary policy is low inflation, scholars have not yet made confident conclusions about neither 
the costs of inflation nor the optimal rates of inflation (Romer 1996). Therefore, the subject of 
inflation is still open to debates and puzzles to which this research strives to contribute. 
First of all, this research favors and contributes to the “socio-political approach” in the 
literature. Purely economic views, especially monetarist theory, are incomplete and cannot 
explain why inflation persists. This research will argue that inflation is not only a monetary 
problem, as suggested by some mainstream economists, like Milton Friedman. The fight against 
inflation is always a political task, despite the efforts of international institutions to present it 
solely as an economic challenge. A comparison of the Turkish case with Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Israel can provide a good understanding of the socio-political bases of success in 
eliminating persistent inflation.  
Most of the debates on inflation seem to have been settled in favor of the neoliberal view 
that favors price stabilization over other economic and political goals. This study rejects the 
primacy of price stability over other economic goals such as growth, employment and 
redistribution and even over political goals. In fact, while many countries succeeded in 
stabilizing their prices in the last decades, they made no improvement or even experienced 
deterioration in other aspects of the economy, such as poverty, income distribution and 
employment (see Chapter 8 and Appendix-II). This dissertation supports the view that economics 
and politics are inseparable and we have to study inflation and its control through multiple 
dynamics. Achieving an economic goal, like eliminating inflation, may worsen other economic 
spheres and threaten political stability, which may then threaten economic stability. Therefore, 
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economics and politics should be seen as parts of a complex whole and each economic problem 
should be analyzed with its political aspects.  
Similarly, prioritizing the solution of an economic problem may cause us to ignore the 
political conditions necessary to accomplish that solution. This study makes us more aware of 
the political context of economic policymaking. For instance, it is contestable which comes first: 
political stabilization or price stabilization? It is argued in this study that sustained disinflation is 
more possible after necessary political conditions are established. Therefore, failed attempts to 
stabilize prices can at least partly be explained by lack of favorable political conditions. This is a 
totally different perspective than many mainstream arguments that blame the governments for 
their economic failures. It also rejects the utility of uniform economic policies and goals, as each 
country has unique political structures and institutions.  
While some scholars have studied the effects of the political regime type, political 
system, electoral and party system, and inequality on inflation, this is one of the few studies that 
also investigates the relation of security issues to inflation. To my knowledge, this study will also 
be the first one that measures inflation by its persistence over the years. Most studies measure 
inflation directly by its percentage rate or its logarithm. However, my focus is on the continuity 
of high inflation, not its actual rate. Any inflation rate over 20 percent is considered high, and 
thus, problematic. Yet, persistence of high inflation for more than ten years is much more 
problematic than having hyper inflation for few years, because persistent inflation indicates a 
government’s failure to resolve the problem.   
This study is also unique as it studies inflation by combining five case studies with a 
large sample cross-national analysis. Typically, scholars have employed either large sample 
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cross-national analysis or case studies. By combining the two methods, this study adds rich detail 
to general findings.  
1.6 PLAN OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 2 gives a review of important literature on 
inflation and its causes. This review not only summarizes the major views on inflation and its 
stabilization, but also it introduces the “socio-political” approach, which guides this study.  
Chapter 3 presents the research questions and explains why a socio-political approach is 
preferred to answer these questions. It also develops a model that explains failure or success of 
governments in stabilizing prices through a theoretical and conceptual framework. The model 
also introduces all variables used in this study, the sources of these variables, and how they 
support the socio-political approach. Lastly this chapter presents the research design and 
methodology of this study. The use of comparative case methodology and a cross-national design 
with a larger sample is justified and the selection of cases is explained.   
The five country case studies are presented in Chapters 4 through 8. These chapters 
analyze the socio-political variables and how they affect the ability to decrease inflation through 
case studies. Chapter 4 focuses on international influences, such as strategic importance, security 
threats, and international aid, and how they influence the ability to stabilize prices in Argentina, 
Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey. Chapter 5 looks into political regime and analyzes especially 
how the level of democracy and regime stability affect success of governments in price 
stabilization. Chapter 6 focuses on political systems and analyzes whether presidential systems 
or parliamentarian systems are more successful in price stabilization. Chapter 7 discusses the 
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effects of different electoral and party systems on price stabilization. Chapter 8 looks into two 
social factors, inequality and poverty, and analyzes if these factors influence the ability to 
stabilize prices. 
Chapter 9 presents cross-national analyses with a larger sample of developing countries. 
These analyses show the relations between persistence of inflation and various socio-political 
factors discussed. Through various statistical methods, this chapter analyzes the same groups of 
socio-political variables analyzed by the case studies for a larger sample.  
The final chapter summarizes findings from the comparative case analysis and the cross-
national analysis with larger sample. Findings of these two different analyses are summarized 
and compared. After making some conclusions from these findings, implications and limitations 
of this dissertation are discussed to guide further research in the field.  
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2.0  SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE7 
Inflation has been a widely researched topic in academic circles. During the 1970s, scholars 
focused on the rising inflation in industrialized countries. As these countries began controlling 
inflation, attention shifted to Latin American countries because of high or hyper-inflation. The 
literature on inflation is generally focused on the causes of inflation and fails to acknowledge 
that its persistence is a different phenomenon than its emergence. Also, the debate has been 
mostly between monetarists and structuralists (with all their varieties) and today there is almost 
no debate as the monetarist view has become very dominant.  
Inflation is defined as sustained increase in the price levels of goods and services in an 
economy that causes a fall in the purchasing power of the currency. Although its origins are 
probably as old as the origins of money (currency), it was a particularly disturbing phenomenon 
in the 20th century. Indeed, Irving S. Friedman (1975) calls the last century the “Century of 
Inflation” (p. 159). Although different scholars use different classifications of inflation, for the 
purposes of this study, I consider hyper-inflation to be a rise in prices of greater than 100 percent 
per year, high inflation to be any rise in prices between 20 percent and 100 percent per year, and 
                                                 
7 Except the section on Turkish inflation literature, this literature review is only focused on the research done on 
inflation from the 1960s until the early 1980s, when that topic was a very popular one due to inflationary period 
among industrialized countries. The recent political economy literature which touches upon the issue of inflation 
will be presented in the coming analysis chapters as they become relevant.  
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low inflation to be price rises less than 20 percent per year.8 I define persistent inflation as 
hyper- or high inflation (rise in prices of greater than 20 percent) that continues 10 or more 
consecutive years.  
                                                
2.1 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INFLATION  
Most scholars have tried to explain the inflation problem in economic terms. Like in many 
modern economic topics, literature on inflation is a divided one. On the one hand there are liberal 
views on the topic, on the other hand there are Marxism influenced views. Liberal views on 
inflation are mainly represented by monetarism, while the leftist view is mainly represented by 
structuralism. The literature also represents a debate between monetarists vs. Keynesians.  
Monetarists see inflation solely determined by the money supply, while Keynesians 
emphasize the role of aggregate demand, of which money supply is only one determinant. The 
most significant contribution of Keynesian analysis to the study of inflation is the Phillips curve. 
As a late Keynesian view, it  was first developed by Alban W. Phillips (1958). The Phillips curve 
set up a relationship between the changes in money wages (rise in price of labor) and the 
unemployment rate. Richard G. Lipsey (1960) further developed Phillips’ work and 
demonstrated a negative relationship between excess demand for labor and unemployment rate. 
Paul Samuelson and Robert M. Solow (1960) suggested that a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment existed, and argued that governments have a policy choice between inflation and 
unemployment.  
 
8 Cagan (1956) defines hyperinflation as a rise of 50 percent in prices per month, while Gordon (1981) defines it as a 
rise of at least 1,000 percent per year. Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002) define “very high inflation” as a rise of over 
100 percent in prices annually.  
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By the end of the 1960s, the Phillips curve came under severe criticism, especially by 
monetarists, such as Milton Friedman (1968), Edmund S. Phelps (1972), and Michael Parkin 
(1973). A monetarist view on Phillips curve, Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU), or natural rate hypothesis, distinguished between the short-term and the long-term 
Phillips curves. This theory argued that the trade-off between inflation and employment is valid 
only in the short-term and inflationary policies may lead to stagflation rather than higher 
employment (Phelps 1967; Friedman 1968; Phelps 1968). In the long run, there is no trade-off, 
so policy-makers cannot achieve lower unemployment with a little bit of inflation.  
On the other hand, the rational expectations theory suggested that the period for trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment was so short that it can be considered non-existent. This 
theory argued that any attempt to reduce unemployment below the NAIRU would immediately 
raise inflationary expectations and cause the policy to fail (Sargent 1971; Lucas 1972, 1976).  
Phillips curve (and its critique) generated the first important debate on inflation. Shortly 
after, two rival inflation models were developed in the 1960s: the demand-pull model and the 
cost-push model. The demand-pull model can be seen as the origin of liberal view on inflation, 
which later led to monetarism. It stressed the level of demand in an economy. Accordingly, if the 
demand increases in excess of supply, then the prices of scarce goods and services rise until 
supply and demand reaches equilibrium. This excess demand can result from increases in the 
money supply, increases in government purchases, and increases in exports. This theory was 
proposed by both Keynesians and quantity theorists (monetarists), such as Harry G. Johnson 
(1972a), Michael Parkin and Michael Sumner (1973), and Rudiger Dornbusch (1975).  
The cost-push model of inflation is more a leftist view on inflation and it later influenced 
structuralism. It emphasized the impact of increases in the cost of production (labor, capital, 
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intermediate products, raw materials, or even taxes and exchange rates) as the cause of inflation. 
Lindbeck (1972), George L. Perry (1966; 1975), and Robert J. Gordon (1972; 1975) argued that 
rises in costs of production create further price rises unless they are balanced by increases in 
productivity.  
A deeper theoretical division in the economic literature emerged in the 1970s between the 
“monetarist view” and the “structuralist view.” Monetarists were deeply influenced by the 
demand-pull theory while structuralists were influenced by the cost-push theory. In the 
monetarist theory, inflation is a key topic. This theory suggests that “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon” and it is simply the outcome of growth of money supply in 
excess of money demand (Friedman 1970). Monetarists also argue that, as inflation is solely a 
monetary problem, it is the monetary authority’s responsibility to take the necessary measures to 
reduce it (Beckerman 1992). In general, all monetarists associate fiscal deficits or balance of 
payments deficits with inflation.   
This view reached its peak in early 1970s primarily through the writings of Milton 
Friedman (1968; 1970; 1971), Karl Brunner (1972), Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1976), David 
E. W. Laidler and Michael J. Parkin (1975), Edmund S. Phelps (1972), Philip Cagan (1971; 
1973; 1974; 1979), Franco Modigliani (1977), and later with Helmut Frisch (1983). The 
monetarist theory is still the mainstream view today both in academia and in policy world.  
Monetarists are not a uniform group. Monetarist view has two main varieties: the fiscal 
view and the balance-of-payments view. The fiscal view argues that the fiscal deficit, which is 
mostly financed through money creation, is the main cause of high and chronic inflation. It 
originated in the work of Phelps (1973) and still represents the most widely accepted model of 
inflation. M. Friedman (1972) also maintains that budget deficits produce inflation if they are 
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financed by creating money. Even if they are financed by borrowing from public, they may still 
cause minor inflation. Other main representatives of this view are Leonall C. Andersen and Keith 
M. Carlson (1970), Brunner and Meltzer (1976), and Franco Modigliani and Albert Ando (1976). 
The alternative balance of payments view sees exchange rate depreciation caused by balance of 
payments crises as the principal reason of inflation. Some representatives of this view were 
Johnson (1972b), Robert Mundell (1971), Jacob A. Frenkel (1976), David E. W. Laidler (1975), 
and Alexander K. Swoboda (1976).  
The structural view has been the most powerful alternative to all versions of monetarism. 
In fact, structuralism is a version of cost-push inflation theory that largely attributes inflation to 
non-monetary, supply-side effects. According to structuralists, inflation is the outcome of deeper 
problems related to what happens on the “supply side” of the economy. Structures in developing 
countries, such as inefficient agricultural sectors, rapid urbanization, limited foreign and 
domestic resources, distorted industrial structures, and monopolized or oligopolistic markets, 
cause bottlenecks in the economy and constitute the real causes of inflation.  
Unlike monetarists, structuralists argue that in analyzing inflation, specific characteristics 
and structures of an economy are as important as general macroeconomic relations. For instance, 
they suggest that inflation is an indication of distributional conflict, which is inherent in all 
capitalist economies but more pressing in developing countries. Hence, inflation is not simply a 
monetary problem, but it is a “structural” problem. They do not reject the argument that 
monetary factors partially determine inflation, but they suggest that inflation will continue until 
the underlying economic, political, and social constraints cease to exist.  
Structural views were used to explain inflation in both advanced and developing 
countries. Paul Streeten (1962), Julio H.G. Olivera (1964), William J. Baumol (1967), John R. 
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Hicks (1975), and Geoffrey Maynard and Willy van Rijckeghem (1975) used structural theory to 
explain inflation in industrialized countries. A Scandinavian model of structuralism made the 
contribution of combining structural explanation with an explanation of how inflation is 
transmitted from the world market to small economies. Some representatives of this version of 
structural view are Odd Aukrust (1970) and Gosta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen, and Clas-Erik 
Odhner (1973).  
Probably the most important contribution of the structuralists is their vigorous 
explanation of inflation in developing countries. Structuralists see the inflation problem as a 
problem of development and underdevelopment (Kirkpatrick and Nixon 1976). Thus, many 
proponents of structural view, such as Dudley Seers (1962; 1964), Celso Furtado (1967), Gunnar 
Myrdal (1968), Rosemary Thorp (1971), Osvaldo Sunkel (1960), and Victor Argy (1970), have 
analyzed inflation particularly in developing countries, and especially in Latin America. They 
have pointed out structural constraints or “bottlenecks” in developing economies that facilitate 
inflationary pressures. Sunkel (1960) identifies three main inflationary constraints which were 
generally shared by all structuralists: 1) bottlenecks in food production, 2) foreign exchange 
constraints, and 3) lack of financial resources. Also, like structuralists that have focused on the 
industrialized world, they saw inflation as a consequence of government efforts to reconcile 
social conflicts.  
Despite vigorous and prominent explanations by its proponents, the structural view lost 
popularity by the early 1980s. As the neoliberal view gained more and more recognition, 
structural problems were no longer mentioned as explanations of inflation. Today the monetarist 
theory continues to be the dominant view on inflation in both academia and the policy world.  
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As discussed above and as can be seen in Figure 1, the theory of inflation has always 
involved a debate between opposing views: first between the demand-pull and cost-push views, 
then between the monetarism and structuralism, which were influenced by the demand-pull and 
cost-push views. Although monetarists shared many of their premises on inflation with 
Keynesians, these two views challenged each other when it comes to the relation between 
employment/output and inflation. The monetarists and structuralists have also their sub-theories, 
such as fiscal view, balance of payments view, and the Scandinavian model.  
Figure 1: Classification of economic theories of inflation 
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This study argues that neither of these economic views provides a complete explanation 
to inflation, particularly persistent inflation. The explanation that may be most helpful in terms of 
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understanding persistent inflation is the socio-political approach. This view has been influenced 
by structuralism, as it focuses on structural causes of inflation. However, rather than emphasizing 
economic structures, it emphasizes the role of political and social structures. It has also been 
influenced by Marxism, as it refers to class conflict.  
2.2 SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACH TO INFLATION  
Economic theories have well formulated explanations of inflation, but they also have limitations. 
One of the obvious shortcomings in economic approaches to inflation is their inability to explain 
why certain countries experience persistent inflation. This study holds the view that inflation 
cannot be approached solely as an economic matter and that we need to complement the 
economic approach with a socio-political approach in order to understand its persistence.  
This study is not the first to approach inflation by taking social and political factors into 
consideration. Some scholars have already suggested that inflation has various social and 
political implications and it cannot be considered exclusively as an economic problem. For 
example, Irving S. Friedman (1975) argues that inflation creates political problems and weakens 
the governments since it increases social problems and affects income distribution. In the early 
1970s, some sociologists and political scientists got interested in the inflation problem and 
initiated the socio-political approach to inflation (Phelps-Brown 1971; Hicks 1974; Hirsch 1978).  
Although the structural view introduced some international and domestic structural issues 
into the analysis of inflation and had a more comprehensive explanation than monetarism, 
structuralists have also limited their analyses mostly to the economic realm. As Fred Hirsch 
(1978) has maintained, economic factors can explain how inflation happens, but they cannot 
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fully explain why it happens. The same thing can be said for the persistence of inflation as well. 
Economic difficulties, like fiscal problems or trade deficits, facilitate an inflationary 
environment, but they are themselves endogenous factors that are affected by some social and 
political factors. Therefore, in order to understand inflation, we need to analyze conditions that 
facilitate the economic mechanisms that provoke inflationary pressures. Many of these other 
conditions are essentially socio-political, like social conflicts, extent of democracy, and the 
dynamics of political institutions.  
According to a socio-political approach, socio-political factors, such as democratization, 
class demands, and social and political institutions, exert inflationary pressures on the economy.9 
Proponents of this approach suggested that social and political factors affect inflation, and 
inflation affects social and political structures (Maier 1978; 1985). They maintained that in order 
to have a better understanding of the inflationary process, a political and institutional approach is 
necessary (Lindberg 1982; Lindberg, Maier et al. 1985). 
To many of the theorists who did their research in 1970s primarily on industrialized 
countries, inflation was related to the governments’ difficulty in responding to rising 
expectations of their people. Excess expectations of social groups not only increase through 
economic development, but also are exacerbated by democratization and the struggle to improve 
or maintain their relative position (Jay 1976; Brittan 1977, 1978; Hirsch 1978). Thus, as 
O'Connor (1973) has maintained, inflation can be a sign that the internal contradictions of 
capitalism are leading to an “unresolvable fiscal crisis of the state.” In the 1970s, increases in 
expectations required more social spending while budget revenues were not keeping up with the 
expectations.  According to I.S. Friedman (1975) “…persistent inflation, which is both caused by 
                                                 
9 The socio-political approach to inflation was developed by scholars, such as Leon N. Lindberg, Charles S. Maier, 
Fred Hirsch, John H. Goldthorpe, and Colin Crouch. 
 34
inadequate government and results in heightened disbelief in government, has resulted in 
increased reliance upon it. Indeed, more and more people turn to it as the ‘only’ way out...” 
(p.159). Therefore, inflation may be a result of growing social expectations and the governments’ 
inability to meet these expectations without creating more money. 
Inflation, then, can be considered as a way of relieving potential or existing socio-
political instability by government. Goldthorpe (1978), Crouch (1978), and Fox (1974) argue 
that governments yield to inflationary pressures in order to avoid social conflict. According to 
Crouch (1978), inflation is a means to delay resolution of class conflicts. As British Labor 
Party’s slogan of the 1970s “the rich man has his money, and the poor man has his politics” 
indicated, distributional demands are sooner or later carried to the political arena, especially in 
democracies. When policymakers implement expansionary economic policies, they also try to 
“accommodate pressures that threaten or appear to threaten the broad political and constitutional 
fabric ...” (Hirsch 1978, p. 276). Inflation has been mostly experienced in societies and periods in 
which political and distributional struggle has been most intense and most threatening. We can 
expect this struggle to be more intense in societies with high inequality and to be more 
threatening within countries which do not have stable political regimes. 
The socio-political approach to inflation developed in the 1970s and 1980s concluded 
that the increasing power of unions pushed governments to spend more on social payments, 
causing growth of budget deficits in a recessionary economic environment and, consequently, 
acceleration of inflation. For example, Mancur Olson (1975) stated that, 
To the extent that… governments and nationalized industries usually offer less resistance 
to unions than do firms who must pay wage claims out of their market-constrained 
receipts, we would expect the growth of nationalized industry…, and the advance of 
public sector unionism… to have added to wage-push, and thus unemployment and the 
demand for inflation… (p.867) 
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This approach was developed primarily to explain the growth of inflation in the 1970s in 
those industrialized countries whose regimes were feeling the pains of increasing pressure from 
unions and the crisis of the welfare state. It did not explain inflation in developing countries, 
since they lacked advanced welfare systems and high rate of unionization.  
According to other political analysts, the inflation problem is related to the self-interested 
nature of politicians. This idea comes from the well-known argument of Schumpeter (1942) that 
politicians attempt to maximize votes, in the same manner as businessmen try to maximize 
profits. Thus, there is competitive struggle for people’s votes and economic policies are shaped 
by this competition. Downs (1957) argues that the people vote according to their future 
economic expectations and their future expectations are determined by their current economic 
performance. Therefore, in order to maximize votes, politicians have to take the existing and 
possible economic benefits to the voters into consideration. Following from Schumpeter, Gordon 
(1975) argues that inflation is the result of vote-maximizing behavior of the politicians as they 
respond to the “demand for inflation” by the social groups that gain from inflation, especially 
through various welfare benefits. As a more recent scholar Michael R. Smith (1992) also argues 
that politicians provide cash, goods, and services to voters to buy their votes and the consequent 
expansion of the public sector generates inflation as it makes the economy less efficient and 
pushes the government to print money to pay for the budget deficit. 
Accordingly, inflation occurs when state spending increases more than the increase in 
revenues. As taxes are politically unpopular, the government does not raise taxes to pay for the 
increase in spending. Instead, it creates more money, and thus, inflation. The costs of 
stabilization (e.g. unemployment, economic recession) make inflation acceptable, or even 
preferable, for the majority of the constituents (Maier 1987). Politicians faced with rising prices 
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have often chosen to perpetuate the inflationary process by printing new money, accepting higher 
wage requests, and continuing to use public sector spending rather than choosing the political 
risk of government restructuring, budget cuts, and austerity (Kryzanek 1995). Thus, amid rising 
social demands and falling public revenues, politicians used inflation to maximize votes.   
Some studies on inflation use the political business cycle theory, which was championed 
by William D. Nordhaus (1973), assumes that voters are myopic, and politicians are vote-
maximizers. Politicians manipulate the economy temporarily to their advantage to increase 
growth and employment in order to gain more votes, and those boom-bust cycles and stop-go 
policies cause economic instability. The problem is that, these expansionary monetary policies 
used to maximize votes lead to a temporary increase in economic activity (around elections 
times), and an increase in inflation with a lag follows (Drazen 2000). Typically governments try 
to increase employment and economic growth before the elections by using expansionary 
policies, which induce inflation, unemployment and falling growth after the elections (Nordhaus 
1975; Alesina and Gatti 1995). This argument suggests that governments may manipulate the 
economy to buy votes by using the short-term reverse relationship between inflation and 
unemployment. Therefore, economy booms and unemployment decreases before the elections, 
and then this period is followed by an economic recession and rise in inflation (stagflation) after 
the elections, forcing the government to follow tight economic policies. An inflationary boom is 
repeated toward the next election. 
Some scholars have argued that, as inflation is an economic problem with socio-political 
roots and effects, the solution to it should also come from the socio-political sphere. For 
example, Michael Gilbert (1985) has suggested that we should try to discover what social and 
political conditions are most favorable to dealing with inflationary pressures. According to 
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Goldthorpe (1978), “the problem of inflation is a political problem: approach to [inflation] 
depends on what kind of society one wants… This is a matter, ultimately, for political action.” 
(p.215). Thus, solutions to inflation may also come from the political realm, such as reaching a 
political consensus across classes on economic policies.  
While a political and sociological approach to inflation exists, it is not complete. Many 
scholars who adopted this approach focused exclusively on advanced economies, although most 
of the countries which have experienced inflation are developing countries. Therefore, a renewed 
attention on socio-political determinants of inflation is necessary for those who seek a 
comprehensive understanding of the inflation problem, especially in developing countries.  
Inflation has been studied vigorously by economists. Various economic approaches to 
inflation help us understand the different causes of inflation (e.g., monetization, budget deficits, 
and developmental problems) and they also depict the type of economic policies that are needed 
to end this problem. However, when it comes to explaining persistent inflation, economic 
theories are less useful. Socio-political theories of inflation complement the economic theories, 
because they can help us understand why and how governments choose the unsound economic 
policies they pursue. For instance, they can explain why governments continue to implement 
inflationary policies for extended periods of time although economic policies to end inflation are 
widely known at least for the last two decades.  
2.3 THE LITERATURE ON TURKISH INFLATION  
Turkey is one of the most typical cases of persistent inflation and research on Turkish inflation 
has almost exclusively followed the two main economic approaches, monetarism and 
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structuralism. Although these studies contribute to our understanding of Turkish inflation, they 
fail to acknowledge the socio-political grounds of chronic inflation in Turkey. Indeed, inflation 
has persisted in Turkey throughout the liberalization of the economy and endured several 
economic crises (see Figure 2).10  
Figure 2: Inflation and GDP growth in Turkey (1975-2000) 
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10 The extensive liberalization of the Turkish economy started with the January 24, 1980 economic decisions of the 
government and continued since then.  
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 The studies on inflation have focused primarily on Latin American countries and some on 
Israel. Turkey has captured less attention from the leading scholars although, over the last thirty 
years, it has continuously suffered from inflation. Hence, an explanation of the Turkish inflation 
is crucial in order to understand conditions that impede disinflation. There exist some socio-
political studies of Turkey’s inflation. Yet, particularly lacking is a socio-political explanation of 
why Turkish government, unlike their counterparts in other parts of the world, has not been able 
to decrease inflation to single digit levels until the 21st century. One of the motives behind this 
research is to fill this gap in the literature on Turkish inflation, especially on the socio-political 
front.  
While the inflation problem in Turkey has been studied by several scholars, these studies 
are exclusively economic.11 The Akyüz (1973), Ertuğrul (1982), and Aksoy (1982) studies on 
inflation investigate the pre-1970s period. Akyüz’s study supports the monetarist view, whereas 
Ertuğrul’s and Aksoy’s studies support more the structuralist view. The analyses of the pre-1980 
inflation maintained that expansion of the domestic credits and foreign exchange shortages 
caused by the oil shocks were the two main factors that increased inflation (Kibritçioğlu 2002).  
Inflation that appeared in the late 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
showed a much more persistent character. Therefore, it attracted much more attention from the 
scholars of both monetarist and structural perspectives. The findings of some empirical studies 
on Turkish inflation in the 1980s and 1990s suggest that, in an economic environment of 
                                                 
11 Some scholars who studied inflation in Turkey are Togan (1987), Öniş and Özmucur (1990), Özatay (1992), de 
Santis (1993), Rittenberg (1993), Yeldan (1993),  Lim and Papi (1997), Agenor and Hoffmaister (1997), Metin 
(1995; 1998), Alper and Üçer (1999), Yeldan and Cizre-Sakallioglu (1999), Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu (1999), 
Erlat (2001), Kibritçioğlu (2002), and Kibritcioğlu et al. (2002). 
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extensive currency substitution, exchange rate policies are the main cause of inflation.12 Another 
argument is that interest rates are the most important determinant of inflation (Togan 1987; De 
Santis 1993; Insel 1995; Darrat 1997). Probably the strongest and most common approach 
identifies budget deficits as the main cause of the Turkish inflation (Yeldan 1993; Metin 1995; 
Akçay, Alper et al. 1997; Lim and Papi 1997; Alper and Üçer 1998; Metin 1998). Most of these 
studies fall under the monetarist approach. Some studies have focused on inertia, the expectation 
of inflation. These studies attempt to explain the persistence of inflation in Turkey, rather than 
the causes of inflation.13  
As indicated by Kibritçioğlu (2002), “the role of political process in explaining Turkish 
inflation has been in general ignored in empirical modeling efforts” (p. 35). Turkish governments 
suffer from many political weaknesses, like insufficient consolidation of democracy, instability, 
patronage, and ineffectiveness, that affect economic policymaking. However, very few scholars 
have investigated these factors’ relation to inflation.  
Yeldan (1993) made the first attempt to study Turkish inflation from a political economy 
perspective. His structural approach looks into distributional issues, as it emphasizes the effect of 
public sector expenditures on Turkish inflation. Asaf Savas Akat (2000) has also made an 
attempt to analyze Turkish inflation through a political perspective with some emphasis on the 
behavior of actors such as politicians, social groups, businessmen and bureaucracy, but his study 
mainly focuses on economic factors with a monetarist view. Tevfik F. Nas and Mark J. Perry 
(2000) consider the effects of the Turkish political environment on inflation. They suggest that 
                                                 
12 Some studies which focused on exchange rate policies as cause of inflation in Turkey are Öniş and Özmucur 
1990; Insel 1995; Agenor and Hoffmaister 1997; Darrat 1997; Erol and Wijnbergen 1997; Lim and Papi 1997; 
Akyürek 1999; Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu 1999; Metin-Özcan, Berument et al. 2004. 
13 Some studies which focused on inflation inertia in Turkey are Özatay 1992; Insel 1995; Akçay, Alper et al. 1997; 
Lim and Papi 1997; Alper and Üçer 1998; Metin 1998; Akyürek 1999; Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu 1999; Erlat 
2001; Metin-Özcan, Berument et al. 2004. 
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political instability and the opportunistic policy behavior are associated with high inflation in 
Turkey. Mine Ergun (2000) provides a more thorough empirical study of political economy of 
inflation through an analysis of relations between political business cycles and inflation.  
All the above mentioned research on Turkish inflation is summarized in Table 6. In sum, 
there are various studies which try to explain Turkish inflation through purely economic views 
and most of these studies hold the monetarist view. These studies present us different economic 
mechanisms that cause inflation in Turkey, but they fail to explain the persistence of inflation in 
Turkey. The studies that come closer to do that are ones focused on inflation inertia. There are 
only few limited attempts to look into socio-political factors to explain persistence of Turkish 
inflation.  
Table 6: Research on Turkish inflation according to their explanations of Turkish inflation 
 
Main Causes of Turkish Inflation 
 
 
Works 
 
Exchange rate regime 
 
Öniş and Özmucur 1990; İnsel 1995; Erol and van Wijnbergen 
1997; Lim and Papi 1997; Agenor and Hoffmaister 1997; 
Darrat 1997; Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu 1999; Akyürek 
1999; Metin-Özcan, Berüment, and Neyaptı 2001 
 
 
Interest rates 
 
Togan 1987, DeSantis 1993, İnsel 1995, and Darrat 1997 
 
 
Budget deficits 
 
Yeldan 1993; Metin 1995; Akçay, Alper, and Özmucur 1996; 
Lim and Papi 1997; Alper and Üçer 1998; and Metin 1998 
 
 
Inertia 
 
Özatay 1992; İnsel 1995; Akçay, Alper, and Özmucur 1996; 
Lim and Papi 1997; Alper and Üçer 1998; Metin 1998; 
Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu 1999; Akyurek 1999; Erlat 2001; 
Metin-Özcan, Berument, and Neyapti 2001 
 
 
Political factors 
 
Yeldan 1993; Akat 2000; Nas and Perry 2000; Ergun 2000 
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2.4 ASSUMPTIONS 
There is an intensive literature on inflation, but none of these approaches seem to explain 
persistence of inflation in developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey. One of the 
two main theories in the literature, monetarism, contributes to our understanding by explaining 
inflation in terms of changes in demand and supply of money. It focuses on the economic factors 
(e.g., monetization, budget deficits) that increase the supply of money, and thus cause inflation. 
Accordingly, inflation can be dealt by controlling the supply of money. However, monetarists 
fail to explain why some governments continue not controlling money supply although they 
know that it eliminates inflation. Therefore, they are unable to explain persistence of inflation. 
Only a political explanation can tell us why governments keep on pursuing unsound policies.  
Structuralists contribute to our understanding of inflation by focusing on structural 
problems of the economy that cause inflation. Although some streams of structuralist view focus 
on advanced countries, most structuralists recognize that inflation may be related to problems of 
development. They are better at bringing up persistence of inflation as a separate problem, as 
they argue that inflation would persist as long as the structural problems that cause it cease to 
exist. Yet, their explanations become questioned as many countries chose to pursue 
disinflationary policies and succeeded in eliminating inflation without changing their economic 
structures and the monetarist view continued to be the dominant view.  
There is a socio-political approach in the literature. However, most of the research done 
with this approach is focused on industrialized countries and their socio-political problems, such 
as unionization and welfare state. This dissertation is focused on inflation in developing 
countries and the possible socio-political problems that may make those countries prone to 
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persistent inflation. Unlike their counterparts in the advanced world, these countries do not have 
strong unions or welfare state, but inflation in some of them has become persistent.  
This dissertation does not directly challenge the arguments of the economic or the socio-
political views discussed above. Instead, it accepts some of their arguments and tries to build on 
this extensive literature. The following assumptions guide this study and many are taken from 
the existing literature: 
1. Budget deficits are the main causes of inflation: As most economists agree today, the 
main cause of inflation is unsustainable budget deficits generated by the governments that 
spend more than their revenues. A common way to pay for deficits is printing more 
money, and thus, causing inflation. For example, government subsidies given to farmers 
may contribute to budget deficits. Although such subsidies usually prove to be 
economically costly, they are initiated by policymakers as a result of political motives. 
This assumption that links budget deficits and inflation mainly comes from monetarism 
with “fiscal view.” As Rogoff (2003) puts it, “…pressure to finance government debt and 
deficits, directly or indirectly, has been the single most important driver of inflation” (p. 
48). Therefore, this study assumes that inflation rises and persists because of government 
debt and deficit.  
2. Budget deficits are at least partially generated because governments redistribute 
resources to social groups to assure their survival: All governments, either democratic or 
authoritarian, need strong support to survive. They allocate more resources to constituent 
groups, and thus spend more from the budget, when their survival is at stake. This 
assumption comes from the existing socio-political approach, which sees inflation as a 
result of politics and distributional conflict. According to this approach, governments 
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inflate while they are trying to pay off to social groups in order to prevent or resolve 
social conflict and stay in power.  
3. National context is important: Much of the literature assumes that inflation is caused and 
persists because of similar problems everywhere. Therefore, national differences are not 
emphasized. In contrast, this research tries to understand persistence of inflation by 
looking at different socio-political contexts of countries. Different countries have 
different social and political settings and different institutional attributes. Therefore, 
governments deal with inflation in diverse ways. For instance, some countries never let 
inflation become persistent (especially East Asian countries, such as South Korea), some 
prefer orthodox policies to deal with persistent inflation (like transition economies in East 
Europe), some prefer heterodox policies (like Mexico and Israel), while some leave 
inflation persist long time without any serious attempt to deal with it (e.g. Turkey).  
4. At least since the 1980s, policymakers and politicians are aware of the inflation problem 
and its possible solutions: Economists clearly specify policies to end inflation. For 
instance, monetarists identify a very simple solution to inflation: control of money 
supply. According to their approach, persistence of inflation implies ignorance of the 
policymakers. However, lack of information about the effects of inflation and necessary 
policies to deal with inflation can no longer be a credible cause of inflationary policies. 
Because of globalization and wide spread economic knowledge, policymakers are well 
aware of necessary economic policies that would end inflation for the last decades. This 
study assumes that policymakers and politicians all around the world are well informed 
about the negative effects of inflation since the 1980s and the economic policies to 
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eradicate it. Inflationary policies are not persistently chosen because politicians believe 
that inflation is good.  
5. In most cases when inflation persists, it persists because of deep political and social 
problems: I do not suggest that economic factors and economic policies do not matter for 
persistence of inflation. I agree that economic factors, such as budget deficits and 
monetization, cause inflation. Yet, I argue that there are social and political causes that 
lead to such bad economic policies and outcomes. Unconsolidated democracy, political 
instability, social and political fragmentation, inequality, and high threats to security are 
some of the factors that facilitate persistence of inflation, even though they do not cause 
inflation directly. Such problems may cause governments to spend more and avoid 
austerity measures, and thus, end up with chronic inflation. The socio-political approach 
in the literature considers some of these factors, but mostly for advanced countries. Also, 
the socio-political approach fails to link these factors to the persistence of inflation.  
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
Although economic stabilization measures, such as fiscal and monetary austerity, can decrease 
inflation, politically it is not always easy to implement these measures, because they are widely 
unpopular. Taking this fact into consideration, this study argues that persistence of inflation has 
socio-political dynamics. Therefore, this study strives to find out the relation between several 
socio-political factors (e.g., security concerns, democracy, political institutions, and inequality) 
and the ability to eliminate inflation problem.  
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As with all other economic problems, inflation is an outcome of the interaction between 
economic and political factors, and it requires a multi-disciplinary analysis. The purpose of this 
study is to create a comprehensive framework to explore persistent inflation by adopting an 
analysis that combines economic, political, and social links of the problem.   
Economic theories show us how the mechanics of inflation work and how inflation can 
be stopped. Social-political approach reminds us that, like all other economic problems, inflation 
cannot be solely seen as an economic problem and it is not an easy to resolve problem because of 
its deep socio-political connotations. Based on some premises of the economic approaches and 
inspired by the existing socio-political approach, this study investigates the factors behind the 
persistence of inflation.  
Economic literature explains the persistence of inflation only partially. And the existing 
socio-political approach is too much focused on few political and social factors (welfare state 
and unionization) that are not very relevant for developing countries. This dissertation is focused 
on developing countries and looks into some factors (e.g. security threats, democratic 
consolidation, and electoral system) that the existing literature has not emphasized.  
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3.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study is based on the idea that, considering its causes and effects, inflation is not simply an 
economic problem. When inflation problem appears, various kinds of disinflationary fiscal and 
monetary policies are available for policymakers, but not all policymakers choose to adopt and 
implement them to stop inflation. Thus, it would be interesting to explore what discourages 
governments from implementing disinflationary policies in a timely manner. The theoretical 
framework presented here indicates that the answer may be found in the socio-political features 
that characterize states. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, monetarism (or neo-liberalism) has been the dominant 
approach to inflation over the last two decades. However, it may not provide an adequate 
explanation for persistent inflation, because it focuses on the causes of inflation. Since most 
developed and developing countries have chosen orthodox policies14 in the last two decades and 
almost all of them were able to decrease inflation, monetarist policies are considered to be the 
solution to inflation by most economists and many policymakers. While this study sees 
monetarist policies as an effective treatment of inflation, it also argues that some policymakers 
are not able or willing to introduce those policies, and thus, they continue to live with inflation. 
In other words, disinflationary (monetarist) policies are available to policymakers, but they are 
not always preferred because of some socio-political grounds.  
                                                 
14 Orthodox economic policies are the tight fiscal policies and a fixed exchange rate regime to battle inflation.  
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As structuralists suggest, certain inherent economic structures of developing countries, 
such as lack of resources, and oligopolistic markets, may make them more prone to inflation.15 
For instance, oligopolistic markets cause prices to rise, as there is not enough competition, and 
cause inflation. These are enduring problems, so structuralists anticipate persistent inflation. 
However, structuralists fail to include political structures to their analysis. Moreover, 
explanations of structuralists are contradicted by the fact that most of the developing countries 
have been able to decrease inflation in the last two decades, despite their economic structures. 
Monetarist remedies for inflation work everywhere, whether it is an advanced country or 
developing country or whether there are structural economic problems or not. Similar kinds of 
disinflationary policies (tight fiscal policies and a fixed exchange rate) were implemented in 
countries as diverse as Iceland, Israel, Nicaragua, and Argentina with success (Hamann and Prati 
2003). Hence, structural theories might have explained the emergence of inflation by structural 
economic problems, but they have failed to provide an explanation for its elimination, 
particularly under democratic conditions.  
My hypothesis is that, persistent inflation has some socio-political roots and it 
endures because those socio-political reasons affect the choices of economic policies. We can 
identify endless number of factors that may affect a state’s ability to control inflation, be it 
economic, political, social, or legal. However, the focus of this research is the following: a 
country’s strategic position in the world (whether it is an important country for great power 
politics) and the level of security threats it faces; its domestic political institutions (political 
regime, political system, and electoral and party system); and its degree of inequality and 
                                                 
15 Although structuralists ignored political structures, they did focus on some social structures, such as inequality, 
and monopoly capital. They argued that severe income inequalities in the society may create spirals of inflation 
(Hirschman 1981, 1985). See chapter 8 for a detailed analysis of the relation between inequality and inflation.  
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poverty. These factors affect the economic policies chosen and implemented, and thus, they 
influence the endurance of the inflation problem.  
There are various political and social factors that influence governments’ decisions in 
choosing their economic policies. A country’s security may be a factor. That is, if the is 
continuously under threat, it may have to spend considerable resources for its security needs, 
which in return can increase inflation and impede stabilization efforts under some circumstances. 
Another political factor may be that, strategically important states are more advantaged in 
receiving international funds, which may help them to battle with inflation.  
This study argues that domestic political factors may be another determinant of economic 
policies that sustain inflation. Regime type may determine how much economic policies are 
contested and whether the public has influence on the policies. Democratic countries formulate 
their economic policies more in line with their constituents’ demands, as they worry about re-
election. Parliamentary systems are supposed to be more sensitive to constituents’ demands, 
since, unlike presidential systems, most of its forms seek consensus among different parties. 
Thus, they produce larger government (Persson and Tabellini 1999). They may also be more 
prone to fall down since they depend on the parliament’s confidence (Linz 1990, 1994). This is 
especially true if the electoral system is a proportional representation one (Powell 1982). Also, as 
the party system is more fragmented and competitive, the government becomes more concerned 
about its survival and its economic decisions become more short-sighted (Grilli, Masciandaro et 
al. 1991b).  
Domestic social structures are also expected to affect persistence of inflation. Probably 
the most important social structures that impact inflation are the level of income and the 
distribution of income. I agree with the structuralists that developing countries have fewer 
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resources, so their stable growth opportunities are more restricted. They also have fewer 
resources to distribute to their people. Most developing countries are highly stratified with large 
gaps between social strata. Policymakers may need to pay off some groups in order to maintain 
stability. Thus, as structuralists have also suggested, many developing countries may use 
inflationary policies as a temporary means of redistribution and changing these policies is not 
easy. For instance, they give subsidies to certain sectors or provide excess employment in state 
owned enterprises which contribute to budget deficits and those deficits may be funded through 
creation of more money. Cutting these benefits may help the government control inflation but, at 
least in the short-term, it may create political opposition of the groups that gain from these 
benefits.   
In short, there are various social and political factors behind persistent inflationary 
economic policies. The goal of this research is to reveal some of these factors and to suggest that, 
although lax fiscal and monetary policies produce it, chronic inflation is not simply a monetary 
problem as monetarists argue. The economic policies that the monetarists suggest can decrease 
inflation. However, monetarism or any other merely economic theory falls short of explaining 
persistent inflation, because they say nothing about the motivations and choices that drive 
economic policies. A full understanding of persistent inflation requires an analysis of socio-
political factors that promote inflationary policies.  
At the same time, a better understanding of inflation does not necessarily mean giving 
inflation priority over other problems. On the contrary, understanding the linkages between 
inflation and socio-political issues may help us recognize that economic policies which are 
considered “sound” by international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are not 
always a priority for governments. Governments feel the need to balance price stabilization goal 
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with other economic, social, and political goals such as employment, redistribution, and regime 
stability.  
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this study, I try to explore why some governments cannot or do not address the inflation 
problem in a timely manner. I argue that a framework that attempts to account for persistent 
inflation should incorporate socio-political factors. Therefore, the central question this research 
seeks to answer is how socio-political factors deter economic policies that eliminate inflation. 
The answer to this question may then explain the differences in success in battling persistent 
inflation.  
Many different economic causes of inflation can be listed, e.g. high public sector budget 
deficits, persistent inflationary expectations of agents, changes in exchange rates, monetization, 
and so on. Because these fail to consider the role of social and political influences, they are 
inadequate. However, this study mainly focuses on the socio-political factors on inflation, 
which inhibit or make it difficult for governments to apply disinflationary policies that 
would end persistent inflation.  
In trying to specify the socio-political conditions that cause inflation to persist, this 
dissertation tries to answer three main sub-questions: 
1. How do strategic and security concerns affect choices of policies regarding inflation? 
2. How do domestic political structures and institutions influence choices of policies 
regarding inflation? 
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3. How do social structures, particularly poverty and inequality, affect choices of policies 
regarding inflation? 
3.2 THE MODEL 
The goal in this study is to provide a more comprehensive account of persistent inflation than 
mainstream economic theories have thus far offered. Therefore, the model that directs this study 
is composed of some international and domestic socio-political factors that facilitate policies that 
allow inflation to persist.  
This dissertation is built on a model in which the dependent variable is the persistence of 
inflation (see Figure 3 below). Also, in this study persistence of inflation implies inability of the 
state to choose policies that would stabilize prices. The independent variables are 
international political factors (strategic importance and security threats), domestic political 
factors (political regime type, political system, and electoral and party system), and social 
factors (inequality and poverty). The intermediary variable international aid (loans and grants) 
links some international factors to persistence of inflation. It is also acknowledged that there is a 
policy link between the socio-political variables and persistence of inflation, i.e. socio-political 
variables influence the economic policies chosen which then determine whether the government 
can successfully eliminate inflation or continue to have high inflation. However, given the 
worldwide acceptance of monetarism and undesirability of inflation since early 1980s, it is 
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assumed that all governments would adopt disinflationary (monetarist) economic policies unless 
they are limited by the social and political factors.16 
Figure 3: Suggested Model of persistent inflation17 
  
Strategic and security concerns     (1a) 
      
                        (1c)    International assistance 
              
 Domestic political factors             (1b) 
            
(2) 
          
              (4) Persistence of 
            Inflationary   inflation (Ability  
      policies  to stabilize prices) 
       (3)                          
            
 
Social structures 
 
   
 
Hypothesis (1):  Strategic position and security concerns of a state may directly and 
indirectly influence its ability to succeed in price stabilization, as they affect 
the economic policies chosen.  
 
(1a): Strategically important states are treated more generously by the 
IMF and World Bank as they are given more international aid. 
 
                                                 
16 This means that some factors, such as political beliefs, political courage or risk averseness, are not taken into 
account in this dissertation. If the time span of this study went further back into 1950s and 1960s when monetarism 
was not the dominant economic view and undesirability inflation was more debated, it would be impossible to 
ignore these factors,.  
17 Although dashed lines also show relations between variables, they are excluded from the analysis in order to 
simplify the model and the explanation.  
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 (1b): International aid increases states’ ability to battle inflation as this 
aid can be used to finance budget deficits that cause inflation. 
 
(1c): High security concerns cause states to spend significant economic 
resources on military. This makes it harder for these states to 
stabilize prices. 
 
 
Hypothesis (2): Political institutions of a state affect the economic policies chosen, and thus, 
the ability to stabilize prices. 
 
 Democratic regimes are more sensitive to demands of their 
constituents in choosing economic policies, so it may take them 
longer to stabilize prices. 
 
 Presidential systems are more able than parliamentary systems to 
introduce and implement price stabilization policies, as they can be 
less sensitive to the demands of their constituents. 
 
 It takes longer to chose and implement price stabilization policies 
if the party system is polarized and fragmented. Since proportional 
representation (PR) election systems produce more fragmented 
party systems, they are also more associated with persistent 
inflation.  
 
 
Hypothesis (3):  Social structures related to income levels and income disparities influence 
the economic policies chosen, and thus, affect the ability of states to 
stabilize prices.18  
 
 Income inequality, i.e. differences of income between the rich and 
the poor, makes it harder for states to implement disinflationary 
policies, as those differences inflame populist economic policies.  
 
 The rate of poverty in a country makes it harder for countries to 
implement disinflationary policies, because poor masses encourage 
populist economic policies. 
 
                                                 
18 Although there may be other social structures that affect inflation, here the focus is only on income inequality and 
rate of poverty. This is also the only social structure that structuralism has focused on. The mainstream socio-
political approach on inflation emphasizes unions and welfare state, but these are not well-established structures in 
developing countries, so they are not as relevant for the case studies of this study. Social groups and their respective 
power may influence inflationary policies, but this variable is very difficult to measure. And the rest of the social 
structures (e.g., family) do not have a direct relation with inflation or inflationary policies.  
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Hypothesis (4):  The persistence of inflation depends on fiscal and monetary policies chosen. 
Lax economic policies sustain inflation. 
 
Although reasons behind the emergence of inflation may be the same for most states, the 
difference in the persistence level of inflation may be better understood when socio-political 
factors are taken into account. This dissertation argues that there are various international and 
domestic political and social factors that may make it harder for states to introduce and 
implement price stabilization. As a result, these states suffer from persistent inflation. Although 
these socio-political factors may also affect and interact with each other (as marked by dashed 
lines in Figure 3), this model only focuses on the relations that are thought to have the most 
important effects on price stabilization.19  
The variables, their definitions, measures and sources of data are listed below. Detailed 
information on the measures and sources of data can be found in Appendix-I.  
3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In this study there are three main independent factors: strategic and security concerns, domestic 
political factors, and social structures. It is suggested that these three groups of factors influence 
the economic policies adopted, and thus, affect the ability of a state to stabilize prices and 
eliminate persistent inflation. 
                                                 
19 As shown in the model (Figure I.1), independent variables may be affected by each other and even by the 
dependent variable. Such relations may cause bias in statistical analyses through multicollinearity and simultaneous 
causality. In Chapter 9, this type of problems are handled by employing factor analyses, robust regression analysis, 
and some simple causality analyses that check whether there is reverse causality in the model. 
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3.3.1 Strategic and Security Concerns 
Strategic position: According to the definition used here, the strategic position of a country is 
determined by its geographical location and its military power. Thus, a country is strategically 
important when it is geographically located close to or in the center of an area that is of main 
interest to great powers.  
The strategic position of a country in the international system determines its relations not 
only with other countries but also with international financial institutions, like the IMF. 
Countries that are strategically important to the West are treated much more generously and with 
more tolerance by international financers, since the resources of these institutions are mostly 
provided by the Western countries (Stiles 1990; Bird 1996; Oatley and Yackee 2000).  
It is hard to measure strategic importance, but this qualitative variable is evaluated 
through geographical location of a country and through some quantitative data about the size of 
its economy (see Chapter 4 for details). These data are taken from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) database 
maintained by Norman Paterson School of International Affairs of Carleton University, and 
database of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC).  
Security threats: In this study, security threat is understood as the possibility of military 
confrontation. It is related to how much a country feels militarily insecure. A security threat may 
come not only from other countries (e.g., a threat or actual military attack) but also from groups 
within the country (e.g., guerilla movements). A state that has the ability to acquire a dominant 
position in its relation to other states and to defeat all rebel groups within the country can be 
considered powerful, but it does not mean that it has fewer threats to its security. Security threats 
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are more related to whether the country has friendly or conflictual relations with other countries 
and whether there is political peace within the country.  
Military resources are considered to be a solution to the feeling of insecurity of states. 
Security threats that a state perceives determine the demand for military spending. Unless its 
military spending is financed by other states, a state may have to spend significant amounts to 
provide its security. Therefore, for states under high security threats, fiscal and monetary 
austerity is harder to achieve. High security threats affect the battle with inflation as they require 
more economic resources to be diverted to military.  
The security threats a state perceives are very much determined by the past and present 
conflicts the country has had. If a country is located close to or in the center of a conflict area, or 
if it has one or more confrontational neighboring countries, this is also an indication of amount 
of threats to its security. In this study, this variable is measured by the amount of military 
conflicts a country has had in the past and the existing conflicts with other states and within the 
country. These data are taken from Conflictbarometer report of the Heidelberg Institute of 
International Conflict Research (HIIK). Also, the geographical location of the countries is 
evaluated to determine whether they are more prone to conflicts.  
International aid: In this study, international assistance is an intermediary variable. It 
links the variables strategic importance and security threats to price stabilization. It is argued that 
countries that are of high strategic importance receive more international assistance. International 
assistance help the recipients balance their budgets and, thus, help them stabilize prices.  
There are three types of international assistance that are discussed in this study: 
assistance from international financial institutions (the IMF and World Bank), assistance directly 
from other states (official aid), and military aid. Significant international financial assistance may 
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help governments to stabilize prices as they directly relieve budget deficits. Yet, type of 
assistance may make a difference. Grants may be more helpful for eliminating persistent 
inflation than loans, as they do not need to be repaid in future. 
In this study the variable international assistance is measured by the amount of assistance 
received from the IMF and the World Bank, official aid received from other countries, and 
military aid received from other countries. The data are taken from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank, International Financial Statistics database of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Greenbook (The U.S. Loans & Grants) database of 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
3.3.2 Domestic Political Factors 
Political regime type: In this study political regime type is a political spectrum that extends from 
democracy to dictatorship, i.e. it is related to how democratic or authoritarian a state is. Political 
regime type is determined by the extent of civil liberties and political rights, ranging from free 
and regular elections and free expression of thought to freedom of organizing. The degree of 
democracy is a factor that determines the influence of constituents on economic decision-
making. Theoretically, the more democratic a country is, the more economic decision-making 
reflects the interests of the majority, so it would not be easy to implement economic policies that 
hurt the majority of the population (Cheibub 1998; Gasiorowski 2000a; Desai, Olofsgard et al. 
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2002). Although low inflation may eventually benefit all, the short-term burden of austerity 
policies to fight inflation is usually heavy, and thus politically risky, to be implemented.20  
In this study political regime type is measured by indices of democracy and the changes 
in those indices. Some ready classifications are also used. These data are taken from the 
classification of regimes in ACLP (Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi 
and Adam Przeworski) Database (1994); Freedom in the World statistics of the Freedom House; 
and Polity IV Country Reports, which is maintained by University of Maryland's Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). ACLP Database makes three 
classifications of the regimes: democracy, bureaucracy (dictatorships with a legislature), and 
autocracy (dictatorships without a legislature). Freedom in the World ranks civil liberties and 
political freedom from 1 to 7, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free rating. Through 
liberties and political freedom rankings, Freedom in the World also classifies countries as free, 
partly free, or not free.21 In the Polity IV statistics, democracy and autocracy indicators are 
additive eleven-point scales (0-10), which are derived from codings of the competitiveness of 
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive.22    
Political system: The relations among a country’s governing institutions differ depending on its 
political system, i.e. whether a country has a presidential, parliamentary or a hybrid political 
system. A political system concerns particularly the relation between the country’s legislative 
                                                 
20 In cases of hyperinflation, like Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Peru, it may be easier for people to accept 
austerity compared to where inflation is only high or moderate as there is loess feeling of urgency and less acute 
fiscal imbalances. 
21 Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are 
designated "free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” 
22 The polity score, which is the main indicator used from that database, is computed by subtracting the autocracy 
score from the democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic). 
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and executive bodies. Although each country has its own variation on these political typologies, 
some conclusions have been drawn about the general characteristics of political systems and 
their relationship to political conflict and executive and legislative power.  
In presidential systems the executive is not dependent on legislative support. Also, 
presidents are elected by voters, have paramount executive authority, and they are also formal 
head of state. This gives them a freer hand in policymaking. They have a tendency to make many 
economic policy decisions by issuing presidential decrees and to rely on insulated "technocratic 
teams" to develop and implement policies (Shugart and Haggard 2001; Cheibub and Limongi 
2002). Thus, it can be suggested that, compared to parliamentary governments, which rely more 
on consensus, it is easier for presidential systems to initiate reforms and employ unpopular 
economic stability measures.  
In parliamentary systems the executive (government) is dependent on legislative support 
and normally emerges from within legislature. As opposed to the presidential system, 
governments of parliamentary systems do not have fixed terms—they may be replaced at any 
time by legislature. The governments of parliamentary systems look for consensus (especially if 
the government is a coalition) in order to survive, since they are dependent on the confidence of 
the parliament. Therefore, their decision-making processes are more participatory as it involves 
negotiation, bargaining, and consultation (Shugart and Carey 1992; Sartori 1994b; Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001).  
To measure this variable, states are classified as “parliamentary,” “presidential,” or 
“mixed system” according to the characteristics of their executive and legislative institutions. 
These classifications are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the 
Development Research Group of the World Bank. 
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Electoral and Party Systems: Political parties are institutions composed of coalitions of citizens 
that participate in the forming of the political will of the people and contest in elections for 
legislative seats and positions in government. They attempt to influence government by 
occupying it or by opposing it. A political party system is the system of interactions resulting 
from political competition among parties. Different parties have different economic programs, 
because they appeal to different interests, so their economic programs reflect their constituents’ 
interests and they compete to attract more constituents.  
The polarization and fragmentation of the party the system in a country is by and large 
determined by the electoral system. An electoral system is the system of rules regarding how 
politicians are chosen to political positions. There are two main types of electoral systems: 
proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian system. The other electoral systems fall in 
between these two typologies. The PR facilitates and reflects polarization and fragmentation in 
the party system, as it allows tiny parties to hold seats (Powell 1982; Roubini and Sachs 1989a; 
Grilli, Masciandaro et al. 1991a). Majoritarian systems prevent this by their winner-take-all 
feature (Powell 1982; Stein, Talvi et al. 1998). Therefore, by looking at the electoral system of a 
country, we can get an idea about the polarization and fragmentation of the party system. The 
data on electoral systems are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the 
Development Research Group of the World Bank. 
The dominant perspective in political economy considers fragmentation and polarization 
of party system as political impediments to economic adjustment (Roubini and Sachs 1989a; 
Grilli, Masciandaro et al. 1991a; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999).  Therefore, it 
is expected that states with highly fragmented and polarized party systems have more difficulty 
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in consistently choosing and implementing disinflationary policies, and thus, controlling inflation 
permanently.  
Polarization, defined as the ideological distance between parties, is an important element 
of political party system. The higher the polarization of parties is, higher is the politicization of 
economic policies. As parties ideologically diverge more from the center, some of them tend to 
advocate more lax fiscal and monetary policies. Polarization data are taken from the DPI, which 
measures polarization as the maximum difference between the chief executive’s party’s value 
(right, left, or center) and the values of the three largest government parties and the largest 
opposition party.  
Political fragmentation is another important quality of a party system and it is defined as 
the number of political parties that are significant players in the legislature. Fragmentation of the 
party system is measured by some well-known indicators of fragmentation, such as the effective 
number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Lijphart 1994) and the fractionalization index 
for the government, legislature, and the opposition (Beck, Keefer et al. 2004). Effective number 
of parties is defined as the number of political parties that are significant players in the 
legislature. It takes not only the number of parties but also their relative weights into account 
(Lijphart 1995). The fractionalization index is defined as the probability that, when you pick two 
legislators randomly, each belongs to different parties. Its value ranges between 0 and 1, and 
values greater than 0.5 indicate a multi-party system. As the index value approaches one, the 
number of parties in the system increases. The fractionalization data are taken from the 
government fractionalization, opposition fractionalization, and total legislature fractionalization 
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indicators of the DPI. The effective number of parties is calculated from the fractionalization 
values.23  
3.3.3 Social structures 
In the original socio-political approach to inflation power of the trade unions is the main focus as 
social factor and, as can be recalled from Chapter 2, it is because unions are powerful actors in 
most industrialized countries that these studies look into (Olson 1975; Crouch 1978; Goldthorpe 
1978). However, this study chooses not to focus on unions as social factors, because they are not 
very powerful actors in developing countries which this study analyzes. Instead, as some 
structuralists did, inequality and poverty are used as social variables that affect inflation. 
According to structuralists, inequality and poverty are among the causes of inflation (Kuznets 
1955; Hirschman 1981, 1985). Political economists, both old and new, also focused on 
inequality, especially the lack of consensus that it causes in the society which eventually 
encourages inflationary policies. Inequality and poverty determine many other structures in the 
society and polity, such as economic policies and political stability. 
Inequality: In this dissertation inequality stands for income inequality and implies the degree of 
imbalance in the distribution of income. Inequality in a country gives us an idea about social 
structures in that country. Economically it is related to the amount of economic means and the 
                                                 
23 Fractionalization index is calculated for parties, which have seats in the legislature, by the formula (1 - 2
i
s∑ ), 
where represents party i’s proportion of the seats in the legislature. The effective number of parties is 
calculated as
si
∑ 21 is . Therefore, by using the fractionalization index value, you can calculate the effective 
number of parties and vice versa.  
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share of economic output a class possesses relative to others. In unequal societies, there are huge 
gaps between social classes. Inequality also affects governments’ ability to stabilize prices, as it 
shapes the economic policies chosen. Inequality may provoke social and political crises. The 
higher is inequality, the more conflictual may get the relation among classes (Burdekin and 
Burkett 1996). Then, the polity may get threatened and the economic decisions may be made to 
ease these conflicts or to avoid economic policies that would intensify them. Thus, usually when 
there are already tense class relations, austerity policies are hard to implement (Dornbusch and 
Edwards 1991; Easterly and Fischer 2001). Inequality may also bring some regimes into power 
that care less about inflation than redistribution.  
The data on inequality are gathered from World Bank’s database World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Inequality is measured through Gini coefficient and percentage shares of 
income.24  
Poverty: Poverty implies lack of resources or low standards of living. In its extreme forms, 
people even lack enough food, clean water, any healthcare or any kind of education that would 
let them sustain their lives. Poverty may have an affect on ability to reduce inflation similar to 
that of inequality. High poverty indicates a considerable proportion of the population is deprived 
of necessary economic resources. As poor social groups are usually the less powerful ones, high 
poverty may mean less influence of these groups on economic decision-making. However, it 
                                                 
24 Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total 
income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The 
Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a 
percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 
1 implies perfect inequality. Countries which have Gini coefficient over 0.40 can be considered considerably 
unequal. 
Percentage share of income is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. 
(“World Development Indicators, 2005” World Bank) The higher the difference between the share of income of the 
lower and higher subgroups, the higher the inequality is in that society.  
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may also motivate some governments to seek inflationary policies for redistribution purposes, as 
poverty may increase chances of social conflict (Easterly and Fischer 2001).  
In this study poverty is measured by the percentage of population under poverty line (1 
dollar per day) and poverty gap.25 These data are gathered from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
3.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Dependent variables of this study include economic policies (fiscal polices and monetary 
policies) chosen by the governments and the persistent inflation they may cause. The monetary 
and fiscal policies chosen and implemented are affected by the international and domestic 
political factors as well as social factors. Depending on the economic policies adopted, inflation 
may either persist or disappear.  
3.4.1 Economic policies 
Fiscal policies: Fiscal policy is the management of government purchases, transfer payments, 
taxes, and borrowing in order to influence macroeconomic variables such as real GDP, 
employment, the price level, and the economic growth. The key aspect of fiscal policies is the 
national budget. A budget is a plan for how the government spends its limited resources. 
                                                 
25 Poverty gap is the mean shortfall separating the population from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having 
zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The shortfall is calculated by averaging population 
incomes (with anything above the poverty line counting as $1) and subtracting that average from the poverty line. 
This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. (“World Development Indicators, 2006” online, 
World Bank, http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/table2_7.htm ) mean distance  
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Budgeting is a political allocation process where general policy objectives are translated into 
specific programs and projects in order to attain social, political and economic goals.  
Budgets reflect the balance between revenues and spending of a government. 
Government spending includes public employees’ wages, public purchases of goods and 
services, transfer payments, and social security and retirement payments. Government revenues 
come from state owned enterprises’ profits (if any), taxes, and borrowing.  
There are various political conflicts and competition in the budgeting process. The 
conflicts and competition essentially occur because all different participants request their 
political opinions and priorities in budgetary process. Most of the government revenues come 
through taxation. Taxation policies reflect government’s preferences towards economic groups 
and sectors. The government spending (wages, subsidies, military expenses, investment, foreign 
debt service, and so on) also reflects the ongoing social and political forces. As constituents are 
reluctant to pay higher taxes, usually governments are reluctant to increase taxes even when the 
spending is on the rise. If the gap between government revenue and spending widens and the 
government has difficulties in financing that deficit, it starts to print money to finance the deficit, 
and this causes inflation to rise. If this situation continues, inflation becomes persistent.    
Monetary policies: Monetary policy is the set of measures taken by the monetary authority (the 
Central Bank) to influence the availability and cost of money and credit, as a way helping to 
achieve national economic goals. It is the management of the amount of money and the financial 
conditions, such as interest rates, credit volumes, discount rates for minimum reserve 
requirements and others. Monetary policy is closely related to inflation, because the broad goal 
of monetary policy is to achieve price stability. Lax monetary policies, especially increasing the 
money in circulation through monetization of the deficits, are considered to be the main 
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economic reason behind inflation. If states do not adopt tight monetary policies, they cannot 
stabilize prices. Monetary policies are affected by social and political structures, so it is not 
always easy to adopt sound monetary policies. They are particularly influenced by the stability of 
the government. This variable is also affected by international factors, especially through 
pressures from international financial institutions which tend to be more benevolent to 
strategically important states.  
Fiscal and monetary policies will not be directly measured in this study. As it is widely 
known that lax fiscal and monetary policies definitely cause inflation, and thus, the continuation 
of these policies cause persistent inflation, persistent inflation will be used as the only dependent 
variable to be measured. The effect of socio-political variables will also be directly analyzed in 
relation to persistence of inflation.   
3.4.2 Persistence of Inflation 
The ultimate dependent variable of this study is the “ability to stabilize prices.“ Persistence of 
inflation also implies the inability to stabilize prices, because states which are not able to 
stabilize prices for long-term end up with persistent inflation. Therefore, these two terms are 
used interchangeably in this study. It is because this study assumes that any government which 
can institute disinflationary (monetarist) policies will do so. The time span of this study is 1975-
2000, when the monetarist view has been exceedingly dominant, and thus, inflation has been 
regarded as the primary economic ill that has to be dealt with. Consequently, unless socio-
political pressures push the governments otherwise, they would adopt anti-inflationary policies 
and end inflation.  
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Inflation is a general rise in prices across the economy. The persistence of inflation is 
continuation of inflationary environment for extended period of time, at least more than a 
decade. Inflation is caused by lax fiscal and monetary policies, but the ability to achieve price 
stabilization through tight macroeconomic policies may depend on political (both international 
and domestic) and social conditions of a country. For instance, lax fiscal policy is a factor which 
can explain why there is inflation, but its long-term adoption can be explained by socio-political 
factors, such as security threats, political regime, or income inequality.  
Here the endogenous variable is the ability to successfully stabilize prices before it 
persists for more than two decades. Persistence of inflation is measured by how many years it 
has taken states to attain price stability. The length of each country’s inflationary episode is 
calculated easily from inflation statistics of the IMF by adding up the number of years with high 
inflation for each state.  
3.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research has both descriptive and explanatory goals. The primary design of this study is 
explanatory, because it designs a comprehensive socio-political model that explains the 
persistence of inflation. Therefore, it puts several causal hypotheses together to explain the 
ability of states to end inflation. We can use the results of this study to argue that some socio-
political factors are associated with persistence of inflation.  
Since there is a rich literature on inflation, the relations set in hypotheses are largely 
derived from the existing literature. These hypotheses are then put into test through five 
comparative cases: Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey. These were chosen from the 
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population of inflationary countries with different levels of success in stabilizing prices (i.e., 
different levels of inflation persistence). The goal is to explain the reasons behind this variety in 
success. Lastly, a cross-national analysis is employed and its results are compared with the 
conclusions of the case studies. 
3.5.1 Selection and Classification of Cases 
This study combines a comparative case study with a cross-national analysis. As I try to explain 
the reasons why different countries have performed differently in dealing with persistent 
inflation, all the cases I selected (Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey) are among 
countries which had persistent inflation. The cases were selected according to how they vary 
along my socio-political variables: strategic importance, security threats, political regime, 
political system, electoral and party system, inequality, and poverty. 
The case study methodology is particularly good for in-depth understanding of a 
phenomenon or a complex policy problem. It can strengthen and add details to what is already 
known through previous research. Case studies are seen useless for providing reliability and 
generalizability of findings, but in that respect comparative case studies fare better than single 
case studies (Eckstein 1973; Manheim, Rich et al. 2002). Therefore, five cases are chosen in this 
study to compare and contrast and to get detailed information about the conditions in those 
countries while they successfully stabilize prices.  
As my main objective is to understand the process of persistent inflation, a comparative 
case study is well suited for this study. Although a comparison of five cases may not provide 
reliable theory testing, it can provide rich detail on causal relations. The analysis of five different 
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cases would also demonstrate us how diverse the socio-political process of persistent inflation 
and price stabilization in those countries was. 
The main focus of this dissertation is inflationary middle-income developing countries 
which are considered “emerging markets.” As can be seen from Table 7, there are many 
countries that suffered from high inflation through several decades, but only come of them are 
emerging markets. Although there is no commonly accepted definition of an emerging market, it 
is usually a middle-income economy, which is significantly big and growing through 
internationalization. Arnold & Quelch (1998) identified three characteristics of emerging 
markets: at least a middle level of economic development, fast increasing economic 
development, and a working and stable free-market system. Emerging market economies are 
important to focus on, because they are considered to be exemplars for other developing 
economies that strive for economic growth and prosperity. Alice H Amsden (2001) considers 
them as the new rising economies that have been globally competing and economically 
challenging the advanced countries of the West and Japan. According to Garten (1997), the big 
ten emerging markets are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, South 
Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. 
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Table 7: Countries with inflation problems  
(countries with average inflation rate higher than 20% per decade) 
 
Only in 1970s and 
1980s 
Only in 1980s and 
1990s 
In 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s 
From 1970s up until 
2004  
Chile 
Iceland 
Israel 
Uganda 
Colombia 
Guyana 
Lebanon 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
Poland 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Nicaragua 
Peru  
Uruguay  
 
Dem. Rep. of Congo 
Lao, PDR 
Turkey 
 
 
Besides being one of the ten big emerging markets of the world (Garten 1997), Turkey is 
also an interesting case in terms of its domestic politics and international position. It has a 
parliamentary system with significant regime and government instabilities. Besides, 
internationally it is an important actor because of its geo-strategic position. 
I decided to focus on Argentina and Brazil, because not only they are both considered big 
emerging economies but also they have distinctive political institutions and political problems. 
For instance, they both have had major shifts between democracy and authoritarianism. Both 
have presidential systems with strong presidents. Both use proportional representation electoral 
systems, but Brazil uses open lists while Argentina uses closed lists. Argentina is essentially a 
two-party system, while Brazil has a very fragmented party system.  
I chose Mexico as one of my case studies because it is another big emerging market and 
it has an unusual political structure. In Mexico, there was strong one-party rule for 71 years up 
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until 2000. That has given Mexico an extraordinary political stability and this distinguishes it 
from all other cases I look into.   
Israel is not an emerging market. However, I chose to focus on Israel, because unlike my 
other cases it is a higher income country with no significant inequality problem. Also, it has 
major security problems and it receives very high amount of official aid. Also, it is a 
parliamentary system like Turkey.  
After selecting the cases to analyze, I classified them according to their success with 
price stabilization. As can be seen in Table 8, all the cases I picked have had long-term inflation 
problem. What counts as success in this study is neither the exact level of inflation nor how sharp 
the fall in inflation was after the destabilization program. What matters is the number of years 
countries had high- or hyperinflation (at least 20 percent inflation over a year period) since 1970. 
According to that criterion, Turkey is the country with the most persistent inflation problem 
among those five cases. Although Turkey did not have hyperinflation, like Argentina and Brazil 
did, it is considered as the “most unsuccessful” case in this study as it was unable to lower its 
inflation below 20 percent for 24 years of the 26 year period between 1975 and 2000. Another 
reason that it is the most unsuccessful case is that its inflation persisted even beyond 2000, until 
2003. 
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Table 8: Number of years with high inflation in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico and 
Turkey in 1975-200026 
Number of years with 
20% or higher inflation 
Argentina 18
Brazil 21
Israel 13
Mexico 16
Turkey 24
 
As Israel and Mexico were able to decrease inflation to one-digit levels in 1980s (in 13 
and 16 years respectively), they constitute “successful” cases. Argentina and Brazil were able to 
decrease inflation to one-digit levels in 1990s, after battling with it for 18 and 21 years 
respectively. Thus, they are considered as “moderately successful” cases.  
While selecting the cases, I paid particular attention on comparability of the cases. 
Although it is slightly more advanced compared to other four cases, Israel suffered serious 
inflationary problems between 1974 and 1986. As it had a parliamentary system, its political 
institutions are more similar to Turkey than Latin American cases. Israel was successful in 
decreasing inflation, despite its parliamentary and fragmented political system. Also, like 
                                                 
26  
Table 8 shows how many of the 26 years between 1975 and 2000 were inflationary in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, 
Mexico, and Turkey. Although these inflationary years may not be consecutive, one or few years with low inflation 
followed by another period of high inflation does not imply disinflation success, but rather continuation of the 
inflation problem. Therefore, this study focuses on the actual number of inflationary years, not on number of 
consecutive inflationary years. 
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Turkey, it has a very important strategic position. Therefore, it is a very critical case to compare 
with Turkey.  
Among the Latin American cases, Mexico is a “successful” case, while Argentina and 
Brazil are “moderately successful” cases. However, politically (both international and domestic) 
they all have different structures from Turkey and Israel, and to a lesser extend, even from each 
other. They are all presidential systems, while Turkey and Israel are parliamentary systems. 
Their strategic position is not very important, probably with the exception of Mexico, and they 
perceive few security threats. As a result, they do not get as much bilateral aid as Turkey and 
Israel do. Yet, socially these Latin American cases are more similar to Turkey than Israel. They 
are all unequal societies with significant population segments that live in poverty. On the other 
hand, Mexico is a case of extreme regime and government stability, while Argentina and Brazil 
are examples of serious regime instabilities. However, since 1970 Brazil has had more unstable 
governments than Argentina (21 governments versus 9 governments), thanks to its fragmented 
and undisciplined party system.   
3.5.2 Cross-national Analysis 
If a comparative case study is supplemented with a cross-national study, the findings can be 
more reliable and generalizable. Therefore, this study combines comparative case study method 
with cross-national analysis method.  
After comparing and contrasting fives cases through my socio-political model, the model 
is employed cross-nationally. The purpose is to review the validity of the case study findings on 
a larger sample. As mentioned above, case studies provide us rich detail but they fail generate 
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generalizable findings. A larger sample cross-national study would tell us whether the case study 
results are valid beyond these five cases.  
In order to employ a larger sample cross-national study, 55 independent variables are 
taken from various databases, mainly from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Polity IV of the Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management, and Database of Political Institutions of Thorsten Beck, Philip E. 
Keefer et.al.27 Then, these variables are classified under the categories defined in the case studies 
(strategic and security issues, political regime, political system, party and electoral system, and 
poverty and inequality) and used in the cross-national analysis for 45 observations.28 In cross-
national analysis, factor analysis is used to decrease the number of variables. Regression analysis 
is used to evaluate the significance of relations between independent variables and the dependent 
variable (persistence of inflation). Also, some simple analyses are employed to check causal 
relations between the variables. (Details of the statistical analyses can be found at Chapter 9.) 
Consequently, in addition to a five case comparative study, this dissertation contains a 
cross-national analysis, which seeks to test the relations between persistent inflation and socio-
political variables. Later, the results of the comparative case analyses and cross-national analyses 
are compared to reach conclusions.  
                                                 
27 All the indicators used in the cross-national study and their sources are listed in Appendix-5. 
28 The original sample consisted of 148 states, all states which have inflation data. Yet, number of observations fell 
from 148 to 45 because of lack of complete data on other variables.  
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3.5.3 Data Sources and Data Collection 
In this analysis I decided to focus on the period from 1975 to 2000. The 1970s is the period when 
a lot of middle income countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey, 
experienced rising inflation. In the 1980s many countries had high inflation. In the 1990s many 
countries succeeded in stabilizing their prices. However, this time newly independent or ex-
communist countries had few years of high inflation. In the beginning of twenty-first century, 
very few countries with high inflation were left. In sum, while it was very common for states to 
experience high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, it was unusual to still have high inflation by the 
1990s. Therefore, 1975-2000 is a good period to observe variances in the ability of countries to 
end persistent inflation.  
Another factor that motivated me to focus on the 1975-2000 period is the availability of 
data. While you can find most economic variables for many decades back, most of the political 
databases are relatively new and start from the 1970s and end in 2000. Availability of data is 
very crucial for cross-national analysis. For this study, 1975-2000 is the optimal period for 
meaningful statistical analysis. However, for case studies, in some instances I have gone beyond 
that period in order to add more detail and evidence to the analysis.  
I had to aggregate data on my cases’ economic, social, and political characteristics, 
especially while conducting the cross-national analysis. Most of these data (military expenditure, 
Gini coefficient, distribution of income of percentiles, number of effective parties in the political 
system, and so on) are secondary data that are collected by national institutes and by 
international institutions. Almost all economic and social variables are taken from World Bank 
database, World Development Indicators. Most of the political variables are taken from Polity IV 
database of Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) of the 
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University of Maryland and Database of Political Institutions (DPI) compiled by the 
Development Research Group of the World Bank.29 Both of these political databases are the 
most complete and most widely utilized databases for political economy research.  
The next five chapters will analyze how these factors affect the ability of states to 
stabilize prices through a comparison of five cases (Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and 
Turkey) for a period extending from 1970s to 2000s. Chapter 4 focuses on the international 
political factors, mainly strategic and security concerns and international assistance. Chapter 5 
looks into the relation between political regime and the ability to eliminate persistent inflation. 
Chapter 6 is focused on political systems and Chapter 7 is focused on electoral and party 
systems. Chapter 8, which analyzes the effect of poverty and inequality on the ability to stabilize 
prices, is followed by a statistical cross-national analysis of these variables on a larger sample of 
countries.  
                                                 
29 The authors of DPI are World Bank economists Thorsten Beck , Philip E. Keefer, and George R. Clarke and non-
World Bank economists Patrich Walsh and Alberto Groff.  
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4.0  INFLATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
In this chapter I consider the argument that international political factors, such as strategic 
importance and security threats, are related to the ability to eliminate inflation. International 
politics can influence a country’s ability to get rid of persistent inflation in two ways: 
• by facilitating an inflow of funds through international financial institutions or directly 
through official aid. Strategically more important developing countries may receive more 
international aid, which may allow them to decrease budget deficits and, thus, help 
governments decrease inflation.  
• by putting strains on its budget through military expenses. More security threats cause 
more military expenditure which may contribute to budget deficits and thus make price 
stabilization more difficult.  
These relationships are demonstrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: The relation between international politics and ability to stabilize prices 
 
Strategic 
importance 
Security 
threats 
International 
aid 
Military 
expenses 
Economic 
policies 
Persistence 
of inflation International 
Politics 
 
 
The relationship between international politics and price stabilization has not been 
studied previously. By examining the international politics of Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, 
and Turkey, this chapter reviews the argument that strategic importance increases and security 
threats decrease the capacity of government to eliminate persistent inflation. However, the 
findings reveal that the strategic importance of a country is not closely related to success in 
fighting inflation. The amount of funding from international financial institutions (The World 
Bank and the IMF) does not seem to be affected completely by international politics. And the 
effect of such funding does not seem to determine success in disinflation.  
However, it is discovered that high security threats may cause a significant resource 
transfer to the military, making it harder to find resources to fight inflation. This finding is 
especially valid if the country that makes significant military spending is not provided with a 
significant amount of military aid by other countries. In fact, military expenditures are a problem 
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for inflation to the extent that they put a burden on the budget. Thus, international politics has an 
indirect effect on price stabilization through military spending and international aid received.  
4.1 STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND INFLATION STABILIZATION 
The assumption in this section is that strategically important countries are provided with more 
financial support. It is expected that the financial support provided to strategically important 
countries may help them to decrease their budget deficits and thus prevent monetization, which 
is the main cause of persistent inflation.  
The strategic position of a country is determined by that country’s geographical location 
and its importance as an international actor in a political and economic sense. Thus, a country is 
strategically important when it is geographically located close to or in the center of a conflict 
area. A country is also strategically important if its economy is significantly big.30 Any of these 
factors may give a country strategic significance. None of the cases in this study are great 
powers, but their importance for great powers, especially for the US, differs along more or less 
the same variables. Here I try to evaluate the strategic importance of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Israel, and Turkey through their geographical location and the size of their economy.  
The strategic position of a country in the international system not only determines its 
relations with other countries but it may also affect its relations with international financial 
institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank. Countries that are strategically important to the 
                                                 
30 As a rule of thumb this study considers the top 20 countries with highest GDP (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland,  the UK, and the US) as significant economies, according to the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2000 data (averaged for years 1975-2000).  
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West may be treated with greater generosity by international financial institutions, since most of 
the resources of these institutions are provided by the western industrialized countries. They may 
also receive a considerable amount of official aid from individual countries. Strategically 
important countries may use these funds to relieve their budget deficits and have less difficulty in 
eliminating inflation.   
4.1.1 Geographical location 
The location of a country is very important in determining strategic importance. Countries that 
are located in areas of interest to great powers, i.e. the areas in or adjacent to the arenas of power 
politics, are considered to be strategically important. If a country is strategically important, it is 
usually provided with more international aid which may help resolve inflation problem by 
reducing budget deficit.  
As the main superpower, the US shows special interest in certain parts of the world. For 
the US, Third World countries are important as long as it can use military bases in these 
countries to affect events in areas that are of its interest (Walt 1989). Neo-realists argue that 
North America, Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are the only places that US has 
strategic interest. The Third World, other than the Middle East, has much less strategic 
importance for the US (Posen and Van Evera 1983).  
Krasner (1974) argues that Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf have been important 
because these are the regions central to the international economic system and important for US 
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prosperity, where new great powers may emerge and a new World War may happen.31 Europe 
and East Asia are strategically significant for the US because of the possibility of new great 
powers to emerge from these regions. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf is important because 
of its oil reserves. Although the US is not too dependent on Persian Gulf oil, oil from that region 
is vital for US allies in Japan and Western Europe. Therefore, the Middle East is exceptional as a 
Third World region for its strategic importance to the US (Krasner 1974).  
Actually US interests are not limited to Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Desch 
(1989) states that, “if a peripheral area is proximate to a great power’s homeland, to other 
intrinsically valuable regions, or to the lines of communication between them, …. then these 
areas have extrinsic value” (p.100). Thus, the US has interests in other countries to the extent 
that they can affect the US or destabilize other regions important to the US (Oye, Lieber et al. 
1992; Layne 1997). For example, merely for sharing a huge border with the US, Mexico is 
inevitably a country of great importance to the US. During the Cold War, countries bordering the 
Soviet Union and/or those with communist inclinations were considered to be strategically 
important.  
Among our cases, Turkey is important for any great power as it is at the crossing point of 
Europe, Caucasia and the Middle East. It also used to share borders with the Soviet Union before 
its collapse. However, the end of Cold War did not decrease Turkey’s importance. Especially 
because of its proximity to the Middle East, US bases in Turkey have been crucial for the 
operations in the Gulf area. Also, it is adjacent to another conflictual region, the Balkans. The US 
                                                 
31 These three regions were the strategically most important regions until the late 1990s, but lately other regions, like 
the oil and gas rich areas of Central Asia, have also emerged as strategically important. However, this study is 
focused on the period 1975-2000 and the newly emerging strategic regions are not taken into consideration.  
 83
has used its bases in Turkey during its operations in all these areas.32 Currently Turkey’s 
geographical and cultural proximity to Caucasian and Central Asian countries also has a high 
strategic value, especially with the prospect of gas and oil pipelines stretching from there through 
Turkey (Iskit 1996; Akinci 1998; Bilgin 2005). 
Regarding the strategic importance of Turkey, the effect of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is also crucial. Turkey became a NATO member in 1956 because of its 
proximity to the Soviet Union and Western Europe, and since then proved to be a very important 
strategic partner. This provided NATO and the US with important military bases in Turkey, 
which were used extensively not only during the Cold War, but also in recent international 
conflicts in the Middle East region, like the 1991 Gulf War and Iraqi War of 2003.  
Among the cases of this study, Israel is probably the one that is located in the most 
conflictual area. The Middle East was an important arena of superpower competition during the 
Cold War and Israel has always been the most important partner of the US in the Middle East. 
The US has had a “long-standing and deeply felt commitment to the security and well-being of 
Israel” (Shlaim 1994, p.38). As stated by the President Jimmy Carter in 1977, the US has a 
“special relationship” with Israel and the top US commitment in the Middle East is “to protect 
the right of Israel to exist” (The New York Times, May 13, 1977).  
US policymakers, who prioritized Israel in the region, believed that Israel was an 
important asset for the US to be used against the Soviet Union and a stronghold of US policy in 
the Middle East. For proponents of that approach, Israel should also be prioritized as it has been 
the only reliable US ally because of its level of economic development and cultural affinity to the 
Western world (Marcus 1990; Shlaim 1994; Reich 1996). Therefore, as the only non-Muslim 
                                                 
32 The US military especially used its bases in Turkey during Gulf War of 1991 and Gulf War of 2003. 
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country and with unquestioned commitment in its alliance with US, Israel has been even more 
important than Turkey for US policies in the region.  
Another reason for Israel’s significance in US foreign policy has been the power of the 
Jewish lobby in the US, especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The 
AIPAC has been one of the most (or may be the most) important lobbies in the US, which 
promotes policies in favor of Israel (Shlaim 1994; Watkins 1997; Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). 
As a result, Israel has been the recipient of major economic, military, and political support from 
the US. 
An important element of geography is the natural resource base that the land holds. 
Significant natural resources make a country important in the eyes of great powers, especially the 
strategic ones, like oil. Since great powers want to have access to these resources and do not 
want these important resources to be acquired by their enemies, they usually seek to influence 
these countries through military and economic means. Turkey and Israel do not have any 
strategically important natural resources. Nonetheless, they are still important for the US 
strategic interests because of their geographical proximity to the main oil areas in the Middle 
East. Although they are not themselves oil producers, their location in the Middle East, the main 
oil producing area of the world, is a factor that make them strategically important.  
Mexico is strategically significant because of its large frontier with the US. The primary 
security goal of every country is the defense of its homeland (Desch 1989). Because of its 
proximity, Mexico has immediate impact on US homeland security. It not only has extensive 
economic relations with the US because of the long common border, but also it is important 
because of migration flows from Mexico to the US. Mexico also has the world’s 8th largest oil 
reserves, which are the second largest reserves (after Russia) among non-OPEC producers. Thus, 
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together with its large border with the US, and thus, easy and cheap transport of this oil to the 
US, Mexico is a country of value to the US.  
Brazil and Argentina are not considered as strategic areas, at least compared to Israel, 
Turkey or Mexico. First of all, Latin America as a region is not considered as important as 
Europe, Asia, or the Middle East.  
Despite their protestations of concern for hemispheric solidarity, policymakers in 
Washington have not seemed to regard Latin America as very important since the 1920s, 
certainly not by comparison with Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In part, that attitude 
has been a reflection of economic realities. It has also reflected geopolitics: Like Africa, 
Latin America was more distant from the Soviet Union… (Ullman 1994, p.13) 
 
Desch (1989) argues that the only strategically important place in Latin America for the US 
(with the exception of Mexico) is the Caribbean, because Caribbean Sea lines of communication 
are important to the US.33 Therefore, Mexico, Caribbean islands, and Central America are 
considered important for the US interests, but not the rest of Latin America. In that sense, among 
our cases Argentina and Brazil are the least strategically important countries for the US.  
Consequently, we can conclude that only Turkey, Israel, and Mexico are located in 
strategically important areas. As can be seen in Table 9, Mexico and Israel were the countries 
that stabilized their prices earlier than the others. On the other, Turkey, the other strategically 
important country, had most difficulty in battling inflation. With the exception of Turkey, it 
seems like strategic importance works in favor of price stabilization rather than the contrary.  
                                                 
33 We would accept this argument for the purposes of this study, but it does not mean that we consider South 
America as an unimportant region in the world in general, and for the US in particular. Actually the US has seen 
South America as one of its influence areas and intervened in several occasions, especially during the Cold War era. 
However, unlike East Asia, Europe, or Middle East, the US does not maintain military bases in South America (with 
the exception of the small Manta base in Ecuador). Instead, the interventions have been mostly through supporting 
right-wing groups against left wing groups during political instabilities or civil wars, e.g. support for military coup 
in Chile or more recently support for the Colombian army.   
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Table 9: Classification of importance of geography vs. price stabilization 
 Strategically 
located 
Not strategically 
located 
 
Successful price 
stabilization  
 
Mexico 
Israel 
 
 
 
Moderately successful 
price stabilization 
  
Argentina 
Brazil 
 
Unsuccessful price 
stabilization 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Economic size of the country 
The economic size of a country increases its significance, because such a country can affect 
international markets and, thus, the economies of other countries. Big economies may impact 
international markets in various ways. Some, like China, are important producers; some, like the 
US and European countries, are not only important producers but also important consumers; 
some others, like Brazil and Argentina, are important debtors; and some, like Mexico and China, 
are important recipients of international investment. Therefore, any development in these 
significant economies produces repercussions in other countries which have links with them.  
Only few developing countries are big economies comparable to the economies of the 
North America, Western Europe and Japan. These significant economies of the Third World may 
be treated more tolerantly by other countries and international financial institutions than smaller 
developing economies. This may work in favor of anti-inflationary policies of these countries as 
they have more access to international funds to ease stabilization at home.  
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According to the World Bank, as of 1990 Brazil was the 10th largest economy In terms of 
Gross National Product (GNP), Mexico the 16th, Turkey the 21st, Argentina the 22nd, and Israel 
the 37th.34 We can argue that Mexico and Brazil are among the significant economies of the 
world. The stability of these economies is important for the stability of the world economy, 
especially as other countries are heavily exposed to them.  
Having a big economy may not guarantee support from industrialized countries. If a 
developing country has a large closed economy, economic developments in that country may not 
have much effect on other economies. The exposure of industrialized countries to developing 
countries determines how willing these advanced countries would be to support them. Therefore, 
we should also look into international links of these developing countries in order to predict the 
support they may receive.  
As can be seen from Table 10, Brazil and Mexico have significantly more aggregate 
foreign direct investment (FDI) than Argentina, Israel and Turkey. Although the difference is not 
as significant, they also have higher aggregate external debt compared to others (see Table 11). 
When we look to trade volume data in Table 12, Mexico appears as the country which 
participates most in world trade. Mexico is followed by Brazil and then by Turkey. Although 
Israel has a much smaller economy, it has more share in world trade than Argentina. 
 
 
                                                 
34 The data are taken from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank on internet at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~pagePK:6413315
0~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. (The last access date is March 31, 2007.) 
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Table 10: Aggregate FDI stock (inward) in $ millions 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
World      615,805      893,567   1,888,672   2,937,539    6,314,271 
Developing 
countries       240,837      347,237      487,694      849,376    1,979,262 
Israel          1,633          2,038          2,940          6,269        23,350 
Argentina           5,344          6,563        9,085        27,828         73,441 
Brazil        17,480        25,664        37,143        42,530       197,652 
Mexico          8,105        18,802        22,424        41,130         91,222 
Turkey            107             360          1,320          5,103           9,335 
Source: World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages, UNCTAD 
 
Table 11: Aggregate external debt-average, US$ millions 
 
 Argentina   Brazil Israel*  Mexico  Turkey  
 Middle 
income
countries 
1970-74 
  
6,737  
 
12,281 
 
n.a.
 
9,427 
  
3,685  
 
73,060 
1975-79 
  
12,534  
 
43,723 
 
n.a
 
30,374 
  
10,659  
 
229,600 
1980-84 
  
40,245  
 
89,860 
 
n.a
 
81,895 
  
20,003  
 
570,400 
1985-89 
  
57,189  
 
112,927 
 
n.a
 
100,057 
  
36,492  
 
870,400 
1990-94 
  
67,057  
 
133,316 
 
n.a
 
119,975 
  
58,341  
 
1,174,000 
1995-99 
  
124,958  
 
205,352 
 
53,197 
 
158,941 
  
87,556  
 
1,774,000 
2000-04 
  
157,335  
 
233,246 
 
64,784
 
343,613 
  
129,194  
 
1,833,702 
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2006 (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
* Data of Israel are from www.bradynet.com. The last datum on Israel is the 2001 datum, not the average of 2000-
2004 data. 
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Table 12: Trade volume in goods and services (constant 2000 prices, in million US$) 
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey
Middle income 
countries
1970-74       11,815  
 
29,845  na 
 
31,083  na   na 
1975-79       15,577  
 
41,467  na 
 
41,156  na       468,771 
1980-84       20,273  
 
45,937  na 
 
68,605  na    1,291,620 
1985-89       19,349  
 
55,397  na 
 
76,813 
 
20,025    1,483,312 
1990-94       32,792  
 
75,446  na 
 
131,127 
 
46,605    1,747,500 
1995-99       57,837  
 
120,800 
 
71,542 
 
241,880 
 
81,994    2,456,850 
2000-04       57,837  
 
151,590 
 
94,252 
 
377,951 
 
123,694    3,621,401 
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2006 (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
 
In general it can be concluded that Turkey and Israel have less economic importance for 
the other countries. This can be clearly seen from their lower FDI and external debt levels (see 
Table 10 and Table 11). The significance of Israel and Turkey is more due to the strategic 
importance of their geographical location, and in case of Israel, also because of the powerful 
Jewish lobby in the US.  
In terms of economic significance Mexico and Brazil are the most important cases. Since 
they have bigger economies that are heavily invested in by foreign capital and are widely 
involved in international markets, other countries have higher exposure to Mexico and Brazil. 
Therefore, industrialized countries would be more threatened by instabilities in these areas. As a 
result, international institutions may be compelled to provide them funds, helping them battle 
inflation. Argentina seems like the least advantaged among our five cases because, compared to 
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others, it is also less important economic wise. Therefore, we expect it to receive less 
international aid and have most problems with eliminating inflation.  
As can be seen in Table 13, the analysis of economic importance of Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Israel, and Turkey does not give a consistent result with regards to the ability to 
decrease inflation. Mexico, one of the countries with highest economic importance, successfully 
eliminated its persistent inflation problem, but Israel, economically much less important, was the 
most successful among all five cases in eliminating its inflation problem.   
Table 13: Classification of economic importance vs. price stabilization 
 High Economic 
Importance 
Low Economic 
Importance 
 
Successful fight with 
inflation 
 
Mexico 
 
Israel 
 
Moderately successful 
price stabilization 
 
Brazil 
 
Argentina 
 
 
Unsuccessful fight with 
inflation 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 14 that Brazil and especially Argentina have less strategic 
importance. Looking at Israel and Mexico, the results of this analysis suggest that strategic 
importance positively affects the ability to stabilize prices as expected. Israel and Mexico are 
strategically important countries and they decreased inflation most easily, while Argentina and 
Brazil were less successful in price stabilization compared to them. Yet, Turkey is an outlier. It is 
a country with high strategic importance, but it had most difficulty in stabilizing prices. We need 
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to look more closely into the relation between strategic importance and ability to stabilize prices 
to see if some other factors intervene in this relation.35  
Table 14: Classification of strategic importance vs. price stabilization 
 No strategic 
importance 
Some strategic 
importance 
High strategic 
importance 
 
Successful price 
stabilization 
 
 
 
 
 
Israel 
Mexico 
 
 
Moderately successful 
price stabilization 
 
Argentina 
 
 
Brazil 
 
 
Unsuccessful price 
stabilization 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
4.2 SECURITY THREATS AND INFLATION  
The economic policies of countries may be affected not only by their strategic importance but 
also by the security threats they face. The countries which perceive high security threats 
inevitably increase their military spending, because they need to keep a large army and acquire 
modern weapons for their security. Such spending consumes significant economic resources and 
                                                 
35 Turkey’s outlier status also encouraged me to review its domestic political institutions for an explanation (see 
chapters 5 to 7).  
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may contribute to budget deficits, which are the main causes of inflation. This argument is 
somewhat confirmed by the analysis in this section. 
In this study, a security threat is understood in its traditional sense, i.e. it is the possibility 
of a military confrontation and is related to how much a country feels militarily insecure. It 
actually has both international and domestic aspects, because a security threat may come not 
only from other countries (e.g., a threat of or actual military attack) but also from some groups 
within the country (e.g., armed dissident groups) that may also have international ties.  
A state that has the military capability to acquire a dominant position in relation to other 
states and to defeat all threatening groups within the country may be considered powerful, but it 
does not mean that that country has fewer threats to its security. Security threats are highly 
related to whether the country has friendly or conflictual relations with other countries and 
whether there is an atmosphere of political peace within the country. If these conditions are not 
met, states keep increasing their military capabilities in order to feel more secure. Maintaining a 
large and modern military is the primary way to feel more secure in the face of domestic and 
international threats to security.36  
No matter how helpful maintaining a big and powerful military is to attain security, it is 
not always an economically feasible option. A powerful and capable military requires enormous 
expenses and this may contribute directly to budget deficits. Budget deficits are the main cause 
of inflation, especially when they are monetized. Thus, we can expect that states with high 
military expenses have greater difficulty in controlling inflation. 
                                                 
36 What we try to measure in this section is not the trend in conflicts but the general level of conflicts in our cases. 
The purpose is to find a relationship between the “general” level of security threats and persistence of inflation. 
Therefore, some of our data go beyond the inflationary period.  
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4.2.1 Conflicts 
If a country is exposed to security threats and/or involved in armed conflicts, we expect it to try 
to strengthen its military. Therefore, the more threats and conflicts the countries faces, the more 
they are expected to spend on weapons and keep large military personnel.  
Although security threats depend largely on the perception of states, there are some 
indicators of potential threats, such as past and present civil conflicts or conflicts the country has 
had with other countries. In this study a “conflict” is a clash of interests on issues such as 
territory, independence, self-determination, autonomy, ideology, power, and resources which 
involves at least two parties (mostly states or organized groups) that do or willing to use military 
force to pursue their interests and win their case. The variable “security threats” will be measured 
by the amount of military disputes a country has had in the past (since 1945) and the existing 
conflicts with other states and within the country. 
4.2.1.1 International threats and conflicts 
Table 15 shows the major conflicts involving Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey, the 
parties involved in those conflicts, the issues concerned, time period of the conflicts, and the 
intensity of the conflicts. As can be seen from that table, our cases have had a variety of security 
problems with different intensities. Brazil and Mexico have generally been living peacefully, and 
they do not have any significant international security problems. However, Israel in particular 
has had major violent conflicts over the decades and continues to face international threats to its 
security. Turkey and Argentina have also been involved in serious international conflicts.  
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Table 15: List of major conflicts in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey (1945-
2005) 
Name of the 
conflict Parties involved 
External 
parties 
involved 
Issue Start year Intensity 
Israel I 
(independence) 
Non-state groups 
(Zionists) vs, non-state 
groups (Palestinians), 
UK  
USSR, Egypt, 
Syria, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, 
AL 
national independence 1946-48 Violent crisis 
Israel II  
(Palestine war) 
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
Iraq vs. Israel and non-
state groups (Hagana, 
Leumi, Sternen)  
 
CZE, United 
Kingdom 
territory, borders or 
water, ethnic, 
religious or regional 
autonomy 
1948-49 War  
Israel – Arab 
states 
(cease-fire) 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq vs. Israel  
 
- territory, borders or water 1949-56 
Violent 
crisis 
Israel III  
(border) 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria vs. 
Israel  
 
USSR 
territory, borders or 
water, international 
power 
1948-49 Violent crisis 
Israel IV   
(Yom Kippur 
War) 
Egypt, Syria, non-state 
groups (PLO) vs. Israel  
USSR, Iraq, 
Jordan, 
Algeria, 
Morocco vs. 
USA 
territory, borders or 
water, international 
power 
1973 War  
Israel - Lebanon I Israel vs. Lebanon, non-state groups (PLO)  
 
- 
territory, borders or 
water 1974 
Violent 
crisis 
Israel-Lebanon IV 
(Hizbollah vs. 
government) 
Israel, non-state groups 
(SLA) vs. non-state 
groups (Araft-Geg., 
Hizbollah, AMAL)  
 
 
Lebanon 
territory, borders or 
water,ideology or 
system conflict 
1993-99 Violent crisis 
Israel V  
(Intifada) 
Non-state groups (PLO, 
al-Aqsa, Islamic Jihad, 
Fatah, Hamas) vs. Israel  
 
Syria, Iraq, 
non-state 
groups (PFLP, 
Hizbollah) 
territory, borders or 
water, ethnic, 
religious or regional 
autonomy, national 
independence  
1987-93 Violent crisis 
Israel - Lebanon II 
(Litani operation) 
Israel vs. Lebanon, non-
state groups (PLO)  
 
USA vs. USSR 
resources, national 
independence, ethnic, 
religious or regional 
autonomy 
1978 Non-violent crisis 
Israel - Lebanon 
III  
Israel vs. non-state 
groups (PLO, AMAL)  
USA vs. Syria other 1982-85 violent crisis 
Israel - Jordan 
(Jordan water I) 
Israel vs. Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon 
Non-state 
groups (Fatal), 
Egypt 
resources 1959-67 violent crisis 
Israel – Jordan 
(Jordan water II) Israel vs. Jordan 
- resources 1969-76 violent crisis 
Israel – Jordan 
(Jordan water III) Israel vs. Jordan 
- resources 1977-94 Latent conflict 
Egypt – Israel  
(6 days war) 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
non-state groups (PLO) 
vs. Israel  
Algeria, 
Kuwait, USSR 
vs. USA 
territory, borders or 
water, international 
power, resources 
1967 War  
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Table 15  (Continued from previous page) 
Name of the 
conflict Parties involved 
External 
parties 
involved 
Issue Start year Intensity 
Egypt – Israel  
(confrontations) Egypt, Syria vs. Israel  
 
USSR 
territory, borders or 
water, international 
power 
1967-73 violent crisis 
 
Turkey (Kurds I) PKK vs. Turkish 
government  
Lebanon, 
Syria, Iraq as 
external 
participants 
autonomy, ideology 
or system conflict, 
national independence 
1984-89 violent crisis 
 
Turkey (Kurds II) PKK, TKSP, HEP/I/HADEP vs. 
Turkish government  
Iraq and Iraqi 
Kurdish groups 
as external 
participants 
autonomy, national 
power 1989-99 war 
Turkey-Syria  
(border) Turkey vs. Syria  
 
USA, USSR, 
Egypt 
international power, 
ideology or system 
conflict 
1955-57 violent crisis 
Turkey - Syria, 
Iraq  (water) 
Turkey vs. Syria and 
Iraq 
 
- resources 1990-99 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Cyprus IV  
(Turkey invasion) 
Cyprus, Greece, non-
state groups (Nat. Garde, 
EOKA) vs. Cyprus, non-
state groups (TMT) 
 
 
Turkey 
ideology or system 
conflict 1974 War  
Turkey – Greece  Turkey vs. Greece   - other 1964-65 
Latent 
conflict 
Greece – Turkey 
(Aegean Sea I) Turkey vs. Greece  
 
- 
territory, borders or 
water, resources 1973-76 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Greece – Turkey 
(Aegean Sea II) Turkey vs. Greece  
 
- 
territory, borders or 
water, resources 1987 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Greece – Turkey 
(Aegean Sea III) Turkey vs. Greece  
 
- 
territory, borders or 
water, resources 1987-99 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Turkey - Russia 
(Russian claims) Turkey vs. USSR 
 
USA, UK 
Territory/marital 
borders, resources 1992 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Turkey - Russia 
(Bosporus)  Turkey vs. Russia 
 
- 
marital rights 
(Dardanelles) 1992-99 
Latent 
conflict 
Argentina – Chile 
(Beagle I) Argentina vs. Chile  
 
- 
territory, borders or 
water, resources 1958-72 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Argentina – Chile 
(Beagle II) Argentina vs. Chile  
 
- 
Territory, borders or 
water 1972-77 
Latent 
conflict 
Argentina – Chile 
(Beagle III) Argentina vs. Chile  
 
- 
Territory, borders or 
water, resources 1978-79 
Violent 
crisis  
Argentina – Chile 
(Beagle IV) Argentina vs. Chile  
 
- 
Territory, borders or 
water, resources, 
international power 
1979-85 
Non- 
violent 
crisis 
Argentina – Chile 
(Campo de Hielo) Argentina vs. Chile  
 
- 
Territory, borders or 
water  1985-94 
Latent 
conflict 
Argentina -
Uruguay (Rio de 
la Plata) 
Argentina vs. Uruguay  
 
- Territory, borders or water, resources  1969-73 
Non- 
violent 
crisis 
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Table 15  (Continued from previous page) 
Name of the 
conflict Parties involved 
External 
parties 
involved 
Issue Start year Intensity 
Paraguay 
(Argentine 
support for rebels) 
Non-state groups 
(external opposition, 
internal opposition) vs. 
government of Paraguay 
 
 
Argentina  
ideology or system 
conflict 1958-61 
Non-violent 
crisis 
United Kingdom-
Argentina-Chile 
(Palmer) 
Argentina, UK, Chile 
 
- territory, borders or water 1956-58 
Latent 
conflict 
Argentina – UK 
(Falkland I) 
Argentina vs. United 
Kingdom 
- territory, borders or 
water 1965-82 
Latent 
conflict 
Argentina – UK 
(Falkland II) 
Argentina vs. United 
Kingdom 
USA territory, borders or 
water, resources 1982 War  
Argentina – UK 
(Falkland III) 
Argentina vs. United 
Kingdom 
- territory, borders or 
water, resources 1982-99 
Latent 
conflict 
Argentina 
(consequence of 
Falkland-defeat) 
Non-state groups 
(opposition) vs. 
Argentine government  
 
USA ideology or system conflict 1982-86 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Argentina 
(Monteneros) 
Argentine government, 
non-state groups vs. 
non-state groups 
(Monteneros) 
 
USA Ideology or system 
conflict  1969-77 War  
Mexico (Chiapas) EZLN vs. government of Mexico 
- ethnic, religious or 
regional autonomy 1994-99 
violent 
crisis 
Guatemala -
Mexico (Shrimp 
Boat) 
Guatemala vs. Mexico 
- territory, borders, or 
water, resources 1958-59 
Non-violent 
crisis 
Guatemala - 
Mexico  Guatemala vs. Mexico 
- other 1961 Latent conflict 
Brazil 
(constitution) 
Non-state groups vs. 
government of Brazil 
- ideology or system 
conflict 1986 
Latent 
conflict 
Brazil - Paraguay Brazil vs. Paraguay 
 
- 
territory, borders or 
water, resources 1962-85 
Latent 
conflict 
Source: Conflictbarometer (1997/2002/2003/2004/2005), Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 
University of Heidelberg. 
 
Brazil and Mexico have had no international conflict for decades. The only international 
conflict Brazil has had is the Parana dispute (1962-1985) with Paraguay, which was settled 
without resort to violence. Mexico had two insignificant conflicts with Guatemala, one in 1958-
59 and another in 1961. None of these conflicts were violent. Since 1961, Mexico faced no real 
international threat to its security. 
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For Argentina, the most important international conflict was with the United Kingdom 
(UK) over the Falkland Islands, which caused a war between two countries in 1982. However, 
the two states are now trying to improve their relations and use only diplomatic channels to 
resolve the issue (Conflict Barometer 2002). In the past, Argentina also had several territorial 
disputes with Chile (the Palena dispute of 1958-1966, the Beagle dispute from 1958 to 1985, the 
Campo de Hielo dispute of 1985-1994), a conflict with Uruguay (the Rio de la Plata dispute of 
1969-1973), and the Palmer dispute of 1956-1958 with the UK and Chile. Argentina is a Latin 
American case that was challenged by many international conflicts, but all except two of these 
crises (the Falkland Islands crisis in 1982 and the Beagle III crisis with Chile in 1978-1979) were 
nonviolent.  
Both Turkey and Israel are located in conflictual areas and they inevitably face various 
security problems. They frequently have violent or non-violent international conflicts. Israel in 
general has hostile relations with all its neighbors, and conflicts with them usually involve 
considerable violence. In total it has had fifteen conflicts with individual or with coalitions of 
states, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan, of which only two were nonviolent. Indeed, 
some of these conflicts led to open war with Palestinians and some other Arab nations, (e.g., 
Palestine War of 1948-49, 6-days war of 1967, and Yom-Kippur War of 1973). Israel and 
Lebanon have been in constant conflict since the creation of Israel in 1948. Israel has also had 
hostile relations with Syria since 1948 and the relations got worse since the Israeli occupation of 
Golan Heights in 1967 (Conflict Barometer 2002). 
A lot of international terrorist organizations also attack Israelis on a daily basis. One of 
them is Hezbollah, which has been fighting against Israeli forces since 1982. Hezbollah operates 
from Lebanon and is supported by Syria and by Iran. Although the Israeli military withdrew 
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from Southern Lebanon in May 2000 and the pro-Israeli South Lebanese Army (SLA) was 
dissolved, the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah is still going on (Conflict Barometer 
2002). 
The conflicts in the Middle East are not only over the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also over 
water. In the Middle East, water is a very scarce resource and has strategic importance for the 
region’s countries, so it is regularly a source of conflict. For example, the tensions between Israel 
and Lebanon have increased since September 2002 because of the announcement of the 
Lebanese government to divert water from the Wazzani River to irrigate villages in Southern 
Lebanon. Israel has also had crises with Jordan (in 1959-67, 1969-76 and 1977-94) over the 
water issue (Haddadin 2002).  
Turkey is surrounded by many inimical countries as well. It is constantly in conflict with 
Greece over Cyprus, which caused a war in 1974 and led to the division of the island into two 
separate political entities, Turkish and Greek. That problem remains unresolved. Another source 
of conflict is the maritime borders of Greek islands, some of which are located very close to the 
Turkish mainland. Greece argues that the borders extend up to 12 miles whereas Turkey argues 
that the limit is only 6 miles (Athanasopulos 2001). Although this issue has not led to a war, it 
sometimes escalates to very critical levels, like it did in January 1996 over Imia (Kardak) islets.37  
In the past, Turkey also had problems with Russia, like the nonviolent crisis regarding the 
Soviet claims in 1945-47 and the Bosporus strait passage crisis of 1992-99. A violent conflict 
occurred with Syria in 1955-57 because of border issues. Turkey has also clashed with Syria and 
Iraq over water issues (1990-99). Another reason for conflict with Syria was that Syria used to 
provide shelter for the terrorist Kurdish organization PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), which was 
                                                 
37 See CNN news at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9601/turkey_greece_dispute for more information about this 
confrontation.  
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using northern Syrian territories for camps from which they launched attacks on southeastern 
Turkey. This conflict ended in 1999 when Turkey forced the Syrian government to expel the 
PKK leader and later caught him to be sent to prison in Turkey (Conflict Barometer 2002). 
Not only the number of conflicts, but also the intensity of the conflicts is important in 
determining how much a state feels insecure. As can be seen from Table 16, Brazil has had no 
violent conflict since 1945 and Argentina and Mexico have had few. Although Turkey seems to 
have had fewer conflicts than Argentina, it has had four violent conflicts, while Argentina had 
three. Israel not only has had the highest amount of conflicts among our cases, but also almost all 
of these conflicts were violent. Therefore, we expect Israel to spend most for its security, 
followed by Turkey and Argentina. On the other hand, we expect Brazil and Mexico to spend 
least for military.  
Table 16: Number of conflicts in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey (1945-2005)  
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
violent 
conflicts 3 0 13 1 4 
non-
violent 
conflicts 
11 2 2 2 7 
 
4.2.1.2 Domestic threats and conflicts 
Domestic threats to security may threaten a country as much as international ones. A civil war, 
threat of a civil war, terrorist groups, guerilla movements, or separatist organizations are all 
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causes of internal conflicts and contribute to feeling of insecurity. Terrorist groups, guerilla 
movements, and separatist organizations typically also have international ties. In order to deal 
with these dissident groups, usually governments use their military and this may add to military 
spending. 
Since 1985 Argentina and Brazil have had no armed domestic insurgency, aside from the 
Montoneros terrorist organization in Argentina, which fought violently against the government 
between 1969 and 1977.38 Brazil did not have such a strong rebellion group. It had a serious 
constitutional dispute in 1986, but it was resolved without major violence. However, both 
Argentina and Brazil have had several military coups and military regimes that might also have 
an impact on military spending. Indeed, it can be seen in Table 17 and Table 18 that military in 
Argentina and Brazil shrank considerably after these states shifted to democracy.    
                                                 
38 However, Argentina became a target of international terrorism twice in the 1990s. In 1992 Israeli Embassy in 
Buenos Aires was bombed killing 29 people and in 1994 the Argentina-Israeli Community Center was bombed 
killing 86 people (Poe and Meernik 1995). 
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Table 17: Weapon holdings (aggregate number of heavy weapons)* 
 
 
Argentina Brazil Mexico Israel Turkey
World 
average 
1990 1,760  2,420  520 18,460 10,700 3,283 
1991  1,860   2,390  560 18,360 10,920  3,233 
1992 1,770  2,430  560 18,630 11, 510  3,332 
1993 1,730  2,340  570 18,970 11,220  3,210 
1994 1,710  2,280  640 17,850 11,770  3,002 
1995 1,580  2,270  700 15,560 11,560 2,915 
1996 1,550  2,120  770 15,510 11,240  2,674 
1997 1,520  2,170  960 17,530 11,360  2,582 
1998 1,530  2,090  1,200 17,850 11,070  2,506 
1999 1,500  2,110  1,240 19,500 11,000  2,434 
2000 1,340  2,120  1,240 15,430     10,460  2,294 
2001 1,330  2,150  1,230 17,370 10,460 2,269 
2002 1,310  2,100  1,230 17,490    10,030  2,230 
2003 1,290  2,270  1,250 17,730 10,030 2,207 
Source: BICC Yearbook, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 2005 (http://first.sipri.org/index.php)  
(*) Unfortunately data for the years 1975-1989 were not available. 
 
Table 18: Armed forces personnel (in 1000s) 
 
Argentina 
 
Brazil 
 
Mexico 
 
Israel 
 
Turkey 
 
World 
average 
1974 150 435 85 182 574 n.a. 
1975 160 455 95 172 584 n.a. 
1976 155 450 100 172 674 n.a. 
1977 155 450 100 179 771 n.a. 
1978 155 450 120 179 721 n.a. 
1979 155 450 120 181 698 n.a. 
1980 155 450 120 196 717 n.a. 
1981 155 450 125 201 741 n.a. 
1982 175 460 130 205 769 n.a. 
1983 175 460 130 205 824 n.a. 
1984 174 459 129 205 815 n.a. 
1985 129 496 140 195 814 n.a. 
1986 104 527 141 180 860 n.a. 
1987 118 541 141 180 879 n.a. 
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Table 18  (Continued from previous page) 
 
Argentina 
 
Brazil 
 
Mexico 
 
Israel 
 
Turkey 
 
World 
average 
1988 95 319 154 191 847 n.a. 
1989 95 319 154 191 780 n.a. 
1990 85 295 175 190 769 193 
1991 70 295 175 190 804 183 
1992 65 296 175 181 704 156 
1993 65 296 175 181 686 151 
1994 67 296 175 177 811 145 
1995 67 295 175 177 805 142 
1996 72 300 175 175 818 136 
1997 73 314 175 176 828 136 
1998 73 313 175 176 788 133 
1999 73 291 179 177 789 133 
2000 71 288 190 179 793 129 
2001 70 288 190 181 803 129 
2002 70 288 193 181 816 124 
2003 71 288 193 183 823 123 
Source: 1974-89 data are from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995, 1965, US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 1990-2003 data are from BICC Yearbook, Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC), 2005. 
 
Although period of regime instability is over in Argentina and Brazil, both countries have 
experienced political dissatisfaction that arises from time to time on economic grounds, like the 
case of piqueteros in Argentina since the 2001 economic crisis and Landless Rural Workers´ 
Movement (MST) in Brazil since 1995. However, these groups do not pose serious armed 
opposition to the government that threatens the political establishment, so military expenditures 
are not necessarily affected by them. Also, they do not have international ties. Especially with 
the effect of democratization, political insurgency in these countries has decreased over time. 
Thus, Argentina and Brazil do not need large armies to control domestic dissent.  
In Mexico, military is traditionally not a very strong institution (Camp 1992; Fitch 1998). 
Mexican military has been persistently under civilian control since late 1920s through 
“Revolutionary ideology,” constitution, professionalization, and ultimately the overarching 
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political control of the Party of Institutionalized Revolution, PRI (Serrano 1995). In fact, it is the 
only Latin American country besides Costa Rica which has not had any military coup since 
World War II. Although internally Mexico has been the most peaceful country among all our 
cases, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), which emerged in 1994 and 
campaigned for autonomy for the province of Chiapas, ended that image of tranquility. Since late 
1994, the Mexican military has been carrying out operations in the south of the country to put 
down this movement, and to a large extend they have been able to control it. Although there is no 
recognizable progress in resolving this conflict, this problem ceased to be an important military 
conflict towards the end of 1990s, as EZLN withdrew into deep jungle areas (Conflict Barometer 
2002). Also other similar dissident groups, such as People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and 
Insurgent Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERPI), appeared in the Guerrero state of Mexico with 
similar claims. Yet, there have been no significant clashes between these groups and the Mexican 
military.39 
Turkey and Israel differ from the Latin American cases, because they have had 
considerable domestic unrest. Turkey has been fighting against the secessionist PKK since 1979. 
This movement, which emerged in the southeastern region of the country with a radical Marxist-
Leninist and Kurdish nationalistic ideology, has caused significant human and economic losses 
for the country. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), over 
35,000 lives were lost during the fighting between the PKK and Turkish military forces between 
1984 and 1999. This internal conflict is the main battle of the Turkish military. Since the arrest 
of PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the activities of PKK have considerably decreased 
                                                 
39 Recently, due to their increasing power, narco-traffickers have become the main concern of the Mexican military. 
This may be the reason behind rise in weaponry and military personnel in Mexico since the 1990s (see Table IV-2 
and Table IV-3).  
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though not ended. PKK has changed its name to Congress for Freedom and Democracy in 
Kurdistan (KADEK) in 2002 and it is still active around the Turkish border with Iraq and Iran. 
PKK/KADEK usually cooperates with DHKC-P (Revolutionary Peoples' Liberation Party), a 
similar kind of Marxist terrorist organization that conducts urban bombings and rural guerilla 
operations in Turkey. Both organizations have international ties, especially in Europe and the 
Middle East. 
Israel is the country which has the most severe domestic conflicts. Because of its 
occupation of the Palestinian lands, Israel has become a target of not only Palestinians, but also 
other nationalistic and religious Arabs. Israel passes almost no week without suicide bombs 
exploding or suicide bomb attempts. The never-ending conflict between Israel and Palestinian 
groups such as the al-Aqsa Brigades, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Fatah Movement on an 
independent Palestinian state has escalated to war, especially with the initiation of Second 
Intifada in 2000 (Conflict Barometer 2002). Despite the amount of money invested in internal 
security mechanisms, life in Israel is still largely insecure. Also, Israel often bombs territories 
controlled by Palestinians in order to respond to the missile or suicide bomb attacks of the 
Palestinian groups.  
The analysis of security threats to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Israel and Turkey reveals 
that Turkey and Israel have the largest security problems (see Table 19). As a result, we expect 
military costs of Turkey and Israel to be higher and, thus, we expect them to have higher 
difficulty in decreasing inflation. Turkey has not been able to eliminate inflation. Yet, Israel, a 
country with even more security threats than Turkey, was able to decrease inflation. Therefore, 
we cannot directly relate security threats to the ability to stabilize prices. Israel receives 
considerable support to cover some portion of its security costs. In this case, international aid 
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may act as an intervening factor, which affects the budget the opposite way that military 
expenses do. Therefore, we also have to review these countries’ actual security costs and the 
military aid they receive.   
Table 19: Classification of security threats vs. price stabilization 
  
High security 
threats 
 
Moderate security 
threats 
 
 
Low security 
threats 
 
 
Success in price 
stabilization 
 
Israel 
 
 
Mexico 
 
 
Moderate success in price 
stabilization 
  
Argentina 
 
 
Brazil 
 
Low success in price 
stabilization 
 
Turkey 
  
 
 
4.2.2 Military spending 
Countries that have to spend a lot for defense may have difficulty in implementing 
disinflationary economic policies. High security threats affect economic policies, as they require 
more economic resources to be diverted to the military. High military expenditures contribute to 
budget deficits. Thus, for countries under high security threats, fiscal and monetary austerity is 
harder to achieve.  
The main factor that determines the amount of resources spent on the military is security 
threats. If states feel that their domestic or international enemies’ military capabilities are large 
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and/or increasing, they feel threatened and tend to invest more in military as a response (Hess 
1989). 
For countries which are located in very unstable regions and/or have international 
security problems, military spending is essential, since their military needs personnel and 
weapons to preserve the very existence of the state. Therefore, despite their high economic costs, 
military expenses are inevitable, or at least vital, for such countries. As a result, military 
expenses are an important item in budgets of countries that face security threats, especially if 
those countries are not rich. This spending consumes foreign exchange resources, causing 
adverse effects on financial accounts and making it more difficult to stabilize prices. Huge 
military spending may not be a very important financial burden for advanced countries and big 
economies, but it may be financially disrupting for developing countries and small economies, 
even if they try to keep fiscal discipline.  
As can be seen from Table 20 and Figure 5, and as expected from the previous analysis, 
Latin American cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico spend a much smaller portion of their 
GNP for security purposes than Israel and Turkey. Although military is an important institution 
in Argentina and Brazil, its importance was prevalent mostly in domestic politics (due to past 
military regimes) rather than international politics. Mexico spends least for military. In general, 
these three countries spend less for military because they have fewer threats to their security.  
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Table 20: Military expenditure as a share (%) of GNP * 
 
Argentina  Brazil Mexico Israel Turkey 
1976 2.4 1.3 0.6 26.4 6.2 
1977 2.4 1.1 0.6 24.4 5.8 
1978 2.7 0.9 0.5 20.4 5.2 
1979 6.3 0.9 0.6 26.1 4.3 
1980 6.4 1.3 0.6 25.0 4.3 
1981 7.1 1.3 0.6 23.5 4.9 
1982 6.0 1.6 0.5 19.0 5.2 
1983 4.6 1.2 0.5 20.2 4.8 
1984 4.5 1.2 0.6 21.4 4.4 
1985 3.5 1.1 0.7 17.4 4.5 
1986 1.0 1.2 0.6 16.9 4.8 
1987 1.1 1.2 0.5 14.7 4.2 
1988 1.6 2.0 0.5 13.0 3.0 
1989 1.7 2.4 0.4 12.4 3.3 
1990 1.3 1.9 0.4 12.2 3.5 
1991 1.4 1.1 0.4 11.0 3.7 
1992 1.4 1.1 0.5 10.5 3.7 
1993 1.6 1.3 0.5 9.4 3.8 
1994 1.6 1.2 0.6 8.8 4.1 
1995 1.7 1.5 0.6 8.3 3.9 
1996 1.5 1.3 0.6 8.6 4.1 
1997 1.4 1.5 0.6 8.4 4.1 
1998 1.3 1.4 0.5 8.4 4.4 
1999 1.5 1.3 0.6 8.4 5.4 
2000 1.3 1.3 0.5 8.2 5.0 
2001 1.4 1.4 0.5 7.7 5.0 
2002 1.2 1.6 0.5 9.2 4.9 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1982, 1988, 1993, 2002, 2003 (Stockholm: SIPRI). 
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Figure 5: Military expenditure as a share of GNP 
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Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2002 (Stockholm: SIPRI). 
 
 
Turkey and Israel keep big armies and invest a lot on modern weaponry systems (see 
Table 18 and Table 17) because of the high security threats they perceive. As a result, their 
military expenditures are very high. Israel spends at least 8 percent of its GDP on the military 
and Turkey spends about 5 percent (SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security 2004). In terms of ratio of military expenditure to Gross National Product 
(GNP), Israel ranks 11th and Turkey ranks 36th in the world  as of 1994 ("World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1994" 1995).40 Almost 4 percent of Israeli population is in the 
army, which is the highest in the world after North Korea. Also, Israel not only is one of the 
                                                 
40 On the same variable Argentina ranks 108th, Brazil ranks 132th, and Mexico ranks 155th among 166 countries. 
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leading producers of arms and weapons, but also imports a significant amount of equipment from 
abroad (SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 2004). 
Therefore, it bears very high military costs.  
Yet, as can be noticed in Table 20, Israel’s military spending relative to GNP has 
decreased considerably over the last decades. Although on average Israel used to spend 23 
percent of its GNP on military between 1976 and 1984, from 1985 (the year disinflation program 
was initiated) on, Israel has never spent over 17 percent of its GNP on military and this share has 
even dropped under 10 percent from 1993 on. This supports our hypothesis that military 
spending can contribute to the persistence of inflation, but the same relation cannot be confirmed 
by our other cases.  
Although Israel has decreased its military spending relative to GNP over time, it still has 
the highest share of military spending among our cases. Therefore, we would expect Israel to 
have the highest difficulty in battling inflation. However, we know that Israel resolved its 
inflation problem in the mid-1980s. Our next highly threatened country is Turkey with its big 
military establishment. Turkey has had greatest difficulty in stabilizing prices. The difference 
between Turkey and Israel may be explained by the difference in the amount of military aid these 
countries receive. Therefore, we next turn to international aid to see if it compensates for some 
military costs.  
4.3 THE INTERMEDIARY LINK: AID  
The effect of strategic importance and security threats on the ability to decrease inflation is 
probably not a direct one. As argued in the beginning of this chapter, strategically important 
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countries are thought to receive more support that may help them stop monetization to finance 
budget deficits. On the other hand, countries that face more security threats may have more 
difficulty in dealing with inflation problem because of their high military expenditures. In this 
section, I look into the relation between strategic importance, security threats and international 
financial support to see whether strategically important countries really receive significant aid as 
expected. Secondly, I will check how this aid affects the ability of the countries to stabilize 
prices. The findings suggest that strategically important countries do receive significant support, 
but this politically motivated support does not determine their ability to eliminate inflation, 
unless it comes in large amounts and under very concessional terms.41  
4.3.1 Assistance through International Financial Institutions 
The financial support of international financial institutions, like the IMF and the World Bank, 
differs from country to country. For developing countries this support is crucial as they have 
limited resources and are frequently hit by economic crises. Many times these countries shape 
their economic policies in line with the treatment they receive from the international financial 
institutions. 
Although middle-income countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey and a 
higher income economy Israel are not dependent on aid, support of international financial 
institutions is important for them. The influence of IMF assistance far exceeds the importance of 
funds it provides. IMF support is a signal of credibility to all international financial markets. 
International funds wait for the IMF signal to flow to developing countries. If a country cannot 
                                                 
41 Loans with concessional terms are loans which have low interest rate (lower than the market rate), do not need to 
be repaid in the short-term, and/or impose little or no conditions on the recipient.    
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obtain IMF support, it can be deprived of foreign exchange and abandoned by investors (Lastra 
2000). Yet, the power of the IMF is effective only on developing countries, since they are the 
ones in need of funds (Swedberg 1986). Since a country has to have a balance of payments 
problem in order to be eligible for IMF support, industrialized economies do not normally need 
any IMF funds. Likewise, Israel has not received any IMF funding recently as its economy 
became stronger in 1990s. Yet, it is generally believed that IMF funding is very essential for 
price stabilization. Our analysis here will evaluate the validity of this argument.  
The IMF primarily uses two means of loans for countries. The first is Stand-by 
Arrangements (SBAs), which typically cover a period of 12 to 18 months. Under SBAs, 
members are given a right to draw an annual 100 percent and a cumulative 300 percent of their 
quota. Repayments are to be made within 3 to 5 years. Another principal IMF assistance is the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF), which provides medium-term (3 to 4 years) aid to countries that 
have serious structural balance of payments problems. EFFs are more extensive and 
comprehensive than SBAs. They aim to correct balance of payments difficulties that result from 
structural problems, and thus, require a longer period. Repayments are due within 4.5 to 10 
years. The IMF rarely exceeds its 300 percent quota to support a country (Stiles 1990; Lastra 
2000). Most IMF assistance comes with non-concessional terms. They need to be repaid in few 
years and in order to qualify for or to continue to receive these funds countries have to agree to 
comply with certain strict conditions. These conditions usually require countries to implement 
liberal economic reforms that aim to fix economic imbalances. 
The IMF’s primary stated goal is to overcome balance of payments problems of its 
members. A secondary goal of the IMF is resuming economic growth and decreasing inflation 
(Bird 1996). Therefore, it is the primary international financial institution that helps states to deal 
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with inflation. However, many have suspected that the IMF also has a political agenda. When 
countries are considered for IMF support, they are not only evaluated according to their financial 
needs and creditworthiness. Although the IMF’s official procedures prohibit intervention of 
political factors into the decision-making process, countries are also judged for their political and 
strategic significance before they receive funds (Bird 1996).  
According to political models, IMF policies are manipulated by industrialized countries, 
especially by the US. It is argued that it is not the IMF’s bureaucrats and their economic 
neutrality but the US government that influences conditionality and other decisions regarding 
IMF loans (Stiles 1990; Oatley and Yackee 2000). The more strategically important a country, 
the more tolerant and generous the IMF may be towards that country. The IMF provides more 
assistance to countries that are friends of the US. Thus, the closer are the ties and alliance with 
the US, the higher may be the probability to get IMF funds. The US uses its power to provide 
such support to its allies. As Oatley and Yackee (2000) argue that “ the larger IMF loans will be 
advanced to governments closely allied with American interests…” (p.17). The US provides 
financial support to secure that foreign policies of those countries comply with US political 
interests.  
Officially it is stated that IMF works under the principles of “Financial Programming” 
and “Doctrine of Economic Neutrality,” which exclude any kind of political and subjective 
considerations. However, as meetings of the IMF Executive Board are very secretive, the details 
of the IMF decisions are not publicly known. Therefore, many scholars have argued that, despite 
its principles, IMF decisions are politicized, especially to reflect political and economic interests 
of its largest contributor, the US (Payer, Cheryl 1974; Kahler 1990; Stiles 1990; Killick 1995; 
Thacker 1999; Oatley and Yackee 2000). 
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Thacker (1999) argues that there are three factors that make us suspect the neutrality of 
IMF decisions. First, many countries continue to receive support although they do not comply 
with the IMF conditionality. Second, the representative of each country in the IMF Executive 
Board is appointed by the respective governments. Indeed, the highest positions in the IMF are 
all politically appointed. Third, the voting and decision-making processes also allow 
politicization. The IMF has a weighted voting system and the weight of a country’s vote depends 
on that country’s contribution. As the biggest contributor, the US has the biggest voice in the 
IMF with its 17.53 percent voting power. Since all IMF Executive Board decisions require a 
majority of 85 percent of the votes, the US inevitably has a veto power on those IMF decisions. 
Therefore, many scholars have argued that IMF decisions reflect interests of the US (Swedberg 
1986; Stiles 1990; Thacker 1999; Oatley and Yackee 2000). Swedberg (1986) further argues 
that, because of IMF’s institutional and decision-making structures, “no [IMF] managing director 
or president can make a major decision without clearance from the US…” (p.379). 
A US motivation for providing financial aid is to strengthen its allies by stabilizing them 
economically. Financial crises have severe destabilizing effects through the economic 
devastation they cause. If no financial support is found, either the economy totally collapses or 
the government needs to take extreme austerity measures that would lead to high unemployment, 
decreasing incomes, and low consumption levels. These generally lead to political dissatisfaction 
among people that may bring about a serious political crisis or even a regime change. The 
prompt availability of much needed foreign exchange is crucial at that point. Such aid, which is 
typically provided by the IMF, may reduce severity of economic adjustments and the danger of 
political instability (Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Oatley and Yackee 2000). Although IMF 
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supported policies are generally believed to engender political protests, called “IMF riots” 
(Payer, C. 1974; Haggard 1985), Auvinen (1996) states that, 
IMF’s economic intervention may actually enhance economic stability. Without the 
Fund’s assistance, countries would sink deeper into economic distress and would have no 
hope of securing foreign finance and assistance. Under these conditions, the likelihood of 
political protest would be even greater. (p. 378) 
 
 
Evidence for the politicized nature of the IMF decisions is plentiful. A clear historical 
example was that US blocked the membership of Soviet Union to the IMF. Also, the US 
prevented IMF assistance to Vietnam, although it was a large economy in need of funds. 
Although the IMF provided significant aid to leftist countries, such as Jamaica, Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, and Romania, between 1952 and 1984, those were believed to be US efforts to pull 
these countries into its own sphere of influence. In fact, Thacker (1999) argues that, not 
necessarily the very close US allies, but the countries that move towards alliance with the US 
have more probability to get IMF funding.  
In the post-Cold War era, IMF decisions continued to be political. With the end of Cold 
War, the politicization of IMF decisions by the US has even increased, as the US intervened 
more and more into important IMF decisions. As suggested by Thacker (1999), after the Cold 
War, “the US has been able to use the IMF to further its own international political agenda” 
(p.71). Therefore, the argument that IMF support is determined by political interests of the US is 
even more valid for 1990s and 2000s than 1970s or 1980s. For instance, in 1995, the IMF made 
its largest commitment up to that time by providing Mexico 17.8 billion dollars and Russia 6.8 
billion dollars. Equally needy Argentina was largely overlooked during its 2001 economic crisis.  
All our cases are important clients of the World Bank and IMF, except Israel. Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Turkey have needed and taken significant amounts of World Bank and IMF 
 115
loans since 1980 (see Table 21 and Table 22). However, especially the treatment of the IMF of 
these countries has differed from country to country and sometimes through time. This variation 
might have depended on the severity of the economic crises they had, but also it might have 
depended on the political conditions.  
Table 21: Net financial flows, IBRD (current US$)* 
 
 Argentina Brazil Mexico Turkey 
Middle income 
countries 
1970-74 213,200,000 662,200,000 467,200,000 169,200,000 
2,672,700,000
1975-79 27,200,000 968,200,000 757,400,000 681,900,000 
7,808,800,000
1980-84 185,900,000 2,807,200,000 1,569,100,000 1,951,200,000 
18,657,600,000 
1985-89 1,404,600,000 1,390,100,000 2,806,700,000 1,631,200,000 
16,276,500,000 
1990-94 1,364,900,000 -3,074,900,000 3,507,100,000 -1,501,500,000 
10,001,500,000 
1995-99 4,781,300,000 932,200,000 -812,500,000 -1,887,100,000 
18,553,100,000 
2000-04 -860,500,000 1,494,900,000 -1,462,100,000 3,205,100,000 
-4,789,400,000 
TOTAL 7,116,600,000 5,179,900,000 6,832,900,000 4,250,000,000 
69,180,800,000 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2006) (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
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Table 22: Ratio of net financial flows from the IBRD as a percentage of GDP* 
 
 Argentina Brazil Mexico Turkey
1970-74 0.47% 0.99% 0.95% 0.70%
1975-79 0.05% 0.55% 0.76% 1.08%
1980-84 0.22% 1.18% 0.83% 3.02%
1985-89 1.37% 0.44% 1.63% 1.91%
1990-94 0.65% -0.69% 0.99% -0.98%
1995-99 1.70% 0.13% -0.21% -1.02%
2000-04 -0.46% 0.28% -0.23% 1.50%
Average  0.15% 0.04% 0.07% 0.11%
 
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2006) (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
(*) Highlighted periods are inflationary periods for the relevant country. 
 
The World Bank is an important financial institution that provides loan based assistance 
to developing countries. In Table 21, we can see the amount of net financial flows from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the financial arm of the World 
Bank, to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey.42 World Bank loans are more development 
oriented and they are not as much accused of being politicized as the IMF loans. This can also be 
seen from Table 21 and Table 22, because the amount of IBRD flows does not exactly 
correspond to results of our strategic importance analysis. In 1970-2004 Argentina and Turkey 
received more IBRD funding relative to their economic size than Brazil and Mexico. The aid 
Turkey received is not unexpected as it is a strategically important developing country. Yet, 
Argentina, the least important country and the richest developing country among our cases, has 
                                                 
42 Israel does not receive IBRD funds as it is considered a high income country. 
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received more IBRD funding than any other one of our cases. It was probably because beginning 
in 1989, Argentina implemented far-reaching neo-liberal economic reforms which were 
consistently supported not only by the World Bank but also by the IMF (Mussa 2002).  
Table 23 shows that Argentina and Brazil have been the most significant IMF clients. 
Yet, in the last few years Turkey surpassed both Argentina and Brazil in its outstanding IMF 
credits and loans. All our cases (except Israel) have faced economic crises in 1990s and 2000s, 
so it is not surprising that they all received significant amount of IMF funds. If Table 24 is 
reviewed, the countries which have received most funding from the IMF relative to their 
economic size are Argentina and Turkey. However, if we exclude the 2000s when all but Turkey 
had already stabilized prices, Argentina appears as the most significant recipients of IMF funds, 
while Brazil appears the least important. Argentina eliminated high inflation only three years 
before Brazil and Turkey battled inflation longer than any of the other cases. Thus, IMF funding 
does not seem to affect inflation stabilization. 
Table 23: Total IMF credit and loans outstanding (million US$)* 
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey
1970-74 412.00 0.00 77.46 0.00 136.26
1975-79 1,050.18 0.00 1,274.21 1,070.72 1,839.16
1980-84 2,241.22 7,294.34 271.09 3,811.88 6,233.51
1985-89 12,154.02 15,008.32 0.01 17,105.72 2,895.95
1990-94 11,033.05 3,074.74 535.92 19,791.24 235.50
1995-99 19,977.40 10,023.33 133.98 35,828.55 2,286.10
2000-03 45,068.11 58,483.48 0.00 0.00 60,745.00
TOTAL 91,935.98 93,884.21 2,292.67 77,608.11 74,371.48
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (January 2006) 
(*) Highlighted periods are inflationary periods of the relevant countries. 
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Table 24: Total IMF credit and loans outstanding as a ration of GDP* 
  Argentina  Brazil  Israel  Mexico  Turkey  
1970-74 0.9% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
1975-79 1.8% 0.0% 9.1% 1.1% 2.9% 
1980-84 2.6% 3.1% 1.1% 2.0% 9.6% 
1985-89 11.8% 4.8% 0.0% 9.9% 3.4% 
1990-94 5.2% 0.7% 0.8% 5.6% 0.2% 
1995-99 7.1% 1.4% 0.1% 9.3% 1.2% 
 2000-03  23.0% 11.3% 0.0% 0.0% 31.6% 
average 1.96% 0.79% 0.14% 0.89% 2.04% 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (January 2006) 
(*) Highlighted periods are inflationary periods of the relevant countries. 
 
It can be seen that all our cases have received IMF funding during their economically 
difficult times (e.g., hyperinflationary period of Israel in 1970s, Mexican crisis of 1994, and 
economic crises in Argentina and Turkey in the early 2000s). Mexico is an important country for 
the US for its geographical proximity. Turkey is one of the most strategic partners of the US. 
However, Brazil and Argentina do not have those traits. In fact, Argentina is strategically the 
least significant country for the US and it has a smaller economy than Brazil and Mexico, but it 
received a huge amount of funds from the IMF. That can be explained by the series of economic 
crises Argentina faced and its close relationship with the IMF due to its sweeping economic 
liberalization policies that were seen as exemplar by the IMF (Mussa 2002). Therefore, at first 
sight, it does not appear that strategic importance is a factor that determines the amount of IMF 
assistance given. 
Turkey is a country of vital strategic importance and has had a difficult relation with the 
IMF (Stiles 1990). The first two adjustment programs offered by the IMF to Turkey were 
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negotiated in 1978 and 1979. They provided significant funding, though not enough for the 
Turkish needs, and imposed strict conditionality. Many NATO members tried to influence the 
IMF decisions, but until 1980 Turkey did not receive the big support it needed (Stiles 1990). In 
1980, Turkey was offered more generous funds as the IMF let Turkey use about 625 percent of 
its quota. That was right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in 
Iran in 1979, which were both considered as crisis cases with respect to US strategic interests. 
Turkey received five structural adjustment loans in 1980-84 and then gained approval for four 
sector adjustment loans from 1984 to 1988, making it by far the largest recipient of balance of 
payments support in that period. Turkey had standby arrangements with the IMF in 1980, 1983, 
and 1984. Since these funds were given “after” Turkey had initiated many economic 
liberalization policies, they were seen as a reward (Aricanli and Rodrik 1990).  
The most political decision to support Turkey came in 2001. Shaken by a severe financial 
crisis in February 2001, Turkish authorities resorted to the IMF. The IMF provided Turkey with 
more than 19 billion dollars of loans, increasing its quota usage to 1,773.5 percent in 2002. This 
IMF support corresponds to rising US interests in the region because of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. These terrorist attacks made Turkey even a more important strategic partner of 
the US. The political nature of the IMF’s decision can be understood more clearly when we look 
to the Argentine case. Argentina, which was going through a harsher economic crisis at the same 
time, did not receive any new significant support in 2001. Later it was provided some support, 
raising its quota usage to 598.2 percent as of 2002, but that was less than what Turkey was 
rewarded. At the same time, Brazil also received IMF support in 2002, raising its quota usage to 
604.6 percent. 
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In conclusion, we can suggest that politics may affect the IMF decisions, but it is 
probably one of many factors that do so, not the most important one. The intensity of economic 
crises seems to determine the flow of IMF funds more. Yet, if more than one country is going 
through a crisis, it is probable that the strategic ones would be prioritized, as observed during the 
Argentine and Turkish crises of 2001.  
How do these funds affect price stabilization? It is hard to get a clear answer to this 
question from these five cases. Argentina, the country which has traditionally received more IMF 
funds, had only moderate success in price stabilization.  Mexico and Israel have received less 
IMF assistance relative to their economic size, but they eliminated persistent inflation earlier 
than the others. Thus, it does not look like IMF funds help inflation stabilization. Mexico has 
received more World Bank funds than others and Israel has received none. Yet, Israel and 
Mexico eliminated persistent inflation faster than the others. Therefore, we do not see a 
consistent pattern of relationship between the assistance received through the World Bank and 
price stabilization. 
4.3.2 Official Economic Aid   
The IMF and World Bank funds are a more indirect way of providing financial assistance 
compared to official economic aid, simply because they are not given directly by governments 
but through multiple institutions. Official aid is much more directly political, as it is decided 
according to bilateral relations between the donor country and the recipient country, without an 
intermediary institution.  
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As the greatest power of the world, the most significant official aid donor is the US. The 
US government provides significant funds to developing countries and the amount of this aid 
depends more on the political relations with the recipient country than its need for funds.  
During the years of Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, both of these 
countries used foreign aid to address international threats and opportunities by granting 
assistance to win or maintain allies, to help countries fighting adversaries, an to 
encourage economic development, and thus, presumably, political stability. (Poe and 
Meernik 1995, p.399) 
 
Ideologies may affect how much foreign aid countries would receive. Typically friendly 
ideologies are rewarded, while those with ideologies of the adversary are punished. Also, 
location of countries may affect how strategically important they are, and thus, how much 
foreign aid they would receive. Not only countries’ location vis-à-vis the US, but also their 
location vis-à-vis the US’s enemies determines strategic importance. A third factor is alliances. 
During the Cold War, NATO countries received more aid from the US than other countries. A 
study found that in the 1980s NATO countries on average received more than 359 million dollars 
worth of aid than non-NATO countries. During that period Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey 
were given more aid than other countries except Egypt and Israel (Poe and Meernik 1995). 
The Table 25, Table 26, and Table 27 clearly demonstrate the political nature of official 
aid. Some countries, such as Israel, are very fortunate to receive generous assistance from 
advanced countries for strategic political grounds (Frey and Eichenberger 1994). Israel has 
received the most official aid (almost 33 billion dollars in 1970-2003) and most US assistance 
(over 50 billion dollars in 1962-2004), although it is least in need of official aid as it is the richest 
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country among our cases.43 Israel already has a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of 
18,358 US dollars as of 2000, whereas none of other cases had more than 8,000 dollars of GDP 
per capita. Besides it is a very small economy compared to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, or Turkey. 
As it is the smallest economy but the one that receives most aid, the impact of aid on Israel’s 
economy should be even higher. As can be seen in Table 26, between 1975 and 1990 official aid 
was almost 5 percent of Israel’s GDP. This aid might have put Israel in a quite advantaged 
position when it comes to stabilization.   
Table 25: Official development assistance and official aid (current US$)* 
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey
1970-74 143,040,000 776,430,000 524,810,000 295,870,000 745,630,000
1975-79 157,320,000 575,430,000 3,992,740,000 267,720,000 1,042,210,000
1980-84 190,260,000 790,080,000 5,122,950,000 510,540,000 2,926,400,000
1985-89 591,590,000 1,006,930,000 7,599,130,000 824,900,000 1,312,700,000
1990-94 1,083,120,000 520,160,000 7,690,470,000 1,599,290,000 3,676,200,000
1995-99 567,070,000 1,370,870,000 5,720,650,000 857,870,000 575,640,000
2000-04 506,880,000 1,582,000,000 2,648,150,000 380,410,000 1,328,790,000
TOTAL 3,239,280,000 6,624,900,000 33,298,900,000 4,736,600,000 11,585,580,000
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2005) (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/) 
 
                                                 
43 Egypt and Israel are exceptional in the amount of aid they receive from US, because of the Camp David 
agreement reached in 1977. They have been allocated disproportionate amounts of aid (Watkins 1997). Another 
reason that Israel receives extraordinary proportions of US aid is well-organized and effective Jewish lobby in the 
US. Jewish campaign contributions are an important consideration in US elections (Watkins 1997)(forthcoming). 
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Table 26: Official development assistance and official aid as a percentage of GDP* 
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
Middle 
income
countries
1970-74 0.06% 0.23% 1.31% 0.12% 0.62% 0.47%
1975-79 0.05% 0.07% 5.73% 0.05% 0.33% 0.56%
1980-84 0.04% 0.07% 4.16% 0.05% 0.91% 0.49%
1985-89 0.12% 0.06% 4.27% 0.10% 0.31% 0.50%
1990-94 0.10% 0.02% 2.42% 0.09% 0.47% 0.77%
1995-99 0.04% 0.04% 1.14% 0.04% 0.07% 0.51%
2000-04 0.05% 0.06% 0.47% 0.01% 0.12% 0.45%
Average  0.07% 0.05% 1.86% 0.05% 0.29% 0.54%
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2005) (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/) 
Table 27: US overseas loans and grants, 1962-2004 (million US$) 
 
Argentina 
 
Brazil Israel Mexico 
 
Turkey
USAID and 
Predecessor, Total       710.00     6,937.80    46,951.20        551.40      9,989.00 
Department of 
Agriculture, Total 0.00     2,855.20      1,864.10        455.80      1,796.20 
State Department, 
Total           8.00         52.00          49.80        482.80          33.80 
Other Economic 
Assistance, Total       238.30        606.80         142.20        435.40          88.60 
Economic Assistance, 
Total 956.30   10,451.70 49,007.30    1,925.40  11,907.60
Export-Import Bank 
Loans 3,192.60     9,871.60 2,689.60     9,527.70  1,292.40
OPIC & Other Non-
Concessional US 
Loans 173.70        952.70 2.20         45.80  396.90
Non-Concessional US 
Loans, Total 3,366.30   10,824.40 2,691.80    9,573.60  1,689.30
GDP (2000) 284,203.70 601,732.02 115,452.13 581,428.45 199,267.32
GDP per capita (2000) 7,726 3,538 18,358 5,935 2,956
Sources: The US Loans & Grants (Greenbook), USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation 
(http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/)  
World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2005) (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/) 
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Turkey is next after Israel as it received more than $11 billions official aid in 1970-2001, 
exceeding Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, although it has a smaller economy. As can be seen 
from Table 27, Turkey received the second highest level of economic support from the US, 
though nothing close to what Israel has received, especially in United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) assistance.  
The amount of non-concessional US loans rewarded corresponds to the economic 
importance and the intensity of economic relations between the recipient countries and the US. 
However, it is clear that the total economic assistance rewarded by the US is determined by 
political interests. Countries which are strategically more important have been supported more 
by other countries.  
Official aid may have helped countries to decrease inflation by balancing their budgets. 
Mexico seems like a very important country for the US, but it did not receive significant aid. It 
never had a hyperinflation and was able to decrease its inflation rather quickly in the 1980s. 
Turkey received more economic aid than Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, but it was less 
successful than any of these cases. The Mexican and Turkish cases do not support our 
hypothesis. Yet Israel, which had a hyperinflationary crisis in the 1970s, is a country which has 
been receiving huge amounts of economic aid and it was also able to decrease inflation in 1980s 
even faster than Mexico. In fact, probably the economic aid it received helped Israel to balance 
its budget and eliminate persistent inflation. These contrary cases demonstrate that the variable 
strategic importance determines official economic aid, but economic aid in return does not 
determine the success in price stabilization.  
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4.3.3 Military aid 
Military aid is a tool for great powers to promote their political and military interests in the 
world. Although military aid is not as useful as economic aid for developing countries, it may 
help them to lower their military costs, and thus, ease their budget squeeze.  
Unlike developmental aid, which may or may not be politically motivated, military aid is 
at all times politically motivated. It is always a function of strategic interests of the donor 
countries (Hess 1989). Great powers usually give foreign military aid in order to extend their 
political and economic influence in other countries and to help advancement of their economy, 
especially military industry. They typically prefer to give such aid to the countries that have high 
strategic significance. On the other hand, countries seek military aid to improve their external 
and/or internal security and for prestige (Whynes 1979). 
The US is also the biggest provider of military aid. During the Cold War, the main goal 
of the US foreign policy was to prevent further expansion of the Soviet Union, and thus 
communism, and to avoid a Third World War (R.D. McKinlay 1984; Walt 1989). Therefore, the 
US not only provided economic aid but also military aid to many countries in order to check 
Soviet power. The Middle East has traditionally been the region that received most aid provided 
by the US (Hess 1989). 
US military aid usually comes in two forms: the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMSP) 
and the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The FMSP provides favorable credits (long term 
credits with low interest rates) or gives guarantee for loans given by private financial institutions 
to developing countries that purchase military equipment from the US. The MAP gives grants for 
military purposes. The US has given substantial military aid to NATO countries, to countries that 
are geographically or ideologically (potentially) close to the Soviet bloc and to the Middle 
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Eastern countries. Both FMSP and MAP were provided generously to Turkey and to several 
other countries, such as Greece, Taiwan and South Korea (Whynes 1979). 
Our Latin American cases are not major recipients of military aid. The majority of the 
military aid given to Latin America was for prestige reasons, since there has not been a 
significant international conflict in the region for long time.44 45 For instance, although Brazil 
and Argentina neither have had a major conflict with each other for centuries nor have been 
strategically very important for the US, they have acquired military equipment as they had 
caught up in an arms race in 1950s in trying to compete with each other (Whynes 1979). 
However, the military aid they have received is still very little compared to what Turkey and 
Israel have received (see Table 28 and Table 29). That aid does not even constitute one percent 
of what those countries spend for military and Mexico is not very different either (see Table 30).  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 US military aid to Latin America was mostly through military training which was not as costly as military 
financial or equipment aid. School of the Americas (SOA), a facility established by the US in 1946 and renamed as 
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC) in 2001, is the main training facility for Latin 
American military and law-enforcement personnel. It especially trained military personnel before and during the 
“dirty war” years in the Southern Cone and the civil war years in Central America, where military either ruled or had 
extensive political influence and committed serious human rights violations. (http://www.soaw.org and 
http://www.ciponline.org/facts/soa.htm ) 
45 The 1982 Falkland Islands War between Argentina and the UK was an exception to this, but this conflict was not 
one that would cause Argentina to receive more military aid. On the contrary, as the adversary of Argentina in this 
conflict was the UK, one of the great western powers and the most important ally of the US, it might have actually 
decreased military aid.   
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Table 28: US military assistance 1970-2004 (in million US $) 
 
Argentina Brazil Israel  Mexico 
  
Turkey
Peacekeeping Operations 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.00
Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) Grants 
 
25.30
 
2.20
 
1,246.20
 
130.20 
 
330.70
International Military 
Education and Training 24.20 21.50 0.60 21.70 3,643.80
Other Military Grants 17.10 27.10 1,773.90 23.70 146.00
Foreign Military 
Financing Program 14.40 0.00 63,034.50 0.00 2,583.50
Foreign Military 
Financing, Direct Loan 
Program Account 410.50 604.10 25,763.00 0.00 8,894.10
Total Military Assistance 492.10 655.00 91,819.80 175.70 17,342.60
Source: “The US Loans & Grants (Greenbook),” USAID Center for Development Information and 
Evaluation. (http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk 
 
 
Table 29: Total US military assistance ( in million $US)* 
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey
1970-74       256.50        334.80  12,416.00        24.90    3,825.80 
1975-79       185.10        313.80  18,830.10          1.70    1,452.20 
1980-84 0.00  0.00  12,629.20          1.20    3,417.50 
1985-89          0.30           0.30  12,529.90          1.60    4,167.70 
1990-94         33.90           1.30  12,444.50        93.50    3,402.90 
1995-99          6.30           3.30  10,414.60        47.20       959.70 
2000-04         10.00           1.50  12,555.50          5.60       116.80 
Total       492.10        655.00  91,819.80       175.70  17,342.60 
Source: The US Loans & Grants (Greenbook), USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation. 
(http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/) 
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Table 30: Military assistance as a percentage of military expenditure* 
 Argentina   Brazil  Israel  Mexico  Turkey 
1988 0.00% 0.00% 31.52% 0.02% 18.86%
1989 0.01% 0.00% 31.63% 0.02% 17.21%
1990 0.02% 0.00% 29.92% 1.33% 13.59%
1991 0.20% 0.00% 30.20% 0.12% 19.84%
1992 0.47% 0.01% 29.33% 3.09% 10.93%
1993 0.31% 0.00% 36.57% 0.04% 8.73%
1994 0.00% 0.00% 30.61% 0.01% 7.83%
1995 0.00% 0.00% 28.30% 0.02% 6.03%
1996 0.02% 0.00% 24.96% 0.04% 5.09%
1997 0.02% 0.00% 24.26% 1.49% 2.58%
1998 0.05% 0.03% 23.39% 0.06% 0.02%
1999 0.06% 0.00% 24.19% 0.03% 0.02%
2000 0.03% 0.00% 34.17% 0.03% 0.02%
2001 0.05% 0.00% 23.28% 0.04% 0.02%
2002 0.09% 0.01% 19.99% 0.03% 0.54%
2003 0.10% 0.01% 31.18% 0.05% 0.20%
average 0.09% 0.01% 28.35% 0.40% 6.97%
Sources: The US Loans & Grants (Greenbook), USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation. 
(http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/)  
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21298138~pagePK:641331
50~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html ) [Data prior to 1988 could not be found.] 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 28 and Table 29, Israel is the principal recipient of the US 
military aid. As it was demonstrated previously, Israel spends excessively on military. However, 
in Table 30 it looks like the US has compensated for about 30 percent of Israel’s military costs. 
Although Turkey’s military expenses are about the same amount as those of Israel, the military 
aid Turkey has received is about one fifth of what Israel has received. On average only about 7 
percent of Turkey’s military spending has been compensated through US military aid. Thus, 
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military spending in Turkey contributes more to the budget deficits, while Israel is compensated 
considerably for those expenses by military aid. It may be one of the reasons why it has been 
more difficult for Turkey to contain inflation. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has analyzed two arguments. The first argument was that the strategic importance of 
states provides states with more financial funds, which may affect their performance positively 
while they try to eliminate persistent inflation. Mexico and Israel, strategically very important 
countries for the US, were able to decrease their inflation faster than Argentina and Brazil, which 
are less important.  These four cases support our hypothesis. On the other hand, Turkey, another 
strategically important country, was quite unsuccessful in price stabilization. There seems to be a 
relation between strategic importance and ability to eliminate persistent inflation, but Turkey 
presents an outlier case.  
When I expected strategic importance to increase ability to decrease inflation, our main 
assumption was that the IMF and World Bank would provide more funds for the strategically 
important countries and thus help with disinflation. However, first of all, strategic importance 
does not provide a significantly higher IMF and World Bank assistance. Indeed, Argentina, the 
strategically least important state, seemed to have received more funds from these institutions 
and Israel much less. The IMF and World Bank assistance seems to be determined more by 
economic crises that countries face. And in the Argentina case, it was determined more by 
economic ideology, i.e. the neo-liberal policies adopted by the Argentine government were seen 
as exemplars to be supported by the international financial institutions.  
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Secondly, our analysis reveals that IMF and World Bank aid does not necessary cause a 
country to achieve price stabilization.  In fact, we can argue that when aid is provided in the form 
of loans, it may even create a debt spiral which may worsen the inflation problem in the medium 
or long term. Therefore, official aid, which usually comes in the form of grants or loans with 
very concessional terms, may be more beneficial in financing the budget deficits and stopping 
persistent inflation. Israel has been the most significant recipient of official aid and this has 
probably helped the stabilization of its economy. The second significant official aid recipient 
among our cases is Turkey, but official aid does not seem to have helped Turkey to eliminate 
inflation.    
Our other hypothesis was that the countries that face more security threats are less able to 
end their inflation problems. If a country feels insecure, it invests more in military and, thus, has 
high military spending. This may contribute to budget deficits and lead to difficulties in battling 
inflation. The analysis of this chapter somewhat supports this argument. In fact, countries that 
face more security threats do spend more for military. However, if they are strategically 
important, they may also receive significant military aid. With significant military assistance 
military expenditures do not necessarily contribute to inflation. That may explain why Israel had 
less problem in controlling inflation compared to Turkey. 
Based on the above findings, we can argue that international politics provides only partial 
answers to the question of persistent inflation. Especially Turkey’s failure to eliminate its 
persistent inflation leaves us with unanswered questions. Why a strategically important country 
like Turkey has failed to resolve its inflation problem while other important countries Israel and 
Mexico were successful? The answer to this question may be found in domestic variables. 
Therefore, the next four chapters will look into domestic socio-political institutions and 
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structures of Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey in an attempt to find out some factors 
that delay price stabilization.  
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5.0  POLITICAL REGIMES AND INFLATION: DOES DEMOCRACY IMPEDE 
STABILIZATION? 
The second relationship that this dissertation evaluates is whether the political regime has an 
impact on the ability to stabilize prices. As it is used in this chapter, political regime signifies the 
level democracy in a state. It is hypothesized that political regime is related to the ability of a 
country to introduce and pursue effective policies, including the ones employed to fight inflation. 
I expected to find democracy to make it harder to achieve price stabilization, as the economic 
policies needed to eliminate inflation are usually politically unpopular. The assumption was that 
democratic regimes are not able to implement necessary economic policies effectively as they 
are more vulnerable to “popular political pressures”  (Remmer 1990, p.315).  
The findings of this chapter indicate that if there is inflation in a country, democratization 
increases the existing inflationary pressures, but only in the short term. Thus, it may be difficult 
to decrease inflation immediately after a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. 
The instability of a democratic regime has a negative effect on the ability to decrease inflation. 
However, consolidation of democracy and the accompanying regime stability are associated with 
low inflation. As democracies mature, it becomes easier for governments to introduce and 
implement anti-inflationary policies as a stable regime is more willing to take political risks 
when it comes to implementing unpopular policies, like austerity measures needed to eliminate 
persistent inflation.  
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Political regime is related to who controls power in a state and the way it is controlled. 
Lawson (1993, p.185) defines a political regime as “the formal and informal organization of the 
center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who 
has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not.” 
Political regime is closely linked to degree of democracy in the polity, but it may encompass 
more features of the polity than democracy (Cardoso 1979). However, in this study I will simply 
classify regimes according to their level of democracy.   
The democratic level of a political regime encompasses a spectrum which extends from 
democracy to dictatorship. It is associated with the existence of democratic institutions and 
processes, such as regular and free elections, free political competition, government 
accountability, civil liberties, and political rights. These democratic qualities then determine the 
relationship between the government and its constituents. In more democratic countries, 
constituents are considered to be better represented and to have more influence on the 
government when compared regimes that restrict political competition. However, as found in this 
analysis, it may also be very important how stable these institutions and processes are. Regime 
instability, i.e. shifts between democracy and authoritarianism, has significant impact on the 
performance of the state.  
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5.1 THEORIES OF THE RELATION BETWEEN INFLATION AND 
POLITICAL REGIME  
Although democratic and authoritarian regimes differ in the way they operate, they both need 
support for their political survival. Therefore, in both kinds of regimes, “governments seek to 
influence political outcomes by handing out or calling back benefits to specific groups” (Frey 
and Eichenberger 1994, p.172). A government’s survival depends on sufficient level of support 
or low level of opposition. The support of some groups is more important than others.  For 
instance, poor people are more easily ignored by governments than rich businessmen because of 
their economic power. Also, support of unionized workers is more important than workers 
without unions as they lack economic and political power of organization. Support of groups not 
only depends on the benefits they receive from the government, but also on the relative level of 
these benefits. However, governments have limited resources to pursue their goals.  
As raising funds through taxation is usually politically difficult, governments resort to 
other means for financing their expenditures. Inflation is one of those means that government 
may use to raise funds and it also works like a tax. When the government does not have enough 
resources to meet the demands of the constituents, it may simply print more money. The revenue 
that the government earns from issuing more money is called seignorage, or inflation tax. 
Seignorage works like an interest-free loan to the government and a tax levied on the holders of a 
currency. Yet, the expansion of the money supply beyond the expansion in the economy causes 
inflation. 
There are different views on the relationship between inflation and political regime. The 
two dominant theories, the state-capture approach and the populist approach, offer 
contradictory arguments. The state-capture approach argues that democracy reduces the 
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propensity to inflation. This view is based on liberal theory, which claims that free political 
competition between self-seeking politicians brings about efficient policies. If there is no free 
political competition, the state may be captured by special interest groups that push government 
for inflationary economic policies that benefit them (Stigler 1972; Wittman 1989).  
A state is captured when powerful interest groups have unbalanced weight on 
policymaking. Usually this happens in undemocratic environments where politicians and their 
clients obtain particularistic benefits. Such exclusive benefits cause economic inefficiency and 
loss of state resources. Ultimately they may trigger inflation because they create budget deficits 
which then can be financed by creating more money. The ruling class and its clients resist 
disinflationary policies, because they do not want to lose their private economic benefits (e.g. 
credits, low interest rates). Democratization makes them lose power and benefits that drain state 
resources. Therefore, the state capture view argues that democratization helps governments deal 
with inflation. Some scholars who have supported this argument are Bates and Krueger (1993); 
Geddes (1995); Shleifer and Vishny (1998); Hellman, Jones, Kauffman, and Schankerman 
(2000); Hellman and Kaufmann (2002); Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef (2002); and Kaufmann 
(2003). 
The state-capture approach has been used to explain inflation in transition economies. 
However, similar arguments were made by some other scholars who investigated other 
developing countries as well. For instance,  Nelson (1989) and Remmer (1990) argue that 
democratic governments have been as successful as, or even more successful than, undemocratic 
ones in implementing stabilization and austerity measures. 
The populist approach argues that democracy affects macroeconomic performance 
negatively. According to this view, democracy increases the demand for inflation and democratic 
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institutions undermine a state’s commitment to keep prices stable. Inflation rises in democratic 
environments because democratically elected politicians are more responsive to popular 
pressures, and thus, use inflation for more spending and redistribution. Theoretically, the more 
democratic a country’s regime is, the more power the constituents exert on economic decisions, 
and thus, the more difficult, if not impossible, it is for governments to oppose inflationary 
pressures. Democratically elected officials may use monetary policy and seigniorage to increase 
economic growth and benefit the poorer masses rather than the rich elites (O'Donnell 1973; 
Skidmore 1977; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1992).  
In democratic systems, more channels (e.g. elections, civil and political organizations) 
exist to force policymakers to consider the interests of the people and groups. Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) argue that that is why the size of the government and public spending increase in 
democratic systems, facilitating budget deficits, and thus inflation. Also, some interest groups 
(especially labor unions) that have more organizational power in democratic environments can 
pressure governments for higher wages and rents, and thus, inflame or exacerbate inflation 
(Olson 1982; Alvarez, Garrett et al. 1991). Lindbeck (1983) argues that democracy facilitates 
political competition and thus creates demand for budget expansion, which in turn increases 
budget deficits and thus inflation through money growth.  According to Cheibub (1998), 
democratic countries may be more prone to inflation as they depend on popular votes and the 
popular constituents demand higher consumption. Gasiorowski (2000b) also claims that 
developing countries with more democratic regimes face higher inflation because they have 
higher budget deficits and more pressure for wage increases. Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef 
(2002) suggest that democratic societies with high income inequalities are particularly vulnerable 
to inflation.  
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Democracy may increase inflation due to the unpopularity of the economic policies that 
are necessary for its control. States generally use two types of economic policies to battle with 
inflation: orthodox policies and heterodox policies. Orthodox policies are economic policies 
promoted by monetarists to battle inflation. They involve tight fiscal and monetary policies and 
also they usually promote economic liberalization and deregulation. Heterodox policies, 
promoted both by structuralists and non-structuralists, also use orthodox measures. However, in 
addition to these measures, they initially and temporarily use incomes policies, i.e. price and 
wage controls (Dijkstra 1997). Although heterodox policies try to moderate adverse effects of 
tight economic policies through price and wage controls, both heterodox and orthodox policies 
are often widely unpopular. Thus, policymakers may be reluctant to take economic measures that 
will hurt the majority, even though they may bring about better macroeconomic performance in 
the long-term. Especially when it is election time, politicians prefer expansionary policies that 
appeal more to a majority of the constituents.  
Proponents of the populist view argue that authoritarian governments can be more 
successful in decreasing inflation. Democratic governments may also reduce inflation, but if only 
if they have “autonomous” and “consolidated” authority that can ignore inflationary pressures 
(Desai, Olofsgard et al. 2002). Authoritarianism fosters autonomy of the state. Authoritarian 
governments are not as dependent on popular groups’ support as the democratic ones, so they 
can implement even the unpopular policies quite effectively (Haggard 1990). Authoritarian states 
are also able to force labor to accept lower wages and absorb price shocks (Velasco 1988; 
Whitehead 1989; Silva 1993). Chile’s success in late 1970s in decreasing inflation, though slow, 
was due to a very undemocratic government. Yet, populist view fails to explain how Argentina 
and Brazil decreased inflation in 1990s through democratically elected governments.  
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Business cycle theories, which suggest that governments may manipulate the inflation 
rate around election time, partially support the populist view. According to business cycle theory, 
politicians temporarily increase growth and employment, i.e. they try to make economy look 
good before the elections in order to gain more votes. However, this temporary makeup for the 
economy consequently increases inflation right after the elections. Then, politicians implement 
more strict economic policies and, thus, induce unemployment and falling growth, in order to 
recover macroeconomic equilibrium (Fair 1973; Nordhaus 1975; Alesina 1988; Alesina and 
Sachs 1988; Alesina and Gatti 1995; Alesina, Roubini et al. 1997). Therefore, the economy 
booms right before the elections and inflation tends to increase right after the elections, but this 
period is followed by unemployment and deflation in the first years of the elected government. 
An inflationary boom is repeated as the next elections approach.  
Despite many claims that the inflation problem is exacerbated in democratic 
environments, recently many countries were able to decrease their inflation not during 
authoritarian regimes but during democratic regimes. Although the pessimist populist view had 
concrete examples in 1970s and 1980s that supported its arguments, by the mid-1990s prices 
were stabilized in almost all countries, even in democratic ones. Israel has always been 
democratic. The country experienced inflation problems and was able to resolve them in the 
second half of the 1980s within a democratic political environment. Not only Israel, but also 
Argentina and Brazil were successful in decreasing inflation during democratic regimes. 
Argentina eliminated its inflation problem during the democratically elected government of 
Carlos Menem (1989-1994) and Brazil decreased its inflation during democratic governments of 
Itamar Franco (1992-1995) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Turkey also had lower 
inflation in 1970s when it was more democratic.  
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Indeed, there is no consensus on how political regime influences the ability of a 
government to decrease inflation. And some studies have found no relation between inflation and 
political regime (Haggard, Kaufman et al. 1992; Lindenberg and Devarajan 1993). Others have 
focused more on change in political regime, i.e. on the consolidation of democracy. Accordingly, 
in countries which have recently made a transition to democracy, policymakers are concerned 
more about regime stability, so they implement expansionary macroeconomic policies to satisfy 
popular demands and relieve social conflicts. As a result, they are more prone to inflation 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1989). Therefore, the relationship between the political regime and 
inflation may not be a very clear-cut one. In this chapter I try to look into this relationship by 
analyzing the trends in the inflation rate and democratic level of Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and 
Turkey between 1970 and 2003 in order to find out whether democracy really undermines the 
ability of state to eliminate persistent inflation.    
5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION AND 
DEMOCRACY 
In this chapter, the political regime variable is measured by classification of polities according to 
their degree of democracy on a yearly basis from 1970s through 2000s. Democracy is measured 
not only qualitatively, through classifications existing in the literature, particularly by Przeworski 
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and Vreeland (2000)46, but also quantitatively, through available democracy indices produced by 
Freedom House47 and the Polity IV. 48 49  
The charts below (Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10) show the relation 
between inflation and the degree of democracy in our cases by using the Polity IV index of 
democracy. As we can see from these charts, all the countries, except Israel, experienced an 
increase in inflation after democratization. However, all these countries, except Turkey, were 
able to decrease inflation later in more democratic conditions.  
Figure 6: Inflation rate vs. degree of democracy in Argentina 
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Source: Polity IV Report (CIDCM) data and World Economic Outlook Database, 2003 (IMF) 
 
                                                 
46 Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) classification of regimes for Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey can be 
found at Appendix-III. 
47 Freedom House indices can be found at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=276. 
48 Polity IV indices can be found at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/. 
49 Since each measurement has its own weaknesses, I chose to use several different measurements. 
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Figure 7: Inflation rate vs. degree of democracy in Brazil 
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Source: Polity IV Report (CIDCM) data and World Economic Outlook Database, 2003 (IMF) 
Figure 8: Inflation rate vs. degree of democracy in Israel 
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Source: Polity IV Report (CIDCM) data and World Economic Outlook Database, 2003 (IMF) 
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Figure 9: Inflation rate vs. degree of democracy in Mexico 
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Source: Polity IV Report (CIDCM) data and World Economic Outlook Database, 2003 (IMF) 
Figure 10: Inflation rate vs. degree of democracy in Turkey 
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If the charts above are checked, it seems like there is a positive relation between 
democracy and inflation, but only within few years after democratization. Later, this relation 
changes to a negative one. This indicates that inflation tends to decrease as democracy 
consolidates.50 Therefore, these charts seem to confirm the argument by Haggard and Kaufman 
(1989) that democracy increases inflation only initially in order to maintain regime stability. 
After democracy is consolidated and regime stability is established, it is easier to stabilize prices.  
Regime stability emerges as an important factor that affects the relation between political 
regime and inflation. Our most politically stable countries are Israel and Mexico.51 Israel has 
been a very stable democracy since its formation in 1948. On the other hand, Mexico had a very 
stable authoritarian regime until 2000. In July 2000, after 71 years of dominance, National 
Action Party (PAN) replaced the ruling Institutional Party of the Revolution (PRI) in presidency. 
In these stable political environments, we cannot explain elimination of inflation by the type of 
political regime, since the regime does not vary. Yet, in countries with shifts in regime, inflation 
may still be related to the degree of democracy. Especially during regime transitions, democracy 
may render the governments reluctant to take measures to decrease inflation. However, this 
relation tends to change as democracy consolidates.  
Table 31 demonstrates that all of our case countries, except Turkey, have improved their 
democracy rankings since the 1970s. By the 1990s all of them, except Turkey, were more 
democratic than ever. Compared to my other cases, Turkey is lagging in political rights, civil 
liberties, and consequently in democratic status. The reason that Turkey has been lagging in 
inflation stabilization may be that, politically, it still does not have conditions as free as other 
                                                 
50 Of course, this relation does not hold for Israel, since Israel has been a stable democracy from the beginning but 
had instabilities in prices.  
51 Here, political stability indicates regime stability, not changes in government.  
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cases. Democracy is still not as consolidated in Turkey as in other cases. By looking at the 
deterioration in Turkey’s democracy ratings from 1992-93 to 1994-95 (from 2, 4 to 5, 5), we 
may conclude that regime instability is still a threat in Turkey. If we follow Haggard and 
Kaufman’s (1989) argument, that may be why Turkey’s inflation rate was still high as of late 
1990s.  
Table 31: Freedom ratings 
Year Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1972-73 6,3,PF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,3,PF 3,4,PF 
1973-74 2,2,F 5,5,PF 2,3,F 4,3,PF 2,4,PF 
1974-75 2,4,PF 4,4,PF 2,3,F 4,3,PF 2,3,F 
1975-76 2,4,PF 4,5,PF 2,3,F 4,3,PF 2,3,F 
1976-77 6,5,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F 4,4,PF 2,3,F 
1977-78 6,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F 4,4,PF 2,3,F 
1978-79 6,5,NF 4,4,PF 2,2,F 4,4,PF 2,3,F 
1979-80 6,5,NF 4,3,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F 
1980-81 6,5,NF 4,3,PF 2,2,F 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 
1981-82 6,5,NF 4,3,PF 2,2,F 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 
1982-83 6,5,PF 3,3,PF 2,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 
1983-84 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 2,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 
1984-85 2,2,F 3,3,PF 2,2,F 3,4,PF 3,5,PF 
1985-86 2,2,F 3,2,F 2,2,F 4,4,PF 3,5,PF 
1986-87 2,1,F 2,2,F 2,2,F 4,4,PF 3,4,PF 
1987-88 2,1,F 2,2,F 2,2,F 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 
1988-89 2,1,F 2,3,F 2,2,F 3,4,PF 2,4,PF 
1989-90 1,2,F 2,2,F 2,2,F 4,3,PF 3,3,PF 
1990-91 1,3,F 2,3,F 2,2,F 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 
1991-92 1,3,F 2,3,F 2,2,F 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 
1992-93 2,3,F 2,3,F 2,2,F 4,3,PF 2,4,PF 
1993-94 2,3,F 3,4,PF 1,3,F 4,4,PF 4,4,PF 
1994-95 2,3,F 2,4,PF 1,3,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF 
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Table 31  (Continued from previous page) 
Year Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1995-96 2,3,F 2,4,PF 1,3,F 4,4,PF 5,5,PF 
1996-97 2,3,F 2,4,PF 1,3,F 4,3,PF 4,5,PF 
1997-98 2,3,F 3,4,PF 1,3,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 
1998-99 3,3,F 3,4,PF 1,3,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 
1999-00 2,3,F 3,4,PF 1,2,F 3,4,PF 4,5,PF 
2000-01 1,2,F 3,3,PF 1,3,F 2,3,F 4,5,PF 
2001-02 3,3 PF 3,3 PF 1,3 F 2,3 F 4,5 PF 
Source: Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-73 to 2001-2002. The first rating is for political rights. The 
second is for civil liberties. The value of both these ratings ranges between 1 and 7, 1 signifying most free and 7 
signifying least free. The last rating indicates “freedom status” with F=free, PF= partly free, and NF= not free. 
* Ratings of inflationary years are highlighted. 
 
 
Many analysts do not see Turkey as a stable and consolidated democracy (Özbudun 
1996; Candar 1999). As indicated in the Polity IV Country Report of 2001, although the Turkish 
political regime is classified as democratic, the military continues to have substantial (though 
mostly indirect) influence on the government. A fourth military coup in Turkey is still a likely 
political threat. This was demonstrated in 1997, when the military successfully ousted the 
prevailing government by forcing the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (leader of the Islamic 
Refah Party) to resign because of his anti-secular ambitions. This incident was called a "virtual" 
or "postmodern" coup that caused collapse of a democratically elected government and its 
replacement by another government which was more sympathetic to the military’s wishes and 
influence ("Polity IV Country Report 2001" 2001). This event worsened the democracy rating of 
Turkey after 1997.  
We may argue that prices were still not stabilized in Turkey as of 2000 because of flaws 
in democracy. However, this conclusion is not consistent with the Mexican case, where inflation 
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had decreased under even less democratic conditions than Turkey. This contradiction is more 
obvious if we look to the Polity IV democracy data. Mexico demonstrates significant 
improvements in its democracy rating despite the fact that it was still not considered a 
democratic state. Although Mexico was less democratic than Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, 
unlike Turkey, it has always had a stable regime. This confirms the idea that we should focus 
more on regime stability than the type of political regime to assess the ability of a state to 
decrease inflation.  
As can be seen in the Table 32, neither Brazil nor Argentina was able to stabilize prices 
without democratic consolidation and regime stability. These countries battled inflation well 
after the end of military authoritarian regimes. It took nine years for Argentina and sixteen years 
for Brazil to implement stabilize prices after shifting to democracy. Democratic regimes in 
Argentina and Brazil inherited high budget deficits from the preceding authoritarian regimes, 
very high debt and expanding demand for public services. Those regimes faced a fiscal crisis but 
chose to adopt loose fiscal and monetary policies (Blake 1996). Therefore, they had difficulties 
in controlling inflation in their first years. After several failed attempts, these countries were 
finally able to eliminate persistent inflation problem by the 1990s.  
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Table 32: A comparison of democracy and inflation in 1980s and 1990s 
End of 1980s 
 Stable 
democracy 
 
Unstable 
democracy 
Stable 
authoritarian 
Decrease in 
inflation  
 
Israel 
  
Mexico 
 
No decrease in 
inflation  
 Argentina 
Brazil 
Turkey 
 
 
End of 1990s 
 Stable 
democracy 
 
Unstable 
democracy 
Stable 
authoritarian 
Decrease in 
inflation  
Israel 
Argentina 
Brazil 
  
Mexico 
No decrease in 
inflation  
  
Turkey 
 
 
 
Typically the Argentine political regime has been very unstable. Throughout the 
twentieth century, Argentina has been ruled by a series of democratic and authoritarian military 
regimes. After about eight years of strict authoritarian rule, in December 1983, Argentina 
returned to democracy. Since then, there have been free and fair elections. Although Raul 
Alfonsín Foulkes, the first democratically elected Argentine president after the military regime, 
introduced heterodox anti-inflationary programs to end inflation, his government was 
unsuccessful in this fight and the country witnessed dramatic hyperinflation. When Alfonsín 
transferred the presidency to Carlos Saúl Menem in 1989, for the first time in Argentine history, 
a freely and fairly elected president from one party transferred the presidency to a freely and 
fairly elected president from another party. It was the government of Menem which finally 
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succeeded in eliminating inflation with the Convertibility Plan of 1991 (Jones 1997). This was a 
shock therapy or “cold turkey” type of stabilization which involved rapid and radical monetary 
reforms. Argentine peso was pegged to the United States dollar and the money growth was 
limited by law to the growth in reserves. As a result inflation decreased from four digit levels to 
less than 20 percent in two years and to one digit levels in three years.  
Brazil followed a path similar to Argentina. The first Brazilian democratic government 
after twenty one years of authoritarian rule did not last long because of president Tancredo 
Neves’ death in 1985 on the day of his inauguration. The next democratic government was 
headed by Jose Sarney (1985-1990), who was unsuccessful in inflation stabilization despite 
trying to implement some disinflationary policies. Then, the following president Fernando Collor 
de Mello (1990-1992) was never able to stabilize prices and was impeached in 1992 over charges 
of corruption. Finally, the interim government of former vice-president Itamar Franco (1992-94) 
succeeded in stabilizing prices with Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Plano Real of 1994 
(Mainwaring 1997; von Mettenheim 1997). Therefore, Brazil faced more political instability and, 
thus, had more problems in consistently implementing disinflation policies.  
We may conclude that regime stability is a more significant factor than democracy in 
predicting price stability. Stable regimes are more willing and able to take the political risks 
associated with implementing the unpopular economic policies needed to decrease inflation to 
single digit levels.  
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
It was assumed that political regime is related to a state’s willingness and capacity to implement 
economic policies that would end persistent inflation.  In that respect, I expected to find out that 
democracy directly undermines while authoritarianism strengthens a state’s ability to effectively 
implement disinflationary policies.  
As a result of the findings of this chapter, it can be argued that an authoritarian regime is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for successful price stabilization. There have been authoritarian 
governments which were able to eliminate persistent inflation (e.g., Mexico). There have also 
been very democratic governments which successfully decreased persistent inflation (e.g., 
Israel).52 However, that does not mean that political regime does not have an effect on inflation. 
In fact, authoritarian governments may find it easier to implement successful stabilization of 
prices, but only if they are stable authoritarian regimes. Democratic governments may also 
decrease inflation successfully, provided that they are well consolidated and stable. For states 
with unstable regimes it may take longer to eliminate persistent inflation, as in the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey.  
In sum, we cannot make conclusions on the relationship between political regime and 
inflation without taking the stability of the political regime into consideration. Moreover, other 
political institutions, such as the political system and party and electoral systems, have to be 
analyzed, since they may also relate to the state’s ability to stabilize prices.  
                                                 
52 These findings are consistent with findings of Keech (de Souza 2004), who also acknowledges that neither 
democracy nor authoritarianism are necessary or sufficient for good economic performance.  
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6.0  POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INFLATION: PRESIDENTIALISM VS. 
PARLIAMENTARISM 
Countries have different political systems and that shapes how they make and implement various 
policies. Presidential systems and parliamentary systems (or hybrid ones) have different 
decision-making processes and procedures and tend to lead to different kinds of decisions. 
Therefore, different systems show variety in their capacity to introduce and implement 
disinflationary policies as well.  
In this chapter I hypothesize that it is easier to implement unpopular economic policies in 
a presidential system than in a parliamentary system. This statement is especially true when the 
parliamentary government is not a one-party government or does not have a majority in the 
legislature. Presidential systems are in general more able than parliamentary systems to introduce 
and implement tight economic policies, because they tend to be more stable. This is true even 
when the government does not have a majority in the legislature, because many presidents in 
presidential systems (especially in Latin America) enjoy extensive powers that can override the 
opposition. 
The relations among a country’s governing institutions differ depending on its political 
system, i.e. whether a country has a presidential, parliamentary or a hybrid political system. 
Although each country has its own variation on these political typologies, some general 
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conclusions can be drawn about the characteristics of political systems and their relationship to 
political conflict and executive-legislative power.  
In presidential systems, executive and legislative powers are separated and the executive 
is not dependent on legislative support. Presidents are elected by voters, have paramount 
executive authority, and are also formally head of state. In parliamentary systems, the executive 
(government) is dependent on legislative support and normally emerges from the legislature. The 
prime-minister is "first among equals" in the Cabinet. He has more powers than the President, 
who is chosen by the legislature and mostly symbolic (Powell 1982; Shugart and Carey 1992). 
As opposed to the presidential system, executive and legislative powers are fused in 
parliamentary systems. The governments of parliamentary systems do not have fixed terms, i.e. 
they may be replaced at any time by the legislature. The governments of parliamentary systems 
look for consensus (especially if the government is a coalition) in order to survive, since they are 
dependent on the confidence of the parliament. Their decision-making processes are more 
participatory as it involves negotiation, bargaining, and consultation (Shugart and Carey 1992; 
Linz 1994; Sartori 1994b; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Although sometimes minority 
governments can emerge, they may be unstable and short-lived.53 Normally the government 
should have the support of the majority of the legislators.  
As we can see from Table 33, all cases with presidential systems were able to resolve 
their inflation problem, while only 50 percent of the parliamentary systems did. Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico are all presidential systems and were able to decrease inflation. Mexicans 
eliminated inflation even before Argentines and Brazilians did. Israel is a parliamentary system, 
which also eliminated inflation faster compared to others. The case of Israel makes a great 
                                                 
53 Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2001) show that parliamentary systems produced minority governments 22% of 
the time between 1946 and 1999.  
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contrast with the other parliamentary case Turkey, which was still battling inflation as late as 
2002.  
Table 33: Political systems vs. price stabilization 
 
System 
 
Successful 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
Presidential 
 
Mexico, Argentina, 
Brazil 
 
- 
 
Parliamentary 
 
Israel 
(1948-1996) 
 
 
Turkey 
 
Hybrid 
 
Israel 
(after 1996) 
 
- 
 
 
From the data above, we cannot directly conclude that a particular political system 
(presidentialism) naturally has more ability to decrease inflation. Also, although parliamentary 
and presidential systems are differentiated clearly, there is great variation among presidential and 
parliamentary systems. We can focus on more specific characteristics of each political system, 
especially the power of executive and political stability, to see how they impact a state’s ability 
to introduce and effectively implement disinflationary policies.  
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6.1 EXECUTIVE POWER AND INFLATION 
An issue that differentiates presidential systems from parliamentary ones is the relative power of 
the executive vis-à-vis the legislature. Since the executive of the parliamentary system is 
dependent on the legislature, it seems less powerful than the presidential executive. In 
presidential systems the fate of the executive is not tied to the legislature, so it acts like an 
independent force. Indeed, in presidential systems where presidents have wide powers, such as 
decree power, they may initiate radical policy changes to fight with inflation much more easily 
than in parliamentary systems.  
The power of presidents differs from country to country, and so does their capacity to 
initiate and implement policies. The main source of presidential power is the constitution. 
Presidents mainly have two types of constitutional powers: veto power and decree power. They 
may use their veto powers to maintain the status quo while they may use their decree powers to 
initiate policy changes (Shugart and Haggard 2001).  
Most presidential systems give veto power to presidents, although its degree varies. Veto 
powers enable presidents to maintain the status quo by preventing the legislature from enacting 
new laws. Hence, the veto power of presidents usually serves as a conservative force in 
policymaking (Shugart and Haggard 2001). It is a power that is related to the ability to initiate 
reforms by the legislature, not by the President. 
Normally presidents have no veto power in parliamentary systems, whereas presidential 
veto power is very common in presidential systems. However, the degree of veto power differs 
also among presidential systems. For instance, Argentine presidents have strong veto powers. 
They have the power to veto a package of laws or individual laws that are passed by the 
Congress. Congress needs a two thirds majority to override that veto. In Brazil, presidents do not 
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have veto power. Mexican presidents also have strong veto power on all policy areas except ones 
related to spending, and the Congress can override this veto only by two thirds majority (Weldon 
1997; Shugart and Haggard 2001). 
In Turkey, the President is the country's official head of state but his/her role is largely 
ceremonial. However, the President also has some important governmental (but not executive) 
powers. The position shares executive power with the Prime Minister, appoints the Prime 
Minister and also appoints members of the Council of Ministers upon recommendation by the 
Prime Minister.54  
Turkey, however, has a parliamentary system. The President does not have an effective 
veto power. When the President receives a law that he/she does not approve, there are three 
choices. The first choice is to return it to the Parliament for reconsideration. If it is a law that 
amends the constitution, the second alternative is to call for a referendum. However, it is very 
rare that Turkish presidents have called for a referendum.55 Referendum is a measure that the 
Turkish presidents are very reluctant to use, but there are many cases that they have returned the 
laws to the parliament. If the parliament resends the same law to the President, the President has 
to approve it. Therefore, this veto power is merely symbolic disapproval. It may just delay the 
law, but not impede it. However, Turkish presidents also have a third choice. If they think the 
law passed by the Parliament contradicts the constitution, they can file a case in the 
Constitutional Court for annulment. In fact, the Constitutional Court serves as an important veto 
institution in Turkey. The Turkish Constitutional Court acts as a fairly independent judiciary. 
                                                 
54 Practically the Council of Ministers (i.e. the Cabinet) lists are prepared by the Prime Minister and his party, and 
the President approves them, unless he/she has some reservations.  
55 Since transition to democracy in 1983, Turkey had only two referendums, first in 1987 and then in 1988. 
 155
Between 1990 and 1996, 80 challenges to legislation were submitted to the Constitutional Court 
and the Court ruled unconstitutionality of 69 of these laws (Özbudun 1996).  
Israel does not have a formal written constitution. Instead, it has a set of "Basic Laws” 
setting out basic government structure and practices (Gutmann 1988). Although it has shifted 
from being a pure parliamentary system to a hybrid system by changing electoral laws in 1992, 
the role of the President is still merely symbolic. In fact, the Prime Minister has become more 
powerful with these changes since the position is now directly and separately elected by the 
constituents. The Prime Minister of Israel is now more like a President in a presidential system. 
In Israel, there is lack of formal checks and balances as is typical of parliamentary systems. 
Thus, the government is dependent on the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) for enacting laws and the 
President has no veto power (Hazan 1997; Brichta 1998; Mahler 2004; Hazan 2005).  
Decree power is another constitutional power of presidents. When it comes to the impact 
of constitutional powers of presidents to affect economic reform or stabilization, it is more 
appropriate to focus on decree power. Contrary to veto power, decree power of the executive is 
an influential source of policy change. It enables the executive to initiate reforms and to make 
new laws that the legislature is not willing to approve (Shugart and Haggard 2001).  
The US is the only presidential system in which presidents have no authority to initiate 
new laws (Sala 1998).56 In other presidential systems, presidents have some explicit decree 
power, and when they use it, the new law initiated usually becomes effective before the 
legislature acts (Cheibub and Limongi 2002). Hence, in many presidential systems the executive 
may introduce radical policy changes and reforms quite rapidly.  
                                                 
56 However, the US presidents can issue “executive orders” which may function similar to presidential decrees in 
other presidential systems.  
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The executive in presidential systems does not have to worry about the legislative 
opposition as much as in parliamentary systems, especially if the President has enough powers to 
overrule it. Presidents in presidential systems feel more comfortable with initiating even quite 
controversial policies, because they cannot be replaced until the next scheduled elections even 
though they fall into conflict with the legislative. In parliamentary systems, executive conflict 
with the legislature may bring about the end of the government. The legislation should have the 
support of the majority of the legislature.  
Even the presidential systems do not always resort to decrees. Shugart and Haggard 
(2001) argue that the decree power of presidents is particularly useful when there is a crisis 
situation, a temporary need, or a common purpose. It is very effective when used to initiate 
unpopular economic policies or reforms, which later may become popular as they decrease 
inflation and stabilize the economy. For instance, although Brazilian presidents do not have 
much support in the legislature, due to a fragmented and undisciplined party system, they have 
been quite successful recently in implementing very important policy changes due to their decree 
powers (Mainwaring 1997).  
A strong decree power is an important characteristic of Latin American polities. Latin 
American presidents use extensive decree powers in policymaking. Among our cases, Argentine 
and Brazilian presidents have the authority to issue decrees that take effect immediately without 
a prior delegation by the legislature. They have the ability not only to set the legislative agenda, 
but also to dominate and force all lawmaking unless these laws are merely temporary. Argentine 
and Brazilian presidents also have the constitutional authority to modify laws by decrees in any 
policy area (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1997; Mainwaring 1997; Shugart and Mainwaring 
1997; Power 1998; Rubio and Goretti 1998).  
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Argentina has been an exceptional case in terms of presidential decree powers, because 
presidents not only did not need prior consent of the legislature but also they were not exposed to 
other checks by the Congress or judiciary. That is why Argentina was called a “delegative 
democracy” (O'Donnell 1994). In Argentina, President Carlos Menem used decrees of 
‘‘necessity and urgency’’ during his term, particularly regarding his economic stabilization and 
liberalization program. Alfonsin, whose fight with inflation was unsuccessful, had used decrees 
just 10 times during his term between 1983 and 1989, whereas Menem used them 336 times 
between 1989 and 1994 (Rubio and Goretti 1998).57 According to the agreement reached by the 
opposition Radical Party, in July 1989 the Congress delegated Menem enormous legislative 
powers through Economic Emergency Law and State Reform Law. As a result, Menem 
considerably exceeded former Argentine presidents in usage of executive powers (Bambaci, 
Saront et al. 2002). It was in this political environment of extraordinary use of executive powers 
that the inflation in Argentina was finally tackled successfully. This excessive use of decrees 
caused frequent tensions between the President and the Congress. However, when President 
Menem appointed Domingo Cavallo as his Economy Minister, this tension decreased due to 
Cavallo’s attempts to treat the Congress with more respect. Therefore, the Congress passed the 
Convertibility Law in March 1991, the key to Menem’s price stabilization program in Argentina 
(Rubio and Goretti 1998).58 Although the Convertibility Plan was passed by the Congress in 
1991, 1991 was also the year Menem utilized decree power most and issued 85 decrees. Most 
other laws supporting the Convertibility Law were passed through decrees (Jones 1997; Rubio 
                                                 
57 President Menem issued more decrees than all previous Argentine presidents since 1816 and he also dominated 
the judiciary to make sure that his decrees were not reversed (Rubio and Goretti 1998, Jones 1997).  
58 The Convertibility Law pegged the peso to the dollar one-to-one and established the currency board system. “This 
law established the free convertibility of the currency, banned the Central Bank from printing money, and eliminated 
indexation.” (Corrales 1997, p.637)  
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and Goretti 1998). As Polity IV Country Report 2001 (CIDCM, "Polity IV Country Report 
2001" 2001) also states, 
While the Argentine constitution limits the powers of the executive, nevertheless, 
President Menem was able to dominate the political arena in this country for a decade 
(1989-1999). President Menem sought to rule by decree, often bypassing Congress, and 
limited the oversight powers of the judiciary by packing the Supreme Court with political 
supporters. 
 
Yet, the power of Argentine presidents has been declining since some restrictions were put on 
issuing presidential decrees by the 1994 constitutional reform (Shugart and Haggard 2001).  
In Brazil, the usage of decree power is even a more common than in Argentina. Among 
our three Latin American cases, only Brazilian presidents have an exclusive authority to 
introduce bills in certain policy areas other than the budget (Shugart and Carey 1992). As in 
Argentina, the judiciary is an ineffective check on executive power (CIDCM, "Polity IV Country 
Report 2001" 2001). Many Brazilian presidents have used decrees to introduce economic 
stabilization plans. For instance, during 1990-1992, President Fernando Collor de Melo used 
decrees to enact many reforms and a comprehensive economic plan. He issued 37 provisional 
measures in his first two months, compared to 148 that Sarney had issued in three years 
following the 1988 constitutional amendments, giving the President greater power (Figueiredo 
and Limongi 2000). (See Table 34 below.) 
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Table 34: Distribution of presidential decrees by administrations in Brazil, 1988-1998 
  Sarney 
1988-
1990 
Collor 
1990- 
1992 
Franco 
1992-
1995 
Cardoso
1995-
1998 
Total decrees 147 159 505 2609 
    Reissued decrees 22 70 363 2449 
    Reissues of decrees of Previous President 0 0 0 699 
    Original decrees 125 89 142 160 
    Converted into Law 96 74 71 130 
    Withdrawn/Abrogated by President 2 5 5 12 
    Rejected by Congress 9 11 0 1 
 Outright Success Rate of decree Strategy 76.8% 83.1% 50.0% 81.3% 
 Relative Success Rate of decree Strategy* 68.0% 65.2% 46.5% 73.1% 
 Outright Rejection Rate 7.2% 12.4% 0% 0.6% 
Source: Pereira, C., T. J. Power, et al. (2002). Choose Your Weapon: Under What Conditions Do Brazilian 
Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Paper presented at the 3rd Meeting of the Brazilian Political Science 
Association - ABCP, on 28-31 July 2002., Niterói - RJ. 
 
 
With the 1988 constitution, the Brazilian Congress gained more power in various issues. 
Yet, the President remained considerably powerful, particularly in economic policymaking 
because of decrees which were introduced as "temporary measures." Article 62 the Constitution 
gives the presidents the authority to issue “provisional measures with force of law” in cases of 
“urgency and relevance” (Pereira, Power et al. 2002) The President has the power to alter the 
status quo by issuing decrees that remain in force for 30 days unless reversed by a majority vote 
in a joint session of Congress. After 30 days the President can reissue the decree.  
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Provisional decrees have been used extensively and increasingly from 1988 until 2001.59 
From 1989 to 1997, Brazilian presidents issued 446 provisional decrees and Congress rejected 
only 3 percent of them (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). For instance, the end of wage indexation 
in 1995, which was considered to have contributed to Brazil's hyperinflation, was also 
accomplished through a provisional decree which was reissued 47 times.  
President Cardoso (1995-2002), who succeeded in eliminating inflation in Brazil, also 
made excessive use of presidential decrees to get around the legislature. He was criticized for 
using too many “temporary measures” to initiate and implement his disinflationary economic 
program, Plano Real (Real Plan) at the end of 1993 and 1994 (Mainwaring 1997).60 In order to 
apply his economic reforms quickly, Cardoso, like Collor, issued decrees rather than securing the 
approval of Congress (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, "Brazil: 1994 Country Report 
On Economic Policy And Trade Practices" 1994). In total, he issued 1,800 provisional decrees in 
his first three years; 1,698 were reissued decrees. Among them, only 90 became law (Maxwell 
1999). Therefore, the Real Plan was almost entirely implemented through presidential decrees.  
Mexico represents a different case, as it displays sources of presidential power other than 
constitutional powers. Mexico is a good example of an exceptionally strong presidency with few 
constitutional powers. Mexican presidents have strong veto power, but they lack strong decree 
authority like the Argentine or Brazilian presidents have. The power of Mexican presidents has 
been more due to all encompassing power of the long dominating Partido Revolucionario 
                                                 
59 In 2001 the Congress amended Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution to limit presidents’ power. With amendments, 
presidents are limited to a single reissue of a decree. The amendment also specified the issue-areas in which the 
President may not issue decrees (Pereira et al. 2005). The text of the amendment can be found at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Emendas/Emc/emc32.htm . 
60 Various Brazilian governments had initiated several other disinflationary programs in the past (Cruzado Plan of 
1986, Bresser Plan of 1987, Summer Plan of 1989, Collor I Plan of 1990 and Collor II Plan of 1991) which did not 
succeed. These plans were mostly heterodox plans, which “involved a large external devaluation, a new currency, a 
wage and price freeze, and cuts in government spending.” (Armijo 1996, p.9) 
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Institucional (PRI) and the authoritarian corporatist political system (Weldon 1997; Weldon 
2002). The factors that have contributed to strength of presidents in Mexico have been listed by 
the Polity IV Country Report 2001 (CIDCM, "Polity IV Country Report 2001" 2001) as follows, 
Party hierarchy in Mexico's one-party state, the fact that legislators are elected for short 
non-renewable terms, and the large and diverse legislature have all made it easier for 
executive authority to overshadow legislative power. In addition, the President has 
enjoyed extensive patronage powers as well as constitutional powers to legislate by 
decree in certain economic areas.61  
 
Since its foundation in 1929, PRI has been the dominant force in Mexican politics. It 
maintained its one-party rule nearly seven decades. The PRI had lost its absolute majority in the 
House of Deputies for the first time in the 1997 elections and the two main opposition parties, 
the National Action Party (PAN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), ended the one-
party rule in the legislature and increased their competitiveness in next elections. Thus, only until 
1997 Mexican presidents had a very centralized and firm power over the legislature. In the 2000 
elections, the PRI lost presidency for the first time since 1929, leaving the President with limited 
constitutional powers. With the decline in power of the PRI, Mexican presidents remained much 
weaker compared to their counterparts in Latin America (Shugart and Haggard 2001). 
The Mexican disinflationary economic program was implemented in 1987, during the 
authoritarian one-party dominant period. Unlike Argentina or Brazil, the Mexican stabilization 
program was a product of corporatist political structure. The government and representatives of 
business and labor sectors agreed on and signed a stabilization program on December 15, 1987, 
called the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica (Economic Solidarity Pact). “Labor agreed to not ask 
for salary increases; business agreed to freeze prices; and the government agreed to reduce the 
fiscal deficit and use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations” (Heath 
                                                 
61 This information can be found at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/Mex1.htm. 
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1999, p.29). This was a heterodox stabilization program, which decreased inflation from 132 
percent in 1987 to 20 percent in 1989. This was not a as sharp fall in inflation as in the cases of 
Argentina and Brazil and it also took three more years to pull inflation under 20 percent, but still 
Pacto de Solidaridad Economica is considered a very successful stabilization program which 
ended persistent inflation. Besides, unlike Argentine or Brazil plans, it was a collaborative plan, 
not a plan forced by the government through decrees (Lustig 1998). 
In most parliamentary countries, the position of President lacks executive power and the 
role is merely symbolic. Executive powers are instead exercised by the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet. The power of Prime Minister and his Cabinet, however, mostly depends on support in 
the parliament, because in parliamentary systems there is a fusion of powers between executive 
and legislature. Although there are differences among parliamentary systems, the general rule is 
that the executive is strong if the government is a majority government. If it is a coalition 
government or worse a minority government, the executive has difficulties in passing the new 
laws through Parliament and initiating reforms and new policies.  
Turkey and Israel are parliamentary democracies where lawmaking power belongs to the 
Cabinet (Council of Ministers) and the parliament. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are 
responsible to the Parliament. Besides supervising the Cabinet, the enactment, amendment, and 
repeal of laws are the main functions of the Parliament. Although the Council of Ministers can 
propose new laws and amendments in existing laws, all legislation should receive the approval of 
the Parliament in order to become law. Decrees are not an appropriate means of legislation in a 
parliamentary democracy. 
Turkey is a parliamentary system, so the Prime Minister is responsible to the Parliament 
for political support. However, the Turkish President and Prime Minister have more authority 
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than typical parliamentary systems (Öniş and Webb 1994).62 For instance, by simple majority, 
the Turkish Parliament may authorize the Council of Ministers to issue statutory decrees on 
certain matters for a temporary period. In that case, the Cabinet may issue decrees without the 
need of parliamentary approval, undermining the essential nature of the parliamentary 
democracy. Such decrees were common in Turkey during the Turgut Özal period (1983-1989), 
but it was not as common in the 1990s.  
[Özal’s] preference was for ruling by decrees, hence bypassing normal parliamentary 
procedures and constraints. His vision was rather typical of the kind of practice 
associated with the Latin American style presidential systems characterized by the 
absence of checks and balances providing enormous powers for the key individual in 
charge. Whilst, this style of decision-making was useful in terms of the ability to 
undertake decisions rapidly and overcome powerful interest group pressures, 
nevertheless, it tended to undermine the longer-term viability of the program…. Hence, 
for the sake of the economic process, it was imperative to by-pass democratic processes 
such as the constraints imposed by bureaucratic and parliamentary norms. Not 
surprisingly, Özal preferred a decision-making style based on Cabinet Decrees as 
opposed to Acts of Parliament (Öniş 2004, p.114).  
 
Yet, even when provided with the decree power, the Turkish Prime Minister is not as 
strong as a Latin American President. The President and the judiciary limit his/her powers. For 
example, in July 2000 the Parliament issued a law that gave the Prime Minister the authority to 
make decisions by decree. However, President Necdet Sezer refused to approve many of these 
decrees and the Constitutional Court declared them illegal (CIDCM, "Polity IV Country Report 
2001" 2001). Thus, Prime Ministers in Turkey are much more subject to checks and balances by 
other actors than presidents in Argentina, Brazil or Mexico.  
Israel is also a parliamentary democracy. Israel does not have a written constitution but it 
has several Basic Laws enacted by its Parliament, the Knesset. The President of Israel is elected 
                                                 
62 Particularly the Turkish constitution of 1982 granted more power to executive branch than other branches of the 
government. 
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by the Knesset and has no executive power. The government, i.e. the Cabinet and its head, the 
Prime Minister, exercises executive power. The President acts only with the advice of the 
government, signing laws enacted and/or ratified by the Knesset. Therefore, “the Knesset is both 
the source and the target of most governmental reforms” (Hazan 1997, p.329). The government 
is always responsible to Knesset and always has to maintain its confidence in order to use its 
executive power. Therefore, Knesset is the supreme authority in Israel.  
With the 1992 reform of the electoral system, the Israeli Prime Minister’s control of the 
legislative agenda and output has become a very challenging task. Compared to past, it has 
become more difficult and politically risky for the Knesset to topple the Prime Minister, because 
now any vote of no-confidence on government would automatically bring about legislative 
elections. However, it is now easier for the Knesset to weaken the Prime Minister’s legitimacy 
and effectiveness since it has become more fragmented and fractionalized and the party 
discipline has decreased. Therefore, the Israeli governments have become more stable (i.e. 
durable), as members of the Knesset have become more reluctant to vote no-confidence. Yet, the 
governability has decreased (Hazan 1997).63  
The judiciary in Israel is another check on the executive’s power. Unlike countries in 
Latin America, Israel has by and large an “independent and professional” judiciary system, 
which exercises an effective check on the executive (CIDCM, "Polity IV Country Report 2001" 
2001). 
Looking at the Table 35 and Table 36, it is difficult to suggest that specific constitutional 
powers affect the ability to eliminate persistent inflation. Strong constitutional powers probably 
improve the ability to introduce disinflationary programs, but Israel was also able to decrease 
                                                 
63 These political reforms did not affect inflation in Israel much, because inflation problem in Israel was already 
resolved with the 1985 stabilization plan. 
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inflation without having strong constitutional executive powers. Similarly Mexico was able to 
eliminate persistent inflation, with the help of a strong presidency without constitutional powers. 
Therefore, we need to look at factors other than constitutional powers in order to explain how 
some governments have wielded the ability to pursue disinflationary policies and decrease 
inflation.  
Table 35: Constitutional powers of the executive 
 Veto Power Decree Power 
Argentina strong strong 
Brazil low strong 
Mexico strong weak 
Israel none none 
Turkey almost none some with parliamentary approval 
Table 36: Executive power vs. price stabilization 
 
 
 
Successful 
 
Moderately 
successful 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
Very strong executive 
 
 
- 
 
Argentina 
 
- 
 
Executive with only 
strong decree power  
 
- 
 
Brazil 
 
- 
 
Executive with only 
strong veto power 
Mexico 
 
  
- 
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Executive without or 
little decree or veto 
power 
 
Israel 
 
- 
 
Turkey 
6.2 POLITICAL STABILITY AND INFLATION  
Political stability is another aspect in which political systems vary. The fixed term of Presidents 
gives presidential systems more stability than parliamentary systems. Thus, coupled with strong 
presidential powers, leaders in presidential systems may be more willing than parliamentary 
systems to introduce economic reforms and austerity measures that are needed to decrease 
inflation. Parliamentary systems are usually more unstable, i.e. the existing government and 
legislature are more likely to be removed from office before their term expires. Therefore, they 
do not tend to shift their economic policies radically unless they enjoy high majorities in the 
Parliament, which is an exception rather than a rule, except in the British Westminster system 
(Lijphart 1992; Shugart and Carey 1992; Verney 1992; Sartori 1994b). This risk averseness 
makes parliamentary systems less reluctant to implement ambitious disinflationary economic 
programs.  
Government durability is one indicator of political stability. It is defined as the average 
number of years that a government spends in office until it is replaced by a new one. 
Government durability affects the government’s strength and effectiveness. Governments with 
lower durability are considered to be weak. Short-lived governments are an indication of 
frequent government crises and low legislative support. Such governments cannot effectively 
pursue policies not only because of their low support, but also because of their short time 
horizon.  
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Government durability is affected by how many parties there are in the government and 
legislature. Multi-party systems produce more coalition governments. Coalition governments are 
less durable, because they are composed of competing parties. Minority governments are also 
less durable, because they do not have the necessary majority in the legislature to govern 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989a; Roubini and Sachs 1989b; Grilli, Masciandaro et al. 1991a). When 
one party holds the majority in the legislature, there is more political stability, i.e. governments 
tend to be more durable (Inman and Fitts 1997). One-party governments are more common in 
presidential systems than in parliamentary systems.64 
In terms of political stability, the most important difference between a presidential and a 
parliamentary system is that the first has a fixed term in office, whereas the latter does not. In 
parliamentary systems, the government depends on the support of the legislature. Once the 
Parliament withdraws its confidence from the government and votes no-confidence, then the 
government falls, and what follows is a search for a new government from the same Parliament 
or from a new Parliament after new elections. That characteristic of the parliamentary system 
usually creates a politically more unstable environment, especially if the government party (or 
parties) does not constitute the majority in the Parliament. This difference between presidential 
and parliamentary systems may create a difference in ability to implement disinflationary 
policies.  
Some scholars argue that political instability increases monetary instability (Edwards and 
Tabellini 1991; Cukierman, Edwards et al. 1992; Cukierman and Webb 1995). The demand for 
inflationary policies may be more difficult to resist if governments are threatened by electoral 
uncertainty (Desai, Olofsgard et al. 2002). Political instability may motivate politicians to spend 
                                                 
64 The number of parties in the government also depends on the election system. This issue will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.  
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more in order to attract votes and/or remain in office. Increased spending would probably mean a 
larger budget deficit. This, in return, prompts governments to pressure the Central Bank for more 
money creation, which maintains or worsens inflation (Treisman 2000). Many scholars have 
argued that governments in a presidential system spend less on public goods and transfers than 
governments in a parliamentary system, causing fewer budget deficits (Persson and Tabellini 
1999; Persson 2002; Scartascini and Crain 2002).  
Also, many scholars have argued that durable governments are more able to control their 
budget deficits. Paldam (1987) suggests that strong and stable governments are more credible in 
pursuing unpopular economic policies. Roubini and Sachs (1989a; 1989b) argue that 
governments with short durability that are composed of multi-party coalitions produce higher 
budget deficits.65 Political instability, i.e. low government durability, increases budget deficits 
(Roubini 1991). As also suggested by the “game theory,” short expected tenure in office makes it 
more difficult for coalition parties to agree on policies and decrease budget deficits (Roubini and 
Sachs 1989b; Strauch and von Hagen 2000). Edin and Ohlsson (1991) argue that, not necessarily 
coalition governments, but minority governments generate higher budget deficits. In their 
empirical study, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991a) find that any government change 
causes higher budget deficits. Therefore, government stability can be considered to be a positive 
factor on government’s ability to decrease inflation by keeping budget deficits more under 
control.  
In this study parliamentary systems are expected to have more difficulty in stabilizing 
prices. The governments in parliamentary systems collapse when they lose the confidence of the 
                                                 
65 Roubini and Sachs (1989b) argue that not all coalition governments are prone to large budget deficits. Only under 
difficult economic conditions, coalition governments considerably fare worse, because they are not capable of 
decreasing spending when it is needed. However, under normal economic conditions, they may perform as well as 
one-party governments, since they are not naturally prone to produce more deficits.  
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parliamentary majority, so they are usually more unstable than the presidential ones. Therefore, 
they may be less successful in battling inflation. In presidential systems the executive does not 
collapse when it faces the legislature’s opposition. Indeed, divided government, i.e. the situation 
when the presidency and the majority of the legislature are in the hands of different parties, is a 
very common phenomenon in presidential systems. Unless there is an extraordinary situation, 
such as impeachment, presidents stay in power until their term ends. This gives governments of 
presidential systems more stability compared to parliamentary systems and may help them to 
have a longer time horizon and be more decisive in battling inflation. 
If the deficit of a state grows large, political instability and polarization between changing 
governments may increase, and it is less likely that the existing government will be re-elected in 
the coming elections. Uncertainty of re-election makes governments avoid politically risky 
economic programs. Especially if the two successive governments differ a lot in their ideology 
and policy choices, then the government in office tends to use public debt to influence policies of 
its successor. The incoming government can easily shift the burden of debt and deficit that it has 
incurred to the incoming government (Roubini and Sachs 1989b; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; 
Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Therefore, all government changes do not necessarily cause 
political instability. If the new government is made up of the same people, or supported by the 
same parties in the legislature, that indicates political stability, rather than instability. As 
suggested by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991a), significant government changes 
(change from one group or party to another) are a better measure for political instability. Thus, 
Table 37 provides us a better picture of political (in)stability in these countries. 
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Table 37: Political stability – how long the party of chief executive has been in office 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina 1 2 - - - - - - - 
Brazil 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Israel 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mexico 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 
Turkey 1 1 2 3 1 1 - - - 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 
Brazil 19 20 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
Israel 7 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mexico 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 
Turkey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Argentina 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 
Brazil 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Israel 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 
Mexico 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 1 
Turkey 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 
          
 2002 2003 Average number of years parties have spent in government  
Argentina 1 1       5.3 
Brazil 8 1       9.3 
Israel 1 2       4.7 
Mexico 2 3       71.0 
Turkey 3 1       3.1 
Source: PRTYIN variable from the Database of Political Institutions (2004) with my corrections. 
[ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004-no_formula_no_macro.xls ] 
 
In the Table 37, the average number of years each party, or coalition of parties, have 
spent is calculated.66 As can be seen, Mexico has the most political stability in terms of how long 
                                                 
66 This calculation excludes the last same-party governments which were still prevailing as of 2003, because during 
this research we did not yet know when there would a government change with a different party composition.  
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a government supported by the same party stays in office, because PRI controlled presidency for 
more than 71 years. Turkey and Israel seem to have the worst record in political stability. Since 
they are our only parliamentary cases, these data confirm the argument that parliamentary 
governments tend to be more unstable than the presidential ones.  
When we look to all government changes in these countries, without regard to whether 
there was a change in the governing party or not, we again arrive to similar conclusions (see 
Appendix-IV). Turkey appears as the least stable state because it had 26 governments since 
1970, of which three were military governments. This is compared to 21 governments in 
Argentina, 9 in Brazil, 16 in Israel and 6 in Mexico. Mexico again emerges as the politically 
most stable state.  
If Table 38 is analyzed, among our three presidential systems in Latin America Mexico 
has the most political stability and it is also the one that decreased inflation earlier than the other 
two. This confirms the argument that political stability improves the capacity of a government to 
successfully battle inflation. The case of Turkey also seems to confirm this argument because it 
is the least stable among all cases and also the least successful in inflation stabilization. Yet, the 
other parliamentary case, Israel, presents totally contradictory evidence. Despite being politically 
quite unstable, Israel was most successful in elimination of persistent inflation. 
Table 38: Political stability vs. price stabilization 
 
Average number of 
years parties have spent 
in government 
 
Successful 
 
Moderately 
successful 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
Very stable 
(more than 10 years)  
 
Mexico 
 
 
 
- 
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Moderately stable  
(between 5 and 10 
years) 
 
- 
 
Argentina 
Brazil 
 
- 
 
Unstable  
(less than 5 years) 
 
Israel 
 
  
Turkey 
 
The mixed evidence that the political stability data presents suggests that the relation 
between political stability and the ability to decrease inflation is not very straightforward. 
Turkey, the politically most unstable case, is the least successful in eliminating persistent 
inflation as expected. However, Israel succeeded in stabilizing its prices, although politically it is 
also unstable. As stated in the previous chapter, Israel has strong regime stability, unlike Turkey. 
Thus, we may claim that democratic (regime) stability is a more important factor that determines 
government’s success in fighting inflation than political (governmental) stability. A change 
merely in the government does not necessarily affect a state’s risk taking capability and its 
effectiveness in implementing policies that would resolve critical economic problems, like 
inflation. However, a change in the regime (shifts between democracy and authoritarianism) does 
affect a state’s risk taking capacity and its policymaking.    
6.3 UNITY OF PURPOSE IN BATTLING INFLATION 
Unity of purpose is another factor that is related to the political system of a country and it may 
positively affect price stabilization. “Unity of purpose” indicates a situation where both the 
executive and legislature have the same political mandate, and thus share the same policy goals. 
Unity of purpose exists when the executive and the legislature are under the control of the same 
party and legislators and the President have similar interests because of a disciplined and strong 
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party system. In that case, the executive is fully supported by a legislative majority (Shugart and 
Haggard 2001).  
The governments of parliamentary systems should always have unity of purpose, because 
the government and the Parliament are interdependent. The government cannot stay in power 
without the support of the majority of the legislature and the Cabinet members are normally 
picked from the Parliament. The Prime Minister, Cabinet members and the members of the 
Parliament are elected through the same elections and their constituents are same. Therefore, 
they share same national objectives.  
For presidential systems, unity of purpose is not a requirement. Shugart and Haggard 
(2001) characterize a divided government, i.e. where presidency and majority of the Congress 
are from different parties, as a situation of “separation of purpose.” It is a very common situation 
in almost all presidential systems.67 The separation of purpose is enhanced especially if the party 
system is fragmented, undisciplined, weak and particularistic. Brazil is a perfect example of high 
separation of purpose with its fragmented multi-party presidential system (Mainwaring 1997). 
However, Mexico is an example of a presidential system with strong unity of purpose from 
1930s until 1997 with its once dominating PRI (Weldon 1997).  
It is assumed that unity of purpose is advantageous when it comes to tackling important 
national problems, because legislative and executive do not act as contenders but rather share 
same policy goals. Indeed, Shugart and Haggard (2001) argue that governments with unity of 
purpose are much more decisive than the ones with separation of purpose. Thus, it is expected 
that systems with unity of purpose eliminate persistent inflation with less difficulty. In that 
respect it is also expected that parliamentary systems perform better than divided presidential 
                                                 
67 Mexico is a notorious example of an exception to that rule, because of its long-dominating party PRI. 
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systems in battling inflation as they are more likely to have unity of purpose. However, if a 
presidential system has unity of purpose, it can be even more advantaged than a parliamentary 
system for successfully implementing anti-inflationary policies. In a presidential system where 
the president and the majority of the legislature are from the same parties and if the parties are 
strong and disciplined, the executive can be particularly decisive. It can initiate new laws and 
policies easily. In fact, these are probably the best conditions for initiating ambitious price 
stabilization programs. In such a system, policymakers may easily ignore the views, demands, 
and interests of the minority groups that may disagree with government policies.  
Nevertheless, in presidential systems Presidents have more interest in national policies 
since their constituency is the whole nation, while legislators are usually more focused on local 
and regional issues (depending also on the electoral system, especially the election district size) 
since their constituency is more local or regional. This is very different from parliamentary 
systems, where legislators have a much more interest in national policy. As a result, many 
presidential systems lack unity of purpose even when the president and the majority of the 
legislature are from the same party (Shugart and Haggard 2001). Lack of unity of purpose may 
cause these governments not able to agree on policies and take necessary decisions to fight 
inflation, if the President does not have the power to overrule legislative.  
In order to test whether our cases had a divided government or unity of purpose, we can 
look at the percentage of seats of governing party(ies) in the legislature (see Table 39 below). It 
is easier for governments to introduce reforms or radical policy changes and implement these 
new policies effectively, if they hold the majority of the seats in the legislature. From Table 39, it 
can be seen that all governments but the Argentine government had a majority in the legislature 
when disinflationary programs were introduced. Surprisingly, the Argentine government had 
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only 39 percent of the seats in the legislature when they initiated the Convertibility Plan in April 
1991. The majority of the legislature was controlled by parties other than the government party. 
Therefore, it was a period of divided government. When we compare it to the period when the 
government had majority in the Congress, like Alfonsin’s first period (1983-85), we see that 
government majority was not an important factor in Argentina in inflation stabilization. In fact, 
unable to stop hyperinflation, President Alfonsin resigned and Menem agreed to take office in 
December 1989, five months before originally scheduled. In exchange for that, the Radical Party 
committed to give legislative support to Menem’s new government (Jones 1997; Rubio and 
Goretti 1998).  
Table 39: Legislative majority of the government 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Brazil 39.4% 39.4% 56.6% 56.6% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 49.1% 
Israel 50.4% 50.4% 45.9% 62.3% 62.3% 62.3% 62.3% 49.1% 49.1% 
Mexico NA NA 83.0% 83.0% 83.0% 74.0% 74.0% 74.0% 74.8% 
Turkey 51.8% 47.3% 47.3% 51.6% 48.7% 41.8% NA 100.0% 100.0% 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina 51.0% 51.2% 51.0% 48.3% 46.1% 46.1% 39.0% 39.0% 46.9% 
Brazil 52.0% 52.0% 53.0% 76.8% 76.8% 76.8% 76.8% 57.2% 57.2% 
Israel 49.1% 73.3% 73.3% 73.3% 73.3% 53.8% 53.8% 53.8% 53.8% 
Mexico 74.8% 74.8% 80.7% 80.7% 80.7% 52.0% 52.0% 52.0% 52.0% 
Turkey 53.0% 53.0% 53.0% 62.8% 64.9% 64.9% 64.9% 64.9% 59.1% 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001† 
Argentina 47.2% 54.5% 54.5% 53.3% 53.3% 62.1% 62.1% 49.4% 49.4% 
Brazil 57.2% 57.4% 41.2% 41.2% 41.2% 41.2% 75.4% 75.4% 75.4% 
Israel 49.2% 49.2% 49.2% 49.2% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 62.5% 62.5% 
Mexico 52.0% 52.0% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 47.8% 47.8% 47.8% 44.6% 
Turkey 59.1% 59.1% 59.1% 37.8% 37.8% 37.8% 37.8% 57.1% 57.1% 
Source: MAJ (Margin of Majority) variable from the Database of Political Institutions (2004). 
[ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004-no_formula_no_macro.xls ] 
* This is the fraction of seats held by the government parties in the Lower House. It is calculated by dividing the 
number of government seats (NUMGOV) by total (government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats. 
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The highlighted values signify the percentage of government majority in the legislature when the successful 
disinflationary programs were introduced. 
† The values for year 2001 are not from the original DPI dataset. They are assumed to be same as in 2000 as none of 
the countries had elections or a government change during 2000. 
 
Brazil is another case of success in disinflation during a period of separation of purpose, 
but not because the government parties did not control the Congress. Due to the elective system, 
deputies have very local interests in contrast to president’s national goals, so unity of purpose is 
low in Brazil. When Plano Real was initiated in 1994, the Franco government had 46 percent 
support in the House of Deputies and a 65.8 percent majority in the Senate. When he took office 
in the beginning of 1995, Cardoso continued with his ambitious economic reforms although his 
government had only 41 percent support in the legislature. Therefore, the government lacked 
majority support in the Congress. Since parties in Brazil are very undisciplined, we cannot relate 
the success of Plano Real to government seats in the legislative. Even the second government led 
by President Cardoso had difficulty at times gaining sufficient support for some of its legislative 
priorities despite the fact that it held the majority of seats in both Houses (Mainwaring 1997). 
Israel and Turkey have always had a unity of purpose because of their parliamentary 
systems.68 Yet, the two countries had different experiences while they were trying to fight 
inflation. Turkey could not resolve its inflation problem up until 2002, but Israel was first among 
our cases to stabilize its prices. When Israel initiated the anti-inflationary program in 1985, the 
prevailing government was a “national unity” government. After winning the same amount of 
seats in the Parliament in the 1984 elections, the two leading parties of Israel, Likud and the 
Labor Party, could not form a ruling coalition and thus made an agreement to form a national 
                                                 
68 Of course for Israel unity of purpose is no longer a must since 1996, although it has not experienced a divided 
government yet. After the 1992 electoral reform, the Prime Minister is elected by separate elections, and thus, Israel 
is considered to have a “hybrid” political system.  
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unity government and share power for four years. Together these two parties were holding 88 of 
the 120 (73.3 percent) of the Knesset seats. Practically that meant an extreme type of unity of 
purpose and the opposition was divided and almost absent in the legislature when the 
disinflationary plan was initiated and implemented in Israel. Although Turkey has had many 
coalition governments since 1983, it never had such a coalition government that overwhelmingly 
dominated the Parliament.   
Nevertheless, unity of purpose may not be as important as it seems. As maintained by 
Cox and McCubbins (2001), no matter if a state has unity or separation of purpose, “unified 
power” may be a more important condition for a state to be decisive. A main characteristic of 
unified power is a president with all-encompassing powers, as in many Latin American cases. 
Cox and McCubbins (2001) argue that when there is high separation of purpose in a presidential 
system, more constitutional authority is given to the President in order to balance the political 
problems that emanate from separation of purpose. Argentina and Brazil have been decisive 
without unity of purpose because they have given large constitutional powers to their Presidents. 
For Mexico, PRI dominance was a power unifying factor which made Mexico a decisive state, 
despite weak constitutional authority of the President.   
As can be observed from Table 40, the unity of purpose data on our cases do not give a 
very clear picture about how unity of purpose affects elimination of persistent inflation. Israel 
and Mexico support the argument that unity of purpose helps governments implement 
disinflationary policies effectively. Compared to these two cases, Argentina and Brazil, two 
systems with high separation of purpose, had more difficulty in eliminating persistent inflation. 
However, Turkey contradicts with the argument. Although Turkey has unity of purpose as a 
parliamentary system, it was the least successful case in disinflation. Some argue that the 
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political instability caused by the successive coalition governments in the last two decades is 
responsible for Turkey’s failure (Akat 2000). As coalition governments are not expected to be as 
effective as single party governments, next I will focus on the impact of coalition governments 
on economic policymaking.  
Table 40: Unity of purpose vs. price stabilization 
  
Successful 
 
Moderately 
successful 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
Unity of purpose  
 
 
Israel 
Mexico (until 1997) 
 
- 
 
Turkey 
 
Separation of 
purpose 
 
 
- 
 
Argentina 
Brazil 
 
- 
 
6.4 ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENTS VS. COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
Ability to initiate policy changes and reforms may also depend on whether the government is a 
one-party or a coalition government. According to the “veto players” theory, it is more difficult 
to initiate reforms under coalition governments (Tsebelis 2002).  
A one-party government is a government which has only one party in office. Coalition 
governments are formed when more than one party comes together to govern. Coalition 
governments indicate that there is no one party which is strong enough to govern alone. Joining 
forces with one or more parties enlarge the electoral and legislative base of a government, but at 
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the same time it necessitates sharing power and reaching consensus. On the other hand, a 
government can also be a majority government or a minority government, depending on its 
support in the legislature. A majority government is supported by one party in the legislature 
which holds the majority of the seats. A minority government is supported by one or several 
parties which together do not have the legislative majority. According to this categorization, a 
one-party majority government is the strongest type of government, because it does not face a 
legislative opposition that can block the government’s decisions (Grilli, Masciandaro et al. 
1991a).  
According to the veto players theory, which is derived from “game theory,” if more 
actors are involved in policymaking, especially with veto power, it is more difficult to initiate 
policy changes and reforms, as the existing policies become more continuous and sticky 
(Tsebelis 1995, 1999; Treisman 2000; Tsebelis 2002). Veto players are persons or institutions 
which have the power to block a new legislation or policy. Therefore, they act more as a force to 
maintain the status quo than a force of reform. When there are many veto players in the system, 
it may be more difficult to change existing economic policies, because it is difficult to negotiate 
and please everyone. This makes political systems with many veto players less decisive than the 
others (Cox and McCubbins 2001). 
For some other scholars who also study political institutions, what matters most in 
enacting reforms is the level of disagreement among different levels of political decision-making 
(Tabellini 1986; Aizenman 1987; Alesina and Drazen 1991; Drazen and Grilli 1993). 
Accordingly, more conflict between different policymakers makes it harder to decide on policy 
changes, and thus, to change status quo. This causes governments to postpone controversial 
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policies, like shock therapy austerity measures, which are needed to end persistent inflation. 
Therefore, the support that the executive enjoys within legislature is very important.  
Coalition governments are considered to be less effective than one-party governments, 
because each party acts as a veto player since interests of each party have to be considered in 
policymaking (Roubini and Sachs 1989b). Thus, we expect coalition governments to be less 
effective in initiating new policies, including disinflationary economic programs.  
Another issue that game theorists point out is how coalition governments fare in terms of 
the control of budget. In coalition governments, the parties in office can easily be caught in a 
prisoner’s dilemma, and thus, they may be incapable of controlling government spending 
(Austen-Smith and Banks 1988). Each party has its own interests and constituents, so it may be 
difficult to coordinate policymaking and to control budget deficits (Roubini and Sachs 1989b).   
Normally presidential systems have more veto players than parliamentary systems 
because of the separation of power between the executive and the legislature. However, as 
mentioned above, especially in developing country presidential systems, presidents are more able 
to prevail over other veto players by other means, such as decree power and patronage. 
Therefore, in many Latin American cases, including Argentina and Brazil (and Mexico before 
2001), there is unity of power, because presidents are almost the only veto players.  
Coalition governments are the rule rather than the exception in both Israel and Turkey. 
According to above mentioned theories, coalition governments tend to be less effective in 
implementing disinflationary programs. Although the Turkish experience confirms these 
theories, Israel contradicts it. As mentioned above, Israel successfully solved its inflation through 
its national unity government, which was a coalition government. Thus, a dominating majority in 
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the legislature can be sufficient to implement an ambitious disinflationary economic program 
successfully.   
As can be seen in Table 41, systems that produce many coalition governments do not 
necessarily have difficulty in inflation stabilization. It is true that coalition partners may act like 
veto players, but veto power works more as a force to maintain the status quo than as a force of 
reform, while price stabilization policies usually require a break down of the status quo. 
Therefore, the power of the executive is probably a more determining factor regarding the 
initiation and successful implementation of price stabilization. As long as the executive has 
powers that surpass other authorities, it can initiate and implement effective stabilization 
programs whenever needed. 
Table 41: Coalition governments vs. price stabilization 
 
 
 
Successful 
 
Moderately 
successful 
 
Unsuccessful 
 
Frequent coalition 
governments 
 
Israel 
 
Brazil 
 
Turkey 
 
No or rare coalition 
governments 
 
Mexico 
 
Argentina 
 
 
- 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Political stability seems to be a factor that affects the ability of states to eliminate persistent 
inflation. With their tendency to be politically more stable, presidential systems are advantaged 
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in their battle with inflation. However, political stability is not the only explanation of successful 
disinflationary policies. A powerful executive is probably more crucial in combating inflation.  
Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism necessarily determines whether a 
government will successfully end persistent inflation. What really matters is if the executive has 
power or not, regardless of its source of power. In some cases the executive is powerful because 
of his/her strong authority in his/her party, like in Argentina. In other cases, he/she may be 
powerful, despite party fragmentation and lack of authority within the party, because he/she has 
strong constitutional authority, like in Brazil. Alternatively, he/she may be just powerful because 
his party is very dominant, like in Mexico.  
It was argued that “unity of purpose” helps states to be more decisive in implementing 
unpopular economic programs. Yet, our Latin American cases demonstrate that, “unity of 
power” is a more significant factor that affects ability of states to decrease inflation. A president 
with wide powers, regardless of his source of power, can override legislative opposition and 
implement decisively whatever economic program is deemed necessary. In all our presidential 
cases, presidents have been quite powerful, and they used their constitutional and partisan 
powers to stabilize their respective economies. In Israel, which is neither a presidential system 
nor a system based on a legislative override, the success with disinflation came as a result of a 
national unity government, a coalition government with an extremely strong majority in the 
legislature, which introduced an effective disinflationary plan in 1985.  
Last, but not least important, an executive with a strong backing in the legislature is also 
an effective force for economic reform that can lead to elimination of inflation. This factor is 
particularly important for parliamentary systems. In these arrangements, the executive is always 
dependent on the legislature, so it is not independently powerful. Its power, and thus its ability to 
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initiate reforms or unpopular policies depend on its support in the legislature. A parliamentary 
executive with an overwhelming majority in the legislature can be as affective or even more 
effective than powerful leaders in presidential systems in ending inflation, as the Israeli case has 
well demonstrated with its “national unity” government of 1984-88. 
Election and party systems also affect how powerful the executive is and how decisive a 
government can be. Especially the seats the government holds in the legislature and the type of 
government formed (e.g. one-party, coalition, minority, and so on) are very much determined by 
the election and party system. Therefore, our next focus will be how different party and electoral 
systems affect the success of governments battling inflation.  
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7.0  ELECTORAL AND PARTY SYSTEMS AND INFLATION 
As seen in the previous chapter, neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism necessarily prevents 
price stabilization. Economic policymaking may also depend on the electoral and party systems. 
The electoral system has a direct influence on the party system, and both the electoral system and 
party system affect the power of the government and groups involved in the decision-making 
process.  
In the following section I analyze the suggestion that some electoral systems 
(proportional, open-list, and large district) are less effective in tackling national problems, such 
as inflation. I also analyze the suggestion that polarized and fractionalized party systems have 
less capacity to pursue efficient macroeconomic policies, such as disinflationary programs. 
Neither of these arguments is confirmed by the case analysis of this chapter. Indeed, our most 
successful case in price stabilization, Israel, has the most proportional electoral system with 
largest electoral district, as well as the most fractionalized and polarized party system.  
7.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
The electoral system is an important factor that determines who is in office, how they are 
selected, and how they function. It is a set of rules regarding the election of the legislature and 
the executive. The electoral system has a direct influence on the type of support the government 
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has, because it shapes the “intensity and scope of political competition” in the polity (Persson 
and Tabellini 1999, p. 703). Although the literature claims that electoral systems impact the 
performance of governments in economic policymaking, the findings of this study indicate that 
this relation is not noteworthy when it comes to price stabilization. Neither electoral formula nor 
the ballot structure seems to influence the ability of the state to stabilize prices.  
There are two dimensions of electoral systems. The first is the electoral formula, which 
sets the relation between the votes won in the elections and the way seats are distributed in the 
legislature. The electoral formula also includes ballot structure, i.e. whether the party lists that 
compete in the elections are open or closed. The second dimension of the electoral system is the 
district size, which determines how many representatives are elected from each electoral district.  
There are two main classifications for electoral formula: plural-majority and proportional 
representation. In plurality-majority electoral systems, the winner takes all, i.e. the party that gets 
most votes wins all seats in that district, and the voters who voted for other parties remain 
unrepresented (Lijphart 1994, 1999). In presidential elections majority formula differs from 
plurality, as it requires an absolute majority for the election of the president. In plurality formula 
winning the plurality of the votes, i.e. winning greater votes than the closest opponent, is 
sufficient to win the presidency. For legislative elections, the plural and majority systems give 
parties with the most votes disproportionally more seats, and thus enable single party control of 
the legislature.  
[The aim] ... is to exaggerate the share of seats for the leading party in order to produce 
an effective working parliamentary majority for the government, while simultaneously 
penalizing minor parties, especially those whose support is spatially dispersed. In 'winner 
take all', the leading party boosts its legislative base, while the trailing parties get meager 
rewards. The focus is effective governance, not representation of all minority views. 
(Norris 1997, p.3) 
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Therefore, plural and majority electoral systems are expected to generate more support in 
the legislature for the government. They commonly have two-party and less polarized party 
systems that entail fewer veto players and less political tension (Powell 1982; Stein, Talvi et al. 
1998). 
In proportional representation (PR) systems, the seats each party gets are distributed in 
proportion to the share of the vote that that party has received. Such a system leads to a 
legislature more representative of the whole constituency (both majority and minorities), because 
it normally ensures that even parties with small shares of the vote are represented in the 
parliament (Lijphart 1994, 1999). This generally allows more than two parties to enter the 
parliament, and thus, makes it more difficult for a single party to control the legislature. 
Therefore, various parties may need to form coalitions in order to have a majority in the 
parliament. As a result, PR systems produce more coalition or minority governments, and these 
governments are generally more unstable and short-lived than governments in plural or majority 
systems (Powell 1982; Roubini and Sachs 1989a; Grilli, Masciandaro et al. 1991b).  
There are various theories that attempt to explain how electoral systems affect politics 
and policymaking. Yet, there is no real consensus over whether plural-majority systems or PR 
systems are more effective in allowing governments to solve major economic problems, like 
inflation. Some scholars maintain that plural-majority electoral systems generate policies that 
promote the preferences or demands of fewer constituents and benefit smaller, more targeted 
groups of people. They also tend to collect less taxes (Persson and Tabellini 1999; Persson 
2002). Therefore, it may be more difficult for plural-majority systems to control inflation as they 
are prone to be hijacked by small interest groups and have fewer tax revenues. However, plural-
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majority systems lead to smaller government and lower public expenses. This may help them 
avoid inflation, but perhaps not get rid of it once it is created.  
On the other hand, PR systems produce more public goods and policies that benefit the 
population as a whole, and thus, higher taxes and larger governments (Persson and Tabellini 
1999; Persson 2002). Stressing the tendency of PR systems to have bigger government and larger 
public spending, it can be argued that PR systems may have more difficulty in controlling 
inflation and thus, may be less effective in economic policies. However, stressing the fact that 
they are more representative, and therefore, less prone to be hijacked by few groups, they may be 
more able to control inflation.  
Plural-majority systems may be more advantaged in terms of their ability to solve 
economic problems because of their decisiveness. Sartori (1994a) argues that plural-majority 
systems neglect minorities, so it is easier to make political decisions. On the other hand, PR 
systems allow many parties in the system, and thus, decrease political decisiveness. He believes 
that presidential plural-majority systems are more conducive to effective policymaking, although 
they are less representative. However, according to Persson (2002), PR electoral systems allow 
more parties or politicians to enter into competition, but they also encourage parties to seek 
broad support for their policies, which may be an advantage for implementation of economic  
policies.  
There are thus conflicting views about how the electoral formula affects economic 
policymaking. Yet, following the arguments of both Sartori (1994a) and Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini (1991b), this chapter hypothesizes that PR systems may have more difficulty in 
fighting inflation because of their poor decisiveness and high public expenses.  
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Another aspect of the electoral formula is the ballot structure. Many states use multi-seat 
districts and there are two different ballot structures used to elect these representatives. The first 
is called party-centered, or closed list, and it allows voters to vote for a list of candidates 
nominated by one of the parties. Alternatively, if the system is candidate-centered, or open-list, 
then voters vote for candidates, not for the whole party list.  
Party-centered and candidate-centered ballot structures have different implications. 
Candidate-centered lists may seem politically more representative, but they cause intra-party 
competition and personal politics, and therefore, less party loyalty, less party discipline, and less 
emphasis on national policies by the legislators. On the other hand, party-centered lists create 
more party discipline, more emphasis on national policies, and stronger party leaders (Cox and 
McCubbins 2001). Because of their national outlook and discipline, I expect closed-list bullet 
structure to be more favorable for economic reform. 
The district size is another aspect of electoral system that may affect success in 
eliminating inflation. District size indicates the number of legislators to be elected from each 
electoral district. Typically, and also in this study, average district size is calculated by dividing 
the number of seats in the lower house by the number of electoral districts. The legislative 
district size may affect economic policies by giving the legislators a more national or local 
outlook or by allowing more or less number of parties into the Parliament or Congress 
(Scartascini and Crain 2002). Yet, the direction (negative vs. positive) of this effect is not clear.  
District size is not independent of electoral formula. Large districts make an electoral 
system more proportional. Highly proportional systems use very large electoral districts. Large 
electoral districts create fewer barriers to entry and allow more parties in the system, at least in 
PR systems (Persson, Tabellini et al. 2001). Small district size creates natural (effective) 
 189
thresholds that allow only powerful enough parties to enter to the Congress or Parliament. Thus, 
they promote less fractionalization and more political stability. As it will be discussed later, high 
number of parties in a political system is usually associated with difficulty in effective 
policymaking. Thus, small district size is expected to generate governments that are more 
effective in economic policymaking. 
At one end of the spectrum, the whole country can form one electoral district, like in 
Israel. This typically means that the number of votes needed to be elected is extremely low and 
even very small parties can win election. At the other end of the spectrum, some PR systems can 
have district size of two, like in Chile. This creates high disproportionality, because no more than 
two parties can win representation in each district. This undermines representation and 
legitimacy in a PR system ("ACE Encyclopaedia").  
The size of the electoral district may also affect the attitudes of legislators. Electoral 
systems become more proportional as district size increases, and the more proportional the 
system, the more national are the interests of the legislators (Persson 2002). As districts are 
larger, the connection between a legislator and his or her electorate becomes weaker ("ACE 
Encyclopaedia"). When the interests of the legislators are more local, their interests differ more 
from the interests of the executive, who is focused more on broad national issues. This may 
cause separation of purpose between the government and the legislature, and thus, difficulty in 
initiating and implementing policy changes (Shugart and Haggard 2001; Persson 2002). In that 
sense, large electoral districts are expected to promote better economic policymaking.  
There are contradictory arguments regarding the effect of district size. Interpreting them 
in the context of price stabilization, the first one argues that the small district size may increase 
the ability to successfully battle inflation, while the second one argues that large district sizes 
 190
may enable better implementation of disinflationary policies. As a result, it is difficult to 
conclude if and how actually district size effects decision-making. However, following the 
argument that associates district size with proportionality and fragmentation of the political 
system, this chapter hypothesizes that a political system with large district size may have more 
difficulty in stabilizing prices.  
As can be seen in Table 42, Table 43 and Table 44, our cases have diverse electoral 
systems. Like most of our cases Brazil uses a PR electoral formula to choose members of its 
Congress, but it is the only state among our cases that uses open list ballot structure. According 
to Mainwaring (1997), Brazil is an extreme case of multipartism and it has the most fragmented 
and undisciplined party system.69 Such a political system is prone to produce fragile coalitions 
and political instability. Remember that Brazil was able to eliminate its inflation problem only in 
1995, relatively later than all other cases except Turkey.  
Table 42: Electoral systems in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey 
  
Plural/majority 
System 
 
Proportional Representation 
 
 
open list 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
closed list 
 
Mexico 
(with some PR) 
Argentina 
Israel 
Turkey 
                                                 
69 One reason why states have high number of parties and political fragmentation is their political institutions, as 
discussed in this chapter. However, although this chapter does not discuss it, diversity of the population and their 
political preferences may also increase the number of parties and political fragmentation.  
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Table 43: Thresholds, number of lower house seats, and district sizes in Argentina, Brazil, 
Israel, Mexico, and Turkey 
  
 
Thresholds * 
 
Number of 
Lower House 
seats (Number 
of districts) 
Average district 
size of the Lower 
House 
 
Argentina 16.7% natural threshold 
until 1987 
3% legal threshold after 
1987 
 
257 seats 
(24 districts) 
10.7 
(range 2-35) 
Brazil 0% legal threshold until 
2006 
5% legal threshold since 
2006 
(5% natural threshold 
since 1978) 
513 seats 
(27 districts) 
23 (until 1995, 
range 8-60)  
19 (from 1995 on, 
range 8-70) 
Israel 1% legal threshold until 
1992 
1.5% legal threshold after 
1992 
 
120 seats 
(1 district) 
120 
Mexico 0% legal threshold until 
1985 
2% legal threshold after 
1985 
500 seats 
(300+5 districts) 
† 
1.6 (average) 
1 (for 300 seats) 
40 (for 200 seats) 
 
Turkey 0% legal threshold before 
1980 
10% legal threshold after 
1982 
 
550 seats 
(79 districts) 
7 
(range 2-24) 
Source: The data above are taken or calculated from the data provided in Morgenstern and Nacif (eds), Legislative 
Politics in Latin America (p. 420) and the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) IV. 
* All electoral systems have thresholds of representation, i.e. the minimum level of support which a party needs to 
gain representation. Thresholds can be legally imposed (formal or legal threshold) or exist as a mathematical by-
product of features of the electoral system, of which district magnitude is the most important (effective or natural 
threshold). In smaller districts, effective threshold is higher. (Reynolds, Reilly et al. 2005, p, 77, 83-84) 
Although natural threshold data for Argentina and Brazil were available, the same data were not available for the 
rest of the cases. 
† In the Mexican Congress, 300 of the 500 seats are elected in single-seat constituencies by plurality and the 
remaining 200 members are elected by PR in 5 multi-state districts of 40-seat s each. (IFE 2006) 
 
 192
Table 44: Classification of electoral systems in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and 
Turkey 
 Ballot 
structure 
District 
magnitude Threshold 
Argentina  Closed low high 
Brazil Open high low 
Israel Closed high low 
Mexico Closed low low 
Turkey Closed low high 
 
 
All other cases have a closed-list ballot structure. Among them Mexico, our only plural-
majority case, was able to decrease its persistent inflation relatively early. However, we should 
not forget that Mexico was an authoritarian state at that time. The two PR systems, Israel and 
Argentina, were able to control inflation as well, with Israel faster than Argentina. Turkey, 
although it also has PR electoral formula with closed-list ballot structure, was the slowest 
country to put persistent inflation under control.  
In Turkey, the PR system was modified in 1987 in order to give it a more plural-
majoritarian character by creating higher disproportionality in the electoral system. The new 
electoral system was designed to eliminate minor parties and to avoid the instability associated 
with coalition governments in the late 1970s (Özbudun 2001). In all elections from 1987 on, a 10 
percent national threshold and a higher local threshold, which depends on the nature of the 
electoral district, was imposed.70 If a party fails to satisfy these thresholds, it can not have any 
                                                 
70 The local threshold in Turkey has been removed since the 1995 elections. 
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deputies in the Parliament regardless of its performance in a particular electoral district. This 
change should have facilitated less coalition governments and more political stability in Turkey, 
which is supposed to be more favorable to price stabilization. However, instead we see that 
inflation in Turkey gained more pace after 1987.  
Argentina is another case that invalidates the argument that lower proportionality is more 
favorable for battling inflation. The degree of malapportionment (disproportionality) of the 
Argentine senate is the highest in the world and the malapportionment of the Argentine Congress 
is about 2.5 times higher than the world average and 50 percent higher than the Latin American 
average (Acemoglu, Johnson et al. 2002). In Argentina provinces have disproportionally much 
higher weight in legislature compared to the metropolitan areas. The fiscal redistribution is also 
determined by this disproportionality, so some provinces get much more from the budget than 
they should proportionally get (Gibson, Calvo et al. 2001). However, despite being an extreme 
case in disproportionality, Argentina decreased its persistent inflation in 1991, later than Israel 
and Mexico.  
The effect of district size is inconclusive for our cases. Israel has the highest district size, 
as the whole country is counted as the only electoral district in the elections. Indeed, all 120 
members of the Knesset are elected based on parties’ share of the whole national vote. Therefore, 
Israel has a pure proportional system. Yet, there is a national threshold of 1.5 percent (Gutmann 
1988; Beck, Keefer et al. 2004; Mahler 2004).71 Israel is the country which decreased inflation 
fastest. Thus, the Israeli case does not support the argument that huge district size, and thus, high 
proportionality, tends to decrease political ability to pursue disinflationary policies successfully. 
                                                 
71 The 15 percent threshold was established in 1992. Before that the national threshold in Israel was only 10 percent. 
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Among our cases, Turkey has the smallest district size relative to total legislature 
followed by Argentina. Because of its small electoral districts, Turkey has a less proportional 
parliamentary system with legislators focused on local interests. The Turkish Parliament has 550 
members, elected from party lists in 79 districts. With an average district size of 7 seats, the 
natural thresholds average 12.5 percent. Nevertheless, Turkey also has an official national 
threshold of 10 percent since 1983 (The Law Regarding Election of the Members of the Turkish 
Parliament "The Law Regarding Election of the Members of the Parliament" 1983; Beck, Keefer 
et al. 2004). Despite these traits, the Turkish system has been the least effective in decreasing 
inflation. 
One may think that disproportionality and the separation of purpose72 it causes explain 
why Turkey was unsuccessful in eliminating inflation. However, this is not quite true. Although 
district sizes are small, parties remain powerful in Turkey because of the closed-list ballot 
structure. Party discipline is strong and national interests still prevail over local ones, especially 
when compared to Brazil. Also, Turkey is a unitary state, as opposed to federal systems in 
Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, which makes local politics in Turkey much less important.  
Although looking into only two contrary cases, Israel and Turkey, suggests that higher 
district size is more favorable to disinflation, the other three cases do not support this argument. 
The district size of Brazil ranges between 8 and 70 seats per district, i.e. the country ranks second 
after Israel in terms of district size relative to legislature size, and it reduced its persistent 
inflation relatively slowly. On the other hand, Argentina has lower district size but was faster in 
decreasing inflation (Morgenstern 2002).  
                                                 
72 As can be recalled from Chapter 6, “separation of purpose” implies a divided government (in a presidential 
system), but also it indicates a fragmented, undisciplined, weak and particularistic party system where local interests 
are more important than national interests.  
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Mexico is our only plural-majoritarian case, although it is only partially plural-
majoritarian. The Mexican Congress has 500 members, 300 elected by simple plurality in single-
member districts, and 200 seats (40 seats in each of five regions) are assigned by proportional 
representation based on a party's share in the national vote.73 Many countries with plural-
majority electoral systems combine single-member district rule where voters select individual 
candidates. Thus, it is no surprise that Mexico also uses single-member districts, though 
partially. The natural regional threshold is about 2.5 percent. There is also a 2 percent formal  
(legal) national threshold in Mexico, so parties should get at least 2 percent of the national vote 
to be represented in the Congress (Morgenstern 2002). If it was a democratic state at that time, 
we could argue that the plural-majority character of Mexican political system have improved the 
state’s ability to decrease inflation by providing political stability and decisiveness. Mexico, 
along with Israel, implemented a disinflationary program in 1980s and successfully decreased 
inflation earlier than Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey.  
We can also measure proportionality by thresholds. Brazil has 513 members elected by 
party lists in 27 districts. The Brazilian electoral system did not include any national threshold, 
but there were still barriers to entry to the Congress because of the way votes are converted into 
seats. The parties that fell under the electoral quotient (i.e., the total number of votes cast divided 
by the number of seats) did not win any legislative seats. With an average district size of 23 
(ranging from 8 to 60) until 1995, the natural thresholds were about 5 percent in average 
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Ames 2000; Beck, Keefer et al. 2004; de Souza 2004).74  
                                                 
73 The proportional seats give opposition parties an opportunity to be represented in the Congress even if they lose 
all of the district races. 
74 With the 1995 political reform, party law was modified and it now requires parties to win 5 percent of the national 
vote with at least 2 percent in one-third of the states in order to win recognition in Congress and thus have leadership 
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The Argentine Congress has 257 members, half elected every two years, who are elected 
all by party lists in 24 districts. The average district size of Argentina is 10.7, but the natural 
threshold is about 16.7 percent. Because of this threshold, Argentina has the highest barrier of 
entry to the Lower House, encouraging fewer parties in the system (Morgenstern 2002).75 
Turkey follows Argentina with 12.5 percent natural threshold, but the official threshold is 10 
percent (Beck, Keefer et al. 2004).  
                                                                                                                                                            
Compared to Israel and Brazil, Argentina and Turkey have less proportional systems. 
However, Mexico, with 300 of its 500 deputies elected by plural-majority system, is definitely 
most plural-majority of all. Although this may have helped Mexican policymakers in their early 
success with disinflation, we cannot associate success in inflation stabilization with plural-
majority electoral formula because our most successful case, Israel is a pure proportional system. 
Therefore, it does not seem that proportionality is tied significantly with the ability to eliminate 
inflation.  
The electoral systems of the five cases are summarized in Table 45 and Table 46. From 
the five countries, it is not possible to confirm a clear and significant relation between electoral 
systems and the ability to decrease inflation. For instance, Mexico and Israel are the countries 
which were able to decrease persistent inflation relatively early. However, as can be seen in 
Table 45, these two countries have totally opposite kinds of electoral systems; Israel is a purely 
proportional system, whereas Mexico is a majoritarian case, though partially. Also, Mexico was 
a one-party dominated system until 1997, which probably contributed more to its political 
stability than its electoral system. 
 
and committee assignment privileges (Shugart and Haggard 2001). This new threshold was enforced first time in 
October 2006 legislative elections. 
75 In fact, Argentina has the least fragmented party system among our cases which has been more or less a two-party 
system.  
 197
Table 45: Comparison of electoral systems vs. success in price stabilization 
 
Electoral system 
Successful Moderately 
successful 
 
Unsuccessful 
Proportional 
representation 
Closed-list 
 
Israel 
 
Argentina 
 
 
Turkey 
Plural-majority 
Closed-list 
Mexico (partially 
plural-majority) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Proportional 
representation 
Open-list 
 
- 
 
Brazil 
 
- 
Plural-majority 
Open-list 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
Table 46: Comparison of barriers to entry to legislature vs. success in price stabilization 
 
 
Barriers to entry to 
Congress/Parliament 
Successful Moderately 
successful 
Unsuccessful 
 
High 
 
- 
 
Argentina 
 
Turkey 
 
Medium 
 
Mexico 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Low 
 
Israel 
 
Brazil 
 
- 
 
In Table 46, it can be seen that the state with the least barriers to entry to the Lower 
House (Israel) is the most successful one in terms of battling persistent inflation. Whereas 
Turkey, the state which imposes highest barriers, is the most unsuccessful case in terms of 
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battling inflation. This is contrary to what I expected. Yet, our two moderately successful cases, 
Argentina and Brazil, have very opposite traits in terms of barriers to entry to their Lower House. 
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that electoral system is not a factor that directly affects the 
ability of a state to decrease inflation.  
7.2 PARTY SYSTEMS 
Does the party system have an effect on the ability to stabilize prices? Indeed, the government’s 
ability to initiate reforms may depend on the characteristics of the party system. The first 
characteristics of a party system to look at are fractionalization and polarization. Countries with 
highly fragmented and highly polarized party systems are supposed to have more difficulty in 
stabilizing prices. Yet, our cases do not confirm this.   
Political parties are associations of citizens that help define the political will of the people 
and that contest elections in order to govern the country. Parties attempt to influence the 
government by holding its seats or by forming an opposition to it. They are the most important 
political institutions as they establish contact between the government on the one hand and the 
social groups and forces on the other. They channel the interests and demands of people to the 
state (Powell 1982). Different parties have different economic, political, and social programs as 
they appeal to different interests. Their programs reflect their constituents’ interests and they 
compete to attract more voters. 
As parties compete with each other, the system of interactions resulting from this political 
competition shapes the political party system. A strong party system is crucial for a strong 
democracy, because it not only shapes participation in the political system but also affects 
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stability of the political system (Powell 1982). Fractionalization, alignments, stability, discipline, 
and polarization are some of the many attributes of party systems. Here I mainly focus on 
fragmentation and polarization of the party systems and their relation to price stabilization. 
7.2.1 Fragmentation in the Party System  
One very important dimension of the political party system is the number of parties. The number 
of parties in the political system affects the political competition and the performance of the 
government. That is why fragmentation may also affect the policies of governments, including 
inflation policies.  
Scholars have argued that the higher the number of effective parties in the legislature, the 
lower the level of legislative support the government may enjoy and the more difficult it 
becomes to govern (Stein, Talvi et al. 1998). As Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991b, p. 
342) claim, “governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard 
choices. Such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favoring many 
small political parties.” Remmer (1991) has argued that the level of multipartism in a country has 
an important impact on the level of political stability, which in turn may affect economic 
stability. The number of parties also has an important impact on government effectiveness 
(Powell 1982; Lijphart 1984). An increase in the number of parties may have a negative effect on 
the ability to resolve economic problems like inflation. 
Support for the government is probably the most important factor that determines 
governability. The degree of support for the government may be measured by the level of 
multipartism, party discipline, and the stability of party systems (Jones 1995). The fragmented 
party systems, i.e. systems with many parties, provide fewer possibilities for obtaining 
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governmental majority in the legislature (Foweraker 1998). Therefore, such systems may reduce 
governability. Polarization, i.e. the distance between parties on the opposite ideological ends, 
also rises with the increase in the number of parties. A combination of multipartism with 
polarization may produce even more serious governability problems (Mainwaring 1993; 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  
Many scholars choose to use “effective number of parties” or “index of 
fractionalization,” when they measure the impact of number of parties on the political system.76 
First used by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), the effective number of parties is an important 
feature of party systems and it is defined as the number of political parties that are significant 
players in the legislature. It takes not only the number of parties but also their relative weights 
into account (Lijphart 1994). Thus, it is a measure of competition in the party system. Indeed, 
more than the crude number of parties in the party system, it is the weight of these parties that 
influences the effectiveness of policymaking.    
The effective number of parties also determines fractionalization. In fact, these two 
variables measure exactly the same thing, the number of parties and their weight in the political 
system, but fractionalization is formulated in a different way. Fractionalization is defined as the 
probability that, when you pick two legislators randomly, each belongs to different parties that 
support the government, constitute the opposition parties, or form the Parliament. Value  of 
                                                 
76 The effective number of parties is calculated, for all parties eligible to receive votes, by the formula ∑ 21 iv , 
where represents party i’s proportion of the vote. It is calculated for parties, which have seats in the legislature, 
by the formula
vi
∑ 21 is , where represents party i’s proportion of the seats in the legislature. The 
fractionalization index is calculated as (1 -
si
2
i
s∑ ) or (1 - 2iv∑ ). 
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fractionalization index ranges between 0 and 1, and usually for values greater than 0.5, we see 
number of parties greater than two and increasing as long as the value approaches one.  
I expect that a higher fractionalization in the party system or legislature has a negative 
effect on the ability of governments to reduce inflation, because fractionalization decreases the 
chances of having a majority government and consensus. The necessity to satisfy many parties 
and groups may increase budget deficits and increase government expenditures. This would lead 
to more money creation and impact the government’s ability to stabilize prices negatively.  
Some theories establish a relationship between fractionalization and inflation. The public 
choice school sees the inflation problem as a consequence of fractionalized political structures. It 
considers stable prices as a public good that is hard to achieve as long as different interest groups 
do not coordinate their activities by limiting their demands on government to contribute to 
monetary stability (Olson 1982). Some scholars have found empirical evidence that political 
fractionalization is associated with higher inflation (Roubini and Sachs 1989a; Grilli, 
Masciandaro et al. 1991b).  
Foweraker (1998) argues that the primary condition for good governability is for the 
presidential party to have at least 45 percent of seats in the Congress. This percentage mainly 
depends on the number of effective parties in the political system, and the number of effective 
parties is determined largely by electoral rules and political polarization. Yet, Foweraker also 
argues that the disadvantages caused by multipartism and polarization can be offset by 
conditions that favor coalition building. Through coalitions, majorities may be formed in the 
legislature and governability improves.  
Fragmented political systems, however, are typically not able to produce majority 
governments. The more parties that a political system has, the more veto players are there. Thus, 
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it becomes necessary to form inter-party coalitions in order to enact laws and implement policies. 
Forming multi-party coalitions is not as easy since each party has different constituents and 
different interests. It always requires some negotiation between the involved parties, causing 
delays, gridlocks, and even political instabilities (Cox and McCubbins 2001).  
Another problem that fragmentation causes is lack of unity of purpose. Even when other 
conditions facilitate unity of purpose, a fractionalized and undisciplined party system can cause a 
high separation of purpose, since it makes it more difficult for the Presidents to secure the 
majority support in the legislature (Shugart and Haggard 2001). On the other hand, highly strong 
and dominant parties can secure a very united government, despite many other factors that work 
to the contrary. Among our cases, Mexico (until 1997) is the best example of a unified 
government because of a single cohesive party. Yet, fractionalization in presidential systems can 
also be overcome when a party controls both the executive and the majority in the legislative, i.e. 
when the government is not divided.   
According to Duverger’s Law, plural-majority electoral systems favor two-party systems 
and PR systems promote multi-party systems (Duverger 1954). A plurality electoral formula 
promotes fewer parties, mostly a two-party system, because in plural elections voters think that 
only two parties have a chance of winning and view votes for other parties as wasted. Thus, 
voters usually choose between two parties. On the contrary, a PR electoral formula encourages 
entry of new parties to the political system (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982; Myerson 1995). This 
argument was also supported by a number of empirical studies (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; 
Powell 1982; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1990, 1994; Amorin Neto and Cox 1997; 
Cox 1997; Stein, Talvi et al. 1998).  
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I have already mentioned the weakness of PR systems in terms of controlling budget 
deficits. The source of this weakness is mainly the fractionalization they cause. Proportionality 
of the electoral system increases fractionalization of the party system. In parliamentary systems, 
where PR is practiced, there is multipartism. PR systems also produce less support for the 
government in the legislature. Sometimes even very small parties are represented in the 
Parliament and they may be able to block legislation effectively. As a result, we can expect a 
parliamentary system with a PR electoral formula to have more difficulty in initiating policy 
changes and reforms needed to decrease inflation than a presidential and plural-majority system 
which typically has a smaller number of parties.  
The fractionalized party systems generated by PR systems are susceptible to produce 
coalition governments, which tend to be unstable as they are composed of competing parties 
(Grilli, Masciandaro et al. 1991b; Inman and Fitts 1997; Stein, Talvi et al. 1998; Lijphart 1999). 
Yet, this does not need to be very problematical in parliamentary systems, as parliamentary 
systems encourage coalition building and cooperation. As long as there are disciplined parties 
that support the government, parliamentary systems function effectively. However, coalition 
building, and thus effective policymaking, can become more difficult if number of parties in the 
Parliament is excessively high (Sartori 1994a).   
Other things being equal, presidential systems are expected to have fewer effective 
parties (lower fractionalization) in the legislature. Since only large parties have a realistic chance 
of winning the presidency, the party system gets less fractionalized. This is favorable for 
producing effective majorities, which are more successful in initiating and implementing 
economic reforms. On the other hand, presidential systems are expected to weaken party 
discipline, because the president is elected separately and does not depend on the legislative 
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support (Stein, Talvi et al. 1998). Weak party discipline is not good for effective policymaking, 
as the government cannot even depend on the support of its own party members. 
Moreover, it is more problematic when the number of parties is high in presidential 
systems, because in general these systems do not give incentives for legislators to cooperate or to 
form coalitions. Coalition governments in presidential systems are rare and unstable. Unless the 
president has extensive powers, a multi-party presidential system may lead to serious political 
gridlock (Stepan and Skach 1993). This may hinder economic programs that are needed to battle 
inflation. 
Even executives strongly committed to economic reform may not be able to realize these 
reforms if they lack support in the legislature. Thus, in many countries with weak, fractionalized, 
and pork barrel party politics, presidents are provided with more law making powers so that 
national issues are dealt effectively. Brazil offers the best example. In countries with disciplined 
parties, legislators do not delegate as much constitutional powers to the executive, because it is 
easier for them to enact government programs (Shugart 1997). As opposed to Brazil, Argentina 
and Mexico are examples of presidential systems with relatively disciplined party systems.  
District size also affects fractionalization of the party system. Proportional systems with 
small district size tend to generate fewer parties, and thus, they facilitate stronger governments 
which may be effective in decreasing inflation.  Lijphart (1990) and Jones (1993) argue that there 
is a positive relationship between district magnitude and number of parties in the political 
system. At least in Latin America, large district size electoral systems, high number of effective 
parties in the legislature, and low legislative support for the government promote higher 
government spending and higher budget deficits (Jones 1994; Stein, Talvi et al. 1998). 
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Therefore, according to literature, larger districts make it harder for governments to tackle the 
inflation problem.  
As can be seen from Table 47, Table 48, and Table 49, among our cases Israel has the 
most and Mexico has the least fractionalized legislature on average. These were the two 
countries which were able to solve their inflation problem earlier than the others. According to 
our hypothesis, it was expected that a country with low fractionalization would be successful in 
stabilizing its prices. Yet, the Israeli case contradicts that assertion. Our most unsuccessful case, 
Turkey, has a fractionalized parliament (changing within the range of 0.51 to 0.77) and 3.1 
effective parties on average between 1975 and 1999. However, its level of fractionalization has 
not been worse than Israel or Brazil, which were able to eliminate inflation earlier. Therefore, 
our cases do not provide evidence of a relation between fractionalization and ability to eliminate 
persistent inflation.  
Table 47: Government fractionalization (0=lowest, 1=highest) 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA   NA   NA 
Brazil         0           0       0      0          0          0          0     0          0
Israel     0.28      0.28        0     0.62     0.62     0.62     0.62      0.28      0.28 
Mexico  NA   NA        0       0       0       0       0        0        0 
Turkey    0.33      0.46     0.46     0.32     0.05       0 NA  0   0   
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina  0          0          0         0         0         0         0          0          0 
Brazil     0.11     0.11     0.39    0.43    0.43    0.43    0.43      0.71  0.71 
Israel     0.28      0.60    0.60     0.60     0.60     0.60     0.60      0.60      0.60 
Mexico     0        0        0       0       0       0       0        0        0 
Turkey 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0.44   
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Table 47 (Continued from previous page) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average 
Argentina         0          0          0         0         0     0.50     0.50       0  0.06 
Brazil 0.71 0.71     0.66     0.66     0.66     0.66     0.78     0.78 0.36 
Israel     0.46      0.46      0.46     0.45     0.72 0.72 0.72      0.80  0.52 
Mexico  0        0        0       0       0       0       0        0        0 
Turkey     0.44  0.44  0.44     0.47     0.47     0.47     0.47  NA 0.22 
Source: Database of Political Institutions IV (Beck, Keefer et al. 2004) [NA = Not available] 
* Highlights indicate the year the successful disinflationary program is initiated. 
 
Table 48: Legislative fractionalization (0=lowest, 1=highest) 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA   NA   NA 
Brazil     0.48      0.48     0.49     0.49     0.50     0.50     0.50      0.50      0.58 
Israel     0.71      0.71      0.66     0.78     0.78     0.78     0.78      0.66      0.66 
Mexico  NA   NA      0.30     0.30     0.30     0.44     0.44      0.44      0.42 
Turkey     0.70      0.70     0.70    0.59     0.60     0.61 NA  NA   NA   
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina     0.55      0.55     0.59    0.60     0.62     0.62     0.64      0.64      0.67 
Brazil     0.58      0.58      0.72    0.65     0.65     0.65     0.65      0.88      0.88 
Israel     0.66      0.78      0.78     0.78     0.78     0.78     0.78      0.78      0.78 
Mexico     0.42      0.42      0.33     0.33     0.33     0.61     0.61      0.61      0.61 
Turkey    0.60     0.60     0.60     0.57     0.51     0.51     0.51      0.51      0.72 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average 
Argentina     0.66      0.57      0.57 - -     0.67     0.67      0.54  0.61 
Brazil     0.88     0.88     0.87     0.87    0.87    0.87     0.86      0.86  0.68 
Israel    0.80      0.80     0.80     0.80     0.83     0.83     0.83      0.89  0.77 
Mexico     0.61      0.61      0.56     0.56     0.56     0.65     0.65      0.65  0.49 
Turkey     0.72      0.72      0.72  0.77     0.77     0.77     0.77  NA 0.65 
Source: Database of Political Institutions IV (Beck, Keefer et al. 2004) [NA = Not available] 
* Highlights indicate the year the successful disinflationary program is initiated. 
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Table 49: Effective number of parties 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA   NA   NA 
Brazil      1.9       1.9        2.0       2.0       2.0       2.0       2.0        2.0        2.4 
Israel      3. 5       3.5        3.0       4.6       4.6       4.6       4.6  3.0  3.0 
Mexico  NA   NA        1.4       1.4       1.4       1.8       1.8        1.8        1.7 
Turkey      3.3       3.3        3.3       2.5       2.5       2.6 NA   NA   NA 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina      2.2       2.2        2.5       2.5       2.6       2.6       2.8        2.8        3.0 
Brazil      2.4       2.4       3.6       2.9       2.9       2.9       2.9        8.5        8.5 
Israel      3.0       4.5        4.5       4.5       4.5       4.5       4.5        4.5        4.5 
Mexico      1.7       1.7        1.5       1.5       1.5       2.6       2.6        2.6        2.6 
Turkey      2.5       2.5        2.5       2.3       2.1       2.1       2.1        2.1        3.6 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average 
Argentina      3.0       2.4        2.4 NA NA       3.0       3.0        2.2        2.6 
Brazil      8.5       8.5        7.5       7.5       7.5       7.5       7.0        7.0        4.5 
Israel      5.0       5.0        5.0       5.0       5.9       5.9       5.9        9.3        4.6 
Mexico      2.6       2.9        2.3       2.3       2.3       2.9       2.9        2.9        2.1 
Turkey      3.6       3.6        3.6       4.4       4.4       4.4       4.4   NA  3.1 
Source: The Database of Political Institutions IV [NA = Not available] 
* Highlights indicate the year the successful disinflationary program is initiated. 
 
 
Mainly because of the pure PR election formula, the party system in Israel is 
fractionalized and unstable. There are many small radical parties in the legislature, and new ones 
emerge with each round of elections. Those small party factions have a key role in building or 
breaking government coalitions (Mahler 2004). However, until 1996, there was also a bi-polar 
structure of two stable and enduring coalitions: the conservative Likud bloc and the more 
moderate Labor Party bloc (Polity IV Country "Polity IV Country Report 2001" 2001; Polity IV 
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Country Report 2001). Therefore, we can assume that strong coalition building tendency in the 
Israeli political system has worked for its advantage.  
When we look into changes in the rate of fractionalization, we see that when Israel 
initiated and implemented the successful disinflationary plan, the Parliament was as 
fractionalized (0.78) as it has been on average between 1975 and 2000 (0.77). In fact, the 
Knesset was more fractionalized than during the previous three years when this plan was 
initiated in 1985. Therefore, the rate of fractionalization does not explain the Israeli success in 
disinflation. Rather, the Israeli case implies that there may be other factors, like coalition 
building, that can offset the negative effects of fractionalization in battling inflation.  
Mexico is a presidential system which confirms the hypothesis that low fractionalization 
improves stabilization of prices. It is one of the countries that stabilized its persistent inflation 
rather earlier, if not earlier than Israel. Mexico provides some evidence that change in 
fractionalization affected the success in price stabilization. The Mexican Congress was less 
fractionalized in 1987 (0.33 compared to 0.44 in 1980-82 and 0.42 in 1983-85), when the 
government initiated the disinflationary Solidarity Plan (see Table 48).   
Turkey is a parliamentary system with PR electoral formula and disciplined parties. As 
mentioned, a parliamentary system with PR formula may increase the number of parties in a 
political system and that is not good for effective policymaking. However, as can be seen Table 
47, Table 48, and Table 49, political fractionalization in Turkey has been less than Israel and 
Brazil. Also, unlike Brazil, Turkey has disciplined parties, which may further decrease the 
negative effect of political fractionalization on policymaking. Yet, Turkey has been the least 
successful case in terms of disinflation. 
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Brazil is probably the most peculiar case when it comes to party systems. As can be seen 
in Table 48, Brazil had a significant and almost continuous increase in legislative 
fractionalization from 1975 to 1994 (from 0.48 to 0.88) when the disinflationary program was 
initiated. As can be seen in Table 49, the effective number of legislative parties increased from 
1.9 in 1975 to 8.5 in 1994. Parties are personalized in Brazil, and party organization and party 
discipline are also weak. Moreover, party switching is very common, so the presidents cannot 
even rely on their own parties (Mainwaring 1995). Indeed, Mainwaring (1995) suggests that 
Brazil is “a unique case of party underdevelopment in the world,” because Brazilian parties are 
known for “their fragility, their ephemeral character, their weak roots in society, and the 
autonomy politicians of the catch-all parties enjoy with respect to their parties” (p.354). He also 
suggests that, because of this very loose and undisciplined character of parties, Brazilian 
presidents could not even count on the support of their own parties in the legislature. Indeed, 
many scholars maintain that 
…. the roots of party weakness lie in Brazil’s political institutions: its open-list 
proportional representation electoral system (which encourages individualism), large 
district magnitudes and a low electoral threshold (which encourage fragmentation), and 
the fact that nominations are set at the state and not the national level. (Desposato and 
Samuels 2003, p.2) 
 
Because of its fragmented and undisciplined party system, I expect Brazil to be 
unsuccessful in stabilizing prices. In fact, Brazil was late in stabilization. Although the Brazilian 
case seems to confirm the hypothesis, this conclusion is not validated if we look into changes in 
fractionalization. When the Brazilian government initiated the disinflationary plan in 1993, the 
fractionalization was 0.88 and number of effective parties was 8.5, at their peak. Therefore, 
Brazil implemented its stabilization program when its party system was most fragmented, which 
is contrary to what theory would predict. Yet, we know that in Brazil presidents are provided 
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with more law making powers in order to offset the effects of weak, fragmented, and 
undisciplined party system.  
Some scholars argue that concurrent elections lower the number of parties compared to 
when legislative and presidential elections are held at different times (Shugart and Carey 1992; 
Jones 1994). One of the reasons of Brazil’s weak party system, and thus bad performance in 
eliminating inflation, was probably its non-concurrent elections.77  
As can be seen from Table 48, Argentina’s legislature has not been as fractionalized as 
the Israeli, Brazilian, or Turkish legislature and its fractionalization level has not changed as 
significantly as in Brazil. Although Argentina can still be considered mainly as a two-party 
system, fractionalization increased through 1980s and 1990s. Argentina initiated its 
disinflationary plan in 1991, when its fractionalization level was the highest (0.64) since its 
return to democracy in 1983 (see Table 48). Therefore, like Brazil, changes in fractionalization 
in Argentina contradict the expectation that higher fractionalization would make stabilization of 
the prices more difficult.  
Another dimension of fractionalization is fractionalization of opposition in the 
legislature. This variable measures the probability that two deputies picked at random from 
among the opposition parties will be of different parties. The fractionalization of the opposition 
in the legislature is expected to have positive effect on the ability of government to initiate and 
implement successful disinflationary plans, because if the opposition is more divided it has less 
power to hinder the policies of the government.  
                                                 
77 However, in 1994 Brazil amended its constitution to have concurrent presidential and legislative elections. Thus, 
when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected for his first term in 1995, he faced a much less controversial 
Congress, i.e. weaker opposition than before, and was therefore able to initiate his policies much more easily (Beck, 
Keefer et al. 2004). 
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As can be seen from Table 50, on average Argentina has the least and Brazil has the 
highest fractionalization of opposition. If we look at the changes in fractionalization of 
opposition, when Argentina initiated its successful disinflationary plan in 1991, fractionalization 
of opposition was at its highest level (0.45) since democratization in 1983. This is also true for 
Brazil and Israel. These countries had their highest level of fractionalization of opposition when 
they initiated their successful disinflationary plans (0.88 in 1994 and 0.91 in 1985 respectively).  
Table 50: Opposition fractionalization (0=lowest, 1=highest) 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA   NA  NA 
Brazil  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA   NA       0.32 
Israel     0.55         0.55      0.55      0.51      0.51      0.51      0.51       0.36       0.36 
Mexico  NA   NA      0.64      0.64      0.64      0.76      0.76       0.76       0.65 
Turkey      0.48          0.36      0.36      0.04      0.32      0.36  NA   NA  NA 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina      0.20          0.20      0.38      0.38      0.40      0.40      0.45       0.45       0.60 
Brazil      0.23          0.23      0.53      0.82      0.82      0.82      0.82       0.88       0.88 
Israel      0.36          0.91      0.91      0.91      0.91      0.49      0.49       0.49       0.49 
Mexico      0.65          0.65      0.59      0.59      0.59      0.49      0.49       0.49       0.49 
Turkey      0.47          0.47      0.47      0.71      0.47      0.47      0.47       0.47       0.50 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average 
Argentina      0.58          0.37      0.37  NA  NA  NA  NA       0.19       0.38 
Brazil      0.88          0.88      0.78      0.78      0.78      0.78      0.71       0.71       0.70 
Israel      0.72          0.72      0.72      0.73      0.57      0.57      0.57       0.79      0.61 
Mexico      0.49          0.49      0.52      0.52      0.52      0.55      0.55       0.55       0.59 
Turkey      0.50          0.50      0.50      0.61      0.61      0.61      0.61       0.49       0.47 
Source: Database of Political Institutions IV (Beck, Keefer et al. 2004) 
* Highlights indicate the year the successful disinflationary program is initiated. 
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One exception to the tendency of governments to introduce successful disinflationary 
plans when the opposition is more fragmented is Mexico. Mexico initiated its Economic 
Solidarity Pact (Pacto de Solidaridad Económica) in 1985, when the opposition was less 
fractionalized (0.59). Also, Turkey, which experienced an increase in opposition fractionalization 
in 1987 and between 1996 and 1999, never had a chance to have a successful disinflationary 
plan. Besides, on average Turkey does not have high opposition fractionalization, but it was still 
the most unsuccessful case in price stabilization. Therefore, it is hard to associate opposition 
fractionalization with policies on price stabilization. 
7.2.2 Polarization in the Party System  
Polarization, defined as the ideological distance between parties, is another important aspect of 
political party systems. According to scholars that have studied political institutions, political 
polarization is a very important factor that shapes policymakers’ incentives for making economic 
policies (Persson and Svensson 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Tabellini and Alesina 1990; 
Pahuja 2000). The more polarized is the party system, the more unstable is the polity and the 
more myopic is policymaking, because the policy issues get more politicized. These conditions 
may compel the governments to spend more, then to create more money, and thus, increase 
inflation.  
The higher the party polarization, the greater is the politicization of policies. As parties 
ideologically diverge more from the center, they tend to advocate more populist policies. 
Populist governments are more interested in government spending and redistribution than 
economic austerity policies that are necessary to decrease inflation (Dornbusch and Edwards 
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1991). Therefore, as the polarization in the party system is high, it may be more difficult to 
tackle economic problems, such as inflation.  
Fractionalization and polarization in the party system are interrelated. High numbers of 
effective parties in a political system usually brings about more polarization, i.e. it increases the 
ideological distance between the parties (Stein, Talvi et al. 1998). The dominant perspectives in 
political economy regard not only fractionalization but also polarization of the party system as a 
political impediment to economic adjustment (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999). 
In order to measure polarization in the political system, the polarization variable in the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) is used. The DPI defines polarization variable as 
“maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the 
legislature.” It is the maximum difference between the political orientation (left, center or right) 
of the chief executive’s party and the political orientation of the three largest government parties 
and the largest opposition party (DPI 2000).78 
                                                 
78 In the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), polarization is zero if elections are not competitive. It is also zero 
if the chief executive’s party has an absolute majority in the legislature. Otherwise polarization is the maximum 
difference between the chief executive’s party’s value (right, left, or center), as stated in the EXECRLC variable of 
the DPI, and the values of the three largest government parties and the largest opposition party (Wade 2005). 
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As can be seen from Table 51, Israel initiated and implemented its successful 
disinflationary program in 1985, when it was as politically polarized as usual (polarization value 
2). On the contrary, Mexico had no polarization when it initiated its disinflationary Solidarity 
Plan in 1987, because elections were not really competitive and PRI was dominating the 
executive and the whole legislature. Therefore, these two successful cases provide contradictory 
evidence.  
Table 51: Political polarization* 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Israel 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Mexico   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Brazil 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Israel 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average 
Argentina 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.42 
Brazil 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.08 
Israel 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.00 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Turkey 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.00 
Source: Database of Political Institutions IV (Beck, Keefer et al. 2004) 
* Highlights indicate the year the successful disinflationary program is initiated. 
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Argentina was fairly polarized (polarization value 1) and Brazil was more polarized 
(polarization value 2) when the government initiated the successful disinflationary economic 
programs, in 1991 and 1994 respectively. Also, neither Argentina nor Brazil was able to 
eliminate inflation, when they had less polarization. Turkey was equally unsuccessful in 
decreasing inflation when there was no polarization (between 1984 and 1991) as when there was 
high polarization (between 1992 and 2000). Therefore, despite the general belief in the literature 
that polarization decreases the ability to stabilize prices, I do not find evidence through our cases 
that polarization decreases the ability of governments to battle persistent inflation. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
The results of the case analysis of electoral system do not confirm any relation between the 
electoral system and the ability to stabilize prices during the period of 1975-2000. Although I 
expected the countries with plural-majority, closed-list electoral formula and small district size to 
be most successful in disinflation and the countries with PR, open-list electoral formula with 
large district size to be least successful, some of our cases clearly contradict the theory. Israel is 
our most successful case, but it has a PR electoral formula with a exceptionally large district size.  
The results of the analysis of fractionalization in the political system also provide us 
mixed evidence. The hypothesis that low fractionalization increases the ability to decrease 
inflation is confirmed only by the Mexican case. Argentina, Israel and Brazil contradict this 
hypothesis. Similarly, it is hard to reach any generalization about the relation between price 
stabilization and polarization. Although polarization was also expected to decrease the ability to 
reduce inflation, only Mexico confirms that argument. However, polarization was probably not a 
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very important concern in Mexico anyway, as it had an authoritarian regime when it eliminated 
persistent inflation 
After getting mixed evidence from many political variables, in the next chapter I discuss 
the effect of inequality and poverty on the ability to stabilize prices. It is possible that inequality 
and poverty have a strong relation with successful price stabilization as they influence the policy 
choices of decision makers.  
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8.0  SOCIAL FACTORS AND INFLATION: DO INEQUALITY AND POVERTY 
DELAY PRICE STABILIZATION? 
A political economy perspective of inflation requires that I try to explain inflation not only 
through institutions, but also structures. By studying institutions, we learn how political rules, 
law, establishments, and procedures affect the economic decision-making process in a country. 
By studying structures, we learn about the patterns of relationships in the society and how the 
society is organized. Structures are more deep-rooted than institutions, so in many cases, even if 
you change social and political institutions, structures stay same. If you ignore structures, it is 
more difficult to understand why some countries with similar institutions do not perform in the 
same way. Therefore, in this chapter I analyze how some social structures affect inflation.  
Inequality and poverty are the only social factors to be considered in this study. By 
looking at different patterns of income distribution and levels of poverty, I try to understand 
whether some social structures influence the ability to stabilize prices. The findings of this 
chapter suggest that we cannot directly link poverty or inequality to the ability to decrease 
inflation, because the relationship between inequality/poverty and the ability to control inflation 
is neither a clear nor a direct one. However, it deserves attention as studying these relationships 
may reveal the indirect ways that inequality and poverty influence inflation, especially as 
mediated by political institutions.  
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8.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE RELATION BETWEEN 
INEQUALITY-POVERTY AND INFLATION  
Many political economists and sociologists have investigated the relationship between social 
structures and inflation. Among all social structures one, the distribution of income, has a key 
role to play because inequality determines many other structures in the society and polity. In 
some cases, poverty is an outcome of income inequality. The economic and political power of 
different social groups depends on their share of income in a society. Inequality may also affect 
the level of conflict in a society as huge income gaps may create social tensions. Both of these 
factors impact how governments make their economic policies, and hence how they deal with 
inflation. Thus, the relationship between inflation and inequality has important policy 
implications.  
Income inequality implies that the distribution of income is not balanced.  Gini 
coefficient is the typical measurement of inequality and its value changes between 0 (perfect 
equality, where hypothetically everybody gets same income) and 1.0 (perfect inequality, where 
one person gets all income in a society). Historically equal societies (e.g., Sweden, Finland, 
Japan, and Hungary) have Gini coefficient around 0.25, while unequal  societies (e.g. Brazil, 
Mexico, Guatemala, and Sierra Leon) have Gini coefficients around 0.6 (Wade 2005). 
Consensus over policies is more difficult to achieve in societies with unbalanced income 
distributions (Baer 1991). As groups are dissatisfied with their income level, they seek to 
improve their relative position and are more likely to clash with other claimants. This lack of 
consensus is thought to be one of the main causes of inflation (Crouch 1978; Hirsch 1978). 
Governments try to prevent such social and political conflict, so they are pressured to pay off 
social groups. Therefore, the more divided a country is in terms of income distribution, the 
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higher budget deficits governments may have, and thus, the higher tendency to pursue 
inflationary economic policies (Burdekin and Burkett 1996). As David Piachaud (1978) argues, 
if this is the case, a condition for stabilizing prices is to reach a society-wide consensus on a fair 
distribution of income.  
Many studies explore how inflation affects inequality, but there are also studies on how 
inequality affects inflation. The structuralist perspective was the first to recognize inequality as 
one of the causes of inflation. Structuralists argue that distributional conflicts are accentuated in 
unequal societies (Hirschman 1981). Such conflicts increase the chances of inflationary spirals. 
Thus, the emergence of inflation in unequal societies, like in Latin America, was no surprise to 
structuralists. As Hirschman (1985, p.72) has stated, 
[i]nflation then is a remarkable invention that permits a society to exist in a situation that 
is intermediate between the extremes of social harmony and civil war. ... Depending on 
the circumstances, it can either act as a substitute for civil war or as preface to much more 
serious social and political turmoil. … at times, the deflecting of intergroup hostility into 
the making of inflationary demands has helped gain time for reducing tensions that, in the 
absence of the inflationary outlet, would have become right away much more explosive.  
 
It has been widely accepted that income distribution gets more unequal in the early stages 
of economic growth (Kuznets 1955, 1966). Very agrarian societies do not have much inequality, 
but once they begin to industrialize, inequality begins to rise. When the societies reach a critical 
development level (when 50 percent of the work force switches from agricultural sector to the 
higher paying sector industrial sectors), inequality ceases to rise and begins to fall. This view 
implies that it is almost impossible for developing countries to both grow and improve income 
distribution. Yet, Hirschman (1981) has further argued that tolerance to inequality falls as 
disparities among social groups fail to narrow, and that can bring a social and political disaster. 
And that is why income inequality has become an important subject for political investigators.  
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Other contemporary scholars also suggest that there is a positive relation between income 
inequality and inflation (Willett 1988; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Edwards and Tabellini 1992; 
Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg 1996; Bulif 1998; Romer and Romer 1998; Al-Marhubi 2000; 2000; 
Easterly and Fischer 2001; Albanesi 2002; Bhattacharya, Bunzel et al. 2003; Crowe 2004). 
However, the relation between inflation and inequality may not be a direct one (Altimir 1997; 
Dolmas, Huffman et al. 2000). Rather, through political mechanisms, inequality impacts 
redistribution policies which may cause budget deficits, and thus higher inflation. This link 
between inflation and income inequality has become a popular topic of the “new political 
economy” approach, most notably by scholars like Willet (1988), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), 
and Edwards (1994). 
Some have associated inflation with the political strategy of populism, as unequal 
societies are considered to be very fertile ground for populism. Populists mainly seek to please 
low income groups by pursuing expansionary macroeconomic policies that trigger inflation. 
Through their empirical studies Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg (1996) and Dolma, Huffman, and 
Wynne (2000) discover a positive relation between inequality and inflation due to an increased 
tendency toward populist policies in unequal societies. Sachs (1989) and Dornbusch and 
Edwards (1991) have focused on Latin American populism and the rise of inflation in 1970s and 
1980s. They suggest that hyper inflation in Latin America was mainly caused by populists who 
took advantage of the lack of consensus on distribution of income.  
Another perspective comes from “wars of attrition” models which argue that price 
stabilizations are delayed because of conflicts between different socio-political groups. The focus 
of the conflicts is who will assume the burden of fiscal austerity (Alesina and Drazen 1991; 
Kaminski and Pereira 1996). It may be too difficult for all groups to agree on a stabilization 
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program and to decide how to share the burden, so stabilization is delayed. This difficulty is 
largely the result of unequal distribution of income. In that case, unless one social group is 
willing to carry the burden, inflation is likely to continue (Drazen and Grilli 1993). 
Some scholars have maintained that income inequality may affect inflation indirectly 
through political instability (Edwards and Tabellini 1991; Londgregan and Poole 1991; 
Cukierman, Edwards et al. 1992; Edwards 1994; Alesina, Ozler et al. 1996; Alesina and Perotti 
1996). Income inequality may cause political instability, and then, political instability may 
increase inflation. The more unstable and polarized is the political system, the more reluctant is 
the government to raise revenues from traditional taxes. Instead they may prefer using an 
inflation tax. Governments of the unstable and polarized societies prefer to use inflation tax to 
pay for their spending rapidly.  
Also, inequality may affect inflation indirectly by creating a short-term perspective in 
economic policymaking. This may be because high income inequality causes social and political 
polarization, which makes it less possible to reach consensus on economic reform. That situation 
increases political and economic uncertainty and induces a short term perspective in 
policymaking (Haggard and Webb 1993). The policies that fight inflation hurt the majority of the 
population in the short-term. An environment that promotes long-term solutions appears better to 
eliminate inflation.  
Another argument is that the relation between inequality and inflation may be due to pro-
rich bias in economic policymaking in unequal societies (Crowe 2004). High inequality 
intensifies the elite bias in polity. In such societies, the government tends to use more inflation 
tax than income tax as a source of revenue, causing higher inflation.  
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Some other scholars have argued that the level of democracy may be another intervening 
factor between income inequality and inflation. Accordingly, inequality increases inflation only 
in democratic environments. As Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef (2002, p.11) have stated, 
… the redistributive effect of the inflation tax increases with income inequality: in 
economies with high income inequality, the poor are likely to demand that governments 
levy inflation taxes to redistribute from rich to poor… On the other hand, the rich may 
demand more inflation than will the poor if the depreciation of the real value of their 
outstanding liabilities is larger than their inflation-vulnerable money balances… [W]hat 
matters is a combination of the degree to which rich and poor are politically represented, 
and the prevailing income inequality.  
 
On the other hand, where income distribution is more equal, it is possible to have a 
negative relationship between inflation and democracy. Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef (2002) 
have suggested that in economies with Gini coefficients lower than 40, democracy has a 
restraining effect on inflation. Indeed, in more equal societies, inflation is more a result of 
parasitic elites and may be decreased by more political competition. However, not all scholars 
agree. According to Al-Marhubi (2000), inequality increases inflation both in democracies and 
non-democracies. He claims that once inflation emerges as an economic problem, it locks social 
groups in a prisoner’s dilemma in which none of them cooperate to eliminate inflation.  
According to the findings of Bhattacharya, Bunzel, and Haslag (2003), inflation and 
inequality have a U-shaped relation, inflation increasing with inequality up to a certain level and 
then falling for higher levels of inequality. Bulif and Gulde (1995) had found a positive relation 
between income inequality and inflation. However, later Bulif (1998) concluded that 
hyperinflations are more associated with high inequality in income. At lower inflation levels, he 
finds that this relation is not a clear one. 
Despite the richness of literature on the relation between inequality and inflation, we do 
not find many studies that have investigated the relation between poverty and inflation. A rare 
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example is a study by Easterly and Fisher (2001), which suggests that not only unequal income 
distribution but also poverty is positively related to inflation. However, from historical incidents 
of inflation we know that high inflation has not occurred in the poorest societies or in most 
advanced countries, but in middle-income countries. Therefore, inflation is considered as a 
middle-income developing country phenomenon.  
8.2 INCOME INEQUALITY 
Many scholars agree that income inequality affects inflation and this effect is a positive one. As 
income inequality gets higher, the possibility of inflation also increases. In order to find out 
whether this thesis is valid, we need to check the income inequality levels of Argentina, Brazil, 
Israel, Mexico, and Turkey and evaluate how the level of inequality has impacted the 
government’s ability to decrease inflation.  
It is almost impossible to get time series data on income inequality. However, this may 
not be problematic since inequality does not change much from one year to another. Rather, the 
trends are more visible in the long-term. Therefore, as I investigate the relation between inflation 
and inequality, the average level of inequality seems to be sufficient to make an analysis. 
If we look to data demonstrated in Table 52, it can be seen that the income inequality 
levels of our cases vary significantly, although all of them have experienced long-term inflation 
problems. As we see, Israel has the lowest level of income inequality and it is the most 
economically advanced country of all. Israel is followed by Argentina and Turkey. Brazil has the 
highest inequality rate.  
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Table 52: Gini coefficients of respective countries * 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Argentina n.a. 48.0 46.0 
Brazil 54.7 58.0 60.2 
Israel 42.2 42.7 42.3 
Mexico 54.0 49.5 52.8 
Turkey 51.0 44.2 49.0 
 
Source: SIDD-2 data from the inequality database of Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007). 
 (*) For each country the available Gini index within the relevant decade is taken. If there were more than one Gini 
index within the same decade, an average of those indices is taken. 
 
 
Inequality in Latin America is well known. Many scholars have investigated unequal 
income and wealth distribution in Latin America (Maddison and Associates 1992; Morley 1995; 
Reynolds 1996; Berry 1997). Many have sought its roots in Latin America’s colonial past (Glade 
1996; Ramos 1996), some in latter development policies (Reynolds 1996), and others focused 
more on the effects of the 1980s debt crisis (Altimir 1996). The general conclusion is that Latin 
America is one of the most unequal regions of the world and even the economic growth of the 
region has not improved the situation (Furtado 1966; Lustig 1995; Ramos 1996; Reynolds 1996). 
Inequality was also seen as the cause of political instability in Latin America (Lustig 1995). 
What is notable is that Latin America has also experienced the worst and longest incidents of 
inflation. That has led many, especially Hirschman, to conclude that inflation in Latin America is 
related to inequality. 
Although Latin America was originally an unequal region, the trend in inequality varied 
internally. In general, income distribution improved in the 1970s, severely deteriorated in the 
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1980s, and did not improve in the 1990s despite economic recovery (Székely 2000). However, 
these trends vary from country to country. In 1970s some Latin American countries, such as 
Argentina, experienced many external shocks and slower growth, so inequality increased. In 
others, like Mexico, economic growth was higher and there was some improvement of 
distribution of income. On the other hand, Brazil grew significantly without seeing any 
improvement in distribution of income. In the 1980s, during the decade of economic crisis, 
inequality increased noticeably in almost all Latin American countries (Altimir 1996). Even 
economic recovery in the 1990s did not improve situation (Mamalakis 1996; Altimir 1998). 
Those trends can clearly be observed in Table 53 and Table 54.  
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Table 53: Income distribution in Latin America 
  
Gini 
coefficient 
Income share 
of the poorest 
25 % (urban) 
Income share 
of the richest 
10 % (urban) 
 
Inflation rate 
Argentina(m)     
1980   (*) 0.375 9.3 29.8 100.76 
1986   (*)                 0.406 8.8 34.5 90.1 
1990   (*) 0.423 8.4 34.8 2,313.97 
1994   (*) 0.439 6.8 34.2 4.18 
1990    0.501 .. 34.8 2,313.97 
1997 0.530 7.5 35.8 0.53 
1999    0.542 .. 37.0 -1.17 
2002   0.590 .. 42.1 25.87 
Brazil     
1979   (*) 0.493 5.6 39.1 .. 
1987   (*) 0.543 4.4 44.3 228.34 
1990   (*) 0.535 4.7 41.8 2,947.73 
1993   (*) .. 5.4 43.2 1,927.98 
1990 0.627 .. 41.8 2,947.73 
1996 0.638 4.9 44.3 15.76 
1999 0.640 .. 45.7 4.86 
2001 0.639 .. 45.7 6.84 
Mexico     
1984   (*) 0.321 10.5 25.8 65.54 
1989   (*) 0.424 8.5 36.9 20.01 
1992   (*)                 0.414 8.7 34.8 15.51 
1989 0.536 .. 36.9 20.01 
1994 0.539 11.0 34.3 6.97 
1996 .. 10.6 33.7 34.38 
1998 .. .. 34.8 15.93 
2000 0.542 .. 33.6 9.50 
2002 0.514 .. 31.2 5.03 
 
(*) Data taken from Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of 
Latin America: 1999-2000, United Nations, Santiago, Chile, LC/G.2068-P/I, 2000. 
The rest of the data are taken from Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social 
Panorama of Latin America: 2002-2003, United Nations, Santiago, Chile, LC/G.2209-P/I, 2004. 
(m) metropolitan populations 
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Table 54: Share of income in Latin America 
  Share of total income of Ratio of average 
income per capita (*) 
 
Average 
income 
(?) 
the 
poorest 
40% 
Next 
poorest 
30% 
20% 
below 
the 
richest 
10% 
the 
Richest 
10% 
 
D10/D(1 
to 4) 
 
 
Q5/Q1 
 
Argentina        
1990 10.6 14.9 23.6 26.7 34.8 13.5 13.5 
1997 12.4 14.9 22.3 27.1 35.8 16.0 16.4 
1999 12.5 15.4 21.6 26.1 37.0 16.4 16.5 
2002 8.1 13.4 19.3 25.3 42.1 20.0 21.8 
Brazil        
1990 9.3 9.5 18.6 28.0 43.9 31.2 35.0 
1996 12.3 9.9 17.7 26.5 46.0 32.2 38.0 
1999 11.3 10.1 17.3 25.5 47.1 32.0 35.6 
2001 11.0 10.2 17.5 25.6 46.8 32.2 36.9 
Mexico        
1989 8.6 15.8 22.5 25.1 36.6 17.2 16.9 
1994 8.5 15.3 22.9 26.1 35.6 17.3 17.4 
2000 8.5 14.6 22.5 26.5 36.4 17.9 18.5 
2002 8.2 15.7 23.8 27.3 33.2 15.1 15.5 
Source: Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America: 2002-2003, 
United Nations, Santiago, Chile, LC/G.2209-P/I, 2004. 
(?) Average monthly household income in multiples of the per capita poverty line 
(*) Households are divided into deciles (D), each of which represents 10% of total households. D(1 to 4) means the 40% of 
households with the lowest income, and D10 means the 10% of households with the highest income. Similar notation is used for 
quintiles (Q), where each group represents 20% of total households. 
 
 
 
We can try to derive conclusions about the relation between inequality and inflation by 
looking at trends in Latin American. Table 53 lets us see whether inflation has followed the 
trends in inequality. As can be noticed in Table 53 and Table 54, the changes in income equality 
over the years vary from country to country. In Argentina’s case we see that, until the 1990s 
inflation increased along with increasing inequality. The only incidence since 1980 when 
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inequality declined was 1994. That year also saw low inflation. However, once the inflation 
problem was solved in 1991, we know that inflation never rose again until 2002, although 
inequality has continued to rise. Therefore, these two variables have not changed in the same 
direction.  
In Brazil inequality continuously rose until the early 2000s, but inflation stopped being a 
problem from 1995 on. Inequality in Mexico also continued to rise until the early 2000s, but 
inflation had its small ups and downs until being completely stabilized in the 1990s. If we check 
the trends over many decades, we may derive some conclusions, but checking trends over a short 
time cannot provide valuable inference. Moreover, it may not be the changes in inequality, but 
the general inequality level that affects the ability to battle inflation successfully. In highly 
unequal societies, inflation may be seen as a mechanism to temporarily relieve social tensions. 
Concerns about inequality may push for public spending on redistributive social programs, 
which may increase budget deficits, and thus, cause creation of more money and inflation. As 
mentioned earlier, income inequality may also create political tensions which delay price 
stabilization.  
The last decades provide us more detailed data on inequality in Latin America. As can be 
seen in Table 54, poor households in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico receive much less than the 
rich ones. The ratio of average income per capita of the richest 20 percent of the population to 
the average income per capita of the poorest 20 percent of the population is 13.5 in 1990 for 
Argentina, 35.0 in 1990 for Brazil, and 16.9 in 1989 for Mexico. The same ratio is 21.8 in 2002 
for Argentina, 36.9 in 2001 for Brazil, and 15.5 in 2002 for Mexico. Therefore, during the era of 
1990s, the relative income of the poor fell in Argentina and Brazil, but improved in Mexico.  
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Brazil has the most skewed distribution of income among the three Latin American 
countries. Therefore, we would expect Brazil to have less ability to decrease inflation. Indeed, of 
all Latin American cases, Brazil was the last one to resolve its inflation problem, in mid-1990s. 
Therefore, the Latin American cases seem to support the thesis that inequality makes it harder to 
decrease inflation. Yet, it looks as though once inflation is really under control, it does not rise 
again even if inequality increases. 
Turkey also suffers from high inequality, though not to the extent of Brazil and Mexico. 
Inequality in Turkey was significantly high in 1960s, but as the worker unions became stronger 
in 1970s, there were some real improvements in the distribution of income. However, the series 
of neo-liberal economic policies launched beginning in 1980 have created new distributive 
tensions. This may be explained by the marginalization of labor and the increasing retreat of the 
state from the economy (Boratav 1990). Income distribution in Turkey has been affected by 
direct state intervention through subsides, currency depreciation, and wage suppression (Yeldan 
2004). Income inequality has decreased in 2002, mainly after the 2001 financial crisis which led 
to the successful disinflationary program.79 However, the drop in inequality was not due to 
policies targeting inequality. It was because the 2001 financial crisis hit the rich segments of the 
society harder than the poor ones (Hürriyetim 2002; Sabah 2005). 
Historically, Israel has relatively low income inequality. Since the mid-1970s, income 
inequality in Israel has been increasing (Dahan 2002). During high inflation years (1979-1985), 
Israel’s inequality rose significantly (Achdut and Bigman 1991). Inequality decreased around 
1985, but increased again in the following years (Achdut 1997). Achdut (1996) argues that the 
                                                 
79 Gini coefficient in Turkey was 44 in 2002 and 42 in 2003, compared to 48.4 in 1992. The income share of the 
poorest 20% of the population was 9.3% in 2002 and 8.8% in 2003, compared to 8.5% in 1994. (Web page of 
Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/SONIST/GELIR/gelir.html) 
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main causes of these changes were rising unemployment, high minimum wage level, and direct 
taxes. He also admits that high inflation raised inequality, but he associates the later rise in 
inequality with massive immigration of 1989 and the early 1990s, and the consequent rise in 
unemployment.  
What differentiates Israel from other cases is the extent and effectiveness of government 
redistributive policies. Although earnings inequality is high in Israel, government intervention 
through income transfers, taxes, and minimum wage policies serves as an equalizing factor 
(Dahan 2002). That is why Israel has a low inequality, comparable to major European countries. 
When comparing Israel with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, it should not be forgotten 
that Israel is likely to able to maintain such extensive redistributive policies because it is a 
relatively high-income country.  
In conclusion, we recognize that the country with the least inequality, Israel, solved its 
inflation problem earlier than the other cases, as expected. As some theories would suggest, low 
inequality in Israel may have allowed the social groups to easily reach a consensus and undertake 
the necessary long-term economic policies that eliminated inflation. In Latin America, the 
conclusion is similar. Brazil, the country with the worst inequality, was the last country in Latin 
America to end its inflation. This may be due to its high distributive tensions. Yet, Turkey does 
not confirm our thesis, nor does Mexico. Although Turkey has a lower rate of inequality than 
Mexico and Brazil, Turkey was the least able country to take inflation under control and as a 
result struggled with inflation until the 2000s. Mexico decreased inflation earlier than Argentina 
or Turkey, although it has higher inequality.  
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8.3 POVERTY 
Income inequality and poverty are separate topics, but they are related to each other. A very 
important effect of inequality in developing countries is high rates of poverty, because in very 
unequal societies with scarce resources very few people possess a high share of national income 
and the majority of the population is very poor. Therefore, typically the number of people who 
live in poverty is especially high in unequal societies of the Third World.80 This situation may 
affect socio-political stability in the same way that income inequality affects socio-political 
stability.  
One way to measure poverty is to look at income per capita. According to the World 
Bank’s classification Brazil and Turkey are considered lower-middle income countries, 
Argentina and Mexico higher-middle income countries, and Israel a high income country. It can 
also be seen in Table 55 that Israel has the highest GDP per capita, followed by Argentina. Our 
expectation is that the wealthier countries would be more able to decrease inflation. As a matter 
of fact, Israel was the first among our cases to end its inflation problem. Brazil and Turkey, the 
poorest countries, had most difficulty in controlling inflation. Therefore, by just looking at these 
five cases, we can argue that poorer countries have less ability to decrease inflation.  
 
 
                                                 
80 Poverty may also be substantial in industrialized countries where there is high income inequality. For instance, the 
US has more poor people than its egalitarian counterparts in Europe because of its higher inequality (Przeworski, 
Cheibub et al. 2000). 
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Table 55: GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina 7,310 7,051 7,426 6,987 7,588 7,785 7,232 6,770 6,926 
Brazil 3,466 3,716 3,796 3,827 3,991 4,257 3,980 3,917 3,704 
Israel 11,015 10,913 10,671 10,952 11,345 11,837 12,201 12,191 12,391 
Mexico 2,667 2,706 2,721 2,886 3,086 3,288 3,493 3,393 3,180 
Turkey 1,934 2,090 2,117 2,106 2,050 1,956 2,003 2,023 2,072 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina 6,973 6,347 6,746 6,841 6,572 5,996 5,776 6,422 7,094 
Brazil 3,819 4,041 4,280 4,353 4,270 4,334 4,079 4,066 3,983 
Israel 12,341 12,543 12,942 13,650 13,698 13,584 14,071 14,269 14,560 
Mexico 3,225 3,241 3,056 3,052 3,030 3,097 3,193 3,266 3,323 
Turkey 2,156 2,194 2,295 2,459 2,457 2,410 2,575 2,548 2,649 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average 
Argentina 7,414 7,742 7,422 7,731 8,447 8,686 8,313 8,174 7,222 
Brazil 4,116 4,296 4,415 4,473 4,561 4,507 4,486 4,626 4,129 
Israel 14,966 15,594 16,249 16,668 16,743 16,899 16,910 17,710 13,727 
Mexico 3,327 3,412 3,146 3,257 3,427 3,545 3,627 3,810 3,210 
Turkey 2,808 2,606 2,743 2,882 3,043 3,082 2,887 3,048 2,430 
Source: Word Development Indicators, World Bank (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/) 
 
 
However, if our focus is not the average level of income, but the amount of poor people 
that live in a country, GDP per capita is not a good indicator to use. Income per capita does not 
give any idea about how many people in these countries actually live in poverty.  
A better indicator for measuring poverty is the percentage of population living below the 
“poverty line,” which is defined as the level of income below which one cannot afford to 
purchase all the resources one requires to subsist. Table 56 shows the percentage of people who 
live with less than a dollar per day in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey and Table 57 
presents the related poverty gap. If we look at the average percentages of people who live on less 
than one dollar per day between 1975 and 2000, we can see that Brazil and Mexico have 
significantly more poverty than Argentina or Turkey. Brazil and Mexico also have quite high 
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poverty gap, which indicates that poverty in those countries is deep and has high incidence. 
Israel, as a high-income country, does not even produce poverty data, but we can assume that it 
has least poverty.  
Table 56: Living on less than $1 a day (PPP) (% of people)* † 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Brazil .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.8 .. .. 
Mexico .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Turkey .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina .. .. 0.29 .. .. .. .. .. 0.09 
Brazil 15.21 15.75 .. 11.9 .. 9 14.04 .. .. 
Mexico 13.95 .. .. .. .. 8.32 .. .. 15.77 
Turkey .. .. .. 1.49 .. .. .. .. .. 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 
Argentina .. .. .. 1.14 .. 7.69 .. ..     2.30 
Brazil 14.35 .. 10.53 6.86 8.96 9.94 .. ..   11.67 
Mexico .. .. 8.39 6.46 .. 7.98 ..     9.85  10.10 
Turkey .. 2.35 .. .. .. .. ..     0.87     1.57 
 
Source: “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/) 
 (*) Poverty data for Israel is not available as it is considered as a high income country. 
(†)  The symbol “..” denotes that data are not available. 
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Table 57: Poverty gap at $1 a day (% of people)* 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Brazil .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.97 .. .. 
Mexico .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Turkey .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
          
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Argentina .. .. 0.17 .. .. .. .. .. 0.01 
Brazil 4.09 4.64 .. 3.36 .. 2.01 4.27 .. .. 
Mexico 3.38 .. .. .. .. 2.54 .. .. 4.13 
Turkey .. .. .. 0.36 .. .. .. .. .. 
          
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 
Argentina .. .. .. 0.18 .. 3.61 .. ..     0.99 
Brazil 4.58 .. 3.88 1.37 2.09 3.15 .. ..    3.31 
Mexico .. .. 2.39 1.51 .. 2.07 ..     3.71   2.82 
Turkey .. 0.55 .. .. .. .. ..     0.21     0.37 
 
Source: “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/) 
 (*) Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line, which is set as $1 per day (counting the non-poor as having zero 
shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. 
 
 
 
Table 58: Poverty rates in Latin American countries (percentages) 
                            
                       Households 
below the 
poverty line 
Households 
below the 
indigence line 
† 
 
Inflation 
rate 
Argentina    
1980 9 2 100.76 
1986 13 4 90.10 
1990 21(*) 5(*) 2,313.97 
1992 10(*) 1(*) 24.90 
1994 13(*) 3(*) 4.18 
1997 18(*) 5(*) 0.53 
1999 20(*) 5(*) -1.17 
2002 42(*) 9(*) 25.87 
 
 235
Table 58 (Continued from previous page) 
                       Households 
below the 
poverty line 
Households 
below the 
indigence line 
† 
 
Inflation 
rate 
Brazil    
1979 39 17 .. 
1987 40 18 228.34 
1990 48 23 2,947.73 
1993 45 20 1,927.98 
1996 36 14 15.76 
1999 38 13 4.86 
2001 38 13 6.84 
Mexico    
1977 32 10 29.00 
1984 34 11 65.54 
1989 48 19 20.01 
1994 45 17 6.97 
1996 52 21 34.38 
1998 47 19 15.93 
2000 41 15 9.50 
2002 39 13 5.03 
                                                  
Source: Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America, 
United Nations, Santiago, Chile, : 1991, 1992, 1994, 2002-2003. 
† According to ECLAC’s definition, the indigence line (or extreme poverty) represents a level of household income 
that can not adequately cover the nutritional needs of all its members. 
(*) metropolitan area 
 
If we look to Table 56, Table 57, and Table 58 we notice that Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico have higher poverty than Turkey, although Turkey is the poorest in terms of income per 
capita. Having greater poverty with higher average income can be explained by one factor: 
inequality. Thus, poverty in Latin America is not an issue of the lack of resources. As Székely 
(2000) argues in Latin America poverty is a problem of income distribution.  
Latin America stands out not only for the small share of national income that goes to 
groups in the low-income ranges, but also in the extent to which the top 20% of income 
groups claim an unusually high share of the national income, in the area of 50-55%. Once 
again, this percentage is well above that claimed by their upper-income counterparts in 
other parts of the world, both developed and underdeveloped. (Ramos 1996, p. 144) 
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 Like inequality, poverty in Latin America decreased in the 1970s, increased in the 1980s, 
and did not decrease much during the 1990s despite economic recovery (see Table 58). In the 
early 1980s, as per capita incomes fell, most Latin American countries experienced sharp 
increases in absolute poverty. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico recovered partially through 
stabilization, but these countries suffered recessions with further increases in inequality and 
absolute poverty (Helwege 1995; Altimir 1996; Rosenthal 1996; Székely 2000). Inflation, 
stagnation, and cuts in social spending unfavorably affected the poor (Lustig 1995; Morley 1995; 
Edwards 1995; Ramos 1996; Rosenthal 1996). In short, the crisis of the 1980s both increased the 
historically high rates of poverty and decreased per capita income.  
The poverty situation in Latin America improved slightly in 1990s. The number of those 
living in poverty began to decline due to increasing economic growth, especially in Argentina 
and Mexico. Although price stability was seen as a necessary condition for eliminating poverty 
and inequality, the problem of poverty persisted even after stabilization. This was because 
economic output, productivity, and employment did not improve sufficiently (Mamalakis 1996; 
Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000). Thus, poverty rates in the 1990s remained higher than in 1980 
(Helwege 1995). By the 1990s, almost 40 percent of the families in Latin America lived below 
the poverty line (Ramos 1996). Therefore, elimination of inflation did not decrease poverty in 
Latin America.  
Where poverty is a distributive problem, few people are likely to be very rich and a mass 
of people are not going to meet even their basic needs. That situation is typical of an 
environment where distributional conflicts are high. Such social settings may generate powerful 
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political pressures and the potential for major political conflicts. In these circumstances, inflation 
may emerge and/or continue as a major economic problem. Therefore, by looking at poverty 
rates, we would expect Brazil and Mexico to have more difficulty than Israel, Turkey and 
Argentina in controlling inflation. In fact, Brazil struggled with inflation until 1994. However, 
Mexico was able to decrease inflation in 1987, much earlier than Argentina, Brazil, or Turkey. 
For Turkey, which has the lower poverty rate after Israel, it took much longer to control 
inflation. Therefore, the effect of poverty on inflation is not clear.  
By analyzing Table 58, we can compare trends in poverty with trends in inflation. When 
we look at data on Argentina, we see that poverty was very high when inflation increased to four 
digit levels in the early 1990s. We then see an improvement in poverty as the Argentine 
government overcame the inflation problem. Although inflation continued to be low in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, Argentine poverty rose again significantly. Brazil also had its peak 
percentage of people living in poverty when inflation was at four digit levels. Although for 
Argentina and Brazil poverty and inflation appear to be correlated, it is not possible to conclude 
that poverty increases inflation. Most probably the causality is the reverse: hyperinflation creates 
more poverty. The same relation cannot be conformed for inflation which is not at hyper level. 
For instance, for Mexico it is hard to find any correlation between poverty and inflation. Mexico 
had its peak poverty level in the late 1980s and 1990s, when inflation was not very high.  
8.4 CONCLUSION 
The relationship between inequality and inflation has important implications for policymaking. If 
we had confirmed that unequal societies have more difficulty in stabilizing prices, we could have 
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concluded that economic policymakers should be very concerned about high income inequality if 
they want to decrease inflation in their societies. However, data from the five cases do not 
suggest a clear relation. We can argue that inequality increases political pressures for inflation, as 
most Latin American countries and Turkey have demonstrated. However, especially the fact that 
the more unequal Mexico decreased inflation earlier than Argentina and much earlier than 
Turkey contradicts that argument. Therefore, it can be suggested that although inequality may 
increase demand for inflation, political mechanisms allow states to resist the temptation to use an 
inflation tax to satisfy social demands.  
It is even harder to confirm a relation between poverty and inflation. From five cases, it 
looks like high income level helps tackling persistent inflation in a timelier manner. The richest 
case Israel ended persistent inflation first among our cases, while the poorest cases Turkey and 
Brazil struggled longer time with inflation. If we look into poverty levels, Israel, our case with 
also the least poverty, was able to decrease inflation faster than the others. However, Brazil and 
Mexico, the countries with the highest poverty levels among our cases, have followed a very 
different course when it comes to inflation. Mexico was quick to control inflation, whereas 
Brazil was slow. Turkey, which has a lower poverty rate than both Brazil and Mexico, fought a 
longer battle with high inflation. Therefore, we cannot make firm conclusions on the relation 
between poverty and inflation.  
It would be interesting to see whether stabilization policies that worsen income equality 
will, in the future, create inflationary pressures. If that is the case, policymakers should pay 
attention to distributive consequences of their disinflationary programs in order to pursue 
sustainable economic policies. However, if they are able to build and consolidate the political 
institutions that can resist inflationary pressures, policymakers probably can still perform and 
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maintain stabilization without an improvement in inequality or poverty. This can be observed 
today in Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico. That takes us back to political institutions and political 
structures as more important determinants of the ability to pursue disinflationary policies.  
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9.0   A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF INFLATION 
As stated in the first chapter of this study, the goal of this study is to examine why some 
countries have more difficulty in controlling inflation than others and end up with extended years 
of high inflation. In the previous chapters this question was studied through case studies. Here all 
the hypotheses will be reanalyzed on a larger sample through statistical methods. This would 
check the validity of the case study findings on a larger sample of countries and provide us more 
generalizable findings than the case studies offer. The cross-national analyses conducted in this 
chapter confirm only some of the conclusions arrived at in the case studies. The general 
conclusion is that politics at least partly explains why some countries have more difficulty in 
eliminating persistent inflation.  
For a long while scholars have focused on just the economic roots of inflation. However, 
the analyses of this chapter reveal that the political attributes of a country, especially the aid 
received from international financial institutions, security costs, and fractionalization of political 
opposition have a statistically significant effect on price stabilization. This research looks into 
the effect of different levels of inflation and suggests that regional and bilateral aid received, 
level of democracy, political system, regime instability, political stability, opposition power, and 
the electoral system may also affect price stabilization, depending on the level of inflation. On 
the other hand, international aid received, government fractionalization, level of income of a 
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country, and income inequality in the country present no significant relation to the persistence of 
inflation.  
The larger sample chosen here was composed of 148 states, which then dropped to 45 
observations given lack of data (see Table 59 for the list of states). The majority of these states 
are middle income countries (26) and the rest are low income countries (19). Therefore, 
advanced countries are not included in the analysis. The focus is on the period between 1975 and 
2000. This period has witnessed the most extensive inflationary problems in the world. This 
period is chosen also because of data availability. Most political databases, including the ones 
used here, include data from the 1970s on. 
Table 59: The sample of countries used in the statistical analyses 
Low-income 
economies 
Lower-middle-
income economies 
Upper-middle-income 
economies 
High-income 
economies 
Bangladesh 
Burkina Faso 
Central African 
Republic  
Cote d'Ivoire 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea 
India 
Kenya 
Mauritania 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Bolivia 
Colombia  
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Lesotho 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
 
Botswana 
Chile 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Malaysia 
Mexico  
Panama 
Poland 
Romania 
South Africa 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
 
- 
* These classifications are taken from World Bank’s grouping of the countries 
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 This study is focused on persistent inflation, i.e. the governments’ inability to bring down 
a persistently high level of inflation to a low level. For analytical purposes, in this chapter the 
dependent variable is specified as the number of inflationary years that the countries had between 
1975 and 2000. The dependent variable, number of inflationary years, is the total number of 
years in which a country has had inflation equal to or above the specified level—20 percent, 50 
percent, or 100 percent. Therefore, the maximum number of inflationary years a country can 
have is 26 and the minimum is zero. The primary reason why the number of inflationary years 
was chosen as the dependent variable, as opposed to average inflation rate, is that I want to 
measure the ability of governments to decrease inflation. Also, an average rate of inflation can be 
very misleading, because there are many countries that have had hyperinflation for a few years 
but then were able to decrease inflation rapidly to single digit levels (mainly transition countries 
such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Poland, and Ukraine). 
Taking the average inflation rate for these countries would give a distorted picture of the ability 
of those governments to resolve their inflation problem. Hence, in this study, a country which 
has had hyper inflation for only 3 years is considered more successful than a country which had a 
moderately high inflation for a more extended period of time.  
In Chapter III economic policies were mentioned as an intermediatery variable that links 
socio-political variables to persistence of inflation. Accordingly socio-political factors shape 
economic policies, which in turn may end or cause persistence of inflation. In the analyses of this 
chapter, this intermediatery variable is overlooked. Inflation can be fully controlled by economic 
policies, i.e. persistence of inflation is totally dependent on the economic policies followed by a 
state. Yet, economic policies are very difficult to measure. In fact the persistence of inflation 
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itself is the best indicator that inflationary economic policies are continuing. Therefore, the 
statistical analyses directly and merely use persistence of inflation as the dependent variable.  
Although in this chapter the focus is on the length of time that countries have struggled 
with high inflation, rather than the actual level of inflation, it still does not disregard the fact that 
different levels of inflation may have different implications. Therefore, three different levels of 
inflation, and thus, three different independent variables were specified. One reason for using 
different definitions of high inflation was the lack of consensus in the literature on what 
represents high inflation. Furthermore, it is important to check whether the results obtained for a 
certain definition or level of inflation are valid also for inflation defined with lower or higher 
percentages. Different socio-political factors might come into the picture as we change the 
critical level of inflation from 20 percent to 50 percent or to 100 percent, and the conclusions 
might also differ accordingly.81  
In previous chapters, several socio-political factors have been discussed and the manner 
in which they may affect the ability of states to decrease inflation was explained. These factors 
were grouped under the categories of Security and International Political Issues, Political 
Regime, Political System, Electoral and Party System, and Inequality and Poverty. In this 
chapter the variables are grouped under the same categories and they are taken from World 
Development Indicators Database, Database of Political Institutions, and Polity IV Database.82 
The list of the variables and their can be seen in the Appendix-V. 
                                                 
81 As a matter of fact, the results of the statistical analyses of this chapter indicate that only three of the variables 
(funds from the IMF and World Bank, high military expenses, and opposition fractionalization) have a significant 
relation to persistence of inflation for all definitions of high inflation. The rest of the variables are significant only 
for certain definition of high inflation. 
82 Some of the variables that are shown under socio-political categories can also be considered economic variables. 
However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, these variables have direct connection to some socio-political factors, 
especially international and security related ones. Thus, they were kept under socio-political categories as indicators 
of socio-political factors.  
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The biggest challenge in conducting a cross-national analysis, especially if it is related to 
political phenomena and if we are investigating a long time period, is lack of complete data. This 
problem has also made it impossible for me to undertake meaningful panel (times series) 
analyses and encouraged me to employ cross-sectional data analysis. One way to convert panel 
data into cross-sectional data is to use averages or totals. Among the states that are included in 
the databases used, very few of them have complete data on all variables. Thus, I averaged most 
data for each country over the period between 1975 and 2000, so that the number of observations 
is maximized. For instance, the data on income inequality required averaging data over time 
because annual time series data on income inequality do not exist. Typically inequality data are 
collected only every four or five years. Averaged data was also preferred because the focus of 
the study is structures rather than short term changes, as the purpose is to look into general 
characteristics of states. Also, this study tries to explain sustained inflation rather than temporary 
fluctuations in inflation. Similarly, I took totals for some variables (e.g., variables that measure 
regime changes and number of elections) in order to maximize the number of observations.  
Despite averaging and totaling, the number of observations dropped to 45 (out of a 
sample of 148) because of lack data. As the number of political variables is 55, obviously it was 
impossible to get meaningful results from regression analyses. In order to do meaningful 
regression analyses with 45 observations, the number of variables should be no more than 15. 
Many of the 55 variables measure similar political factors. That was the main reason why factor 
analysis was employed. By extracting factor scores, it was possible to decrease the number of 
variables from 55 to 14. 
Next, negative binomial regression analyses were run with the 14 factor scores extracted. 
Instead of regular regression analysis, negative binomial regression analysis was chosen because 
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of the nature of the dependent variable. The independent variable is considered count data, 
because it is composed of total number of inflationary years for each observation. Also, a robust 
version of the regression analysis was used in order to take care of the heteroskedasticity 
problem. Finally, some simple causality tests were employed in order to make sure that the 
direction of the relation between the dependent and independent variables is the way it was 
hypothesized.  
9.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS 
The first statistical analysis employed in this study is factor analysis, which is used to reduce the 
number of variables and control multicollinearity. Factor analysis lets us simplify models by 
combining many correlated variables into a smaller number of “factors” based on some common 
dimensions (Hamilton 2003).Considering that there were 55 variables at hand, factor analysis 
was helpful for producing fewer variables by creating factor scores, which then were used in 
negative binomial regression analyses.  
Another advantage of employing factor analysis is to solve the problem of 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is an important problem, because the inclusion of highly 
correlated variables in a regression analysis can result in misleading individual P-values and very 
wide confidence intervals on the regression coefficients. This makes it hard to determine the 
significance of the effect of different variables on the dependent variable.  
Among the 55 variables, clearly some of the variables measure similar socio-political 
characteristics. For instance, under the political regime category, there were several variables 
that measure the “level of democracy and political competition” (number of legislative elections, 
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number of executive elections, legislative index of electoral competitiveness, executive index of 
electoral competitiveness, revised combined polity score, competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and competitiveness of participation) and some others that measure “regime 
stability” (variance of polity score, average percentage change in polity score, regime durability, 
and regime transition completed), which were all discussed in Chapter 5. A factor analysis would 
reveal that the variables, in total, represent a smaller number of underlying factors. Factor 
analysis also helps to extract factor scores, which could later be used in the regression analysis as 
independent variables.  
A specific type of factor analysis, principal component analysis, was run within each of 
the six categories of variables to find out the main underlying factors, and then, to extract factor 
scores that represent those categories of variables. Principal component analysis was preferred 
because it is a more appropriate method if the goal is to develop a reduced set of factor scores 
(principal components) to be used in other analyses (Hair, Anderson et al. 1994).  
As can be recalled, all variables were grouped under five categories: International 
Politics and Security Issues, Political Regime, Political System, Electoral and Party System, and 
Inequality and Poverty. Factor analyses were run within these categories and Kaiser’s criterion 
was used to decide which factors to retain. Therefore, only the factors that have an Eigenvalue 
greater than 1.0 were kept.83  
After running the factor analyses, all results were also rotated. The goal of rotation is to 
obtain a clear pattern of loadings, where some factors have visibly high loadings for some 
                                                 
83 “An Eigenvalue is the sum of the squared correlations between a factor variate and the p original variables. Thus, 
a factor’s eigenvalue reflects the overall strength of relationship between that factor and the original variables. In 
practice, only factors with eigenvalues of 1.0 or greater are considered to be stable. Hence, the number of factors 
with eigenvalues of 1.0 or greater represents the maximum number of factors that can be considered stable. 
Therefore, in a factor analysis with many variables, many unimportant factors will be associated with eigenvalues as 
large as 1.0” (Diekhoff 1992, p.337). As a matter of fact, in STATA principal component type of factor analysis 
automatically retains only the factors that have eigenvalue greater than 1.  
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variables and low loadings for others (Hair, Anderson et al. 1994). Therefore, with rotation it is 
easier to understand which dimensions each factor represents. In this study Varimax rotation was 
used, as it is the most common rotation strategy and one that presents clearer loadings. (All these 
analyses can be found in Appendix-VI.) 
Then, factor scores were extracted and named according to the dimensions they represent. 
As a result of this process, 14 new variables (factor scores/principal components) were obtained 
to be later used in the regression analyses (see Table 60). Once the factor scores were obtained, 
the other variables could be eliminated from the model as scores already represent the underlying 
common dimensions among those variables. 
Table 60: The list of principal components/factor scores that remained after factor analyses 
Category Factor score name 
 
Dimension represented 
fimfwb  financial flows from the IMF and World 
Bank 
faidpercent aid as percentage of national income 
flowregbilaid low financial flows from regional and 
bilateral aid 
INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 
fhghmilexp high military expenditure 
fdemocracy   level of democracy POLITICAL 
REGIME fregiminstbl regime instability (change in regime, e.g. 
from democracy to authoritarianism or 
vice versa) 
fparliament characteristics of parliamentary system  
fpolstabil political stability (stability of or change in 
governments) 
POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 
fopppowr power of the opposition 
fgovfrac fractionalization among government 
parties 
foppfrac fractionalization among opposition parties 
ELECTORAL and 
PARTY SYSTEM 
fproportnl characteristics of proportional 
representation electoral system  
flowincome  low income (per capita) level  INEQUALITY and 
POVERTY finequality  income inequality 
 248
9.2 REGRESSION ANALYSES 
After getting the factor analysis results, the next step was to conduct regression analysis in order 
to explain the differences in the ability to decrease inflation (measured in terms of number of 
inflationary years). In this analysis negative binomial regression analysis was used because the 
dependent variable is composed of count data. Also, three equations were formed with different 
dependent variables depending on the definition of high inflation and a regression analysis was 
run for each equation. (See the equations at Table 61.) 
Table 61: Model equations 
 
inflyrs20  =  a + b1 fimfwb + b2 faidpercnt + b3 flowregbilaid + b4  
(no. of years with fhghmilexp + b5 fdemocracy + b6 fregiminstbl + b7 
 inflation => 20%)  fparliament + b8 fpolstabil + b9 fopppowr + b10 fgovfrac + b11 foppfrac 
+ b12 fproportnl + b13 flowincome + b14 finequality + u 
 
inflyrs50  =  a + b1 fimfwb + b2 faidpercnt + b3 flowregbilaid + b4 fhghmilexp (no. of 
years with  + b5 fdemocracy + b6 fregiminstbl + b7 fparliament + b8  
inflation => 50%)  fpolstabil + b9 fopppowr + b10 fgovfrac + b11 foppfrac + b12 fproportnl + 
b13 flowincome + b14 finequality + u 
 
inflyrs100  =  a + b1 fimfwb + b2 faidpercnt + b3 flowregbilaid + b4 fhghmilexp (no. of 
years with  + b5 fdemocracy + b6 fregiminstbl + b7 fparliament + b8 
 inflation => 100%)  fpolstabil + b9 fopppowr + b10 fgovfrac + b11 foppfrac + b12 fproportnl + 
b13 flowincome + b14 finequality + u 
 
 
One problem with running a regular regression analysis with the existing variables would 
be that one of the assumptions of unbiased best estimator was not met. As can be observed in 
Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13, the dependent variable (number of inflationary years) does 
not have a normal distribution, because most of the 148 countries initially taken from the 
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databases have zero or only a small number of inflationary years and very few have high number 
of inflationary years. Thus, the regular regression analysis would not give reliable results. 
As dependent variable, number of inflationary years between 1975 and 2000 are counted 
for each observation. Looking at the highly skewed distribution of the variable and the high 
number of observations with zero value (see Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, Table 62, Figure 
14, Figure 15, and Figure 16), the dependent variable is a typical count data. Count data can be 
analyzed by employing Poisson regression model (Greene 1997). Poisson regression is used to 
model the number of incidences of an event under investigation or the rate of incidence of that 
event, as a function of independent variables. Here the event under investigation is the number of 
occurrences of inflationary years.  
 
Figure 11: The distribution of dependent variable (inflationary years>=20%) for 148 states 
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Figure 12: The distribution of dependent variable (inflationary years>=50%) for 148 states 
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Figure 13: The distribution of dependent variable (inflationary years>=100%) for 148 
states 
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 Table 62: The distribution of dependent variable for the sample of 45 states 
Number of years inflation >=20 inflation>=50 inflation>=100 
equal to 0 11 28 31 
between 0 and 9 29 41 45 
between 10 and 19 12 4 0 
between 20 and 26 4 0 0 
 
 
 
Figure 14: The distribution of dependent variable (inflationary years>=20%) for 45 states 
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 Figure 15: The distribution of dependent variable (inflationary years>=50%) for 45 states 
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Figure 16: The distribution of dependent variable (inflationary years>=100%) for 45 states 
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The disadvantage of the Poisson model is that it has strict assumptions. For instance, 
mean and variance of the dependent variable are assumed to be equal. If mean and variance are 
significantly different from each other, then it is better to use one of the extensions of the Poisson 
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distribution, such as negative binomial distribution. If the variance of the model is significantly 
higher than the mean, that is a sign of data overdispersion. On the contrary, if the variance of the 
model is significantly lower than the mean, the data are underdispersed. When there is 
overdispersion or underdispersion, a Poisson model is not a good fit for that data. In that case, 
the negative binomial distribution is usually used as a robust alternative to the Poisson 
distribution (Barron 1992; Gardner, Mulvey et al. 1995). 
In order to find out whether the data are fit for Poisson model, the differences between 
the mean and variance values of the dependent variables were checked (see Appendix-VII for 
details of the analysis). As can be seen in Table 63, neither of the dependent variables has equal 
or even close mean and variance. That indicates that Poisson model is not a good fit for the data. 
Thus, a negative binomial model would probably fit better to the data, but the data also had to be 
checked for overdispersion. 
Table 63: Summary of dependent variables 
 Inflationary 
years (=>20%) 
 
Inflationary 
years (=>50%) 
Inflationary 
years (=>100%) 
Mean  5.6 2.2 1.0 
Variance 44.7 17.8 7.2 
 
 
In order to test for overdispersion, Poisson regression analyses and their goodness of fit 
tests were utilized. In Table 64, it can be again seen that Poisson model is not a good fit for the 
data. We can conclude that the dependent variables are composed of count data with 
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overdispersed distribution, because chi-square values for all three equations are large numbers.84 
Therefore, Poisson analysis would not be an appropriate tool, so instead negative binomial 
regression analysis was employed. (See Appendix-VIII for details.) 
Table 64: Results of goodness of fit tests 
 
No. of inflationary years (=>20%)          
           Goodness-of-fit chi2  =  198.7078 
           Prob > chi2(30)       =    0.0000         
 
No. of inflationary years (=>50%)  
           Goodness-of-fit chi2  =  142.1027 
           Prob > chi2(30)       =    0.0000 
 
 
No. of inflationary years (=>100%)  
           Goodness-of-fit chi2  =   96.9120 
           Prob > chi2(30)       =    0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Another problem to take care of is heteroskedasticity. With count data dependent variable 
we cannot assume that there is homoskedasticity. With a heteroskedasticity problem, equation 
coefficients remain unbiased. However, they are no longer the best estimators and their variances 
are biased and confidence levels are not valid (Wooldridge 2002; Stock and Watson 2003). In 
order to eliminate this problem, robust negative binomial regression analyses were run with the 
same variables. As can be seen in the Appendix, each regression equation was run three times, 
testing for different levels of high inflation: high inflation defined as 20 percent and higher, high 
                                                 
84 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/stata/library/count.htm  
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inflation defined as 50 percent and higher, and high inflation defined as 100 percent and higher. 
The coefficients extracted from the robust regression analyses are listed in Table 65.85 
Table 65: Equations with coefficients 
 
inflyrs20 = 1.75 + 1.46 fimfwb + -0.25 faidpercnt + 0.32 flowregbilaid + 1.25 fhghmilexp + -
0.18 fdemocracy + 0.47 fregiminstbl + -1.42 fparliament + 0.38 fpolstabil + 0.41 
fopppowr + 0.22 fgovfrac + 0.52 foppfrac + 0.48 fproportnl + 0.13 flowincome + -
0.17 finequality + u 
 
inflyrs50 = 2.00 + 6.19 fimfwb + 0.78 faidpercnt + 1.12 flowregbilaid + 1.52 fhghmilexp + -2.34 
fdemocracy + 0.72 fregiminstbl + -0.45 fparliament + -0.87 fpolstabil + 1.26 
fopppowr + 0.23 fgovfrac + 1.26 foppfrac + 0.75 fproportnl + -1.30 flowincome + -
0.62 finequality + u 
 
inflyrs100 = 0.46 + 5.11 fimfwb + 0.82 faidpercnt + 0.56 flowregbilaid + 1.21 fhghmilexp + -2.75 
fdemocracy + 1.60 fregiminstbl + -0.50 fparliament +    -0.34 fpolstabil + 0.31 
fopppowr + 0.45 fgovfrac + 0.96 foppfrac + 0.49 fproportnl + -1.65 flowincome + -
0.64 finequality + u 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, since factor scores were used for the regression analysis, it would not make 
sense to interpret coefficients of the variables in the equations. Therefore, instead of using 
regression coefficients in the results, incidence rate ratios (IRRs) were extracted and interpreted. 
IRRs provide estimates of exponential value of coefficients rather than the coefficients 
themselves. From the IRRs, it is easy to see by what factor each point increase in each variable 
decreases or increases the expected number of inflationary years, or equally, what percent each 
                                                 
85 Only the variables that are significant are shown in bold. The rest of the variables in the equations are 
insignificant.  
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point increase in each variable decreases or increases the expected number of inflationary years, 
when the other variables are held constant.  
As can be seen in the Appendix, the first dependent variable is inflyrs20, which is 
number of years with 20 percent or more inflation. The likelihood ratio test under the negative 
binomial regression analysis shows that the dependent variable is overdispersed. When the 
overdispersion parameter (alpha) is equal to zero, then negative binomial distribution is neither 
overdispersed nor underdispersed; it is a Poisson distribution. In our analysis, the parameter is 
significantly over zero (82.86), which corresponds to a very low probability value (0.00). 
Therefore, I conclude that negative binomial model seems to be the better choice for this 
equation.  
The robust results of the negative binomial regression with IRRs indicate that in the 
equation with the total number of years with high as dependent variable, only five variables are 
significantly related to the dependent variable: funds from the IMF and the World Bank, military 
expenses, political system, fractionalization of the opposition, and proportionality of the electoral 
system. As can be seen from the R2 value, those eight variables explain about 10.6 percent of the 
sample variation in total number of years with inflation equal to or higher than 20 percent. 
We can conclude that, with everything else equal, financial flows from the World Bank 
and IMF have a positive relation with number of years with 20 percent inflation or more. 
Military expenses, fractionalization of the opposition, and proportionality of the electoral system 
also have positive relation with inflationary years. A variable that is negatively related to 
inflationary years is parliamentary political system.  
The negative binomial regression analysis of the second dependent variable inflyrs50, 
number of years with 50 percent or more inflation, can be seen in the Appendix. By looking at 
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the likelihood ratio test, we can see that the dependent variable is overdispersed. The 
overdispersion parameter (alpha) is significantly over zero (59.34), which corresponds to a very 
low probability value (0.00). Therefore, we can again conclude that negative binomial model 
seems to be the right choice for this equation.  
The robust regression results for the inflationary years defined as years with 50 percent or 
more inflation are similar to those obtained with dependent variable defined as years with 20 
percent or more inflation. The explanatory power of the model is higher: 13.6 percent. Again the 
funds from the IMF and the World Bank are positively related to the inflationary years, but this 
time the IRR of this variable is much higher, i.e. one unit increase in funds from the IMF and the 
World Bank is associated with much higher incidence of years with 50 percent or more inflation. 
The rest of the variables that have a positive relation with inflationary years at 50 percent and 
above levels are: low regional and bilateral aid, military expenditure, power of the opposition, 
fractionalization of the opposition, and proportionality of the electoral system. On the other hand, 
level of democracy and political stability are negatively related to the years with 50 percent or 
more inflation.  
The negative binomial regression analysis of the third dependent variable inflyrs100, 
number of years with 100 percent or more inflation, can be seen in the Appendix. By looking at 
the likelihood ratio test, we can see that again the dependent variable is overdispersed, because 
the overdispersion parameter (alpha) is 35.74, significantly over zero and the probability value is 
zero. Therefore, I conclude that negative binomial model is again better choice for the equation.  
When I use the number of years with 100 percent or more inflation as dependent variable, 
only four variables come out as significant, as opposed to eight variables when I use the number 
of years with 50 percent or more inflation as dependent variable. The explanatory power of the 
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model is 13.4 percent. Again the funds from the IMF and the World Bank are positively related 
to the inflationary years and again they have high IRR. Also, regime instability and 
fractionalization of the opposition still have a positive relation with inflationary years at 100 
percent and above. On the other hand, democracy has a very strong negative relation with 
inflationary years.   
9.3 COMPARING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF HIGH INFLATION 
The results of robust regression analyses are summarized in Table 66. These results demonstrate 
that, if we define high inflation differently, although the results are somewhat similar, different 
variables become important factors on inflationary years and with different levels of impact. 
Then, next step is to understand whether these political variables are more or less important at 
different levels of inflation. 
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Table 66: IRRs of variables obtained from negative binomial regression analyses* 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent  
variables 
 
inflyrs20 
 
inflyrs50 
 
inflyrs100 
funds from the IMF and 
World Bank *** 4.31 487.66 166.17 
aid as percentage of 
national income 0.78 2.19 2.26 
low funds from regional 
and bilateral aid * 1.38 3.07 1.75  
high military expenditure 
** 3.49 4.58 3.34 
level of democracy ** 0.84 0.10 0.06 
regime instability * 1.60 2.06 4.97 
parliamentary system * 0.24 0.64 0.61 
political stability * 1.46 0.42 0.71 
power of the opposition * 1.50 3.53 1.36 
fractionalization of 
government parties 1.25 1.26 1.56 
fractionalization of 
opposition parties *** 1.68 2.80 2.61 
proportional 
representation electoral 
system ** 
1.62 2.12 1.64 
low income (per capita) 
level 1.13 0.27 0.19 
income inequality 0.84 0.54 0.53 
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.136 0.134 
NOTE: Only the variables in bold are statistically significant. And each (*) signifies how many times a variable 
came out as significant.  
(*) Unlike coefficients, incidence rate ratios (IRRs) never take a negative value. However, values under 1.0 indicate 
a negative relationship between the dependent and independent variables. As IRR values between 0 and 1.0 get 
closer to 0, there is a bigger decrease in the dependent variable for each incidence of the independent variable when 
the other variables are held constant. For IRR values over 1.0, the increase in the dependent variable is bigger as 
IRR is higher.   
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 Comparing equations with high inflation defined as 20 percent and above, 50 percent and 
above, and 100 percent and above, we observe that the explanatory power of the statistical model 
is lowest when I define high inflation as 20 percent and over. More political variables are 
significantly related to inflationary years when inflation is defined as 50 percent or over. The 
explanatory power of the model is the same when inflation is defined as 50 percent and over and 
when inflation is defined as 100 percent and over, although there are fewer significant variables 
when the dependent variable is defined as inflationary years with 100 percent inflation or over. 
Therefore, the statistical model built in this chapter works better for higher levels of inflation.  
If we start with inflationary years defined as years with 100 percent or more inflation, we 
can see that financial funds from the IMF and the World Bank have a very strong relation with 
inflationary years. Their effect is even higher when high inflation is defined as 50 percent or 
over, but it drops when high inflation is defined as 20 percent or over. Fractionalization of the 
opposition is the only other variable which is positively related to inflationary years and 
significant for all definitions of high inflation. Its effect is weaker for high inflation defined 
widely as 20 percent or over. However, theory suggests that a fragmented opposition is weaker 
and, thus, less able to block stabilization programs. Here we see a positive association between 
opposition fractionalization and inflationary years, which was unexpected. 
High military expenses are significantly related to inflationary years with a considerable 
impact when high inflation is defined widely as 20 percent and over or 50 percent and over. It 
becomes a statistically insignificant variable once high inflation is defined narrowly as 100 
percent or over. A positive relation between inflationary years and high military expenses was 
already expected, as explained in chapter 4. It is interesting that this impact becomes 
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insignificant for very high (hyper) levels of inflation. It can be concluded that high military 
expenses can cause high inflation, but they are not cause of hyper inflation.  
The variable that represents democracy is negatively related to inflationary years, i.e. 
more democratic regimes are associated with fewer inflationary years. This variable is 
insignificant only when I define inflationary years as years with 20 percent or more inflation. For 
other definitions of high inflation, we can conclude that democracy has a strong negative impact 
on inflationary years, as suggested by some theories explored in chapter 5.  
Low regional and bilateral aid, political stability, and power of the opposition have a 
positive relation with inflationary years only when I define inflationary years as years with 50 
percent or more inflation. It is consistent with the theory that lack of regional and bilateral aid 
makes states less able to stop inflation. It is also consistent with theory that strong opposition 
(strong in terms of number of seats held) decreases the ability of states to eliminate inflation. 
Regime stability has a positive relation with inflationary years, but only when 
inflationary years are defined as years with 100 percent or more inflation. There is only one 
variable that is significant only if we define inflation years very broadly, as years with 20 percent 
inflation or more: the parliamentary system. As discussed in chapter 6, there are various theories 
that support this negative relationship and many which contradict it. On the other hand, 
proportionality of the electoral system has a positive relation with inflationary years, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis stated in chapter 7. Yet, this relation is not significant when 
inflationary years are defined as years with 100 percent inflation or above. Therefore, in 
countries with persistent hyperinflation, proportionality of the electoral system do not seem to 
have an effect. 
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The rest of the variables (aid relative to size of the economy, fractionalization of the 
government, income level, and inequality) have no significant relation with inflationary years for 
any level of inflation. Aid was expected to have negative and government fractionalization, low 
income level, and inequality were expected to have positive relation with inflationary years. 
However, none of these expectations are confirmed by this analysis, as these variables do not 
show any statistically significant relation with inflationary years. 
9.4 CAUSALITY 
The results of this analysis may help us to understand the political causes of persistence of 
inflation. Although this analysis confirms the relation between inflation and many political 
variables I focused on, the direction of these relations, i.e. the path of causality, is still unclear. In 
order to check the direction of the relations between the most suspicious political variables and 
inflation, some causality analyses were employed. 
Association between variables does not necessarily prove causation, so it is not enough to 
find out that the variables are related to one another. The regression results obtained above do 
not say much about causality. In order to argue that a causal relation between variables exists, 
one variable must precede the other and other variables must be ruled out as potential causes of 
the existing relationship. In order to meet the first requirement, a time sequence was created to 
determine whether political variables precede the inflationary years or vice versa. In order to 
meet the second requirement of causality, partial correlations were used.   
One way to check causality is through time series analyses, like Granger analysis. 
However, time series analysis could not be employed in this study because of incomplete data. 
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Instead, the period under consideration (1975-2000) was divided into two periods, one from 
1975 to 1987 and another from 1988 to 2000.  
Some of the variables in the analysis, such as political system and electoral system, do 
not show much change over time, so we do not expect inflation to cause changes in those 
variables. For some variables, such as high military expenses and fractionalization of the 
opposition, there are no theories suggesting that their relation with inflation goes the opposite 
way, i.e. inflation affects them. However, there are mainly four variables whose direction of 
causality is under suspicion: funds from IMF and World Bank, regional and bilateral aid, level of 
democracy, and regime stability. It can easily be argued that all these variables are affected by 
inflation, rather than or as well as vice versa. For instance, although I found significant relation 
between IMF and World Bank and inflationary years, this relation can easily be interpreted as 
countries with many inflationary years receive more IMF and World Bank funds. It can also be 
argued that inflation causes regime instability or undermines democracy.  
In order to make the causality analysis, we need to use initial variables rather than factor 
scores. Thus, as the first step, most representative variables that characterize the factor scores of 
funds from IMF and World Bank, regional and bilateral aid, level of democracy, and regime 
stability (i.e. the variables that are highly correlated with the factors) were picked. For the factor 
that represents funds from IMF and World Bank, use of IMF funds is chosen as the 
representative variable and for the factor that represents regional and bilateral aid the variable 
funds from regional development banks is chosen. For democracy factor polity2 (polity score) 
and for regime instability d3 (regime transition) is chosen. Then, as the period under 
consideration was divided into two, the data of these variables were totaled and/or averaged 
under two separate periods. All this was to create a time sequence.  
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The next step was running partial correlations. The partial correlation is a method for 
examining the potential effect of other variables on the relationships between two variables. 
Specifically, it is the correlation between two variables with the effect of other variables 
removed (Diekhoff 1992). Therefore, partial correlations would let us find out the correlation 
between a political variable and inflationary years, while controlling the effect of other variables. 
If a political variable and inflationary years are still correlated after controlling for the shared 
variance of other variables, we can say that other variables are unlikely to cause the relationship 
between these two variables. 
While running partial correlations, first partial correlations were run between the first 
period values of the political variables (use of IMF funds, funds from regional development 
banks, polity score, and regime transition) and the second period values of number of 
inflationary years. Then, partial correlations between the first period values of number of 
inflationary years and second period values of the same political variables were run. This was 
repeated for each definition of inflationary years (number of years with inflation equal to or 
higher than 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent).  
The results, which can be seen at the Appendix-IX, indicate that at least the use of IMF 
funds may actually increase as a result of high number of inflationary years as well as vice versa. 
However, the correlation between the first period of use of IMF funds and second period of 
inflationary years is stronger than the correlation between the second period of use of IMF funds 
and first period of inflationary years. That can be interpreted as use of IMF funds affecting 
inflation more than inflation affecting use of funds. This confirms the hypothesis that IMF funds 
increase persistence of inflation, as discussed in chapter 4.  
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The first period of inflationary years does not have significant correlation with the second 
period of funds from regional development banks for any definition of inflationary years. 
However, there is significant negative correlation that runs in the other way, when inflationary 
years are defined either by 50 percent and more or 100 percent and more. This indicates that, as 
argued previously, funds from regional development banks have a negative effect on number of 
inflationary years, not vice versa.  
The first period of inflationary years does not have significant correlation with the second 
period the level of democracy for any definition of inflationary years. However, there is 
significant negative correlation that runs in the other direction for two definitions of inflationary 
years (inflation rate equal to or over 20 percent and inflation rate equal to or over 50 percent). 
This indicates that, as expected, democracy has a negative effect on number of inflationary years, 
but inflationary years do not have a significant effect on democracy. 
First period of regime stability variable does not have a significant correlation with 
second period of inflationary years under any definition of inflationary years. This rules out the 
possibility that inflationary years affect regime stability. 86 
As a result, causality analyses employed do not contradict the initial finding that political 
variables influence persistence of inflation, more than persistence of inflation influences political 
variables. Therefore, it is assumed that the presumed path of causality is correct.   
                                                 
86 A similar causality analysis was also employed by averaging and/or totaling the data five years before and five 
years after the peak inflation year and taking their partial correlations with the average inflation rate for the opposite 
five year periods. There were no significant correlations found, but partial correlations between post-peak period 
inflation rate and pre-peak period democracy level, use of IMF funds and concessional funds from regional 
development banks were found stronger than the correlations between pre-peak period inflation rate and post-peak 
period democracy level, use of IMF funds and concessional funds from regional development banks.  
Also, another causality analysis, Hausman test through two-step least squares analyses with instrumental variables, 
was also attempted. However, the results were not definite because of technical errors. 
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9.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, some statistical analyses were employed to study the influence of political 
variables on the ability to decrease inflation on a larger sample of states. In order to decrease the 
number of variables, first principal component analysis was employed within different variable 
groups. With the factor scores extracted from this analysis, negative binomial regression analysis 
was employed. Three different equations were used with different definitions of inflationary 
years. Then, also the direction of causality was checked.  
The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in Table 67. These results indicate 
that many political variables have either a positive or a negative relation with number of years 
with inflation. The social factors (inequality and poverty) do not seem to have a significant 
relation. As explained in Chapter 8, this may be because political institutions may provide a 
sufficient barrier between social demands and economic policymaking.  
 
Table 67: Summary of findings 
Factors Analysis findings 
 
Interna-
tional 
politics 
Financial flows from the IMF and the World Bank have a very strong 
positive relation with inflationary years. 
Aid relative to size of the economy has no significant relation with 
inflationary years for all definitions of high inflation. 
Financial flows from regional and bilateral aid have positive relation with 
inflationary years, if inflationary years are defined as years with inflation 
>=50%. 
Military expenses have a significant positive relation with inflationary 
years, if inflationary years are defined as years with inflation >=20% or 
>=50%. 
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Table 67 (Continued from previous page) 
Factors Analysis findings 
 
Political 
regime 
Regime instability has a positive relation with inflationary years, if 
inflationary years are defined as years with inflation >=100%.    
The level of democracy has a negative relation with inflationary years, 
when high inflation is defined as >=50% or >=100%. 
 
Political 
system  
Political stability has a negative relation with inflationary years, only if 
high inflation is defined as >=50%. 
Parliamentarism has a negative relation with inflationary years, only if 
high inflation is defined as >=20%.  
Power of the opposition has a positive relation with inflationary years, if 
high inflation is defined as >=50%.  
 
Electoral 
and party 
system  
Effects of polarization cannot be verified because of lack of data. 
Proportionality of the electoral systems has a positive relation with 
inflationary years, only if high inflation is defined as >=20% or >=50%. 
Fractionalization of the government parties has no significant relation 
with inflationary years.  
Fractionalization of the opposition is positively related to inflationary 
years for all definitions of high inflation.   
 
Inequality 
& poverty 
Income level of countries has no significant relation with inflationary 
years.  
Income inequality has no significant relation with inflationary years.  
Effects of poverty cannot be verified because of lack of data. 
 
 
It can be concluded that political factors affect the ability of states to eliminate inflation, 
especially when it comes to fractionalization of opposition, and also funding from the World 
Bank and IMF and high military expenses, which are both determined by international security 
concerns. These are the variables that are significantly related to number of years with inflation, 
regardless of how we define high inflation. Aid from regional and bilateral organizations, level 
of democracy, regime instability, the type political system, political stability, power of the 
opposition, and proportionality of the electoral system are also significantly related to number of 
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years with inflation. However, the significance of these relations depends on how we define high 
inflation. Some of these variables are significant only when high inflation is defined strictly as 
100 percent or above, whereas others are significant only when we use more extended 
definitions, such as 50 percent and above or 20 percent and above. The social variables analyzed, 
the variables related to poverty and equality, do not seem to have any significant association with 
inflationary years. Neither government fractionalization nor aid relative to size of the economy 
has a significant relation with inflationary years either. 
A final problem was that the direction of the causality could be questioned for some 
variables, such as funds from IMF and the World Bank, bilateral and regional aid, level of 
democracy, and regime stability. However, the causality analysis conducted through partial 
correlations does not prove stronger causality in the opposite direction, i.e. from number of 
inflationary years to these political variables.  
In short, we can argue that the results of the cross-national statistical analysis confirm the 
general hypothesis that many political factors are significantly related to the ability to eliminate 
inflation. This was also suggested after the case studies. However, on variable basis, some 
statistical results confirm the results of the case study analysis, while some results contradict 
them. These will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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10.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has sought to explain the variation in the ability of countries to reduce inflation 
with reference to largely political variables. Accordingly, although we cannot explain a 
successful battle with persistent inflation only by looking into socio-political variables, some of 
these socio-political variables can help us understand part of what traditional economic analysis 
leaves unexplained. A socio-political analysis complements the traditional explanations of 
successful price stabilization. 
The first chapter of this dissertation introduces the problem of why some countries were 
not able bring persistent inflation to an end in a timely manner. Although many countries 
suffered from inflation in the 1970s and even 1980s, a few of them were still struggling with 
inflation by the end of 1990s. Turkey, one of our cases, is one of those countries.  
Both comparative case studies and a cross-national analysis are used in this study in order 
to get plausible explanations of inflation stabilization. Chapter 2 presents the existing 
mainstream theories which have sought to explain inflation and it also introduces the “socio-
political” approach which has guided this study. From Chapter 4 to Chapter 8, five cases are 
analyzed in line with the model developed in Chapter 3. Each chapter focuses on a particular set 
of socio-political variables that are used to explain the variation in success of our five cases: 
Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey.  
 270
Chapter 4 argues that some international political factors, like strategic position and 
threats to security, may influence states’ ability to battle persistent inflation, but this effect 
mostly comes indirectly through international assistance and the effects on the budget. Chapters 
5, 6, and 7 focus on domestic political factors and how they affect the ability of states to battle 
inflation. After comparing the cases with regard to their political regimes, political systems, and 
electoral and party systems, those chapters suggest that regime stability, level of democracy, 
political stability, and the power of the executive have an effect on the ability of governments to 
eliminate persistent inflation. Chapter 8 focuses on poverty and inequality, and concludes that 
rich countries are more able to decrease inflation than the poorer countries, and inequality does 
not affect the ability to stabilize prices negatively.   
Chapter 9 employs a large sample cross-national analysis in order to compare the results 
of a larger sample with the findings of the case studies. Cross-national analysis is conducted 
through various statistical methods, which includes factor analysis and regression analysis.  
10.1 SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS 
Some findings of the large sample cross-national analysis support the findings of the case 
studies, but not all findings are verified. The findings are compared in Table 68. 
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Table 68: Comparison of case study results with cross-national analysis results 
Factors Case Studies Cross-national analyses 
Financial funds from the IMF and 
World Bank do not help control 
inflation. (Section 4.3.1) 
SUPPORTED 
(A significant positive relation is 
found between the amount of IMF 
and WB funds and persistence of 
inflation.) 
The amount of financial assistance 
from the IMF and World Bank is not 
necessarily determined by strategic 
importance of a state. (Section 4.3.1) 
not analyzed 
Official aid may help price 
stabilization. (4.3.2) 
CONTRADICTED  
(no significant relation found) 
 
 
Interna-
tional 
politics 
Military expenses may make it 
difficult to decrease inflation (but 
military aid can offset that effect). 
(Sections 4.2.2 & 4.3.3) 
SUPPORTED  
for inflation ≥20% or ≥50% 
(effect of military aid not 
analyzed) 
Regime stability helps eliminate 
persistent inflation. (Chapter 5) 
SUPPORTED  
for inflation ≥100% 
 
Political 
regime 
Increasing democracy may actually 
increase inflation, until consolidation. 
(Chapter 5) 
in part CONTRADICTED 
(A negative relation is found 
between democracy and 
persistence of inflation, for 
inflation ≥50% or ≥100%.) 
Political stability increases the ability 
to eliminate inflation. (Section 6.2) 
SUPPORTED  
for inflation ≥50% 
Political system itself does not have 
much effect on the ability to eliminate 
persistent inflation. (Chapter 6) 
CONTRADICTED 
(A negative relation is found 
between parliamentarism and 
persistence of inflation, for 
inflation ≥20%.) 
 
Political 
system  
Power of the governing party(ies) in 
the legislature increases the ability of 
the government to decrease inflation. 
(Sections 6.3 & 6.4) 
SUPPORTED 
(A positive relation is found 
between the power of the 
opposition and persistence of 
inflation, for inflation ≥50%.) 
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Table 68 (Continued from previous page) 
Factors Case Studies Cross-national analyses 
Polarization does not necessarily 
decrease the ability to control 
inflation. (Section 7.2.2) 
(cannot be verified because of lack 
of data) 
Proportionality of the electoral system, 
measured by threshold rates, does not 
determine ability to eliminate 
inflation. (Section 7.1) 
CONTRADICTED 
(A positive relation is found 
between the proportionality of the 
electoral systems and persistence 
of inflation, for inflation ≥20% or 
≥50%.) 
Fractionalization of the government 
parties in the legislature does not 
necessarily have an impact on the 
ability to decrease inflation. (Section 
7.2.1) 
SUPPORTED 
(no significant relation found) 
Electoral 
and party 
system  
Fractionalization of the opposition in 
the legislature does not necessarily 
affect the ability to decrease inflation. 
(Section 7.2.1) 
CONTRADICTED 
(A positive relation is found 
between the fractionalization of 
the opposition and persistence of 
inflation.) 
Inequality does not have a direct 
relation with the ability to decrease 
inflation. (Section 8.2) 
SUPPORTED 
Countries with higher income are 
more able to overcome inflation. 
(Section 8.3) 
CONTRADICTED 
(no significant relation found) 
Inequality 
& poverty 
Poverty does not have a relation with 
inflation. (Section 8.3) 
(cannot be verified because of lack 
of data) 
 
 
As can be observed from Table 68, many statistical analysis results support what is found 
in the case analyses, but some do not. Regarding international political factors, there is some 
evidence that strategic importance and security threats are related to inflation stabilization. It is 
concluded from the case studies that international assistance does not necessarily make it easier 
to control inflation. To understand how international funds affect the ability to eliminate 
inflation, we have to look at the type of funds received. Contrary to statistical analysis which 
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finds no significant relation, case studies argue that official aid may help price stabilization. 
Statistical analysis indicates that funds from the IMF and World Bank are associated with more 
inflationary years. Neither case studies find any evidence that IMF and World funding helps 
price stabilization. Both case studies and cross-national analysis suggest that high military 
expenses decrease the ability to eliminate inflation. Nonetheless, case studies argue that aid can 
offset the effect of military expenses.  
There are also common findings regarding domestic political factors. Both case studies 
and cross-national analysis confirm that regime instability makes states less able to tackle 
persistent inflation. When it comes to the level of democracy, case studies demonstrate that 
increasing democracy may increase inflationary years, but cross-national analysis argues that 
higher levels of democracy are associated with less number of inflationary years. Yet, both 
analyses agree that consolidated regimes can better deal with the inflation problem.  
The case studies and cross-national analysis both suggest that political stability is 
associated with fewer inflationary years. Case studies argue that the power of the executive is 
more important than the type of the political system in relation to the ability to decrease inflation, 
whereas the cross-national analysis argues that parliamentarism in general is associated with 
fewer inflationary years. Additionally, in line with case studies, cross-national analysis suggests 
that a powerful opposition, leading to weaker government, is associated with more inflationary 
years.  
Case studies do not find a direct relation between polarization and ability to control 
inflation. They neither find any effect of proportionality of the electoral formula on the ability to 
eliminate inflation. However, cross-national analysis suggests that high proportionality is 
associated with more inflationary years. Neither case studies nor cross-national analysis finds 
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any evidence that fractionalization of the government is an important factor that affects the 
ability of governments to tackle inflation problem. Although case studies do not support it, cross-
national analysis discovers that fractionalization of the opposition is associated with less ability 
to decrease inflation.  
The case studies find no relation between poverty level and the ability to decrease 
inflation, and lack of data does not permit any analysis of that relation through cross-national 
analysis. Although case studies argue that rich countries are more able to eliminate inflation, 
cross-national analysis finds no evidence to support that argument. Lastly, neither case studies 
nor cross-national analysis finds a significant relation between inequality and persistence of 
inflation.  
There is a general problem with findings of the cross-national statistical analysis. They 
assume that the relations between variables are valid when all other factors are held constant. 
However, in reality most individual countries do not have the same conditions and their 
conditions change through time. Another problem is that the effects are complex and 
multiplicative. Especially when we mention political conditions, we are talking about some 
unique characteristics and complex relationships that each country has. Therefore, case studies 
may actually tell us more about the conditions that help countries to eliminate their persistent 
inflation problem.  
Israel is the case that was most successful in price stabilization. After experiencing 14 
subsequent years of high and hyperinflation, Israel eliminated its inflation problem by 1987. For 
Israel, a major factor of success was probably its consolidated democracy. Although it did not 
have a very favorable political environment, due to its highly proportional electoral system and 
polarized party system, the stable political environment that brought price stabilization was 
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facilitated through the stability of the regime and the “national unity government” of 1984-88, 
which ended the governmental crises.  
Another distinctiveness of the Israeli case was the exceptional amount of international aid 
received. Most of this aid was composed of official economic and military aid, which helped 
Israel to balance its economy during hard times, despite its high military spending. As a matter of 
fact, Israel is a primary political ally of the US in international arena and the principal recipient 
of US aid.  
Mexico was considered the other successful case in this study. After battling inflation for 
12 subsequent years, Mexico initiated its famous Solidarity Pact in 1987. Although this program 
worked slower than the Israeli disinflationary program, Mexico was no longer a high inflation 
country by early 1990s. The findings of the case study argued that major factors behind the 
Mexican success were its stable regime and stable government. It was not too difficult to 
implement the anti-inflationary program in Mexico with the existing one-party system dominated 
by the PRI. Lack of political competition, stability of both the regime and the government, and 
lack of polarization and fractionalization were favorable conditions for price stabilization. I 
doubt that Mexico can initiate a similar program under current more democratic, competitive, 
fractionalized, and polarized political conditions.   
The next case was Argentina. Argentina struggled a long time with high and hyper-
inflation and has been long time customer of the IMF. It was a major recipient of IMF assistance 
as it was considered an exemplar country in terms of economic liberalization, but this assistance 
did not necessarily help Argentina to stabilize its prices. After 22 subsequent years of high 
inflation, the 1991 disinflationary program quickly eliminated persistent inflation. Although that 
was unexpected for some, it should not come as a surprise if we look into the political factors. 
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Indeed, by 1991 Argentina was politically stabilized. The democratic regime was consolidated 
and the two terms of Menem’s rule also created a stable government. Carlos Menem (1989-
1999) was a very strong President and made extensive use of decrees to implement his economic 
programs. The success of his disinflationary program was due to the support he received from 
the opposition which helped him to pass the Convertibility Law (1991). Another advantage of 
Argentina has been that its two-party system did not have much polarization or fractionalization. 
Also, Argentina’s highly disproportional electoral system may have helped it with price 
stabilization.  
The Brazilian case is similar to Argentina in terms of long-term struggle with high 
inflation and hyperinflation. They are also similar in terms of their regime instabilities. However, 
after also struggling with high inflation and hyperinflation for many subsequent years, Brazil 
succeeded in stabilization three years later than Argentine did. For Brazil, implementing a 
successful disinflationary program was difficult because the Brazilian political system is more 
unstable due to its extremely fractionalized and undisciplined party system. Brazil did not enjoy 
a powerful government as Argentina did. Yet, Brazilian Presidents are given more extraordinary 
powers, especially for issuing presidential decrees which bypass the legislature. Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, the Economy Minister of that time, made extensive use of this power when 
he initiated and implemented his anti-inflationary economic program in 1994. His economic 
program, which dropped inflation to below 20 percent level by 1996, was successful also 
because of the electoral reform in 1994. The new electoral rules allowed concurrent elections, 
and thus, produced stronger government, which was especially advantageous for Cardoso when 
he was the President in 1995-2002.  
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Turkey is considered as the least successful case throughout this study. Although Turkey 
never fell victim to hyperinflation, its battle with inflation lasted 27 years, longer than other 
countries. By the early 2000s, Turkey was still suffering from high inflation. What made Turkey 
such a failure in terms of price stabilization? It was not a single factor but a combination of 
factors that hindered the stabilization process in Turkey. Turkey did not have regime stability 
like Israel or Mexico had. Its democratic regime was still shaky when Argentina and Brazil had 
already stabilized their regimes. For instance, in 1997 the military ousted the democratically 
elected government through its political and institutional power. Like Israel, Turkey has a 
parliamentary system with unstable governments. Yet, in the Israeli case this weakness was 
offset by the regime stability and the “national unity” government, while in Turkey none of these 
advantages was present. Instead, fractionalization and unstable governments continued in Turkey 
until 2003. Again similar to Israel, Turkey is a strategically important country and it faces 
various threats to its security. However, unlike Israel, Turkey does not receive enormous 
amounts of aid to compensate for its military spending or to balance its deficits.  
10.2 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has identified some political factors that significantly affect the ability to decrease 
inflation. Some of these findings confirm existing presumptions, while some are contradicted.  
The effect of international factors is not as significant as expected. However, this is 
probably good news for the governments, because these factors usually cannot be controlled by 
the governments themselves. With no surprise military expenses contribute to the persistence of 
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inflation. These expenditures are decided by governments themselves, but they may be inevitable 
facing important security threats. Thus, even if cutting military expenditures can be 
recommended in battling inflation, it may not be a feasible policy under a conflictual 
international environment.  
Important strategic position may both help and hinder stabilization efforts. Strategically 
important countries usually face higher threats to their security and, thus, spend more on 
military. Yet, they also receive more international assistance from other countries. By looking at 
the Turkish and Israeli cases, we can argue that unless a country is exceptionally lucky to receive 
high amount of direct assistance, then the net effect of strategic position may be more negative 
than positive.  
Contrary to existing presumptions, funds from international financial institutions do not 
seem to increase the chances of stabilizing prices. Indeed, these funds seem to worsen 
persistence of inflation, does not matter whether they come because of strategic importance, 
because of an economic crisis, or as a support for neo-liberal policies. The same can be said for 
regional and bilateral aid. This is an important finding, because financial assistance is seen as a 
remedy for countries which have serious economic imbalances. And the countries which are 
distressed with high inflation desperately look for IMF funds before they initiate disinflationary 
programs. According to this study such funds are not useful for price stabilization. The aid 
received from other countries (official aid) does not necessarily help price stabilization either. 
Although case studies suggest that official aid may improve the chances of government to 
succeed in stabilization, the large sample cross-national analysis does not find a significant 
relation.  
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When it comes to domestic political institutions, this study suggests that regime stability 
and democracy contribute to government efforts to battle inflation. Nevertheless, regime stability 
(consolidation) is more important than the level of democracy. Both authoritarian and democratic 
countries can end persistent inflation if they are stable. Yet, consolidated democracies may have 
a better chance of stabilizing prices. Especially for countries with unstable regimes it is better to 
establish a stable democracy before initiating a major disinflationary plan. Otherwise, as 
Argentina and Brazil cases demonstrate, political instability may hinder stabilization efforts and 
each failed attempt to stabilize prices may add up to the persistence of inflation.  
Political system (parliamentarism, presidentialism, or mixed) has also some effect on the 
ability to decrease inflation. According to the cross-national statistical analysis, parliamentary 
systems fare better in battling inflation. However, according to the case studies, the most 
important features of a political system are not the type of system itself, but the stability and 
power of government. A stable and powerful executive can battle persistent inflation 
successfully both in a parliamentary and a presidential system. On the negative side, a powerful 
opposition seems to exacerbate persistence of inflation as it may block the government efforts to 
stabilize prices. Curiously a fractionalized opposition also seems to impair the ability to stabilize 
prices. This may be because it would be easier to negotiate with a unified opposition on 
economic policies than a fragmented opposition. Therefore, for success in price stabilization, the 
government should be strong enough to prevail over the opposition but there should also be a 
non-fragmented opposition that the government can negotiate with. 
The other effects of electoral and party system should probably be evaluated in the light 
of above findings. Electoral and party reforms that make the governments more stable and 
powerful may positively affect the ability to stabilize prices. For instance, although not supported 
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by the case studies, statistical analysis indicates a negative relation between proportionality in the 
electoral system and the ability to stabilize prices. Therefore, a less proportional electoral system 
may also be suggested in order to create governments with solid support in the legislature. 
When it comes to social factors, the expectation was to find a negative correlation 
between inequality and inflation stabilization and between poverty and inflation stabilization. 
However, poverty and inequality do not seem to affect the ability of governments to eliminate 
persistent inflation. Although this was not expected, it may be because very poor and 
disenfranchised people do not have much political power to influence economic policies.  
The governments that are concerned about inflation usually ignore their inequality and 
poverty problems and instead focus on austerity measures that even worsen these problems by 
cutting social benefits. Unfortunately the findings of this research do not encourage governments 
to pay attention to these social problems either, because persistent inflation can be eliminated 
without paying attention to inequality and/or poverty issues. However, this does not mean that 
inequality and poverty are less important problems than inflation.  
Many scholars suggest that inflation deteriorates income inequality and poverty (Agenor 
1998; Romer and Romer 1998; Easterly and Fischer 2001). Therefore, it is assumed by most 
policymakers that disinflation would automatically improve distribution of income and benefit 
the poor. Yet, as can be observed in Table 53, income inequalities in Argentina and Brazil 
increased after eliminating persistent inflation. And as can be seen in Table 56, poverty increased 
in all three Latin American cases after high inflation ended. Thus, I suggest that ending persistent 
inflation is not sufficient to decrease inequality and poverty. These problems should be tackled 
by separate policies and also the adverse effects of disinflationary policies on income distribution 
and poverty should carefully be dealt with.  
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I conclude that in order to lead a successful battle against persistent inflation, there 
should be favorable political conditions that facilitate adoption of effective disinflationary 
economic policies. Although disinflationary economic policies are more or less same for all 
countries, their successful application calls for a powerful and stable government functioning in a 
consolidated democratic regime.   
10.3 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Like all studies, this one has a number of limitations. These limitations are not only related to 
data collection and data analysis but also related to the scope of research and the validity of the 
conclusions. Although these limitations do not necessarily invalidate the findings, it may inspire 
further research that overcomes those limitations and bring about further explanations of price 
stabilization.  
First of all, this study has focused only on five case countries. As mentioned previously, 
case studies are a very important source if we want to know the details of conditions that 
facilitate price stabilization. The cases of this study were chosen among typical inflationary ones, 
and they represent different socio-political configurations. However, they are all middle income 
(or high income countries in the case of Israel) with free market institutions in effect for many 
decades. Thus, the results of the cases may not be applicable to low income developing countries 
or to middle-income countries without a long history of open markets.  
Secondly, the lack of complete data has limited some cross-national statistical analyses. 
In analysis of the previous chapter, the number of observations has dropped from over 150 
countries to 45 countries. Lack of data on some variables has also left some factors (e.g. 
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polarization and poverty) unexplored in the cross-national analysis. Similarly, the period I 
focused on was only 26 years. This was the period when inflation was most widespread in the 
world, especially among developing countries, and the goal of this dissertation is to explain 
persistent inflation of that particular period. Yet, if an overall explanation of inflation is sought, a 
longer time frame would probably provide us more and different explanations. Also, as the 
dependent variable (number of inflationary years) is count data, regular regression and causality 
analyses could not be employed.  
Another problem is that all variables analyzed in this study may be endogenous variables 
that may be caused by other factors that are not taken into consideration in this study. There are 
various characteristics (e.g., geography, culture, and so on) omitted in this research and these 
characteristics may influence not only political structures and political institutions, but also 
economic policies. Also, I may be capturing reverse causality in some relations. I have focused 
on the effects of political structures and institutions on inflation, but inflation may also influence 
political structures and institutions. For instance, I found that political stability affects inflation 
stabilization negatively, but persistent inflation may also cause political instability because of the 
public dissatisfaction it causes. A better example is the relation between inflation and inequality. 
I have hypothesized that inequality has an impact on inflation, but it is well known that inflation 
also has adverse effects on inequality (Agenor 1998; Romer and Romer 1998; Easterly and 
Fischer 2001). If there is such reverse causality, then the findings may be biased. 
Another limitation is that this study does not focus on the details of inflation stabilization 
programs and strategies, not even for the five cases studied. The assumption was that these 
programs and strategies are more or less similar. However, the details of these programs and 
their connection to political factors may reveal some more explanations and clarifications. 
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Indeed, the same political factors that I focused on may also shape the stabilization programs and 
strategies chosen.  
Also, this study does not seek to test economic theories of inflation. It acknowledges that 
economic theories cannot explain the variation in the ability to stabilize prices unless 
supplemented by socio-political analyses.  However, at the same time this study readily accepts 
the premises of some economic views. It would be very beneficial to test validity of these 
economic theories, but to do that this research should have included many economic variables to 
its analyses. Economic variables are not included in the model, not even the ones which were 
readily accepted to affect inflation, like budget deficits. Similarly this study neither mentions nor 
looks into the inertia of inflation. Obviously occurrence of an inflationary year is not 
independent of other years with inflation. Therefore, further research should probably take inertia 
into consideration, especially in statistical analyses.  
Lastly, the findings of this research provide us some associations, but neither case studies 
nor cross-national analysis can help us precisely predict the success or failure of a price 
stabilization program that a country is planning. Each country has unique conditions, the 
variables do not stay constant, and there are always some uncontrollable factors which may 
affect the course of stabilization. However, at least the findings of this research can help us 
evaluate the chances of and impediments to successful inflation stabilization in a particular 
country.  
The topic of price stabilization is far from being completely explored. For scholars who 
are planning to conduct a similar socio-political analysis, it would probably help addressing to 
some of these limitations listed above.  
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APPENDIX-I 
Table 69: Variables Used in the Analyses 
 
variable 
 
measure source 
Persistence of 
inflation  
Total number of years with high 
inflation 
Converted from online IMF data on Consumer 
Price Index 
Military 
importance 
Aggregate number of heavy 
weapons holdings 
Bonn International Center for Conversion 
(BICC) Database 
 Number of armed forces personnel 
1974-89 data are from World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995, 1965, 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
1990-2003 data are from BICC Yearbook 2005, 
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) 
Database 
Economic 
importance FDI stock (inward) in $ millions World Investment Report 2003, UNCTAD 
 External debt  World Development Indicators 2003, The World Bank 
Security threats major conflicts in (1945-2005) 
Conflictbarometer 1997/2002/2003/ 2004/2005, 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research (University of Heidelberg). 
Military spending Military expenditure as a share (%) of GNP SIPRI Yearbook 1982, 1988, 1993, 2002, 2003 
World Bank 
assistance 
Net financial flows from IBRD 
(current US$) 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(2005) 
 
IMF assistance Total IMF credit & loans outstanding (million US$) 
International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund (January 2006) 
International aid Official development assistance and official aid (current US$) 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(2005) 
 
US aid US Overseas Loans and Grants, 1962-2004 (million US$) 
The U.S. Loans & Grants (Greenbook), USAID 
Center for Development Information and 
Evaluation. (http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/) 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(2005) 
Military assistance US military assistance 1970-2004 (in million $US) 
The U.S. Loans & Grants (Greenbook), USAID 
Center for Development Information and 
Evaluation. (http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/) 
 Military assistance as a percentage of military expenditure 
Calculated by using data from The U.S. Loans & 
Grants (Greenbook), USAID Center for 
Development Information and Evaluation. 
(http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/) and  
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(www.worldbank.org) 
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variable 
 
measure source 
Degree of 
democracy 
Polity2 (Revised Combined Polity 
Score) 
Polity IV Report data and World Economic 
Outlook Database, 2003 (IMF) 
Political freedom 
(degree of 
democracy) 
Civil and political freedom ratings Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-73 to 2001-2002.  
Political systems 
System (categorical data grouped 
as direct presidential,  mixed 
system, parliamentary) 
Beck et al, Database on  Political Institutions 
(DPI) 
Political stability, point estimate 
(The choice of units for governance 
ensures that the estimates of 
governance have a mean of zero, a 
standard deviation of one, and 
range from around –2.5 to around 
2.5. Higher or positive values 
indicate greater political stability.) 
World Bank Aggregate Governance Indicators 
1996-2002.  
Political Stability 
PRTYIN (how many years the 
party of chief executive has been in 
office) 
Database of Democratic Institutions (DPI), 2001 
MAJ – margin of majority (This is 
the fraction of legislative seats held 
by the government. It is calculated 
by dividing the number of 
government seats by total seats.  
Database of Democratic Institutions (DPI), 2001 
Government power 
Thresholds, number of lower house 
seats, and district sizes 
Taken or calculated from the data provided in 
Mianwaring and Shugart (eds), Presidentialism 
and Democracy in Latin America and the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) IV. 
Government fractionalization 
(GOVFRAC) Database of Political Institutions IV 
Legislative fractionalization 
(FRAC) Database of Political Institutions IV 
Effective number of parties  Calculated from the FRAC data of the Database of Political Institutions IV 
Opposition Fractionalization 
(OPPFRAC) Database of Political Institutions IV 
Political  
fractionalization 
Political polarization (POLARIZ) Database of Political Institutions IV 
Gini coefficients Social Panorama, ECLAC; Word Development Indicators, World Bank 
Income inequality 
Income Distribution in Latin 
America  
[Gini coefficients, income share of 
the poorest 25 % (urban), income 
share of the richest 10 % (urban)] 
Data taken from Economic Commission on Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social 
Panorama of Latin America: 1999-2000, United 
Nations, Santiago, Chile, LC/G.2068-P/I, 2000 
and Social Panorama of Latin America: 2002-
2003, United Nations, Santiago, Chile, 
LC/G.2209-P/I, 2004. 
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variable 
 
 
Measure 
 
 
Source 
 
Share of income for different 
percentiles of population in Latin 
America, ratio of average income 
per capita 
Economic Commission on Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin 
America: 2002-2003, United Nations, Santiago, 
Chile, LC/G.2209-P/I, 2004. 
Inequality data for Turkey  
(GINI coefficient, share of poorest 
20% of population) 
Statistical Yearbook 1981 (UN), 
Statistical Yearbook 1994 (UN), 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2000 
State Institute of Statistics (Turkey) website Income inequality 
Gini coefficients of Israel (1973-
2003) 
 
Israeli Ministry of Finance 1998 
Baer & Maloney 1997: World Bank, World 
Development Report 
LIS Data base 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
1999 
GDP per capita (constant 1995 
US$) 
World Bank, Word Development Indicators (the 
online database) 
Percentage of people living on less 
than $1 a day (PPP)  
World Bank, Word Development Indicators (the 
online database) 
Poverty gap at $1 a day (% of 
people) 
World Bank, Word Development Indicators (the 
online database) 
Percentage of people who live in 
poverty Ramos, 1996. 
Poverty 
Households below the poverty line, 
Households below the indigence 
line (Latin American cases) 
Economic Commission on Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin 
America, United Nations, Santiago, Chile, : 1991, 
1992, 1994, 2002-2003. 
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APPENDIX-II 
MAIN ECONOMIC DATA ON ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, ISRAEL, MEXICO, AND 
TURKEY  
Table 70: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
  Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1960 na na na na na 
1961 13.4 na 6.8 1.6 0.5 
1962 28.3 na 9.4 1.2 2.9 
1963 23.9 na 6.6 0.6 3.1 
1964 22.2 na 5.2 2.3 1.7 
1965 28.6 na 7.7 3.6 5.9 
1966 31.9 na 7.9 4.2 4.4 
1967 29.2 na 1.7 3.0 6.8 
1968 16.2 na 2.1 2.3 0.4 
1969 7.6 na 2.4 3.4 7.9 
1970 13.6 22.3 6.1 5.2 6.9 
1971 34.7 20.1 12.0 5.3 15.7 
1972 58.4 16.5 12.9 5.0 11.7 
1973 61.2 12.7 20.0 12.0 15.4 
1974 23.5 27.6 39.7 23.8 15.8 
1975 182.9 28.9 39.3 15.2 19.2 
1976 444.0 42.0 31.3 15.8 17.4 
1977 176.0 43.7 36.8 29.0 27.1 
1978 175.5 38.7 50.5 17.5 45.3 
1979 159.5 53.9 78.3 18.2 58.7 
1980 100.8 132.6 131.0 26.4 110.2 
1981 104.5 101.7 116.8 27.9 36.6 
1982 164.8 100.5 120.4 58.9 30.8 
1983 343.8 135.0 145.6 101.8 31.4 
1984 626.7 192.1 373.8 65.5 48.4 
1985 672.2 226.0 304.7 57.7 45.0 
1986 90.1 147.1 48.1 86.2 34.6 
1987 131.3 228.3 19.8 131.8 38.8 
1988 343.0 629.1 16.3 114.2 73.7 
1989 3,079.8 1,430.7 20.2 20.0 63.3 
1990 2,314.0 2,947.7 17.2 26.7 60.3 
1991 171.7 432.8 19.0 22.7 66.0 
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  Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1992 24.9 951.6 11.9 15.5 70.1 
1993 10.6 1,928.0 10.9 9.8 66.1 
1994 4.2 2,075.9 12.3 7.0 106.3 
1995 3.4 66.0 10.0 35.0 88.1 
1996 0.2 15.8 11.3 34.4 80.3 
1997 0.5 6.9 9.0 20.6 85.7 
1998 0.9 3.2 5.4 15.9 84.6 
1999 (1.2) 4.9 5.2 16.6 64.9 
2000 (0.9) 7.0 1.1 9.5 54.9 
2001 (1.1) 6.8 1.1 6.4 54.4 
2002 25.9 8.4 5.6 5.0 45.0 
2003 13.4 14.7 0.7 4.5 25.3 
2004 4.4 6.6 (0.4) 4.7 8.6 
2005 9.6 6.9 1.3 4.0 8.2 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (htpp://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
(Highlighted years are the initiation years of the successful disinflationary programs.) 
Table 71: GDP growth (annual %) 
 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1960 na na na na na 
1961 5.4 10.3 11.2 5.0 na 
1962 -0.9 5.2 10.2 4.7 na 
1963 -5.3 0.9 10.7 8.1 na 
1964 10.1 3.5 7.9 11.9 na 
1965 10.6 3.1 9.0 6.6 na 
1966 -0.7 4.2 -0.1 6.1 na 
1967 3.2 4.9 3.0 5.9 na 
1968 4.8 11.4 16.2 9.4 na 
1969 9.7 9.7 13.6 3.4 4.1 
1970 3.0 8.8 7.3 6.5 3.2 
1971 5.7 11.3 11.2 3.8 5.6 
1972 1.6 12.1 13.7 8.2 7.4 
1973 2.8 14.0 3.3 7.9 3.3 
1974 5.5 9.0 6.8 5.8 5.6 
1975 0.0 5.2 3.3 5.7 7.2 
1976 -2.0 9.8 1.3 4.4 10.5 
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 Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1977 6.9 4.6 0.0 3.4 3.4 
1978 -4.5 3.2 4.8 9.0 1.5 
1979 10.2 6.8 6.3 9.7 -0.6 
1980 4.2 9.1 6.9 9.2 -2.4 
1981 -5.7 -4.4 5.1 8.8 4.9 
1982 -5.0 0.6 1.8 -0.6 3.6 
1983 3.9 -3.4 3.5 -4.2 5.0 
1984 2.2 5.3 0.9 3.6 6.7 
1985 -7.6 7.9 3.4 2.6 4.2 
1986 7.9 8.0 4.8 -3.8 7.0 
1987 2.9 3.6 7.2 1.9 9.5 
1988 -2.6 -0.1 2.0 1.2 2.1 
1989 -7.5 3.3 0.9 4.2 0.3 
1990 -2.4 -4.3 6.8 5.1 9.3 
1991 12.7 1.3 7.7 4.2 0.9 
1992 11.9 -0.5 5.6 3.6 6.0 
1993 5.9 4.9 5.6 2.0 8.0 
1994 5.8 5.9 6.9 4.5 -5.5 
1995 -2.8 4.2 6.7 -6.2 7.2 
1996 5.5 2.7 5.4 5.1 7.0 
1997 8.1 3.3 3.6 6.8 7.5 
1998 3.9 0.1 3.7 4.9 3.1 
1999 -3.4 0.8 2.3 3.9 -4.7 
2000 -0.8 4.4 7.7 6.6 7.4 
2001 -4.4 1.3 -0.3 -0.2 -7.5 
2002 -10.9 1.9 -1.2 0.8 7.9 
2003 8.8 0.5 1.7 1.4 5.8 
2004 9.0 4.9 4.4 4.1 8.9 
2005 9.2 2.3 5.2 3.0 7.4 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (htpp://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
(Highlighted years are the initiation years of the successful disinflationary programs.) 
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Table 72: Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 
  Argentina Brazil Israel Mexico Turkey 
1980 2.3 na 4.8 na na 
1981 4.5 4.3 5.1 na na 
1982 4.8 3.9 5.0 na 10.9 
1983 4.2 4.9 4.5 na 12.1 
1984 3.8 4.3 5.9 na 11.9 
1985 5.3 3.4 6.7 na 11.2 
1986 4.4 2.4 7.1 na na 
1987 5.3 3.6 6.1 na na 
1988 6.0 3.8 6.4 2.5 8.4 
1989 7.3 3.0 8.9 na 8.6 
1990 7.3 3.7 9.6 na 8.0 
1991 5.8 na 10.6 3.0 8.2 
1992 6.7 6.4 11.2 3.1 8.5 
1993 10.1 6.0 10.0 3.2 9.0 
1994 12.1 na 7.8 4.2 8.6 
1995 6.7 6.0 6.9 5.8 7.6 
1996 17.2 6.8 6.7 4.3 6.6 
1997 14.9 7.7 7.7 3.4 6.8 
1998 12.8 8.9 8.5 2.9 6.9 
1999 14.1 9.6 8.9 2.1 7.7 
2000 15.0 na 8.8 2.2 6.5 
2001 17.4 9.3 9.3 2.1 8.4 
2002 19.6 9.2 10.3 2.4 10.4 
2003 15.6 9.7 10.7 2.5 10.5 
2004 na na na 3.0 10.3 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006) 
(Highlighted years are the initiation years of the successful disinflationary programs.) 
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APPENDIX-III 
Table 73: Classification of Political Regimes * 
 Argentina Brazil Mexico Israel Turkey 
1970 autocracy bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1971 autocracy bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1972 autocracy bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1973 presidentialism bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1974 presidentialism bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1975 presidentialism bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1976 autocracy bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1977 autocracy bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1978 autocracy bureucracy bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1979 autocracy presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1980 autocracy presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism autocracy 
1981 autocracy presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism autocracy 
1982 autocracy presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism autocracy 
1983 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1984 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1985 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1986 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1987 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1988 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1989 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1990 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1991 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1992 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1993 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1994 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1995 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1996 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1997 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1998 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
1999 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
2000 presidentialism presidentialism bureucracy parliamentarism parliamentarism 
2001 presidentialism presidentialism presidentialism parliamentarism parliamentarism 
2002 presidentialism presidentialism presidentialism parliamentarism parliamentarism 
Source: Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) 
* Highlighted regimes signify regimes in inflationary years. 
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APPENDIX-IV 
Governments in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey 
 
 
Table 74: Governments in Argentina (21 governments- 8 military) 
2003- present  
Néstor Kirchner (JP) 
1989-1994  
Carlos Saúl Menem Akil 
(JP) 
1976-1981  
Jorge Rafael Videla 
(Military) 
2002-2003  
Eduardo Duhalde (JP) 
1983-1989  
Raúl Alfonsín Foulkes 
(UCR) 
1974-1976  
María Estela Martínez de 
Perón (JP) 
2001-2002  
Eduardo Oscar Camaño 
(acting) 
1982-1983  
Reynaldo Benito Bignone 
(Military) 
1973-1974  
Juan Domingo Perón (JP) 
2001-2001  
Adolfo Rodríguez Saá 
(acting) 
1982  
Alfredo Óscar Saint-Jean 
(Military) 
1973  
Raúl Alberto Lastiri 
(FREJULI) 
2001-2001  
Ramón Puerta (acting) 
1981-1982  
Leopoldo Fortunato 
Galtieri (Military) 
1973-1973  
Héctor José Camporá 
(FREJULI) 
1999-2001  
Fernando De La Rua  
(UCR-FREPASO) 
1981  
Horacio Tomás Liendo 
(Military) 
1971-1973  
Alejandro Agustín 
Lanusse Gelly (Military) 
1994-1999  
Carlos Saúl Menem Akil (JP) 
1981  
Roberto Eduardo Viola 
(Military) 
1970-1971  
Roberto Marcelo 
Levingston (Military) 
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Table 75: Governments in Brazil (9 governments- 3 military)  
2002- Luis Ignacio "Lula" 
DaSilva (PT) 
1990-1992 Fernando Collor 
de Mello (PRN) 
1979-1985 João Baptista de 
Oliveira Figueiredo 
(military/ARENA/PDS) 
1995-2002 Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) 
1985-1990 José Sarney 
(PMDB) 
1974-1979 Ernesto Geisel 
Beckmann 
(military/ARENA) 
1992-1995 Itamar Augusto 
Cautiero Franco (PMDB) 
1985 Tancredo Neves  
(PMDB) 
1969-1974 Emilio 
Garrastazú Médici 
(military/ARENA) 
 
Table 76: Governments in Mexico (6 governments)  
2000- Vicente Fox 
Quesada(PAN) 
1988-1994Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (PRI) 
1976-1982 José López-
Portillo y Pacheco (PRI) 
1994-2000 Ernesto Zedillo 
Ponce de León(PRI) 
1982-1988 Miguel de la 
Madrid Hurtado (PRI) 
1970-1976 Luis Echeverría 
Álvarez (PRI) 
 
 
Table 77: Governments in Israel (16 governments)  
2001-2003 Ariel Sharon 
(Likud) 
1990-1992 Yitzhak Shamir 
(Likud) 
1977-1981 Menachem 
Begin 
(Likud) 
2001-2003 Ariel Sharon 
(Likud) 
1988-1990 Yitzhak Shamir 
(Likud) 
1974-1977 Yitzhak Rabin 
(Labor) 
1999-2001 Ehud Barak 
(Labor) 
1986-1988 Yitzhak Shamir  
(Likud) 
1974-1974 Golda Meir  
(Mapai) 
1996-1999 Benjamin 
Netanyahu (Likud) 
1984-1986 Shimon Peres 
(Labor) 
1969-1974 Golda Meir  
(Mapai) 
1995-1996 Shimon Peres  
(Labor) 
1983-1984 Yitzhak Shamir 
(Labor) 
 
1992-1995 Yitzhak Rabin 
(Labor) 
1981-1983 Menachem 
Begin 
(Likud) 
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Table 78: Governments in Turkey (26 governments- 3 military)  
2003 – present Tayyip 
Erdoğan (AKP) 
1991-1993 VII. Suleyman 
Demirel (DYP-SHP)   
1975-1977 IV. Suleyman 
Demirel (AP-MCP-MHP-
CGP) 
2002-2003 Abdullah Gül  
(AKP) 
1991-1991 I. Mesut Yılmaz 
(ANAP) 
1974-1975 Sadi Irmak  
(Non-party caretaker) 
1999-2002 V. Bulent Ecevit  
(DSP-MHP-ANAP) 
1989-1991 Yildirim 
Akbulut (ANAP) 
1974-1974 I.  Bulent Ecevit 
(CHP-MSP) 
1999-1999 IV. Bulent 
Ecevit  (DSP minority) 
1987-1989 II. Turgut Özal  
(ANAP) 
1973-1974 Naim Talu 
(military-JP) 
1997-1999 III. Mesut 
Yılmaz  
(ANAP-DSP-DTP)  
1983-1987 I. Turgut Özal  
(ANAP) 
1972-1973 Ferit  Melen 
(military-JP) 
1996-1997 Necmettin 
Erbakan  
(Refah-DYP) 
1980-1983 Bulent Ulusu  
(military) 
1971-1972 II. Nihat Erim  
(military-JP) 
1996-1996 II. Mesut 
Yılmaz  
(ANAP-DYP) 
1979-1980 VI. Suleyman 
Demirel (AP minority) 
1971-1971 I. Nihat Erim  
(military-JP) 
1995-1996 III. Tansu Çiller  
(DYP-CHP) 
1978-1979 III. Bulent 
Ecevit (CHP) 
1970-1971 III. Suleyman 
Demirel (AP) 
1995-1995 II. Tansu Çiller  
(DYP) 
1977-1978 V. Suleyman 
Demirel (AP-MCP-MHP) 
1969-1970 II. Suleyman 
Demirel (AP) 
1993-1995 I. Tansu Çiller  
(DYP-SHP)   
1977-1977 II. Bulent Ecevit 
(CHP minority) 
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APPENDIX-V 
Table 79: Variables Used In the Statistical Analyses 
 
Group  
 
 
variable 
 
measure source 
inflyrs20  Total number of years with 
inflation over 20% 
inflyrs50 
 
Total number of years with 
inflation over 50% 
Persistence of 
inflation  
inflyrs100 
 
Total number of years with 
inflation over 100% 
Converted from online IMF data on 
Consumer Price Index 
miltryexp  Military expenditure as a 
share (%) of GNP, average  
miltrypers Number of armed forces 
personnel, average 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI), The World Bank (2005) 
 
Strategic and 
security 
concerns  
 
 
 
strategic 
 
 
 
 
Strategic importance 
Coded according to a country’s 
geographic position (Middle East, 
Pakistan & Afghanistan included; US 
neighbors; North East Asia; all 
Europe; and Caribbean), oil reserves 
(top 20 countries with the biggest oil 
reserves taken from 
http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/oil.h
tml), size of military personnel (20 
countries with the biggest army, 
taken from the WDI), and size of the 
economy (20 biggest economies of 
the world, taken from the WDI).  
milibrdflows  
 
 
Net financial flows from 
IBRD (current million 
US$), average 
milidaflows Net financial flows from 
IDA (current million US$), 
average 
milimfconflws Net financial flows from 
IMF, concessional (current 
military US$), average  
milimfnconflw Net financial flows from 
IMF, non-concessional 
(current million US$), 
average 
International 
assistance 
milrbdconflw  
 
Net financial flows from 
regional and development 
banks, concessional (current 
million US$), average 
World Development Indicators, The 
World Bank (2005) 
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Group  
 
 
variable 
 
measure source 
milrbdnconflw  
 
Net financial flows from 
regional and development 
banks, concessional (current 
million US$), average 
miltotalflows  
 
Net total financial flows 
(current million US$), 
average 
milothrflow  
 
Net other financial flows 
(current million US$), 
average 
miluseofimf  
 
Use of IMF credit (current 
million US$), average 
aidexp  
 
Aid (% of central 
government expenses) , 
average 
aidgni    
 
Aid (% of Gross National 
Income) , average 
International 
assistance 
miloffaid Official development 
assistance and official aid 
(current US$), average 
 
polity2   Polity2 (Revised Combined 
Polity Score), average Polity IV Report data 
polity2chng Percentage change in 
polity2 variable (compared 
to previous year), average 
polity2var Variance of polity2 variable, 
average 
calculated from the Polity IV Report 
data  
legelec  Number of legislative 
elections (“1” for each year 
where there was a 
legislative election in a 
year), total 
exelec Number of executive 
elections (“1” for each year 
where there was a executive 
election in a year), total 
Database of Democratic Institutions 
(DPI), 2001 
liec1 Modified version of liec in 
DPI (Legislative Index of 
Electoral Competitiveness); 
1 for years with liec >=6, 
average  
eiec1 Modified version of eiec in 
DPI (Executive Index of 
Electoral Competitiveness); 
1 for years with eiec >=6, 
average 
calculated from the Database of 
Democratic Institutions (DPI), 2001 
Political regime 
durable Regime durability, average  Polity IV Report data 
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Group  
 
 
variable 
 
measure source 
xrcomp1 Competitiveness of 
Executive Recruitment, total 
(coded “1” for each year 
where the executive of one 
of the executives is selected 
through competitive 
elections), total 
coded from the XRCOMP data of the 
Polity IV Report data 
reprsupp Competitiveness of 
Participation, total (coded 
“1” if PARCOMP is 1 
[repressed] or 2 
[suppressed]), total 
competpar lack of competitiveness of 
participation, total (coded 
“1” for each year where 
PARCOMP is 5 
[competitive]), total 
coded from the PARCOMP data of 
the Polity IV Report data 
Political regime 
d3 Regime Transition 
Completed, total (“1’ for 
each year where regime 
transition is completed), 
total 
Polity IV Report data 
president  
 
 
categorical data of the 
political system 
(presidential systems are 
coded 1, the rest 0)  
parliament categorical data of the 
political system 
(parliamentary systems are 
coded 1, the rest 0) 
Coded from the SYSTEM variable of 
the Database on  Political 
Institutions (DPI) 
prtyin how long the Party of Chief 
executive has been in office, 
total 
allhouse Does party of executive 
control all relevant houses? 
(total) 
oppmajh Does one opposition party 
have majority in the House? 
(total) 
majority MAJ – margin of majority 
(This is the fraction of 
legislative seats held by the 
government. It is calculated 
by dividing the number of 
government seats by total 
seats.) [total] 
tensys  Tenure of system or 
executive, total 
Political 
systems 
checks  Checks and Balances, total 
Database on  Political Institutions 
(DPI) 
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Group  
 
 
variable 
 
measure source 
stabs % of veto players who drop 
from the government in any 
given year, total 
 
powerexect Executive Constraints, total 
(coded “1” if XCONST is 1 
[Unlimited Authority], 2 
[Intermediate Category], or 
3[Slight to Moderate 
Limitation on Executive 
Authority]) 
Political 
systems 
nopowerexect Executive Constraints, total 
(coded “1” if XCONST is 7 
[Executive Parity or 
Subordination] 
coded from the XCONST data of the 
Polity IV Report data 
 
govfrac  
 
Government 
fractionalization 
(GOVFRAC) 
frac  
 
Legislative fractionalization 
(FRAC) 
oppfrac  
 
Opposition 
Fractionalization: The 
probability that two deputies 
picked at random from 
among the opposition 
parties will be of different 
parties (average) 
herfgov  
 
Herfndahl Index 
Government: The sum of 
the squared seat shares of all 
parties in the government 
(average)  
herfopp  
 
Herfindahl Index 
Opposition: The sum of the 
squared seat shares of all 
parties in the opposition 
(average) 
Electoral & 
Party System 
herftot  
 
Herfindahl Index Total: The 
sum of the squared seat 
shares of all parties in the 
legislature (average) 
Database of Political Institutions  
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Table 79 (Continued from previous page) 
 
Group  
 
 
variable 
 
measure source 
polarization Political polarization 
(POLARIZ)- the maximum 
difference between the chief 
executive’s party’s value 
(EXECRLC) and the values 
of the three largest 
government parties and the 
largest opposition party. 
[average] 
partyage  
 
This is the average of the 
ages of the 1st government 
party, 2nd government 
party, and 1st opposition 
party, or the subset of these 
for which age of party is 
known. [average] 
mdmh  
 
mean district magnitude 
(House)--The weighted 
average of the number of 
representatives elected by 
each constituency size, if 
available. If not, the number 
of seats is divided by the 
number of constituencies 
[average] 
pluralty  
 
Plurality? (1 if yes, 0 if no), 
average 
Electoral & 
Party System 
propor Proportional 
Representation? (1 if yes, 0 
if no), average 
 
gini Gini index, average  
incmlow10  Income share held by lowest 
10% percentile of the 
population, average  
World Bank, Word Development 
Indicators (the online database) 
incmdiff10   income share difference 
between lowest %10 and 
highest %10 percentile of 
the population, average  
lggdpcapt Logarithm of GDP per 
capita (constant 1995 US$), 
average  
calculated from the World Bank, 
Word Development Indicators (the 
online database) 
emplyagr Employment in agriculture 
(% of total employment), 
average 
Income 
Inequality & 
Poverty 
emplyind Employment in industry (% 
of total employment), 
average 
World Bank, Word Development 
Indicators (the online database 
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APPENDIX-VI 
FACTOR ANALYSES 
1. 
. factor  aidexp aidgni  milibrdflws  milidaflws  milothrflow  milrbdconflw  
milrbdnconflw  milimfconflw  milimfnconflw  miltotalflows  miloffaid  
miluseofimf miltryexp miltrypers  strategic, pcf 
(obs=82) 
 
            (principal component factors; 4 factors retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        4.66949         2.46865      0.3113         0.3113 
     2        2.20084         0.24822      0.1467         0.4580 
     3        1.95262         0.35730      0.1302         0.5882 
     4        1.59532         0.63949      0.1064         0.6946 
     5        0.95583         0.02676      0.0637         0.7583 
     6        0.92907         0.11988      0.0619         0.8202 
     7        0.80919         0.29558      0.0539         0.8742 
     8        0.51361         0.02965      0.0342         0.9084 
     9        0.48395         0.17773      0.0323         0.9407 
    10        0.30623         0.07882      0.0204         0.9611 
    11        0.22741         0.07451      0.0152         0.9762 
    12        0.15290         0.01942      0.0102         0.9864 
    13        0.13348         0.06345      0.0089         0.9953 
    14        0.07004         0.07004      0.0047         1.0000 
    15       -0.00000               .     -0.0000         1.0000 
 
               Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3          4    Uniqueness 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      aidexp |  -0.49776    0.67754    0.11757    0.23991    0.22180 
      aidgni |  -0.50414    0.55355    0.24124    0.24804    0.31971 
 milibrdflws |   0.92714    0.18242    0.15790   -0.12397    0.06683 
  milidaflws |   0.32450    0.40351   -0.52198    0.30024    0.36928 
 milothrflow |   0.26773   -0.29460   -0.57959    0.19665    0.46693 
milrbdconflw |  -0.00718    0.37269   -0.32646    0.53421    0.46910 
milrbdncon~w |   0.60960   -0.05689   -0.43633   -0.23336    0.38031 
milimfconflw |  -0.22169    0.22228    0.13574    0.07480    0.87742 
milimfncon~w |   0.66451    0.26405    0.60686   -0.04995    0.11793 
miltotalfl~s |   0.93203    0.31726    0.10877    0.01661    0.01856 
   miloffaid |   0.60219    0.27910   -0.29063    0.43982    0.28157 
 miluseofimf |   0.82189    0.22398    0.35766   -0.13921    0.12703 
   miltryexp |   0.12645   -0.35424    0.45166    0.62443    0.26462 
  miltrypers |   0.05574   -0.57680    0.35847    0.57726    0.20246 
   strategic |   0.58541   -0.45201   -0.08310    0.21887    0.39817 
 
 
. rotate 
 
            (varimax rotation) 
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               Rotated Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3          4    Uniqueness 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      aidexp |  -0.16340    0.84206   -0.15767   -0.13256    0.22180 
      aidgni |  -0.15838    0.80849   -0.03844   -0.00843    0.31971 
 milibrdflws |   0.91392   -0.27253   -0.14462   -0.05236    0.06683 
  milidaflws |   0.14844    0.00143   -0.75362   -0.20184    0.36928 
 milothrflow |  -0.14609   -0.53217   -0.47670    0.03579    0.46693 
milrbdconflw |  -0.08062    0.27926   -0.66578    0.05614    0.46910 
milrbdncon~w |   0.32781   -0.57389   -0.29482   -0.30979    0.38031 
milimfconflw |  -0.06020    0.34349    0.03070   -0.00465    0.87742 
milimfncon~w |   0.90640    0.11850    0.15001    0.15483    0.11793 
miltotalfl~s |   0.92640   -0.16006   -0.31007   -0.03819    0.01856 
   miloffaid |   0.42080   -0.08736   -0.72551    0.08579    0.28157 
 miluseofimf |   0.92741   -0.11289    0.01113    0.00260    0.12703 
   miltryexp |   0.10890    0.03482   -0.00682    0.84986    0.26462 
  miltrypers |  -0.05914   -0.14538    0.05623    0.87735    0.20246 
   strategic |   0.27502   -0.58400   -0.20331    0.37922    0.39817 
 
 
. score fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp 
            (based on rotated factors) 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1          2          3          4 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
      aidexp |   0.02345    0.33972   -0.12662   -0.01963 
      aidgni |   0.02990    0.32709   -0.06908    0.04121 
 milibrdflws |   0.32654   -0.00624   -0.01200   -0.05819 
  milidaflws |   0.04979    0.04876   -0.39281   -0.07949 
 milothrflow |  -0.11761   -0.21327   -0.24760    0.01956 
milrbdconflw |  -0.04052    0.14445   -0.37627    0.08300 
milrbdncon~w |   0.06182   -0.20622   -0.09704   -0.19510 
milimfconflw |   0.02396    0.13832   -0.00560    0.01360 
milimfncon~w |   0.42552    0.16198    0.10029    0.05675 
miltotalfl~s |   0.00000    0.00000    0.00000    0.00000 
   miloffaid |   0.05515    0.04173   -0.34637    0.07823 
 miluseofimf |   0.26870    0.04450    0.08933   -0.01854 
   miltryexp |   0.02322    0.06943   -0.04385    0.47546 
  miltrypers |  -0.04038   -0.02488   -0.01851    0.48049 
   strategic |   0.00168   -0.19085   -0.07892    0.18942 
 
 
 
2. 
. factor legelec exelec liec1 eiec1 polity2  polity2chng polity2var durable 
xrcomp1 reprsupp competpar d3, pcf 
(obs=137) 
 
            (principal component factors; 2 factors retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        5.02323         2.50406      0.4186         0.4186 
     2        2.51917         1.55319      0.2099         0.6285 
     3        0.96598         0.08145      0.0805         0.7090 
     4        0.88453         0.26821      0.0737         0.7827 
     5        0.61632         0.10512      0.0514         0.8341 
     6        0.51119         0.08334      0.0426         0.8767 
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     7        0.42785         0.06980      0.0357         0.9124 
     8        0.35805         0.08874      0.0298         0.9422 
     9        0.26932         0.05700      0.0224         0.9646 
    10        0.21232         0.03334      0.0177         0.9823 
    11        0.17898         0.14591      0.0149         0.9972 
    12        0.03306               .      0.0028         1.0000 
 
               Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2    Uniqueness 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
     legelec |   0.71721    0.35492    0.35964 
      exelec |  -0.08539    0.55537    0.68427 
       liec1 |   0.83996    0.31689    0.19405 
       eiec1 |   0.36954   -0.05386    0.86054 
     polity2 |   0.93751    0.23323    0.06668 
 polity2chng |  -0.35904    0.70746    0.37058 
  polity2var |  -0.27854    0.66571    0.47924 
     durable |   0.55488   -0.46512    0.47577 
     xrcomp1 |   0.81268    0.27004    0.26663 
    reprsupp |  -0.85203   -0.31671    0.17375 
   competpar |   0.84564   -0.19020    0.24871 
          d3 |  -0.40576    0.74674    0.27773 
 
. rotate 
 
            (varimax rotation) 
               Rotated Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2    Uniqueness 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
     legelec |   0.79823    0.05644    0.35964 
      exelec |   0.13160    0.54627    0.68427 
       liec1 |   0.89739   -0.02530    0.19405 
       eiec1 |   0.32151   -0.18997    0.86054 
     polity2 |   0.95593   -0.13971    0.06668 
 polity2chng |  -0.06395    0.79078    0.37058 
  polity2var |  -0.00529    0.72161    0.47924 
     durable |   0.33706   -0.64080    0.47577 
     xrcomp1 |   0.85438   -0.05831    0.26663 
    reprsupp |  -0.90849    0.03004    0.17375 
   competpar |   0.71035   -0.49667    0.24871 
          d3 |  -0.09227    0.84484    0.27773 
 
. score fdemocracy fregiminstbl 
            (based on rotated factors) 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1          2 
-------------+--------------------- 
     legelec |   0.18554    0.07622 
      exelec |   0.06787    0.21044 
       liec1 |   0.20243    0.05299 
       eiec1 |   0.05996   -0.04768 
     polity2 |   0.20780    0.01489 
 polity2chng |   0.04036    0.28696 
  polity2var |   0.04890    0.26555 
     durable |   0.03220   -0.21273 
     xrcomp1 |   0.19035    0.03784 
    reprsupp |  -0.20462   -0.05201 
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   competpar |   0.12714   -0.13370 
          d3 |   0.03767    0.30492 
 
 
 
3. 
. factor  president parliament prtyin allhouse oppmajh majority tensys checks 
stabs powerexect nopowerexect,  pcf 
(obs=122) 
 
            (principal component factors; 3 factors retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        5.45247         3.90682      0.4957         0.4957 
     2        1.54565         0.45706      0.1405         0.6362 
     3        1.08859         0.32841      0.0990         0.7352 
     4        0.76018         0.14902      0.0691         0.8043 
     5        0.61117         0.16009      0.0556         0.8598 
     6        0.45108         0.10731      0.0410         0.9008 
     7        0.34377         0.07368      0.0313         0.9321 
     8        0.27009         0.06567      0.0246         0.9566 
     9        0.20442         0.04129      0.0186         0.9752 
    10        0.16313         0.05368      0.0148         0.9901 
    11        0.10945               .      0.0099         1.0000 
 
               Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3    Uniqueness 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
   president |  -0.52382   -0.67293    0.05411    0.26986 
  parliament |   0.81305    0.39894   -0.11757    0.16596 
      prtyin |  -0.41386    0.57099    0.19502    0.46466 
    allhouse |  -0.74943    0.30300   -0.05264    0.34378 
     oppmajh |   0.10311   -0.40569    0.79286    0.19615 
    majority |  -0.81387    0.32543    0.05796    0.22834 
      tensys |   0.74159    0.30885    0.29143    0.26972 
      checks |   0.90608    0.01193    0.03168    0.17787 
       stabs |   0.44067   -0.35609   -0.54945    0.37711 
  powerexect |  -0.88951    0.09987   -0.05597    0.19566 
nopowerexect |   0.86875    0.11410    0.08994    0.22417 
 
. rotate 
 
            (varimax rotation) 
               Rotated Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3    Uniqueness 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
   president |  -0.78803   -0.17859    0.27796    0.26986 
  parliament |   0.86706   -0.20860   -0.19680    0.16596 
      prtyin |   0.00116    0.72547   -0.09507    0.46466 
    allhouse |  -0.46126    0.62113   -0.24012    0.34378 
     oppmajh |  -0.00574   -0.04765    0.89529    0.19615 
    majority |  -0.48407    0.71649   -0.15484    0.22834 
      tensys |   0.82617   -0.07611    0.20479    0.26972 
      checks |   0.75790   -0.48631    0.10597    0.17787 
       stabs |   0.07968   -0.72041   -0.31232    0.37711 
  powerexect |  -0.68750    0.54950   -0.17243    0.19566 
nopowerexect |   0.79216   -0.36800    0.11349    0.22417 
 304
 
. score fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr 
            (based on rotated factors) 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1          2          3 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
   president |  -0.30744   -0.24581    0.21518 
  parliament |   0.24533    0.06370   -0.19047 
      prtyin |   0.16742    0.38247    0.00394 
    allhouse |  -0.01464    0.20180   -0.13684 
     oppmajh |  -0.00786    0.07938    0.77030 
    majority |   0.00012    0.25841   -0.05169 
      tensys |   0.26432    0.17392    0.17315 
      checks |   0.14581   -0.07611    0.03829 
       stabs |  -0.14111   -0.40954   -0.35599 
  powerexect |  -0.10768    0.11874   -0.08797 
nopowerexect |   0.18483   -0.00313    0.05908 
 
 
 
 
4. 
. factor  herfgov govfrac herfopp oppfrac herftot frac partyage mdmh pluralty 
propor polarization, pcf 
(obs=115) 
 
            (principal component factors; 3 factors retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        4.25398         2.03861      0.3867         0.3867 
     2        2.21537         0.58751      0.2014         0.5881 
     3        1.62787         0.69138      0.1480         0.7361 
     4        0.93648         0.20625      0.0851         0.8212 
     5        0.73023         0.24695      0.0664         0.8876 
     6        0.48329         0.08038      0.0439         0.9316 
     7        0.40291         0.06297      0.0366         0.9682 
     8        0.33994         0.33096      0.0309         0.9991 
     9        0.00897         0.00807      0.0008         0.9999 
    10        0.00090         0.00083      0.0001         1.0000 
    11        0.00007               .      0.0000         1.0000 
 
               Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3    Uniqueness 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
     herfgov |  -0.85816    0.18925    0.28397    0.14710 
     govfrac |   0.85854   -0.18835   -0.28458    0.14644 
     herfopp |  -0.28976    0.80768   -0.45805    0.05388 
     oppfrac |   0.24339   -0.82416    0.45422    0.05521 
     herftot |  -0.90203   -0.03397    0.23098    0.13183 
        frac |   0.90172    0.03586   -0.23384    0.13093 
    partyage |   0.19252    0.54678    0.04086    0.66230 
        mdmh |   0.20038    0.17270    0.57551    0.59882 
    pluralty |  -0.46022   -0.47589   -0.50357    0.30814 
      propor |   0.38838    0.45904    0.58656    0.29439 
polarization |   0.75540    0.20992    0.10750    0.37375 
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. rotate 
            (varimax rotation) 
               Rotated Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3    Uniqueness 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
     herfgov |  -0.90910    0.16205    0.01318    0.14710 
     govfrac |   0.90964   -0.16105   -0.01302    0.14644 
     herfopp |  -0.12689    0.96427   -0.01403    0.05388 
     oppfrac |   0.08667   -0.96802   -0.01433    0.05521 
     herftot |  -0.91720    0.00979   -0.16378    0.13183 
        frac |   0.91794   -0.00668    0.16252    0.13093 
    partyage |   0.13290    0.40398    0.39603    0.66230 
        mdmh |  -0.05115   -0.18689    0.60303    0.59882 
    pluralty |  -0.20029   -0.05917   -0.80514    0.30814 
      propor |   0.10255    0.01478    0.83359    0.29439 
polarization |   0.64053   -0.01117    0.46459    0.37375 
 
. score fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl 
            (based on rotated factors) 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1          2          3 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
     herfgov |  -0.25814    0.01690    0.10726 
     govfrac |   0.25834   -0.01638   -0.10729 
     herfopp |   0.02961    0.46281   -0.04081 
     oppfrac |  -0.03831   -0.46593    0.03111 
     herftot |  -0.24968   -0.04903    0.02419 
        frac |   0.25026    0.05067   -0.02509 
    partyage |   0.01914    0.18619    0.16900 
        mdmh |  -0.09975   -0.12515    0.32813 
    pluralty |   0.03325   -0.00178   -0.39043 
      propor |  -0.06841   -0.02795    0.41910 
polarization |   0.13223    0.01444    0.16486 
 
 
5. 
. factor   gini incmlow10 incmdiff10 lggdpcapt emplyagr emplyind, pcf 
(obs=90) 
 
 
            (principal component factors; 2 factors retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        3.01748         0.64294      0.5029         0.5029 
     2        2.37454         2.11570      0.3958         0.8987 
     3        0.25884         0.07992      0.0431         0.9418 
     4        0.17892         0.09054      0.0298         0.9716 
     5        0.08838         0.00654      0.0147         0.9864 
     6        0.08184               .      0.0136         1.0000 
 
               Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2    Uniqueness 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
        gini |   0.83762    0.48747    0.06076 
   incmlow10 |  -0.67798   -0.66617    0.09656 
  incmdiff10 |   0.72069    0.60575    0.11367 
   lggdpcapt |  -0.74195    0.53924    0.15873 
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    emplyagr |   0.59493   -0.76422    0.06203 
    emplyind |  -0.65755    0.67185    0.11623 
 
 
. rotate 
            (varimax rotation) 
               Rotated Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2    Uniqueness 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
        gini |   0.18773    0.95079    0.06076 
   incmlow10 |   0.05188   -0.94908    0.09656 
  incmdiff10 |   0.02169    0.94120    0.11367 
   lggdpcapt |  -0.89503   -0.20045    0.15873 
    emplyagr |   0.96672   -0.05858    0.06203 
    emplyind |  -0.93879   -0.04947    0.11623 
 
 
. score flowincome finequality 
            (based on rotated factors) 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1          2 
-------------+--------------------- 
        gini |   0.02939    0.34400 
   incmlow10 |   0.06206   -0.35403 
  incmdiff10 |  -0.03360    0.34784 
   lggdpcapt |  -0.33293   -0.03445 
    emplyagr |   0.37184   -0.06473 
    emplyind |  -0.35636    0.02345 
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APPENDIX-VII 
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
1. 
. summarize  inflyrs20, detail 
 
                          inflyrs20 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            0              0 
 5%            0              0 
10%            0              0       Obs                 135 
25%            0              0       Sum of Wgt.         135 
 
50%            2                      Mean           5.607407 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.688257 
75%           11             21 
90%           17             21       Variance       44.73278 
95%           20             24       Skewness        1.14048 
99%           24             26       Kurtosis       3.164191 
 
 
 
2. 
. summarize  inflyrs50, detail 
 
                          inflyrs50 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            0              0 
 5%            0              0 
10%            0              0       Obs                 135 
25%            0              0       Sum of Wgt.         135 
 
50%            0                      Mean           2.155556 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      4.214167 
75%            2             15 
90%            8             17       Variance        17.7592 
95%           13             17       Skewness       2.144043 
99%           17             18       Kurtosis       6.885776 
 
 
 
3. 
. summarize  inflyrs100, detail 
 
                         inflyrs100 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            0              0 
 308
 5%            0              0 
10%            0              0       Obs                 135 
25%            0              0       Sum of Wgt.         135 
 
50%            0                      Mean           1.022222 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.675111 
75%            0             10 
90%            3             11       Variance       7.156219 
95%            7             15       Skewness       3.492957 
99%           15             16       Kurtosis       16.42554 
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APPENDIX-VIII 
REGRESSION ANALYSES AND OVERDISPERSION TESTS 
 
1. 
 
Poisson regression analysis with Goodness of fit test for inflation years ≥ 20% with IRR: 
 
. poisson  inflyrs20  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -164.8538   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -164.57967   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
 
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =     170.12 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -164.57908                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3407 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   inflyrs20 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   3.496879   .8766857     4.99   0.000     2.139341    5.715856 
  faidpercnt |   .7149622   .0827166    -2.90   0.004     .5699075    .8969366 
flowregbil~d |   1.275003   .1300588     2.38   0.017     1.043958    1.557182 
  fhghmilexp |   2.522086   .4510101     5.17   0.000     1.776415    3.580761 
  fdemocracy |   .7522215   .1212032    -1.77   0.077     .5485222    1.031567 
fregiminstbl |   1.432334   .1820061     2.83   0.005     1.116561    1.837411 
 fparliament |   .4725077   .0973845    -3.64   0.000     .3154823    .7076893 
  fpolstabil |   1.125044   .1378357     0.96   0.336     .8848788    1.430392 
    fopppowr |   1.489539   .2340996     2.54   0.011     1.094649    2.026884 
    fgovfrac |   1.099604   .1440759     0.72   0.469      .850565     1.42156 
    foppfrac |   1.561305   .1126999     6.17   0.000     1.355331    1.798581 
  fproportnl |   1.421836   .1350424     3.71   0.000     1.180333    1.712752 
  flowincome |   1.371821   .1998052     2.17   0.030     1.031146    1.825049 
 finequality |   .9788256   .0731297    -0.29   0.775     .8454942    1.133183 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. poisgof 
 
  
         Goodness-of-fit chi2  =  198.7078 
         Prob > chi2(30)       =    0.0000         
 
 
 
Negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 20% with IRR: 
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. nbreg  inflyrs20  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr 
 
Fitting comparison Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -164.8538   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -164.57967   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -139.22872   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -137.73926   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -137.7381   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -137.7381   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -129.56291   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -124.32882   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -123.19346   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -123.15158   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -123.15155   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -123.15155   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =      29.17 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0099 
Log likelihood = -123.15155                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1059 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   inflyrs20 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   4.307668   3.083782     2.04   0.041     1.058967    17.52274 
  faidpercnt |   .7809068    .219036    -0.88   0.378     .4506572    1.353169 
flowregbil~d |   1.382077   .3357778     1.33   0.183     .8584822    2.225015 
  fhghmilexp |   3.492295   1.531195     2.85   0.004     1.478775    8.247453 
  fdemocracy |   .8358954   .3813311    -0.39   0.694     .3418521    2.043928 
fregiminstbl |   1.603142   .4950743     1.53   0.126     .8752017    2.936539 
 fparliament |   .2426906   .1452642    -2.37   0.018     .0750862    .7844147 
  fpolstabil |   1.458761   .4963459     1.11   0.267     .7487923    2.841888 
    fopppowr |   1.501892   .6354118     0.96   0.336     .6554165    3.441598 
    fgovfrac |   1.246025   .3994236     0.69   0.493     .6647632    2.335535 
    foppfrac |   1.684622   .3345602     2.63   0.009     1.141449    2.486269 
  fproportnl |    1.61688   .4115774     1.89   0.059     .9817569    2.662879 
  flowincome |   1.133348    .449011     0.32   0.752     .5213549    2.463731 
 finequality |   .8409457   .1689794    -0.86   0.389      .567189    1.246832 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.3706669   .3074367                     -.9732317    .2318979 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------  
       alpha |   .6902738   .2122155                      .3778599    1.260991 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   82.86 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Robust negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 20% with IRR: 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs20  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr robust 
 
Getting starting values from Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -164.8538   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -164.57967   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -139.22872   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -137.73926   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -137.7381   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -137.7381   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -129.56291   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -124.32882   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -123.19346   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -123.15158   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -123.15155   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -123.15155   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =      50.85 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -123.15155                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1059 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   inflyrs20 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   4.307668   2.539584     2.48   0.013      1.35649    13.67942 
  faidpercnt |   .7809068   .2236689    -0.86   0.388     .4454474    1.368996 
flowregbil~d |   1.382077   .2846972     1.57   0.116     .9229774    2.069537 
  fhghmilexp |   3.492295   1.205343     3.62   0.000     1.775515    6.869065 
  fdemocracy |   .8358954   .3212633    -0.47   0.641     .3935555    1.775407 
fregiminstbl |   1.603142   .4804291     1.57   0.115     .8910132    2.884429 
 fparliament |   .2426906   .1328519    -2.59   0.010     .0830032    .7095963 
  fpolstabil |   1.458761    .470103     1.17   0.241     .7756654     2.74343 
    fopppowr |   1.501892   .7650291     0.80   0.425     .5534221    4.075877 
    fgovfrac |   1.246025   .4357865     0.63   0.529     .6278072    2.473017 
    foppfrac |   1.684622   .3109979     2.83   0.005     1.173173    2.419038 
  fproportnl |    1.61688   .3462059     2.24   0.025     1.062719     2.46001 
  flowincome |   1.133348   .4890697     0.29   0.772     .4864602    2.640458 
 finequality |   .8409457   .1728061    -0.84   0.399     .5621528    1.258003 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.3706669   .3284676                     -1.014452    .2731176 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .6902738   .2267326                      .3626013    1.314055 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Robust negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 20% with coefficients: 
 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs20  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, robust 
 
Getting starting values from Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -164.8538   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -164.57967   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -164.57908   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -139.22872   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -137.73926   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -137.7381   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -137.7381   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -129.56291   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -124.32882   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -123.19346   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -123.15158   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -123.15155   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -123.15155   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =      50.85 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -123.15155                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1059 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   inflyrs20 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   1.460397   .5895497     2.48   0.013     .3049004    2.615893 
  faidpercnt |  -.2472994    .286422    -0.86   0.388    -.8086762    .3140773 
flowregbil~d |   .3235871   .2059924     1.57   0.116    -.0801505    .7273247 
  fhghmilexp |   1.250559   .3451434     3.62   0.000     .5740905    1.927028 
  fdemocracy |  -.1792518   .3843343    -0.47   0.641    -.9325333    .5740296 
fregiminstbl |   .4719654   .2996797     1.57   0.115    -.1153961    1.059327 
 fparliament |  -1.415968   .5474124    -2.59   0.010    -2.488876   -.3430591 
  fpolstabil |   .3775875   .3222618     1.17   0.241     -.254034    1.009209 
    fopppowr |   .4067258   .5093768     0.80   0.425    -.5916343    1.405086 
    fgovfrac |   .2199584   .3497414     0.63   0.529    -.4655222     .905439 
    foppfrac |   .5215409   .1846099     2.83   0.005     .1597121    .8833698 
 313
  fproportnl |   .4804982   .2141198     2.24   0.025     .0608311    .9001652 
  flowincome |   .1251762   .4315264     0.29   0.772    -.7206001    .9709525 
 finequality |  -.1732282   .2054902    -0.84   0.399    -.5759816    .2295252 
       _cons |   1.751103   .4150878     4.22   0.000     .9375461     2.56466 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.3706669   .3284676                     -1.014452    .2731176 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .6902738   .2267326                      .3626013    1.314055 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
2. 
 
Poisson regression analysis with Goodness of fit test for inflation years ≥ 50% with IRR: 
 
. poisson  inflyrs50  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -103.68449   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -102.4677   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
 
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =     153.71 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.46605                       Pseudo R2       =     0.4286 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   inflyrs50 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   29.63351   15.70301     6.40   0.000     10.48879    83.72226 
  faidpercnt |   1.063596   .2276818     0.29   0.773     .6991359    1.618049 
flowregbil~d |   2.092296   .4699978     3.29   0.001     1.347149    3.249606 
  fhghmilexp |   2.930476   .9200285     3.42   0.001     1.583805    5.422187 
  fdemocracy |   .4452353   .1295966    -2.78   0.005     .2516672    .7876848 
fregiminstbl |   2.048248   .4997312     2.94   0.003     1.269716    3.304141 
 fparliament |   .7654772   .2958197    -0.69   0.489      .358909    1.632602 
  fpolstabil |   .4774658   .1136843    -3.10   0.002     .2994138    .7613998 
    fopppowr |   2.478778   .7854981     2.86   0.004      1.33199    4.612902 
    fgovfrac |   .6382545   .1790647    -1.60   0.109     .3682868    1.106118 
    foppfrac |    1.97736   .2586266     5.21   0.000      1.53022    2.555158 
  fproportnl |   1.275248    .217853     1.42   0.155     .9123942    1.782408 
  flowincome |    .947011   .2311233    -0.22   0.823     .5869682    1.527902 
 finequality |   .8402118   .1067424    -1.37   0.171     .6550135    1.077773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. poisgof 
 
         Goodness-of-fit chi2  =  142.1027 
         Prob > chi2(30)       =    0.0000 
 
 
Negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 50% with IRR: 
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. nbreg  inflyrs50  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr 
 
Fitting comparison Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -103.68449   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -102.4677   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -99.46001   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -84.400155   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -84.247995   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -84.247811   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -84.247811   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -79.95223  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -75.382146   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -74.346298   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -72.808683   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -72.79383   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -72.79381   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  -72.79381   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =      22.91 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0618 
Log likelihood =  -72.79381                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1360 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   inflyrs50 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   487.6632   1049.028     2.88   0.004     7.195711     33049.6 
  faidpercnt |    2.19103   1.320834     1.30   0.193     .6722216    7.141415 
flowregbil~d |   3.073162   2.305758     1.50   0.135     .7062177     13.3731 
  fhghmilexp |   4.579668   4.457252     1.56   0.118     .6798064    30.85195 
  fdemocracy |   .0964281   .1127773    -2.00   0.046     .0097428    .9543871 
fregiminstbl |   2.056814    1.24895     1.19   0.235      .625639     6.76186 
 fparliament |   .6392501   .8198691    -0.35   0.727     .0517564    7.895468 
  fpolstabil |   .4208955   .3276278    -1.11   0.266     .0915363     1.93533 
    fopppowr |   3.531493    3.13847     1.42   0.156     .6187109    20.15714 
    fgovfrac |   1.255403   .9343939     0.31   0.760     .2919007    5.399218 
    foppfrac |   2.799476   1.182381     2.44   0.015      1.22339    6.406024 
  fproportnl |   2.121442   1.177245     1.36   0.175     .7149517    6.294853 
  flowincome |   .2733139    .252838    -1.40   0.161     .0445892    1.675304 
 finequality |   .5405536   .2464773    -1.35   0.177     .2211641    1.321183 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .7177075   .3839412                     -.0348034    1.470218 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   2.049729   .7869753                      .9657953    4.350185 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   59.34 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Robust negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 50% with IRR: 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs50  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr robust 
 
Getting starting values from Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -103.68449   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -102.4677   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -99.46001   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -84.400155   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -84.247995   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -84.247811   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -84.247811   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -79.95223  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -75.382146   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -74.346298   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -72.808683   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -72.79383   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -72.79381   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  -72.79381   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =      22.11 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0763 
Log likelihood =  -72.79381                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1360 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   inflyrs50 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   487.6632   1034.299     2.92   0.004     7.634525    31149.99 
  faidpercnt  2.19103 0.124
flowregbil~d |   3.073162   1.530076     2.25   0.024     1.158207    8.154261 
|       1.11848     1.54        .8056117    5.958966 
  fhghmilexp |   4.579668   3.221268     2.16   0.031      1.15375    18.17842 
  fdemocracy |   .0964281   .1051223    -2.15   0.032      .011383    .8168667 
fregiminstbl |   2.056814   1.017931     1.46   0.145     .7797038    5.425757 
 fparliament |   .6392501   .6212091    -0.46   0.645     .0951682    4.293878 
  fpolstabil |   .4208955   .2194265    -1.66   0.097      .151501     1.16932 
    fopppowr |   3.531493   2.644367     1.69   0.092     .8139212    15.32267 
    fgovfrac |   1.255403   .7206716     0.40   0.692     .4075167    3.867413 
    foppfrac |   2.799476   1.083169     2.66   0.008     1.311389    5.976161 
  fproportnl |   2.121442   .9527109     1.67   0.094     .8797677    5.115573 
  flowincome |   .2733139   .2395589    -1.48   0.139      .049044    1.523133 
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 finequality |   .5405536   .2278316    -1.46   0.144     .2366333    1.234814 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .7177075   .3670981                     -.0017916    1.437207 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   2.049729   .7524516                        .99821    4.208922 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Robust negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 50% with coefficients: 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs50  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, robust 
 
Getting starting values from Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -103.68449   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -102.4677   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.46605   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -99.46001   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -84.400155   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -84.247995   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -84.247811   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -84.247811   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -79.95223  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -75.382146   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -74.346298   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -72.808683   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -72.79383   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -72.79381   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  -72.79381   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =      22.11 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0763 
Log likelihood =  -72.79381                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1360 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   inflyrs50 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   6.189625   2.120929     2.92   0.004     2.032681    10.34657 
  faidpercnt |   .7843718   .5104814     1.54   0.124    -.2161534    1.784897 
flowregbil~d |   1.122707   .4978835     2.25   0.024     .1468731    2.098541 
  fhghmilexp |   1.521626   .7033847     2.16   0.031     .1430178    2.900235 
  fdemocracy |  -2.338957   1.090162    -2.15   0.032    -4.475636   -.2022794 
fregiminstbl |   .7211581   .4949067     1.46   0.145    -.2488412    1.691157 
 fparliament |  -.4474595    .971778    -0.46   0.645    -2.352109     1.45719 
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  fpolstabil |  -.8653706   .5213324    -1.66   0.097    -1.887163    .1564221 
    fopppowr |   1.261721   .7487956     1.69   0.092    -.2058918    2.729333 
    fgovfrac |   .2274562   .5740562     0.40   0.692    -.8976732    1.352586 
    foppfrac |   1.029432   .3869183     2.66   0.008     .2710865    1.787778 
  fproportnl |    .752096   .4490865     1.67   0.094    -.1280974    1.632289 
  flowincome |  -1.297134   .8764974    -1.48   0.139    -3.015038    .4207691 
 finequality |  -.6151615   .4214783    -1.46   0.144    -1.441244    .2109207 
       _cons |   2.003243   .9094657     2.20   0.028     .2207232    3.785763 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .7177075   .3670981                     -.0017916    1.437207 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   2.049729   .7524516                        .99821    4.208922 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
3. 
 
Poisson regression analysis with Goodness of fit test for inflation years ≥ 100% with IRR: 
 
. poisson inflyrs100  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -70.002016   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -69.742719   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
 
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =      36.98 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0007 
Log likelihood = -69.741834                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2096 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  inflyrs100 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   7.969274   5.563823     2.97   0.003     2.028358    31.31072 
  faidpercnt |   1.227753   .3647925     0.69   0.490      .685804     2.19797 
flowregbil~d |   1.368641   .3512593     1.22   0.221     .8276188    2.263336 
  fhghmilexp |   1.866035   .8284708     1.41   0.160     .7816428    4.454829 
  fdemocracy |   .4791557   .2075909    -1.70   0.089     .2049744    1.120092 
fregiminstbl |   2.347283   .8760686     2.29   0.022     1.129469    4.878166 
 fparliament |   .7245207   .4069812    -0.57   0.566     .2409406    2.178671 
  fpolstabil |   .7810621   .2587245    -0.75   0.456     .4080634    1.495008 
    fopppowr |   1.266315   .5572561     0.54   0.592     .5345167    3.000009 
    fgovfrac |   .8411206   .2945782    -0.49   0.621     .4233986    1.670964 
    foppfrac |   1.552377   .3004401     2.27   0.023      1.06233     2.26848 
  fproportnl |   1.051596   .2619738     0.20   0.840     .6453528    1.713564 
  flowincome |   .6950639   .2534849    -1.00   0.319     .3400929    1.420535 
 finequality |   .8337824   .1573758    -0.96   0.336     .5759556    1.207025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. poisgof 
 
         Goodness-of-fit chi2  =  96.91199 
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         Prob > chi2(30)       =    0.0000 
 
 
Negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 100% with IRR: 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs100  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, irr 
 
Fitting comparison Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -70.002016   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -69.742719   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -66.354507   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -65.815182   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -60.525149   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -59.886863   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -59.886249   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -59.886249   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -56.409875   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -53.843679   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =    -51.911   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -51.872676   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -51.872563   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -51.872563   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =      16.03 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3117 
Log likelihood = -51.872563                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1338 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  inflyrs100 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   166.1737   410.4464     2.07   0.038     1.312524    21038.61 
  faidpercnt |   2.259828   1.509318     1.22   0.222     .6103317     8.36729 
flowregbil~d |   1.746918   1.311036     0.74   0.457     .4012904    7.604776 
  fhghmilexp |    3.34131   3.952686     1.02   0.308     .3288263    33.95212 
  fdemocracy |   .0638462   .1039407    -1.69   0.091     .0026266     1.55195 
fregiminstbl |   4.968216   4.947151     1.61   0.107     .7056803    34.97784 
 fparliament |   .6082002   .9785201    -0.31   0.757     .0259757    14.24053 
  fpolstabil |   .7090199   .6494051    -0.38   0.707     .1177678    4.268649 
    fopppowr |   1.359063    1.40059     0.30   0.766     .1803139    10.24354 
    fgovfrac |    1.56372    1.32388     0.53   0.597     .2975178    8.218735 
    foppfrac |   2.607271   1.392034     1.79   0.073     .9156417    7.424149 
  fproportnl |   1.639573   1.116259     0.73   0.468     .4317306    6.226566 
  flowincome |   .1926452   .2138409    -1.48   0.138     .0218728     1.69673 
 finequality |     .52531    .290795    -1.16   0.245     .1775078    1.554583 
 319
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .8665747   .4231508                      .0372144    1.695935 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   2.378749    1.00657                      1.037915    5.451742 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   35.74 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
 
 
Robust negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 100% with IRR: 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs100  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, robust irr 
 
Getting starting values from Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -70.002016   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -69.742719   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -66.354507   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -65.815182   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -60.525149   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -59.886863   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -59.886249   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -59.886249   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -56.409875   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -53.843679   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =    -51.911   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -51.872676   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -51.872563   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -51.872563   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =      14.89 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3854 
Log likelihood = -51.872563                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1338 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  inflyrs100 |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   166.1737   398.9114     2.13   0.033     1.503813    18362.45 
  faidpercnt |   2.259828    1.29985     1.42   0.156     .7319227    6.977269 
flowregbil~d |   1.746918   .8162478     1.19   0.233     .6991149    4.365124 
  fhghmilexp |    3.34131   2.876099     1.40   0.161      .618341    18.05533 
  fdemocracy |   .0638462    .084598    -2.08   0.038     .0047563    .8570386 
fregiminstbl |   4.968216     2.8595     2.79   0.005     1.607993     15.3503 
 fparliament |   .6082002   .6058233    -0.50   0.618      .086332     4.28471 
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  fpolstabil |   .7090199   .3860352    -0.63   0.528     .2438993    2.061134 
    fopppowr |   1.359063   .7357788     0.57   0.571     .4703385    3.927072 
    fgovfrac |    1.56372   .8979478     0.78   0.436     .5074186     4.81894 
    foppfrac |   2.607271   1.271303     1.97   0.049      1.00263    6.780027 
  fproportnl |   1.639573    .833723     0.97   0.331      .605194     4.44188 
  flowincome |   .1926452   .2095941    -1.51   0.130     .0228385    1.624981 
 finequality |     .52531   .2624068    -1.29   0.197     .1973408    1.398345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .8665747   .3633639                      .1543945    1.578755 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   2.378749   .8643516                      1.166951    4.848915 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Robust negative binomial regression results for inflation years ≥ 100% with coefficients: 
 
. nbreg  inflyrs100  fimfwb faidpercnt flowregbilaid fhghmilexp fdemocracy 
fregiminstbl fparliament fpolstabil fopppowr fgovfrac foppfrac fproportnl  flowincome 
finequality, robust 
 
Getting starting values from Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -70.002016   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -69.742719   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -69.741834   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -66.354507   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -65.815182   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -60.525149   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -59.886863   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -59.886249   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -59.886249   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -56.409875   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -53.843679   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =    -51.911   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -51.872676   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -51.872563   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -51.872563   
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =         45 
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =      14.89 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3854 
Log likelihood = -51.872563                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1338 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  inflyrs100 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fimfwb |   5.113033   2.400569     2.13   0.033     .4080037    9.818063 
  faidpercnt |   .8152886   .5751988     1.42   0.156    -.3120803    1.942658 
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flowregbil~d |   .5578532   .4672501     1.19   0.233    -.3579402    1.473647 
  fhghmilexp |   1.206363     .86077     1.40   0.161    -.4807152    2.893441 
  fdemocracy |  -2.751278   1.325027    -2.08   0.038    -5.348283   -.1542724 
fregiminstbl |   1.603061   .5755586     2.79   0.005     .4749868    2.731135 
 fparliament |  -.4972511   .9960918    -0.50   0.618    -2.449555    1.455053 
  fpolstabil |  -.3438717   .5444631    -0.63   0.528       -1.411    .7232565 
    fopppowr |   .3067957   .5413867     0.57   0.571    -.7543027    1.367894 
    fgovfrac |   .4470675   .5742383     0.78   0.436    -.6784189    1.572554 
    foppfrac |    .958304   .4875993     1.97   0.049     .0026268    1.913981 
  fproportnl |   .4944357   .5085002     0.97   0.331    -.5022063    1.491078 
  flowincome |  -1.646905    1.08798    -1.51   0.130    -3.779306     .485496 
 finequality |  -.6437668   .4995276    -1.29   0.197    -1.622823    .3352894 
       _cons |   .4637129   .9121237     0.51   0.611    -1.324017    2.251442 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   .8665747   .3633639                      .1543945    1.578755 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   2.378749   .8643516                      1.166951    4.848915 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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APPENDIX-IX 
CAUSALITY ANALYSIS 
 
1. 
. pcorr  inf20sec polity2first d3first miluseimf1 milrbdflw1 
(obs=131) 
 
Partial correlation of inf20sec with 
 
    Variable |    Corr.     Sig. 
-------------+------------------ 
polity2first |  -0.2493    0.005 
     d3first |  -0.0404    0.651 
  miluseimf1 |   0.1987    0.025 
  milrbdflw1 |  -0.1129    0.205 
 
. pcorr  inf20first polity2sec d3sec miluseimf2 milrbdflw2 
(obs=131) 
 
Partial correlation of inf20first with 
 
    Variable |    Corr.     Sig. 
-------------+------------------ 
  polity2sec |  -0.0754    0.397 
       d3sec |   0.0543    0.543 
  miluseimf2 |   0.1560    0.079 
  milrbdflw2 |   0.0056    0.950 
 
 
2. 
. pcorr  inf50sec polity2first d3first miluseimf1 milrbdflw1 
(obs=131) 
 
Partial correlation of inf50sec with 
 
    Variable |    Corr.     Sig. 
-------------+------------------ 
polity2first |  -0.1438    0.105 
     d3first 0.0394 0.659
  miluseimf1 0.3180    0.000 
 |  -      
 |   
  milrbdflw1 |  -0.2122    0.016 
 
. pcorr  inf50first polity2sec d3sec miluseimf2 milrbdflw2 
(obs=131) 
 
Partial correlation of inf50first with 
 
    Variable |    Corr.     Sig. 
-------------+------------------ 
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  polity2sec |  -0.0290    0.745 
       d3sec |  -0.0621    0.486 
  miluseimf2 |   0.2830    0.001 
  milrbdflw2 |  -0.0362    0.685 
 
 
3. 
. pcorr  inf100sec polity2first d3first miluseimf1 milrbdflw1 
(obs=131) 
 
Partial correlation of inf100sec with  
 
    Variable |    Corr.     Sig. 
------------ ------- -----
polity2first |  -0.1759    0.047 
-+-- ----  
     d3first |  -0.0729    0.414 
  miluseimf1 |   0.3982    0.000 
  milrbdflw1 |  -0.2935    0.001 
 
. pcorr  inf100first polity2sec d3sec miluseimf2 milrbdflw2 
(obs=131) 
 
Partial correlation of inf100first with 
 
    Variable |    Corr.     Sig. 
-------------+------------------ 
  polity2sec |   0.0418    0.640 
       d3sec |  -0.0791    0.375 
  miluseimf2 |   0.3092    0.000 
  milrbdflw2 |  -0.0280    0.754 
 
 324
Bibliography 
"ACE Encyclopaedia."(Last Update Date).  Retrieved Access Date, Access, from 
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd02/esd02e/esd02e01. 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, et al. (2002). "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: 
Volatility, Crises and Growth." 9124. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Achdut, L. (1996). "Income Inequality, Income Composition and Macroeconomic Trends: 
Israel." Economica 63(250): S1-S27. 
 
--- (1997). "Income Inequality and Poverty under Transition from rapid Inflation to Stability: 
Israel 1979-90." In The Distribution of Well-Being During the 1980s. P. Gottschalk, B. 
Gustafsson and E. Palmer. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Achdut, L. and D. Bigman (1991). "The Anatomy of Changes in Poverty and Income Inequality 
Under rapid Inflation: Israel, 1979-84." Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 2: 
229-243. 
 
Agenor, P.-R. (1998). "Stabilization Policies, Poverty, and the Labor Market." Manuscript, 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
 
Aharoni, Y. (1998). "The Changing Political Economy of Israel." Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 555: 127-146. 
 
Aizenman, J. (1987). "Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs." Journal of International 
Economic Integration 2(2 (Autumn)): 12-28. 
 
Akat, A. S. (2000). "The Political Economy of Inflation in Turkey." Journal of International 
Affairs 54(1): 265-82. 
 
Akçay, O. C., C. E. Alper, et al. (1997). "Currency Substitution and Exchange Rate Instability: 
The Turkish Case." European Economic Review 41(3-5): 827-835. 
 
Akinci, H. (1998). "Turkey’s Relations With the Central Asian and Caucasian Republics." In 
Turkey At the Threshold of the 21st Century Global Encounters and/vs Regional 
Alternatives. M. Aydin. Ankara, International Relations Foundation. 
 325
 
Aksoy, A. (1982). "Structural Aspects of Turkish Inflation, 1950-1979." World Bank Staff 
Working Papers. No. 540. World Bank. Washington, DC. 
 
Akyüz, Y. (1973). "Money and Inflation in Turkey: 1950-1968." No. 361. Ankara University. 
Ankara. 
 
Al-Marhubi, F. A. (2000). "Income Inequality and Inflation: The Cross-Country Evidence." 
Contemporary Economic Policy 18(4): 428-439. 
 
Albanesi, S. (2002). "Inflation and Inequality." CEPR Discussion Papers. 3470. CEPR.  
 
Alesina, A. (1988). "Macroeconomics and Politics." NBER Macroeconomic Annual: 13-52. 
 
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991). "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic 
Review 81(5): 1170-88. 
 
Alesina, A. and R. Gatti (1995). "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Costs?" 
American Economic Review 85(May): 196-200. 
 
Alesina, A., S. Ozler, et al. (1996). "Political Instability and Economic Growth." Journal of 
Economic Growth 1(2): 149-187. 
 
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1996). "Income Distribution, Political Instability and Economic 
Growth." European Economic Review 40(6): 1203-1228. 
 
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, et al. (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press. 
 
Alesina, A. and J. Sachs (1988). "Political parties and the business cycle in the United States." 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20(1): 63-82. 
 
Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990). "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government 
Debt." The Review of Economic Studies 57(3): 403-414. 
 
Alper, E. and M. Üçer (1998). "Some Observations on Turkish Inflation: A ‘Random Walk’ 
Down the Past Decade." Bogazici Journal 12 (1): 7-38. 
 
Altimir, O. (1996). "Economic Development and Social Equity: A Latin American Perspective." 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38(2-3): 47-71. 
 
--- (1997)." In Poverty, Economic Reform, and Income Distribution in Latin America. A. Berry. 
Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
 326
--- (1998). "Inequality, Employment, and Poverty in Latin America." In Poverty and Inequality 
in Latin America. V. E. Tokman and G. O'Donnell. Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre 
Dame Press: 3-35. 
 
Alvarez, M. M., J. A. Cheibub, et al. (1994). "Classifying Political Regimes for the ACLP Data 
Set." No. 3. University of Chicago Center on Democracy.  
 
Alvarez, R. M., G. Garrett, et al. (1991). "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and 
Macroeconomic Performance." American Political Science Review 85(2): 539-56. 
 
Ames, B. (2000). The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Michigan, University of Michigan 
Press. 
 
Amorin Neto, O. and G. Cox (1997). "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures and the 
Number of Parties." American Journal of Political Science 41(1): 149-74. 
 
Amsden, A. H. (2001). The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-industrializing 
Economies. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Andersen, L. C. and K. M. Carlson (1970). "A Monetarist Model for Economic Stabilization." 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review 52(4): 7-25. 
 
Argy, V. (1970). "Structural Inflation in Developing Countries." Oxford Economic Papers 22(1): 
73-85. 
 
Aricanli, T. and D. Rodrik (1990). The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and 
Sustainability. Basingstoke, England, Macmillan Press. 
 
Arnold, D. J. and J. A. Quelch (1998). "New Strategies in Emerging Economies." Sloan 
Management Review of Economic Studies 40(1): 7-20. 
 
Athanasopulos, H. (2001). Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International 
Law. Jefferson, NC, McFarland. 
 
Aukrust, O. (1970). "PRIM I: A Model of the Price and Income Distribution Mechanism of an 
Open Economy." Review of Income and Wealth 16(1): 51-78. 
 
Austen-Smith, D. and J. S. Banks (1988). "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." The 
American Political Science Review 82(2): 405-422. 
 
Auvinen, J. Y. (1996). "IMF intervention and political protest in the Third World: a conventional 
wisdom refined." Third World Quarterly 17(3): 377-400. 
 
Babones, S. J. and M. J. Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007). "Standardized Income Inequality Data for 
Use in Cross-National Research." Sociological Inquiry 77(1): 3-22. 
 
 327
Baer, W. (1991). "Social Aspects of Latin American Inflation." Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Business 31(3): 45-57. 
 
--- (2001). The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development. Westport, Conn., Praeger. 
 
Bambaci, J., T. Saront, et al. (2002). "The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in 
Argentina." Journal of Policy Reform 5(2): 75-88. 
 
Baran, P. (1957). The Political Economy of Growth. New York, Monthly Review Press. 
 
Barron, D. N. (1992). "The Analysis of Count Data: Overdispersion and Autocorrelation." 
Sociological Methodology 22: 179-220. 
 
Bates, R. H. and A. O. Krueger (1993). Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy 
Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries. Oxford, Blackwell. 
 
Baumol, W. J. (1967). Business Behavior, Value and Growth. New York, Harcourt Brace and 
World. 
 
Beck, T., P. E. Keefer, et al. (2004, Last Update Date). "Database of Political Institutions." 
Retrieved Access Date, Access 2004, from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2004-
no_formula_no_macro.xls. 
 
Beckerman, P. E. (1992). The Economics of High Inflation. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press. 
 
Beetsma, R. M. W. J. and F. Van Der Ploeg (1996). "Does Inequality Cause Inflation? The 
Political Economy of Inflation, Taxation, and Government Debt." Public Choice 87: 143-
62. 
 
Berry, A., Ed. (1997). Poverty, Economic Reform, and Income Distribution in Latin America. 
Critical Perspectives in Latin America's Economy and Society. Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
 
Bhattacharya, J., H. Bunzel, et al. (2003). "Inflationary Finance in a Simple Voting Model." 
Working Paper. No. 03012. Iowa State University, Department of Economics.  
 
Bienen, H. S. and M. Gersovitz (1985). "Economic Stabilization, Conditionality, and Political 
Stability." International Organization 39(4): 729-754. 
 
Bilgin, P. (2005). "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." 
European Journal of Political Research 44(1): 175-201. 
 
Bird, G. (1996). "The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Review of the 
Evidence and Policy Options." International Organization 50(3): 477-511. 
 
 328
Blake, C. H. (1996). "The Politics of Inflation-Fighting in New Democracies." Studies in 
Comparative International Development 31(2): 37-57. 
 
Boratav, K. (1990). "Inter-Class and Intra-Class Relations of Distribution under "Structural 
Adjustment": Turkey during the 1980s." In The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, 
Adjustment and Sustainability. T. Aricanli and D. Rodrik. New York, St. Martin's Press: 
199-229. 
 
"Brazil: 1994 Country Report On Economic Policy And Trade Practices (1994)." Bureau Of 
Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department Of State.  
 
Brichta, A. (1998). "The New Premier-Parliamentary System in Israel." The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 555(1): 180-192. 
 
Brittan, S. (1977). The Economic Consequences of Democracy. London, Temple Smith. 
 
--- (1978). "How British Is the British Sickness?" Journal of Law and Economics 21(2): 245-68. 
 
Bronfenbrenner, M. and F. D. Holzman (1963). "Survey of Inflation Theory." The American 
Economic Review 53(4): 593-661. 
 
Brunner, K. (1972). "Money, Debt and Economic Activity." Journal of Political Economy 80(5): 
951-77. 
 
Brunner, K. and A. H. Meltzer (1976). "An Aggregative Theory for a Closed Economy." In 
Monetarism. J. Stein. Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
 
Bruno, M. (1993). Crisis, Stabilization, and Economic Reform: Therapy by Consensus, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bulif, A. (1998). "Income Inequality: Does inflation matter?" IMF Working Paper. WP/98/7. 
IMF.  
 
Bulif, A. and A. Gulde (1995). "Inflation and Income Distribution." IMF Working Paper. 95/86. 
IMF. Washington, DC. 
 
Burdekin, R. C. K. and P. Burkett (1996). Distributional Conflict and Inflation: Theoretical and 
Historical Perspectives. Houndmills, Macmillan Press. 
 
Cagan, P. (1971). Recent Monetary Policy and the Inflation, from 1965 to August 1971. 
Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
--- (1974). The Hydra-headed Monster: The Problem of Inflation in the United States. 
Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
 329
--- (1979). Persistent Inflation: Historical and Policy Essays. New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Cagan, P. and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. (1973). A New Look at 
Inflation: Economic Policy in the Early 1970s. Washington, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Calvo, G. and C. A. Vegh (1994). "Inflation Stabilization and Nominal Anchors." Contemporary 
Economic Policy 12(2): 35-45. 
 
--- (1999). "Inflation Stabilization and BOP Crises in Developing Countries." In Handbook of 
Macroeconomics. J. Taylor and M. Woodford, North Holland. Volume C: 1531-1614. 
 
Camp, R. A. (1992). Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico. New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Candar, C. (1999). "Redifining Turkey's Political Center." Journal of Democracy 10(4): 129-141. 
 
Cardoso, F. H. (1979). "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America." In 
The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. D. Collier. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press: 33–57. 
 
Cheibub, J. A. (1998). "Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation 
in Democracies and Dictatorships." World Politics 50(3): 349-376. 
 
Cheibub, J. A. and F. Limongi (2002). "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: 
Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered." Annual Review of Political 
Science 5(June): 151-179. 
 
Conflict Barometer (2002). Heidelberg, Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research. 
 
Cox, G. (1997). Making Votes Count. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cox, G. W. and M. D. McCubbins (2001). "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy 
Outcomes." In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. M. D. McCubbins and S. Haggard. 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Crouch, C. (1978). "Inflation and the Political Organization of Economic Interests." In The 
Political Economy of Inflation. F. Hirsch and J. H. Goldthorpe. London, Martin 
Robertson. 
 
Crowe, C. (2004). "Inflation, Inequality and Social Conflict." CEP Discussion Paper. 657.  
 
Cukierman, A., S. Edwards, et al. (1992). "Seignorage and Political Instability." American 
Economic Review 82(June): 537-56. 
 
 330
Cukierman, A. and S. B. Webb (1995). "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International 
Evidence." World Bank Economic Review 9(3): 397-423. 
 
Dahan, M. (2002). "The Rise of Earning Inequality." In The Israeli Economy, 1985-1998: From 
Government Intervention to Market Economics. A. Ben-Bassat. Cambridge, Mass., The 
MIT Press: 485-517. 
 
Darrat, A. F. (1997). "Domestic and International Sources of Inflation in Some Muslim 
Countries: An Empirical Inquiry." The Middle East Business and Economic Review 9(1): 
14-24. 
 
De Santis, R. (1993). "An Error Correction Monetary Model Explaining the Inflationary Process 
in Turkey." Warwick Economic Research Papers. No. 418.  
 
de Souza, A. (2004). Political Reform in Brazil: Promises and Pitfalls. Policy Papers on the 
Americas. Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
Volume XV. 
 
Desai, R. M., A. Olofsgard, et al. (2002). "Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation." Walsh School 
of Foreign Service Working Paper. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 
Georgetown University. Washington, DC. 
 
Desch, M. C. (1989). "The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the 
Periphery." International Security 14(1): 86-121. 
 
Desposato, S. and D. Samuels (2003). The Search for Party Discipline in the Brazilian 
Legislature and Implications for Comparative Institutional Research. Conference of the 
Latin American Studies Association,  March 27-29, Dallas, Texas. 
 
Dibooglu, S. and A. Kibritcioglu (2001). "Inflation, Output, and Stabilization in a High Inflation 
Economy: Turkey, 1980 - 2000." No. 01-0112. University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign, Office of Research.  
 
Diekhoff, G. (1992). Statistics for the Social and Behavioral Sciences: Univariate, Bivariate, 
Multivariate. Dubuque, IA, Wm.C.Brown Publishers. 
 
Dijkstra, A. G. (1997). "Fighting Inflation in Latin America." Development and Change 28(3): 
531-557. 
 
Dolmas, J., G. W. Huffman, et al. (2000). "Inequality, Inflation, and Central Bank 
Independence." The Canadian Journal of Economics 33(1): 271-287. 
 
Dornbusch, R. (1975). "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics." Journal of Political 
Economy 84(6): 1161-1176. 
 
 331
Dornbusch, R. and S. Edwards (1991). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. 
Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, Harper. 
 
Drazen, A. (2000). "The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years." NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Drazen, A. and V. Grilli (1993). "The Benefit of Crisis for Economic Reform." American 
Economic Review 83: 598-607. 
 
Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties. New York, Wiley. 
 
Easterly, W. and S. Fischer (2001). "Inflation and the Poor." Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 33(2): 160-78. 
 
Eckstein, H. (1973). "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In Handbook of Political 
Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry. F. Greenstein and N. Polsby. Reading, MA, 
Addison-Wesley: 79-133. 
 
Edgren, G., K.-O. Faxen, et al. (1973). Wage Formation and the Economy. London, Alien and 
Unwin. 
 
Edin, P.-A. and H. Olhsson (1991). "Political Determinants of Budget Deficits: Coalition Effects 
vs. Minority Effects." European Economic Review 35(8): 1597-1603. 
 
Edwards, S. (1994). "The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing 
Countries." Economic Development and Cultural Change 42(2): 235-65. 
 
--- (1995). Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Edwards, S. and G. Tabellini (1991). "Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in Developing 
Countries." Journal of International Money and Finance 10(March): 16-48. 
 
--- (1992). "Political Instability, Political Weakness and Inflation: An Empirical Analysis." 
NBER Working Paper. No. 3721. NBER.  
 
Ergun, M. (2000). "Electoral Political Business Cycles in Emerging Markets: Evidence from 
Turkey." Russian and East European Finance and Trade 36(6): 6-32. 
 
Ertuğrul, A. (1982). Public Deficits, Money Stock and Inflation (in Turkish). Ankara, Yapi ve 
Kredi Bankasi Yayinlari. 
 
Fair, R. C. (1973). "On Controlling the Economy to Win Elections." Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Paper.  
 332
 
Figueiredo, A. C. and F. Limongi (2000). "Presidential Power. Legislative Organization, and 
Party Behavior in Brazil." Comparative Politics(January): 151-170. 
 
Fitch, J. S. (1998). The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD, Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
 
Foweraker, J. (1998). "Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability - Differentiating 
the Presidential Regimes in Latin America." British Journal of Political Science 28(4): 
651-676. 
 
Fox, A. (1974). Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations. London, Faber. 
 
Frenkel, J. (1976). "A Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate: Doctrinal Aspects and 
Empirical Evidence." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78(2): 200-224. 
 
Frey, B. S. and R. Eichenberger (1994). "The Political Economy of Stabilization Programmes in 
Developing Countries." European Journal of Political Economy 10(1): 169-190. 
 
Friedman, I. S. (1975). Inflation: A Growing World-wide Disaster. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor 
Press. 
 
Friedman, M. (1968). "The Role of Monetary Policy." American Economic Review 58(1-17). 
 
--- (1970). The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory. London, Published for the Wincott 
Foundation by the Institute of Economic Affairs. 
 
--- (1971). "A Monetary Theory of National Income." The Journal of Political Economy 79(2): 
323-37. 
 
--- (1972). "Comments on the Critics." Journal of Political Economy 80 (5): 906-50. 
 
Frisch, H. (1983). Theories of Inflation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Furtado, C. (1966). Subdesarrollo y Estancaniento en America Latina. Buenos Aires, Edicion 
Universitaria. 
 
--- (1967). "Industrialization and Inflation." International Economic Papers(No. 12). 
 
Gardner, W., E. P. Mulvey, et al. (1995). "Regression analyses of counts and rates: Poisson, 
overdispersed Poisson, and negative binomial models." Psychological Bulletin 118(3): 
392-404. 
 
Garten, J. E. (1997). The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They will Change Our 
Lives. New York, Basic Books. 
 
 333
Gasiorowski, M. J. (2000a). "Democracy and macroeconomic Performance in Underdeveloped 
Countries." Comparative Political Studies 33(3): 319-349. 
 
--- (2000b). "Democracy and Macroeconomic Performance in Underdeveloped Countries." 
Comparative Political Studies 33(3): 319-49. 
 
Geddes, B. (1995). "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom." In Economic Reform and 
Democracy. L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
 
Gibson, E. L., E. F. Calvo, et al. (2001). "Reallocative Federalism: Overrepresentation and 
Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere." Department of Political Science, 
Northwestern University.  
 
Gilbert, M. (1985). Inflation and Social Conflict: A Sociology of Economic Life in Advanced 
Countries. Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books. 
 
Glade, W. (1996). "Institutions and Inequality in Latin America: Text and Subtext." Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38(2-3): 159-179. 
 
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1978). "The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account." In The 
Political Economy of Inflation. F. Hirsch and J. H. Goldthorpe. Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press: 186-214. 
 
Gordon, R. J. (1972). "Wage Price Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve." Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity(no. 2): 385 -421. 
 
--- (1975). "The Demand For and Supply of Inflation." The Journal of Law and Economics 18: 
807-836. 
 
Graham, D. H. (1982). "Mexican and Brazilian Economic Develpment: Legacies, Patterns, and 
Performance." In Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development. S. A. Hewlett and R. 
S. Weinert. Philadelphia, ISHI: 13-55. 
 
Greene, W. H. (1997). Econometric Analysis. London, Prentice Hall. 
 
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, et al. (1991a). "Institutions and Policies." Economic Policy 
13(October): 342-92. 
 
--- (1991b). "Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Finance Policies in the Industrial 
Countries." Economic Policy 13: 341-392. 
 
Gutmann, E. (1988). "Israel: Democracy Without a Constitution." In Constitutions in Democratic 
Politics. V. Bodganor. Aldershot, Gower: 290-308. 
 
 334
Haddadin, M. J. (2002). "Water in the Middle East peace process." The Geographical Journal 
168(4): 324-340. 
 
Haggard, S. (1985). "The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund 
Facility." International Organization 39(3): 505-534. 
 
--- (1990). Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialized 
Countries. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. 
 
Haggard, S. and R. Kaufman (1989). "Economic Adjustment in New Democracies." In Fragile 
Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. J. M. Nelson. New Brunswick, 
Transaction Books. 
 
---, Eds. (1992). The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive 
Conflicts, and the State. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 
 
Haggard, S. and R. R. Kaufman (1995). "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for 
Democracy." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment. S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman. 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press: 319-350. 
 
Haggard, S., R. R. Kaufman, et al. (1992). Democracy, Dictatorship, and Inflation in Middle-
income Countries. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Haggard, S. and M. D. McCubbins, Eds. (2001). Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Haggard, S. and S. B. Webb (1993). "What Do We Know about the Political Economy of 
Reform?" World Bank Research Observer 8(2): 143-168. 
 
Hair, J. F., R. E. Anderson, et al. (1994). Multivariate data analysis with readings. Tulsa, Okla., 
PPC Books. 
 
Hamann, A. J. and A. Prati (2003). "Beating Inflation: The Importance of Luck, Timing, and 
Political Institutions." Finance & Development 40(2): 12-15. 
 
Hamilton, L. C. (2003). Statistics with STATA. Belmont, CA, Thomson Learning. 
 
Hazan, R. (1997). "Executive-Legislative Relations in an Era of Accelerated Reform: Reshaping 
Government in Israel." Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(3): 329-350. 
 
Hazan, R. Y. (2005). "The Failure of Presidential Parliamentarism: Constitutional versus 
Structural Presidentialization in Israel's Parliamentary Democracy." In The 
Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. T. 
Poguntke and P. Webb. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 289-313. 
 
 335
Heath, J. (1999). Mexico and the Sexenio Curse: Presidential Successions and Economic Crises 
in Modern Mexico. Washington DC, The CSIS Press. 
 
Hellman, J. and D. Kaufmann (2002) "The Inequality of Influence."  DOI, from SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=386901. 
 
Hellman, J. S., G. Jones, et al. (2000). "Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: 
How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Countries." 
2312. World Bank. Washington, DC. 
 
Helwege, A. (1995). "Poverty in Latin America: Back to the Abyss?" Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 37(3): 99-123. 
 
Hershlag, Z. Y. (1988). The Contemporary Turkish economy. London, Routledge. 
 
Hess, P. N. (1989). "Force Ratios, Arms Imports and Foreign Aid Receipts in the Developing 
Nations." Journal of Peace Research 26(4): 399-412. 
 
Hicks, J. R. (1974). "Real and Monetary Factors in Economic Fluctuations." Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy 21(3): 205-14. 
 
--- (1975). "The Quest for Monetary Stability." South African Journal of Economics 43(4): 405-
420. 
 
Hirsch, F. (1978). "Ideological Underlay of Inflation." In The Political Economy of Inflation. F. 
Hirsch and J. H. Goldthorpe. London, Martin Robertson. 
 
Hirschman, A. O. (1981). Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond. Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press. 
 
--- (1985). "Reflections on the Latin American Experience." In The Politics of Inflation and 
Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and International Case Studies. L. N. 
Lindberg, C. S. Maier and B. M. Barry. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution. 
 
Hürriyetim. (2002, 11 November 2002). "Kriz gelir dağılımını düzeltti (The crisis has improved 
income distribution)." from http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,sid~4@tarih~2002-11-
11-m@nvid~195744,00.asp. 
 
IFE, I. F. E.-. (2006). Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Elections 2006. Mexico, 
Instituto Federal Electoral. 
 
Inman, R. and M. Fitts (1997). "Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the US 
Historical Record." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6(Special Issue): 79-
132. 
 
 336
Insel, A. (1995). "The Relationship between the Inflation Rate and Money Financed Deficit in 
Turkey: 1977-1993." Discussion Paper. University of New South Wales, School of 
Economics.  
 
Iskit, T. (1996) "Turkey: A New Actor in The Field Of Energy Politics?" Perceptions: Journal of 
International Affairs I,  DOI, from http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume1a.php. 
 
Jay, P. (1976). A General Hypothesis of Employment, Inflation, and Politics: Sixth Wincott 
Memorial Lecture delivered at St. John's Smith Square, Westminster on 4 December, 
1975. London, Published for the Wincott Foundation by the Institute of Economic 
Affairs: 36 p.; 22 cm. 
 
Johnson, H. G. (1972a). Inflation and the Monetarist Controversy. Amsterdam, North-Holland 
Pub. Co. 
 
--- (1972b). "Panel Discussion: World Inflation." In Stabilization Policies in Interdependent 
Economies. E. Claassen and P. Salin. Amsterdam, North-Holland: 299-324. 
 
Jones, M. P. (1993). "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in Latin America and the 
Caribbean." Electoral Studies 12: 59-75. 
 
--- (1994). "Presidential Election Laws and Miltipartism in Latin America." Political Research 
Quarterly 47(1): 41-57. 
 
--- (1995). Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Notre Dame, Indiana, 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
--- (1997). "Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy: 1983-1995." In Presidentialism and 
Democracy in Latin America. S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 259-299. 
 
Kahler, M. (1990). "The United States and the International Monetary Fund." In The United 
States and Nultilateral Institutions. M. P. Karns and K. A. Mingst. Boston, Unwin 
Hyman. 
 
Kaminski, G. L. and A. Pereira (1996). "The Debt Crisis: Lesons of the 1980s for the 1990s." 
Journal of Development Economics 50: 1-24. 
 
Kaufmann, D. (2003). "Rethinking Governance Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy." The 
World Bank Institute.  
 
Keech, W. R. (forthcoming). Economic Politics in Latin America: Rethinking Democracy and 
Dictatorship. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Keehn, N. H. (1980). "Liberal Democracy: Impediment to Anti-Inflation Policy." Polity 8(2): 
207-229. 
 337
 
Kibritçioğlu, A. (2002). "Causes of Inflation in Turkey: A Literature Survey With Special 
Reference to Theories of Inflation." Office of Research Working Paper(No. 01-0115): vi, 
184. 
 
Killick, T. (1995). IMF Programs in Developing Countries: Design and Impact. London, 
Routledge. 
 
Kirkpatrick, C. H. and F. I. Nixon (1976). "The Origins of Inflation in Less Developed 
Countries: A Selective Survey." In Inflation in Open Economies. M. Parkin and G. Ziz. 
Manchaster, Manchaster University Press. 
 
Korzeniewicz, R. P. and W. C. Smith (2000). "Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin 
America: Searching for the High Road to Globalization." Latin American Research 
Review 35(3): 7-54. 
 
Krasner, S. D. (1974). "Oil is the Exception." Foreign Policy Spring(14). 
 
Kryzanek, M. J. (1995). Latin America: Change and Challenge. New York, HaperCollins. 
 
Kuznets, S. (1955). "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American Economic Review 
45(1): 1-28. 
 
--- (1966). Modern Economic Growth. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
 
Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera (1979). "Effective Number of Political Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europe." Comparative Political Studies 12(1): 3-27. 
 
Laidler, D. and M. Parkin (1975). "Inflation: A Survey." The Economic Journal 85(December): 
741-809. 
 
Laidler, D. E. W. (1975). Essays on Money and Inflation. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lastra, R. M. (2000). "The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective." Journal of 
International Economic Law: 507-523. 
 
The Law Regarding Election of the Members of the Parliament (1983). The High Commission of 
the Elections of the Republic of Turkey. Rule no. 2839. 
 
Lawson, S. (1993). "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and 
Democratization." Comparative Politics 25(2): 183-205. 
 
Layne, C. (1997). "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand 
Strategy." International Security 22(1): 86-124. 
 
 338
Leiderman, L. (1993). Inflation and Disinflation: The Israeli experiment. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of Majority and Consensus Rule in Twenty-One 
Countries. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 
 
--- (1990). "The Political Consequences of Political Laws, 1945-85." American Political Science 
Review 84: 481-96. 
 
--- (1992). "Introduction." In Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. A. Lijphart. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
--- (1994). Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-
1990. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
--- (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. 
New Haven and London, Yale University Press. 
 
Lim, C. H. and L. Papi (1997). "An Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of Inflation in 
Turkey." IMF Working Paper(No. WP/97/170). 
 
Lindbeck, A. (1972). The Political Economy and the New Left. New York, Harper and Row. 
 
--- (1983). "Budget Expansion and Cost Inflation." The American Economic Review 73(2): 285-
290. 
 
Lindberg, L. N. (1982). "The Problems of Economic Theory in Explaining Economic 
Performance." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 459: 14-
27. 
 
Lindberg, L. N., C. S. Maier, et al. (1985). The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation: 
Theoretical Approaches and International Case Studies. Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution. 
 
Lindenberg, M. and S. Devarajan (1993). "Prescribing Strong Economic Medicine: Revising the 
Myths About Structural Adjustment, Democracy, and Economic Performance in 
Developing Countries." Comparative Politics 25(2): 169-82. 
 
Linz, J. J. (1990). "The Perils of Presidentialism." Journal of Democracy 1(1): 51-69. 
 
--- (1994). "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" In The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy. J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press: 3-87. 
 
 339
Lipsey, R. G. (1960). "The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money 
Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957: A Further Analysis." Economica 27 
(10): 1-31. 
 
Londgregan, J. and K. Poole (1991). "Poverty, the Coup trap, and the Unconstitutional Seizure of 
Power." World Politics 92: 1-24. 
 
Lucas, R. E. (1972). "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money." Journal of Economic Theory 
4(2): 103-24. 
 
--- (1976). "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A critique." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy 1: 19-46. 
 
Lustig, N. (1995). "Introduction." In Coping with Austerity. N. Lustig. Washington, DC, The 
Brookings Institution: 1-41. 
 
--- (1998). Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy. Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Maddison, A. and Associates (1992). The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: 
Brazil and Mexico. New York, NY, Oxford University Press. 
 
Mahler, G. S. (2004). Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State. 
Lanham, MD, Roman and Littlefield. 
 
Maier, C. S. (1978). "The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century." In The Political 
Economy of Inflation. F. Hirsch and J. H. Goldthorpe. London, Martin Robertson. 
 
--- (1985). "Inflation and Stagnation as Politics and History." In The Politics of Inflation and 
Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and International Case Studies. L. N. 
Lindberg. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution: 3-24. 
 
--- (1987). "The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century." In In Search of Stability: 
Explorations in Historical Political Economy. C. S. Maier. Cambridge; New York and 
Melbourne, Cambridge University Press: 187-224. 
 
Mainwaring, S. (1993). "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult 
Combination." Comparative Political Studies 26(2): 198-228. 
 
--- (1995). "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy." In Building Democratic Institutions: 
Party Systems in Latin America. S. M. a. T. R. Scully. Stanford, Stanford University 
Press: 354-98. 
 
--- (1997). "Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil." In Presidentialism 
and Democracy in Latin America. S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. New York, 
Cambridge University Press: 55-109. 
 
 340
--- (1999). Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. 
Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
 
Mainwaring, S. and T. R. Scully, Eds. (1995). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems 
in Latin America. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
 
Mainwaring, S. and M. S. Shugart, Eds. (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin 
America. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mamalakis, M. J. (1996). "Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Mesoeconomic Dimensions 
of Justice and Entitlements." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38(2-3): 
181-199. 
 
Manheim, J. B., R. C. Rich, et al. (2002). Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in 
Political Science. New York, Longman. 
 
Marcus, J. (1990). "Discordant Voices: The US Jewish Community and Israel during the 1980s." 
International Affairs 66(3): 545-558. 
 
Maxwell, K. R. (1999). "Brazil in Meltdown." World Policy Journal 16(1): 25-33. 
 
Maynard, G. and W. v. Ryckeghem (1975). A World of Inflation. New York, Barnes & Noble 
Books. 
 
McCaughan, E. J. (1993). "Mexico's Long Crisis: Toward New Regimes of Accumulation and 
Domination." Latin American Perspectives 20(3): 6-31. 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and S. Walt (2006). "The Israel Lobby: Does it Have too Much Influence on US 
Foreign Policy." London Review of Books 28(6). 
 
Meltzer, A. H. and S. F. Richard (1981). "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." 
Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 914-27. 
 
Metin, K. (1995). "The analysis of inflation: The case of Turkey (1948-1988)." Publication no. 
20. Ankara(Capital Markets Board of Turkey): xii, 238. 
 
--- (1998). "The Relationship between Inflation and the Budget Deficit in Turkey." Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 16(4): 412-22. 
 
Modigliani, F. (1977). "The Monetarist Controversy: Or Should We Forsake Stabilization 
Policies?" American Economic Review 67 (2): 1-19. 
 
Modigliani, F. and A. Ando (1976). "Impacts of Fiscal Actions on Aggregate Income and the 
Monetarist Controversy: Theory and Evidence." In Monetarism. J. L. Stein. Amsterdam, 
North-Holland: 17-42. 
 
 341
Morgenstern, S. (2002). "Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America." In Legislative 
Politics in Latin America. S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif. Cambrdige, Cambrdige 
University Press: 413-445. 
 
Morley, S. A. (1995). Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Past Evidence, Future Prospects. 
Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins Press. 
 
Mundell, R. (1971). Monetary Theory: Interest, Inflation and Growth in the World Economy. 
Pacific Palisades, CA, Goodyear. 
 
Mussa, M. L. (2002). Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy. Washington, DC, 
Institute for International Economics. 
 
Myerson, R. B. (1995). "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and 
Performance." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(1): 77-89. 
 
Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations. New York, Twentieth 
Century Fund. 
 
Nas, T. F. and M. J. Perry (2000). "Inflation, Inflation Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy in 
Turkey: 1960-1998." Contemporary Economic Policy 18(2): 170-80. 
 
Nelson, J., Ed. (1989). Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. New 
Brunswick, Transaction Books. 
 
Nitzan, J. and S. Bichler (2002). The Global Political Economy of Israel. London, Pluto Press. 
 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1973). "The Effects of Inflation on the Distribution of Economic Welfare." 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking: 465-504. 
 
--- (1975). "The Political Business Cycle." Review of Economic Studies 42(2): 169-190. 
 
Norris, P. (1997). "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems." 
International Political Science Review 18(3): 297-312. 
 
O'Connor, J. (1973). The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York, St. Martin's Press. 
 
O'Donnell, G. (1973). Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South 
American Politics. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
 
--- (1994). "Delegative Democracy." Journal of Democracy 5(1): 55-69. 
 
Oatley, T. and J. Yackee (2000). "Political Determinants of IMF Balance of Payments Lending: 
The Curse of Carabosse?" University of North California at Chapel Hill. Chapel Hill. 
 
 342
Olivera, J. H. G. (1964). "On Structural Inflation and Latin-American Structuralism." Oxford 
Economic Papers 16 (3): 173-195. 
 
Olson, M. (1975). "Comment to Robert J. Gordon." The Journal of Law and Economics 18: 859-
869. 
 
--- (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
 
Öniş, Z. (2004). "Turgut Ozal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical 
Perspective." Middle Eastern Studies 40(4): 113-134. 
 
Öniş, Z. and S. Özmucur (1990). "Exchange Rates, Inflation and Money Supply in Turkey: 
Testing the Vicious Circle Hypothesis." Journal of Development Economics 32(January): 
133-54. 
 
Öniş, Z. and S. B. Webb (1994). "Turkey: Democratization and Adjustment from Above." In 
Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalisation and Economic Adjustment. S. 
Haggard and S. B. Webb. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Oye, K. A., R. J. Lieber, et al., Eds. (1992). Eagle in a New World: American Gran Strategy in 
the Post-Cold War Era. New York, Harper Collins Publishers. 
 
Özbudun, E. (1996). "Turkey: How far from Consolidation?" Journal of Democracy 7(3): 123-
138. 
 
--- (2001). "The Institutional Decline of Parties in Turkey." In Political Parties and Democracy. 
L. Diamond and R. Gunther. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press: 238-265. 
 
Pahuja, S. (2000). "Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reinscription of the 
North/South Divide." Leiden Journal of International Law 13(4): 749-813. 
 
Paldam, M. (1987). "Inflation and Political Instability in Eight Latin American Countries 1946-
83." Public Choice 52: 143-168. 
 
--- (1994). "The Political Economy of Stopping High Inflation." European Journal of Political 
Economy 10(1): 135-168. 
 
Parkin, M. (1973). "The Short-run and Long-run Trade-offs between Inflation and 
Unemployment in Australia." Australian Economic Papers(December): 127-144. 
 
Parkin, M. and M. T. Sumner (1973). Incomes Policy and Inflation. Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press. 
 
Payer, C. (1974). The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. New York, Monthly Review 
Press. 
 343
 
--- (1974). The Debt Trap: The International Monetary Fund and the Third World. New York, 
Monthly Review Press. 
 
Pereira, C., T. J. Power, et al. (2002). Choose Your Weapon: Under What Conditions Do 
Brazilian Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Paper presented at the 3rd Meeting of the 
Brazilian Political Science Association - ABCP, on 28-31 July 2002., Niterói - RJ. 
 
Perry, G. L. (1966). Unemployment, Money Wage Rates, and Inflation. Cambridge, Mass., 
M.I.T. Press. 
 
--- (1975). "Determinants of Wage Inflation around the World." Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity(no. 2): 403-435. 
 
Persson, T. (2002). "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?" Econometrica 70(3): 
883-905. 
 
Persson, T. and L. Svensson (1989). "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy 
with Time Inconsistent Preferences." Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(2): 325-345. 
 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1999). "The size and scope of government: Comparative politics 
with rational politicians." European Economic Review 43(4-6): 699-735. 
 
Persson, T., G. Tabellini, et al. (2001). "Electoral Rules and Corruption." No. 8154. 
NationalBureau of Economic Research.  
 
Phelps-Brown, E. H. (1971). "The Analysis of Wage Movements Under Full Employment." 
Scottish Journal of Political Employment 18(3): 233-243. 
 
Phelps, E. S. (1967). "Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment 
Over Time." Economica 34: 254-81. 
 
--- (1968). "Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-Market Equilibrium." Journal of Political 
Economy 76 (4): 678-711. 
 
--- (1972). Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory: The Cost-Benefit Approach to Monetary 
Planning. New York, NY, Norton. 
 
--- (1973). "Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance." Swedish Journal of Economics 2(1). 
 
Phillips, A. W. (1958). "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money 
Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957." Economica 25 (November): 283-299. 
 
Piachaud, D. (1978). "Inflation and Income Distribution." In The Political Economy of Inflation. 
F. Hirsch and J. H. Goldthorpe. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press: 88-116. 
 
 344
Poe, S. C. and J. Meernik (1995). "US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." Journal of 
Peace Research 32(4): 399-411. 
 
"Polity IV Country Report 2001."(2001, Last Update Date).  Retrieved Access Date, Access 
2001, from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. 
 
Posen, B. R. and S. W. Van Evera (1983). "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: 
Departure from Containment." International Security 8(1)? 
 
Powell, G. B. (1982). Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
 
Power, T. J. (1998). "The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in 
Brazil." In Executive Decree Authority. J. M. Carey and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 197-230. 
 
Przeworski, A., J. A. Cheibub, et al. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions 
and Material Well-being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Przeworski, A. and J. R. Vreeland (2000). "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth 
The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization." Journal of Development Economics 
62(2): 385-421. 
 
R.D. McKinlay, a. A. M. (1984). Aid and Arms to the Third World: An Analysis of the 
Distribution and Impact of US Official Transfers. London, Frances Pinter. 
 
Ramos, J. (1996). "Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: A Neostructural Perspective." 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38(2-3): 141-157. 
 
Reich, B. (1996). "The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship." In The 
Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment. D. Lesch. 
Boulder, Westview Press. 
 
Remmer, K. L. (1990). "Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience." 
World Politics 42(April): 315-35. 
 
--- (1991). "The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America." Amercan Political 
Science Review 85: 777-800. 
 
"Polity IV Country Report." (2001). from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. 
 
Reynolds, A., B. Reilly, et al., Eds. (2005). Electoral System Design: the New International 
IDEA Handbook. Handbook Series. Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 
 
 345
Reynolds, L. G. (1996). "Some Sources of Income Inequality in Latin America." Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38(2-3): 39-36. 
 
Riker, W. (1982). Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco, Freeman. 
 
Rogoff, K. (2003). "Globalization and Global Disinflation." Economic Review(Fourth Quarter): 
45-78. 
 
Romer, C. D. and D. H. Romer (1998). "Monetary Policy and the Well-Being of the Poor." 
NBER Working Paper. No. 6793.  
 
Romer, D. (1996). Advanced Macroeconomics, Mc-Graw Hill. 
 
Rosenthal, G. (1996). "On Poverty and Inequality in Latin America." Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 38(2-3): 15-23. 
 
Roubini, N. (1991). "Economic and Political Determinants of Budget Deficits in Developing 
Countries." Journal of International Money and Finance 10(Supplement 1): S49-S72. 
 
Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989a). "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the 
Industrialized Countries." Economic Policy 8(Spring): 99-132. 
 
Roubini, N. and J. D. Sachs (1989b). "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits 
in the Industrial Democracies." European economic Review 33: 903-938. 
 
Rubio, D. F. and M. Goretti (1998). "When the President Governs Alone: The Decretazo in 
Argentina, 1989-93." In Executive Decree Authority. J. M. Carey and M. S. Shugart. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 33-61. 
 
Sabah. (2005). "Gelir eşitsizliği büyüyor (Income inequality is growing)."   Retrieved January 
14, 2006, from http://www.sabah.com.tr/2005/02/21/eko91.html. 
 
Sachs, J. (1989). "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America." No. 2897.  
 
Sala, B. R. (1998). "In Search of the Administrative President: Presidential ‘Decree’ Powers and 
Policy Implementation in the United States." In Executive Decree Authority. J. M. Carey 
and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Samuelson, P. A. and W. D. Nordhaus (1989). Economics. New York, McGraw Hill. 
 
Samuelson, P. A. and R. M. Solow (1960). "Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy." 
American Economic Review 50(2): 177-94. 
 
Sargent, T. J. (1971). "A Note on the "Acceleration Controversy"." Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 3: 721-25. 
 
 346
Sartori, G. (1994a). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, 
Incentives and Outcomes. New York, New York University Press. 
 
--- (1994b). "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism." In The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy. J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press: 
106-119. 
 
Scartascini, C. G. and W. M. Crain (2002). "The Size and Composition of Government Spending 
in Multi-party Systems." WPE 02.23. James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, 
George Mason University. Fairfax,Virginia. 
 
Schamis, H. E. (1999). "Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin 
America." World Politics 51(2): 236-268. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper. 
 
Seers, D. (1962). "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies Based on 
the Experience of Latin America." Oxford Economic Papers 14(2): 173-195. 
 
--- (1964). "Inflation and growth: The Heart of the Controversy." In Inflation and Growth in 
Latin America. W. Baer and I. Kerstenetzky. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
 
Serrano, M. (1995). "The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico." 
Journal of Latin American Studies 27(2): 423-448. 
 
Shlaim, A. (1994). War and Peace in the Middle East. New York, Whittle Books. 
 
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1998). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their 
Cures. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
 
Shugart, M. S. (1997). "The Inverse Relationship Between Party Srength and Executive 
Strength: A Theory of Constitutional Choice." British Journal of Political Science. 
 
Shugart, M. S. and J. M. Carey (1992). Presidents and Assemblies:  Constitutional Design and 
Electoral Dynamics. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shugart, M. S. and S. Haggard (2001). "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems." 
In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. M. D. McCubbins and S. Haggard. New York, 
Cambridge University Press: 64-102. 
 
Shugart, M. S. and S. Mainwaring (1997). "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: 
Rethinking the Terms of the Debate." In Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin 
America. S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. New York, Cambridge University Press: 12-
54. 
 
 347
Siklos, P. L. (2003). "Inflation and Hyperinflation." In Oxfod Encyclopedia of Economic History. J. 
Mokyr. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Silva, E. (1993). "Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring: Chile, 
1973-88." World Politics 45: 526-59. 
 
SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2004). Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Skidmore, T. E. (1977). "The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Postwar Latin America." In 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. J. Malloy. Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Smith, M. R. (1992). Power, Norms, and Inflation: A Skeptical Treatment. New York, A. de 
Gruyter. 
 
Stein, E., E. Talvi, et al. (1998). "Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin 
American Experience." 367. Inter-American Development Bank. Washington, DC. 
 
Stepan, A. and C. Skach (1993). "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: 
Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism." World Politics 46: 1-22. 
 
Stevens, E. P. (1977). "Mexico’s PRI: The Institutionalization of Corporatism." In 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. J. M. Malloy. Pittsburgh, University 
of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Stigler, G. (1972). "Economic Performance and Political Competition." Public Choice 13(91-
106). 
 
Stiles, K. W. (1990). "IMF Conditionality: Coercion or Compromise?" World Development 
18(7): 959-974. 
 
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2003). Introduction to Econometrics, Addison Wesley. 
 
Strauch, R. R. and J. von Hagen, Eds. (2000). Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. Boston, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Streeten, P. (1962). "Wages, Prices and Productivity." Kyklos 15 (4): 723-731. 
 
Sunkel, O. (1960). "Inflation in Chile: An Unorthodox Approach." International Economic 
Papers: No. 10. 
 
Swedberg, R. (1986). "The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank." 
Journal of Peace Research 23(4): 377-90. 
 
 348
Swoboda, A. K. (1976). "Monetary Approaches to Balance-of-Payments." In Recent Issues in 
International Monetary Economics. C. E. and P. Salin. Amsterdam, North Holland 
Publishing. 
 
Székely, M. (2000). "Inequality in Latin America on the Verge of 21st Century." In Inequality, 
Democracy and Sustainable Development in Latin America. J. Behar. Stockholm, 
Sweden, Institute of Latin American Studies, Stockholm University. 
 
Taagepera, R. and M. Shugart (1989). Seats and Votes. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
 
Tabellini, G. (1986). "Money, Debt and Deficits in a Dynamic Game." Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control. 
 
Tabellini, G. and A. Alesina (1990). "Voting on the Budget Deficit." American Economic 
Review 80(1): 37-49. 
 
Temple, J. (2000). "Inflation and Growth: Stories Short and Tall." Journal of Economic Surveys 
14(4): 396-426. 
 
Thacker, S. C. (1999). "The high politics of IMF lending." World Politics 52(1): 38-75. 
 
Thorp, R. (1971). "Inflation and Financing of Economic Development." In Financing 
Development in Latin America. K. Griffin. London, Macmillan. 
 
Togan, S. (1987). "The Influence of Money and the Rate of Interest on the Rate of Inflation in a 
Financially Repressed Economy: The Case of Turkey." Applied Economics 19(12): 
1585-1601. 
 
Treisman, D. (2000). "Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action,or 
Continuity?" American Political Science Review 94(4): 837-57. 
 
Tsebelis, G. (1995). "Decisionmaking in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Multicameralism and Multipartyism." British Journal of Political Science 25(July): 289-
325. 
 
--- (1999). "Veto Players and Law Production  in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical 
Analysis." American Political Science Review 93(September): 591-608. 
 
--- (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Ullman, R. H. (1994). "The United States Latin America and the World After the Cold War." In 
Latin America in a New World. A. F. Lowenthal and G. F. Treverton. Boulder, Westview 
Press: 13-27. 
 
Vegh, C. A. (1992). "Stopping High Inflation." IMF Staff Papers 39(3): 626-695. 
 
 349
Velasco, A. (1988). "Liberalization, Crisis, Intervention: The Chilean Financial System, 1975-
1985." WP/88/66. International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC. 
 
Verney, D. V. (1992). "Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government." In 
Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. A. Lijphart. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press: 31-47. 
 
von Mettenheim, K. (1997). "Brazilian Presidentialism: Shifting Comparative Perspectives from 
Europe to the Americas." In Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing 
Regional and National Contexts. K. von Mettenheim. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press: 136-158. 
 
Wade, R. H. (2005). "Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality." In Global Political Economy. J. 
Ravenhill. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Walt, S. M. (1989). "The Case for Finite Containment." International Security 14(1): 5-49. 
 
Watkins, E. (1997). "The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East." International Affairs 73(1): 
1-14. 
 
Weintraub, R. E. and R. Jutabha (1981). Deficits: Their Impact on Inflation and Growth. 
Washington, U.S. G.P.O. 
 
Weldon, J. (1997). "The Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico." In Presidentialism 
and Democracy in Latin America. S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 225-258. 
 
Weldon, J. A. (2002). "Legislative Delegation and the Budget Process in Mexico." In Legislative 
Politics in Latin America. S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 222-253. 
 
Whitehead, L. (1989). "Democratization and Disinflation: A Comparative Approach." In Fragile 
Coalitions: The Politics of Adjustment. J. Nelson. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction 
Books. 
 
Whynes, D. K. (1979). The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure. Austin, University 
of Texas Press. 
 
Willett, T. D. (1988). Political Business Cycles: The Political Economy of Money, Inflation, and 
Unemployment. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press. 
 
Wittman, D. A. (1989). "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results." Journal of Political 
Economy 97(1395-1424). 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, South-Western 
College Pub. 
 350
 
"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1994 (1995)." U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Ann Arbor, Mich. 
 
Yeldan, A. E. (1993). "Conflicting Interests and Structural Inflation: Turkey, 1980-1990." 
Pakistan Development Review 32(3): 303-27. 
 
--- (2004). "The Impact of Financial Liberalization and the Rise of Financial Rents on Income 
Inequality: The Case of Turkey." In Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in the Era of 
Liberalization and Globalization. G. A. Cornia. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 351
